[Afghan News] January 9, 2013

[یاسمینه]

Some in administration push for only a few thousand U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014
Washington Post By Ernesto Londoño and Rajiv Chandrasekaran Wednesday, January 9, 2013
Groups within the Obama administration are pushing to keep no more than a few thousand troops in Afghanistan after 2014, U.S. officials said, raising the prospect that the United States will be unable to keep its promise to fully train and equip Afghan security forces.

As the debate over the size and scope of the post-2014 coalition mission nears its end, some in the administration are pressing for a force that could be as small as 2,500, arguing that a light touch would be the most constructive way to cap the costly, unpopular war.

Those troop levels are significantly lower than what some senior military officials have advocated, arguing that a sudden disengagement could lead to the collapse of a frail state and the onset of a new civil war. The low number also is a far cry from figures in the 10,000-to-30,000 range discussed among NATO allies and some U.S. officials as recently as a year ago.

The scope and size of a post-2014 force are at the top of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s agenda during his visit to Washington this week, which includes a meeting with President Obama on Friday.

White House officials said Tuesday that they have not ruled out leaving no troops at all when the U.N. security mandate sanctioning the international coalition expires, saying they might find non-military means to meet U.S. objectives in Afghanistan.

The United States has committed to continue supporting Afghanistan’s security forces and intends to maintain counterterrorism capabilities that would prevent al-Qaeda from regaining a foothold in the country where the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks were planned.

“There are, of course, many different ways of accomplishing those objectives, some of which might involve U.S. troops, some of which might not,” Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategic communication, told reporters in a conference call Tuesday afternoon.

Some senior military officials and analysts have pressed for a more robust force, arguing that a hasty disengagement would be reckless and could cause Afghanistan’s security forces to crumble. The United States has invested $50 billion in training and equipping the Afghan army and police.

Others say that a small, well-managed contingent could accomplish the Obama administration’s key objectives while markedly lowering the United States’ profile in a region where anti-American sentiment runs high.

“The real question is what kind of mission we’re looking at,” said a senior U.S. defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing deliberations. “The challenge will be the temptation to keep doing many of the things we’ve been doing.”

A debate about U.S. goals

Determining the size of a possible post-2014 force is the first step to charting out the timeline for withdrawing the remaining 66,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, according to the Pentagon. Keeping troops there after 2014 would require a bilateral agreement stipulating the authority of the contingent and the legal protections its members would enjoy — thorny questions that Obama and Karzai are expected to tackle this week.

Among the issues are whether the U.S. troops can conduct counterterrorism operations on their own and whether they would be immune from Afghan law.

The troop levels under serious consideration range from 2,500 to 6,000, the senior defense official said.

A senior U.S. military official involved in Afghanistan policy said officials at the Pentagon have all but given up hope for a post-2014 force of at least 10,000, which some commanders had deemed the bare minimum. These officials have said that a force of that size is needed to accomplish the training objective while maintaining counterterrorism capabilities.

The debate is fundamentally about U.S. goals and expectations. Military leaders who have made a case for keeping a large presence after 2014 appear to be losing out to those who want the future of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan to mirror the lower-profile roles that Washington has played in places such as Yemen and Colombia.

Afghanistan presents unique challenges, given its forbidding topography, resilient insurgency and weak government. So a force of a few thousand is likely to have a limited effect.

“You’ll end up doing nothing outside of Kabul,” said another senior U.S. official involved in Afghanistan, referring to the 2,500 figure.

With 6,000 troops, the United States would retain the capability to run Bagram air base, a key hub outside the capital. But that could leave the United States without a military presence in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban’s heartland and the focus of Obama’s 2010 troop surge.

“It would mean walking away from commitments we made in 2009 and 2010,” said retired Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, who argued in a policy paper published by the Institute for the Study of War that an international force of about 30,000 troops is needed to keep the Afghan security forces afloat. He said the Afghans have become good at combat but remain stymied by weak logistics, training and equipment systems.

Kalev Sepp, a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., who has studied U.S. military assistance missions, said the American interventions in El Salvador in the 1980s and Colombia in the 1990s demonstrated that thinly staffed advisory missions can have a huge effect. A small support team places the onus on the local force, he said.

“It makes them fight for their own country,” Sepp said. Army leaders, he said, are too often inclined to draw up plans for large-scale missions. “It is not in their operational doctrine to send very small numbers of people.”

Outcomes and concerns

Afghan leaders would like for a post-2014 U.S. presence to be focused on training the local army and police. But Stephen Biddle, an Afghanistan expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, said a small residual force would probably have a strong emphasis on counterterrorism.

“Among the problems with that is that it is not a popular mission in Afghanistan,” Biddle said, referring to Afghans’ strong aversion to tactics such as night raids and airstrikes. “While you’re flying at 10,000 feet, the country burns underneath you,” he added, describing the way a counterterrorism-focused mission could be viewed.

On the other hand, planning for a substantial force after 2014 has the potential to boost the Taliban’s narrative that Afghanistan is an occupied country led by men subservient to Washington. The militant group issued a statement Saturday calling any bilateral agreement for a post-2014 force a “personal deal” between Karzai and the Americans that would be devoid of “legal credibility.”

Washington’s NATO allies are watching the debate closely. Britain, the second-largest troop contributor to the mission, announced last month that it intended to draw down from roughly 9,500 to 5,200 service members this year. Despite strong lobbying behind the scenes by U.S. officials, few of Washington’s allies have committed to keeping a significant number of troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014. The low numbers the administration is mulling are likely to further curb the meager appetite in NATO capitals for a continued military presence in Afghanistan.

“Everyone is looking at the U.S. to see what the Obama administration will come up with and what this bilateral agreement will entail,” said a senior European diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the concerns the debate is generating on the continent.

Karen DeYoung contributed to this report.


The open question of Afghanistan
By Walter Pincus, Tuesday, January 8, 3:52 AM The Washington Post
President Obama this week has a chance to explain to President Hamid Karzai, and hopefully to the American people, what will be our future role in Afghanistan.

Most speculation has focused on how rapidly the remaining 60,000-plus U.S. combat troops will be withdrawn and how many will be permanently assigned there after 2014. But as the U.S. financial belt is being tightened, people want to know the financial cost, for how long and what will be accomplished.

The fiscal 2013 Defense Authorization Act contains $4.7 billion for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), an amount that the U.S. government can’t continue to expend. The House-Senate conferees on the bill, realizing that Afghan support must be reduced, called for an independent study of what size the ANSF should be to make certain that Afghanistan will not again serve as a training camp for terrorists. The Afghans cannot support the security forces that the United States and its allies have created. That means Washington will have to pay or get others to join in future funding of Kabul’s forces.

“There are no public U.S. plans that show how the Obama administration will deal with either the civil or military aspects of this transition between now and the end of 2014, or in the years that follow,” Anthony H. Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote last week. A former Pentagon official who has closely followed the 10- year war in Afghanistan, Cordesman questioned recent Pentagon statements of continuing successes, saying his reading of official reports shows “there has been no meaningful military progress since the end of 2010.”

He also wrote, “The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have never issued a remotely credible report on the progress and impact of the civilian surge or any aspect of the civil aid program.”

The real issue, Cordesman said, “is the future size of the civil-military effort, not the military effort alone. Any debate or analysis of the future U.S. role in Afghanistan that does not tie the two together is little more than intellectual and media rubbish.”

High on the Obama-Karzai agenda is a status-of-forces or similar agreement that would authorize a U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan after 2014. Discussions have been underway since November. One has to only look back at Iraq to see the pitfalls that may arise before the two sides can reach such an agreement. Not the least is getting an Afghan-U.S. guarantee over which country will exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel and under what circumstances.

Karzai, who is set to give up the presidency next year, has his own wish list that seems to include a long-term U.S. presence, but under Afghan terms. He has a list that “he has enumerated for months in public speeches, including accusations that the United States has fomented corruption in Afghanistan and continues to violate the country’s sovereignty,” according to The Washington Post’s Kabul correspondent Kevin Sieff.

One of Karzai’s favorite subjects is the U.S. approval of contracts “with [Afghan] warlords who use the money for their own gains,” according to his spokesman, Aimal Faizi. While one of the U.S. complaints about the Afghan government is its corruption, Karzai has repeatedly said that corruption is “imposed on us, and it is meant to weaken our system.”

A glance at the contracts awarded or offered in the first week of January shows how deeply committed the U.S. operation is in Afghanistan.

Construction contracts alone awarded last week totaled $41.3 million to build various facilities for elements of the ANSF and other government agencies. The largest was for $14.2 million to build a national fire training academy near Kabul that would be “for a population of 350 personnel to include students, instructors, mentors, administration and support staff,” according to the award notice.

Also awarded were contracts to construct a $3.4 million Afghan Border Police headquarters in Farah province; a $3.3 million Class B fire station for the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Ghor province; a $4.3 million expansion of Afghan army facilities in Helmand province; a $5.6 million supply facility for the ANP in Baghlan province; a $6.8 million expansion of facilities for the Afghan army and air force combined wing in Kandahar province; and $3.8 million to expand facilities at Camp Zafar in Herat province, which I wrote about last week.

New contracts also were in the offing. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is seeking a contractor to upgrade the Afghan army’s Khair Khot garrison in Paktika province. The work, to involve 25 structures, would include “a new compound for a Transient Kandak [Afghan battalion of about 600], an Operations Coordination Center, additional barracks and latrines for existing units already fielded, two literacy training classrooms and utility upgrades,” according to the government notice.

Remember, this was just the first week in January, and the United States is planning to be in Afghanistan 51 more weeks this year. It would be much better for Obama and Karzai to end their meeting with a specific list of what exactly will be involved rather than empty words saying they will continue to support each other in the fight against terrorists.


West must rethink its Afghanistan exit
More is required than simply leaving, write Kurt Volker and George Robertson
Financial Times By Kurt Volker and George Robertson Opinion January 8, 2013
After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the west abandoned Afghanistan. The result: civil war, Taliban rule, human rights catastrophes and an al-Qaeda sanctuary. Now, as we accelerate towards a major troop reduction and transfer of national leadership in 2014, we are on the verge of a repeat. Chuck Hagel, President Barack Obama’s nominee as the new US defence secretary, should reflect on this as he prepares for his Senate confirmation hearings.

Many things are right about the west’s approach. To name a few: transferring control to Afghanistan’s military leadership; training Afghan security forces; targeted attacks on extremist fighters and their leaders; strengthening political institutions; preparing for elections in 2014; and supporting health and education for a new generation of Afghans.

At the same time, serious problems remain: corruption; lack of basic security in certain areas; continued Taliban attacks, including insider infiltrations; havens (if not active support) for extremist fighters in Pakistan; ineffective government institutions; and a rampant opium economy that fuels the insurgency. It is understandable that after 12 years, thousands of lives lost and billions of dollars spent, the US and its allies are tired. Hence the relentless drive to transfer responsibility in 2014.

The current plan is to continue significant troop reductions, promote political “dialogue” with the Taliban, and retain a minimal residual military presence after 2014 for training Afghans and striking terrorist targets. There is just one problem: what if it doesn’t work?

Imagine the following scenario playing out next year. The US and other Nato forces are at their lowest level in more than five years. Though training continues, Afghans remain unable to control security in most of the south and east. Sporadic but sensational Taliban attacks continue in the north and in Kabul. The government security forces themselves are largely Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara, with little Pashtun support for the central government.

Continuing the scenario, President Hamid Karzai is completing his term of office, but the 2014 election campaign is deeply flawed and unlikely to produce a clear winner accepted by all sides.

The Taliban are at their strongest since being routed in 2002, with strategic depth in Pakistan and a long list of “collaborators” on their hit list. After a few demonstrative beheadings and public whippings of independent-minded women and girls who dared attend school, life in the south is growing darker. More extremist elements dream of revenge on the US.

And then, it happens. One spectacular event, and suddenly the house of cards comes down. The Taliban claim the south and east. The Kabul government teeters. International forces lack the capacity to stop the descent into civil war.

This may not be the scenario that plays out in Afghanistan in 2014. Certainly there is no reason why it has to be this way. But from the vantage point of early 2013, it seems increasingly possible. Perhaps even more importantly, none of this seems to be something the international community is planning to prevent. Ever since we first set a deadline for withdrawals – in December 2009 – our objective has shifted from achieving long-term success in Afghanistan to simply getting out.

At three other times during his administration, Mr Obama has quite sensibly conducted a review of US strategy in Afghanistan. The first took place in his first 60 days in office; the second, in mid-2009, confirmed the “surge” of troops but set a deadline of July 2011 for their withdrawal. The most recent review, conducted discreetly, led to a decision in summer 2010 to push the 2011 withdrawal deadline out until 2014. But a deadline it remained. The transition to Afghan leadership – which is essential no matter what – had become an instrument for enabling our withdrawal, rather than for securing Afghanistan’s future.

To be fair, advocates of the deadline had serious arguments on their side. A deadline should persuade Afghans to take more responsibility on their own. The only future for the country is one that is Afghan-led. But more significant was the perception that the west would again abandon Afghanistan, and the Afghans had better accommodate themselves to whomever would wield power in the future. Sooner or later, the Taliban would be back.

And that places us squarely in January 2013. If there was ever a time for a strategy review, that time is now. Much of what we have accomplished is worthy, and much of what we are now doing would make sense, if it was not scheduled to come to an end before the gains made become self-sustaining.

What does not make sense is spending more money and lives in 2013, while risking the whole thing coming apart in 2014. If we want to avoid a civil war, major human rights abuses and the risk that Afghanistan again becomes a haven for exporting extremism, we need to start working out a Plan B – one that focuses on achieving substantive goals, not the timing of our exit.

The writers are a former US permanent representative to Nato and former Nato secretary-general


Obama criticized for visiting Afghan intelligence official at U.S. hospital
Washington Post By David Nakamura and Anne Gearan Wednesday, January 9, 2013
On Dec. 20, President Obama made another in a series of semi-regular trips to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, where he met privately with 10 wounded U.S. service members — and a high-ranking Afghan government official who had recently been admitted.

Asadullah Khalid, the head of Afghanistan’s intelligence agency, suffered severe abdominal injuries in a suicide attack in Kabul on Dec. 5. According to the State Department, he had been granted entry to the United States in mid-December for medical treatment at the request of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s administration.

The White House did not publicly announce that Obama had visited Khalid, but Afghan news outlets reported on the brief meeting. And a snapshot purportedly showing Obama standing by Khalid’s bedside — the spy chief wearing splints on his forearms and a bandage on his face — made the rounds on social media.

A leading U.S. human rights organization said it is outraged by the president’s decision to greet Khalid, who has been accused of abuses including torture and drug trafficking even as he distinguished himself as a Karzai ally and anti-Taliban figure in his native Kandahar.

“Even if your administration determined that humanitarian arguments justified his entry for medical treatment, a presidential visit to his bedside . . . was a major misstep,” Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, wrote Dec. 23 in a letter to Obama, who is scheduled to meet with Karzai at the White House on Friday.

The president’s visit “created the impression that the United States is not concerned about his record of brutality and the abuse and corruption ordinary Afghans have suffered at his hands,” Roth wrote in the letter, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post.

Khalid’s standing as head of the National Directorate of Security illustrates the often conflicted nature of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan, which relies on the intelligence and partnership of local officials who have tangled alliances and employ questionable tactics.

“Given the reasons we’re in Afghanistan and the primacy of the counterterror mission, obviously the head of the intelligence agency is going to play a very critical role” and is someone the United States would go to great lengths to help, said a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Khalid is a longtime U.S. ally who climbed the ranks of the Afghan government with ease, even as allegations mounted against him. He was governor of Ghazni and Kandahar provinces before becoming minister for border and tribal affairs and one of Karzai’s most trusted cabinet ministers.

White House national security spokesman Tommy Vietor said Obama thinks “it was appropriate” to check on Khalid’s condition. “Mr. Khalid and the team he oversees work closely with the United States to protect Afghan citizens and American civilians and military service members in Afghanistan,” he said.

Vietor noted that the White House confirmed that Obama had met with Khalid on the day of the president’s visit to Walter Reed when a Washington Post reporter asked about it.

Khalid also recently received a visit from Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, according to Afghan media, which published a photo of the two together at the hospital. Pentagon officials said Panetta visited on Friday.

There is precedent for foreign government officials — even those surrounded by controversy — to be allowed into the country for medical treatment. Early last year, Ali Abdullah Saleh, then the president of Yemen, was granted a medical visa, even as human rights officials denounced abuses during his rule.

State Department officials said Khalid was not granted a visa but rather admitted under the Department of Homeland Security’s “parole” process, which grants temporary stays for foreign nationals under emergency conditions.

Patrick Ventrell, a spokesman for the State Department, would not directly address the allegations against Khalid but said rights allegations are a regular topic of discussion with the Karzai government.

It is not clear when Khalid will leave the United States. Karzai was scheduled to visit him Tuesday afternoon.
Kevin Sieff in Kabul contributed to this report.


Q. and A. With Former U.S. Commander in Afghanistan
New York Times By MICHAEL R. GORDON January 8, 2013
WASHINGTON - As the Obama administration weighs how many troops to keep in Afghanistan after 2014, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal cautioned that the United States still needs to keep forces there to help stabilize the country and urged a continued effort to advise the Afghan military that appears to be more extensive than the White House has in mind.

“If we allow Afghanistan to become completely unstable, Pakistan’s stability is really difficult,” the former American commander in Afghanistan said in a recent interview. “So I think there’s a geostrategic argument for it.”

General McChrystal offered his analysis of Afghanistan in the interview, which coincided with the release of his book “My Share of the Task: A Memoir,” published by Portfolio/Penguin.

The general, who is retired from the Army, was fired by President Obama from his post in 2010 after an article in Rolling Stone quoted him and his staff as making dismissive comments about the White House.

His comments come as Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, is scheduled to begin a series of high-level meetings this week in Washington.

Regarding Afghanistan, some analysts have urged that the United States rely mainly on small numbers of commandos to carry out raids against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

But General McChrystal asserted that such “counterterrorism” operations work best when they are coupled with “counterinsurgency” efforts to build up the ability of the host nation to govern and bolster the capability of its forces.

He also noted that to carry out commando raids, the American military needs bases, an intelligence network and arrangements for medical evacuation. “But if you don’t have the support of the Afghan people, if you are just in there doing what you want to do on their terrain, there’s no reason for them to be supportive of this,” he said. “We’d be fighting our own war on their territory, and they’re just not that interested in that.”

On troop numbers, General McChrystal declined to say how many troops the United States might need to keep in Afghanistan after 2014. (The White House is considering retaining a force of 3,000 to 9,000 troops, which would be complemented by a much smaller number of troops from other NATO nations).

General McChrystal agreed that the American force, currently 66,000 troops, should be substantially reduced. But he cautioned advised against retaining too small a force.

“We had 7,500 in Afghanistan in the summer of 2002 when I was first stationed there,” he said. “And 7,500 wouldn’t do much.”

An important question for the NATO mission after 2014 is what level of the Afghan military hierarchy would allied nations advise. Under the largest of the troop options under consideration by the White House, it is generally expected that NATO would advise seven regional Afghan Army corps and several regional Afghan police headquarters.

It is unlikely that NATO officers will advise Afghan battalions on the battlefield under this option as that would require many more advisers than the alliance is likely to muster.

But General McChrystal suggested that a more extensive advisery effort was needed to make the Afghan military more effective. “My personal tendency would be to get advisers a little bit lower than corps; I’d want them down to battalion level,” he said.

General McChrystal said he voted for Mr. Obama in 2008 but declined to say whom he had voted for in 2012. He would not discuss the Rolling Stone article in detail but insisted that he had intended no disrespect for the president or his aides.

After the article was published, General McChrystal said that he arrived at his fateful meeting with Mr. Obama on June 23, 2010, with his resignation in hand. The decision whether to accept it was up to the president.

“I walked in with it in my pocket and I said, ‘Whatever’s best for the mission,'” General McChrystal recalled. “And we had a good conversation and then he said he was going to accept it.”

The interview was conducted at General McChrystal’s consulting firm in Alexandria, Va., which has the trappings of a military headquarters, including a horseshoe-shape table for the general and his staff facing an array of wall clocks that showed the time in political and economic power centers: Washington, London, Dubai and Beijing.

Following are excerpts from interview. Some questions have been edited.

QUESTION: You wrote in your book that there was a “deficit of trust” between the White House and the Defense Department on Afghanistan at the start of the Obama administration. Did this exist during the Bush administration?

GENERAL McCHRYSTAL: I think with the beginning of any political administration, you have to build trust, and it takes time. The challenge that we faced with the arrival of the Obama administration is, they didn’t really have time to build trust before they had to make big, difficult decisions.

I go back and think of President Kennedy, who had a military service background, but he comes into the presidency and he’s faced with a decision on the Bay of Pigs, with the C.I.A. and the military giving him data, and it turns out very badly. It really set back their ability to build trust over time.

With the start of the Obama administration, we had a financial crisis, we had a new administration, and yet we had this compressed decision-making timeline on Afghanistan before people had been able to mature relationships and trust to go at this as effectively as I think they would have liked to.

Q. Do you think the trust has improved?

A. I think it’s a problem that needs to be worked at.

Q. During the Afghanistan review you conducted in 2009, the options ranged from sending 80,000 troops on the high end and 40,000 as your recommended course of action. President Obama decided to send 30,000 American troops and to seek 10,000 troops from allied nations. Did those allied contributions materialize, and did this meet your requirement?

A. In December, when the president made the decision, I thought that I had generally gotten what I had asked for. I was concerned about the allied 10,000, and at the end of the day I’m not sure how many of those came. I know there was an intent to get the full 10,000.

Q. How did you design and carry out your strategy in Afghanistan?

A. I went over there with the expectation that we didn’t need additional forces. We did an operational assessment, and we identified 80 key districts out of 364 in the country. It was a little like David Plouffe might do for an election strategy: those places that make a big difference.

We assessed that if we could control — achieve a decent level of security — in those 80 key districts over a reasonable period of time, that would be enough to make the Taliban strategy irrelevant. They wouldn’t be able to influence enough of the population enough of the time to win. We thought we’d be able to “change Afghan perceptions,” which of course was the key thing.

So we did the analysis, and we ran computer runs over and over. And we came down to that we were going to need the equivalent of 40,000 more forces to give us enough bridge capability until we could grow Afghan forces.

Q. How did you interpret the mission in Afghanistan at that point?

A. At that point, I thought the primary focus was to keep Afghanistan from being a potential safe haven for Al Qaeda, but it also said that we were to create, essentially, a stable Afghanistan. Implied in that was, the state of Afghanistan had to survive as a sovereign state. To do that, you had to solve the biggest problem, which was this uncertainty caused by this insurgency. There was no way to cure the patient partially. You had to cure the patient “mostly” to do that. And I thought everybody understood that.

Q. How did you determine the sequencing of the strategy geographically and in terms of fighting seasons?

A. The war in Afghanistan is all about people’s minds. It is not a military campaign like World War II. So you’re trying first to convince the Afghan people that this is going to succeed, and as you go over time they’ll be able to solve the problem.

When I took over, the forces that had been approved for General McKiernan [Gen. David D. McKiernan, the former American commander in Afghanistan] were already focused and had begun to arrive into Helmand. Helmand was the area with the highest levels of violence. I made the decision that we needed to continue with that strategy for several reasons.

First, we needed to take advantage of the forces. If — if I tried to change them elsewhere, it would take me time to figure out where. It would take time to build, and it would be months to change. I didn’t think we had months. We had the election coming up in August, and those forces had been brought to help secure certain areas for the election. If we could secure the Helmand River Valley, it was going to be a clear indication that, if the Taliban couldn’t be effective in their heartland, they weren’t going to be effective elsewhere.

Now, there was a certain argument that says, “Why don’t you go to Kandahar first?” Well, the first thing: Kandahar wasn’t under siege. Kandahar wasn’t about to fall. So we made a decision to use the next set of forces to secure Kandahar — not to capture it, because it wasn’t enemy-controlled, but to secure it.

We felt that that would tremendously increase confidence, particularly in the Pashtun south, which we needed.

Q. How did eastern Afghanistan fit into your strategy?

A. The east was important — obviously, Kunar, Nuristan and all were important. And if you consider the host area and the Haqqani network [a militant group based in Pakistan and Afghanistan] it’s their key — they affect Kabul. RC-East [Regional Command East], the U.S. division there, the 82nd and then the 101st, they needed additional forces but they were in pretty good shape. I thought that, if anybody could continue to make progress without additionalforces initially, they could.

Q. Did you intend to shift effort there later?

A. Yes, as we achieved what we wanted in Helmand and Kandahar, I felt we could continue to increase forces in the east and, if necessary, in the north, although I was hoping to arrest the problem in the north partially by arresting it elsewhere.

Q. What did you accomplish by the end of your Afghanistan tour?

A. When I arrived in 2009 there was this sense of gloom. The allies that I talked to were literally saying, “Let’s get ready to turn the lights out.”

I think we turned the mind-set, not completely, but we changed the mind-set of the ISAF forces [the International Security Assistance Force, the American-led NATO command in Afghanistan] towards protecting the population — not 100 percent but a huge shift toward effective counterinsurgency.

We changed the mind-set of the Afghans in several ways. We continued to affect President Karzai’s view of it. He didn’t become a robust, war-fighting president, but he went a lot farther than he ever had before.

We started to build the Afghan National Police and the army in a very serious way.

Q. How did this affect Pakistan’s behavior?

A. It was in their interest for us to succeed, and I think they knew that, but they didn’t think we were going to succeed. So their actions were often in contradiction to what they wanted to happen, because they felt we were going to lose and were trying to hedge their bets by doing other things. They were supporting the Haqqanis, they were allowing the Afghan Taliban to have refuge inside Pakistan and things like that — pretty clearly.

I was trying to convince the Pakistanis that we were going to pull this off, so it was in their interest to help us. And I think we convinced them we were moving in the right direction — General Kayani [Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pakistani Army chief] told me face to face, “I think you’ve got the right strategy now.”

Q. What did you accomplish on the ground?

A. Two things. One, we don’t write a lot about it in the book, but we increased the pressure through our special operations. We quadrupled them, and we started the pressure that had worked so well in Iraq. But it only worked in Iraq, really, when we were complemented by an effective counterinsurgency effort. So what I was trying to do here was, increase that in a precision way and help tamp down the enemy network while we got the counterinsurgency part going as well.

I think in areas like Helmand and — it was just starting, when I left, in Kandahar — we did make progress. If you go down to the Helmand River Valley now, it’s very different. We thought we had to prove to people that counterinsurgency worked in Afghanistan. I think we proved part of that.

Q. Which part?

A. That the military part of counterinsurgency works in Afghanistan. I don’t think it’s proven yet that the government of Afghanistan could rise to meet what they have to do. Because if they can’t do it, another pillar of counterinsurgency is missing, and you have to have it.

Q. There is a sense that Afghanistan is a lost cause.

A. In fall 2001, there had been 22, 23 years of constant turmoil inside the country. They’d lost 1.2 million Afghans during the Soviet war. They had this big diaspora of people leaving. The memory of what happened during the civil war, '92 to '96, the first part of it — that’s deeply etched on people, particularly inside Kabul. We kind of gloss over it, we go, “Yeah, that civil war ended, move on.” It was as long as our civil war, and 40,000 people were killed in Kabul by [former mujahedeen commander Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar’s shelling. People had deep animosities, hatreds and what not that came from that era. And the Taliban era was, of course, problematic at best. If a country can be psychologically damaged, Afghanistan was psychologically damaged. My biggest criticism of all of us is that we didn’t make a great effort to understand that. We didn’t really say, “This is a badly abused nation, and helping this get on its feet is going to be a long-term, difficult, expensive project.”

Q. What is our stake today?

A. I think it’s both emotional and geostrategic. I’ll start with the emotional part. The emotional part is, we did come in. We fought Al Qaeda, and threw apart their government. And we did incur a certain responsibility there. We raised expectations as well. We raised expectations for the 15 million Afghan females, that they might have a different future. We raised expectations of Afghan children that they’d be able to go to school, and all of these things. They may have been unrealistic expectations, but we raised them.

I think that, over time, there’s been a certain cynicism that has risen, by people in the U.S., that “It’s so hard, and the Afghans won’t help themselves, and the Pakistanis can’t be trusted — we should just stay away from that.”

And there’s been a cynicism on the part of people in the region, saying: “You use us when it’s helpful. You use us when Henry Kissinger needs to sneak into China in 1971, or you use us when you need the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban so you can get at Al Qaeda, or you use us when you need to fight the Soviet Union during the cold war — but you don’t help when you don’t need us.” That’s sort of the emotional part of it.

I don’t think there are many places in the world that “don’t matter” anymore. If we allow Afghanistan to become completely unstable, Pakistan’s stability is really difficult. So I think there’s a geostrategic argument for it.

Q. Is it possible to succeed in Afghanistan today?

A. I believe it can succeed for several reasons: one, the Taliban are not really very strong. They’re not a popular National Liberation Front, they don’t bring a compelling narrative of a better future. In fact, they are antithetical to what a certain percentage of the Afghan population wants. The more educated part, the females, don’t want a Taliban regime. Having said that, Afghanistan has got to take a multiethnic society with some huge fissures in it, meld that back into a country. And it’s been a nation before. The idea that it hasn’t is incorrect, in my view. They’ve got this level of corruption which undermines and corrodes the legitimacy of everyone. Anyone in a position of power is either corrupt or assumed to be corrupt, and the assumption of corruption is as bad as the reality of it.

Q. Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, is going to be here next week. Can the United States work with him?

A. I might put myself inside the Afghan government and say, “Can they work with the United States?” And they might write equally interesting memos about the challenges of working with us.

My opinion is, we have to stop any idea that says, “Well, we don’t like Karzai — let’s get another." Stop. They elected him — you can argue about the election, but I believe they did elect him. There’s a lot of corruption, but I think he would have been the winner anyway. So that’s the first thing and we’ve got to respect that.

I think President Karzai’s successor is unclear. I don’t see any heir apparent, and that’s a little disturbing to me.

Q. Can one maintain a counterterrorism capability in Afghanistan without a complementary counterinsurgency effort?

A. If you take the raid into Abbotabad, that was years of gathering intelligence, some on the ground, some in the air, some signals intelligence. It was launched from bases — not just a single base, it needed a network. It had medevac available. It had this infrastructure that supported it that isn’t seen by people who just look at a couple helicopters landing in a compound.

CT [counterterrorism] typically requires that. Otherwise, it’s really, really hard. It’s like trying to do Desert One that was going to go into Tehran.

If you don’t have the support of the Afghan people. There’s no reason for them to be supportive of this. I think any country where we’re just launching from or operating within becomes a target for the terrorists, too. And then they have a legitimate reason to go, “What’s in it for us?”

Q. For counterterrorism efforts to be effective, you need to do more than counterterrorism?

A. The most important CT thing you can do is strengthen the countries it’s operating in. Terrorism is two things: it’s a symptom of frustration, but it also operates in areas that are less governed and can’t deal with it. So you have to try to create places where you have enough stability in the government where they can provide for the people and you’re not causing terrorists to grow, or not encouraging terrorists.

What we need is a stable Afghanistan. I personally think there’s going to be a military component that I urge be mostly enabling for the institution building, and them doing most of the fighting. I think it’s trainers, logistics support, institutions, leadership, things like that. I don’t think it’s a huge footprint on the ground. I would be very reticent to put a lot there because of the resistance to it, there’s a negative side. And helping the governance get better.

Q. The White House is considering keeping 3,000 to 9,000 troops in Afghanistan after 2014. What can one accomplish with 3,000 or 6,000 or 9,000 troops?

A. I honestly haven’t done the math on it. We had 7,500 in Afghanistan in the summer of 2002 when I was first stationed there. And 7,500 wouldn’t do much, because by the time you had a pretty small headquarters at Bagram, you were running the airfield, you had some people starting to train A.N.S.F. (Afghan National Security Forces). Pretty soon you don’t have much reach.

Q. What is needed politically?

A. It goes back to, “What do you think the mission is? What are you trying to do?” If you make the decision that Afghanistan is a strategic, important priority for the U.S. and we’re going to have a reasonable level of effortthat doesn’t end the civilian requirement. That doesn’t end the requirement for governance help or U.S.A.I.D.-kind of assistance. It actually opens the way for it.

Q. Do the Afghans want that?

A. I thought that they did. I thought there was a great thirst for stable, credible government at the local level. Now, sometimes it’s the eye of the beholder. But I think the average Afghan desperately wants that.

Q. Was Afghanistan worth it?

A. I think it should have been done differently from the beginning. People ask me what we should have done, and I say, “On Sept. 12, 2001, we should have sent 10,000 people to language school.”

Nick Hubbard contributed research.


Afghan civilians worry about Taliban after 2014 withdrawal of U.S. troops
The Washington Times By Ashish Kumar Sen Tuesday, January 8, 2013
Afghan civilians who have helped coalition troops in the U.S.-led mission now fear the Taliban will kill them after Western forces leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

“In Afghanistan, if you work with foreigners — not just Americans — they call you an infidel or a spy,” an Afghan man who has worked as an interpreter for U.S. troops said of the Taliban.

“Once the Taliban find out that you’re working for the U.S. Army, you’re done for, and so is your family,” he said in a phone interview from Kabul. Like most other interpreters interviewed for this article, he asked that his name not be used out of fear for his and his family’s lives.

When his older brother, who also works as an interpreter for U.S. troops, received death threats, his boss gave him two options: He could either quit his job, or take $400 and buy an AK-47 assault rifle for his protection.

Since the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the Western coalition has employed thousands of Afghans, most of them as interpreters, who have accompanied troops to the front lines of the war.

While the personal risks are daunting, coalition jobs mean good money for Afghans desperate for work in a feeble economy.

“For interpreters, it’s a choice between money and security,” said a second Afghan man who recently moved to Virginia with his wife, a U.S. citizen, but who still has family in Afghanistan.

He said he was motivated to earn enough money to pay his way through college. He worked for a year as an interpreter translating between the local languages, Dari and Pashto, and English as he accompanied U.S. troops on dangerous missions to Helmand and Kandahar provinces in the south as well as to the capital, Kabul.

“If someone wants to kidnap you, you are not safe even in the middle of Kabul,” he said. “You may be safe when you’re on the [military] base, but you are always worrying about your family,” which often lives hundreds of miles away.

Special visa programs

Interpreters and their families, especially those who live in Taliban strongholds in the south and east of the country, have been threatened, attacked and even killed.

In November, the Taliban killed two Afghan interpreters in eastern Logar province.

“Bombs have exploded outside the homes of my friends” who worked with the coalition, said Abdul, an interpreter based in southern Afghanistan who only gave his first name. “They lost their family. They received threats, but that is normal.”

Omar Samad, a senior Afghanistan specialist at the U.S. Institute of Peace, said: “Taliban targeting of such individuals is a psychological warfare tactic that could be effective in the short term, but very damaging to the country that needs to keep its human and professional capital at home.”

“On the other hand, the U.S. and other major NATO partners engaged in the Afghan mission and relying on Afghans need to adopt a policy that provides temporary refuge to those facing higher levels of risk,” he said.

U.S. officials acknowledge that Afghans take great risks when they choose to work with the coalition.

“We recognize that many who are employed by or work on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan, and their families, face real threats as a result of their U.S. government affiliation,” said State Department spokesman Noel Clay. “We take these threats, and the concerns of those who work with us, very seriously, and we are committed to providing them with the benefits for which they are legally eligible.”

The Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 authorizes 1,500 special immigrant visas annually through fiscal 2013 for Afghan employees and contractors whose lives are in danger as a consequence of their employment.

An applicant must have been employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan on or after Oct. 7, 2001, for a period of not less than one year to be eligible for the visa.

Afghans who have worked with the U.S. government also are eligible for another special visa program, which is offered to Iraqi interpreters as well. So far, more than 2,100 Afghans have received visas under the two special visa programs.

“There are two categories of people: Those who really fear for their lives, especially those who live in remote areas where the Taliban has some influence, and those who want better opportunities and want to leave Afghanistan so that they have an alternative if things get worse beyond 2014,” said Shahmahmood Miakhel, Kabul-based country director of the U.S. Institute of Peace. Western combat forces are set to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

A waiting game

A U.S. visa is not always the answer.

Some Afghans who get the opportunity to move to the U.S. are “disoriented and disappointed” when they arrive because of a lack of proper training and assimilation programs, said Said T. Jawad, president of the Foundation of Afghanistan and a former ambassador of Afghanistan to the U.S.

“They are used to special privileges in Afghanistan and generally have difficulty adjusting to a much lower social status and regret their migration,” he said, adding that many have returned to Afghanistan.

“With the troops drawdown, the U.S. has limited resources and leverage to protect [the Afghans] in their own village and environment,” said Mr. Jawad. “The best way to assist and empower them is to provide them with higher-education opportunities in Asia and the Middle East.”

All the Afghan interpreters interviewed for this article complained about years-long waits for a U.S. visa.

The first Afghan interpreter said his older brother, who had worked for 10 years with U.S. troops, eventually gave up after a seven-year wait for a U.S. visa and moved to London.

For those with no option but to wait, their biggest worry is that they will not get their visas before U.S. troops leave Afghanistan.

The U.S. Embassy in Kabul, meanwhile, has stepped up staffing at its consular section and increased resources to speed up the Special Immigrant Visa process and reduce backlogs.

“The tempo of overall issuances is continuing to improve, and we expect significantly higher numbers in [fiscal] 2013,” said Mr. Clay, the State Department spokesman.

Afghans who hold dual citizenship have the option of moving to another country, but for most, that is not a choice.

“We want to get out of Afghanistan,” said the first Afghan interpreter, who lives in Kabul. “Whether we go to Europe or America or Australia, we don’t care. We just want to save our lives.”


Karzai meets Obama: How will they shape a post-2014 Afghanistan?
Few appear to believe the Taliban can regain power after 2014, when the US withdraws most of its troops. What's key, some say, is developing a US-Afghan partnership that will survive.
Christian Science Monitor By Scott Peterson, Staff writer January 8, 2013
Kabul, Afghanistan - Afghan President Hamid Karzai's visit to Washington this week will shape the future of Afghanistan, as he and Obama determine the number and role – if any – of US forces in Afghanistan post-2014.

After more than a decade of war and costly efforts to build infrastructure and train Afghan security forces that now number 350,000, the view from Kabul is still mixed. Many are concerned about what will happen when the bulk of the 66,000 remaining US troops will be withdrawn by the end of 2014. Others believe that Afghanistan is ready to stand on its own.

Yet worries about a collapse or a reignited civil war after the US pullout may be overblown, just as similar doomsday predictions about Iraq after the final US withdrawal in December 2011 have not come to pass.

"There is now a sense [among foreigners] that the lights are going to go out in 2014, that the sun is going to stop shining," says Martine van Bijlert, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network in Kabul. "In the early years, they had this overly rosy picture, but since then there has been this decline and increasing pessimism. Both are over-estimations of the international role."

Some fear a return to the dark days of the late 1990s, when the Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan with a centuries-old, unbending Salafi Islamist worldview. Others fear a breakdown of central government and return of warlordism, competing militias, and civil war.

A number of analysts, however, say Afghanistan has come too far since 2001 to disintegrate again into past eras of violence and lawlessness, and that those who fought over Kabul in the 1990s today have vested interests in keeping the peace in the capital.

"It's not important for us, the physical presence of Americans in Afghanistan, the numbers beyond 2014," says Hilaluddin Hilal, an Afghan Air Force general and deputy Interior minister for security until 2005.

"The important thing is a strong partnership and the existence of the US as an ally. We don't want the Americans to take part in the frontline fight against insurgents; we have enough [troops]," says Hilal.

He ticks off a list of complaints voiced by many Afghans: rampant corruption, poor governance with limited capacity, and billions in Western reconstruction aid that often lined pockets instead of creating sustainable, tangible results.

"Now the big problem is disagreement between Karzai and the US – this can create strategic problems for the US and Afghanistan in the future," says Hilal. "Sometimes the president says the reason for insecurity is America itself.... And the Taliban, the president calls them 'brothers,' but they kill innocent people. How can that be? We have no definition of who is the enemy [so] there is no clear strategy about the enemy in Afghanistan."

Mr. Karzai's visit to Washington comes amid news from Afghanistan of yet another "green on blue" attack of a uniformed member of the Afghan Army shooting dead a British soldier on Monday – a reminder of the uncertainties and eroded trust as the US plans to withdraw the bulk of its troops. US forces are part of a 100,000-strong NATO contingent.

The killing was the latest in a surge of such attacks. During the past year, insider attacks killed 63 US and NATO troops, in 47 incidents. 'We have done so much'

"There is a Western point of view that we have done so much all this time, that we have tried so hard to build up this government, that it's still in such bad shape, that it must be impossible for it to roll on and continue to exist without our help," says Ms. Bijlert.

Yet, "the actual locally relevant governance and politics that went on was often not that visible to the foreigners here. This will probably continue," says Bijlert. Often classified as dysfunctional, that system "has defused a lot of the possible violence."

"The complexity of it might be uniquely Afghan. It's very much a personalized, patronage-based society.... Your relationships are the main capital you have, and also the greatest threat: Who is your friend and your enemy is the most important thing in life," adds Bijlert.

"And with all the turnovers over the decades, things have become ever more complicated, [leaving] you with layers of multiple loyalties," notes Bijlert. "Anyone who's anybody, politically or socially, even on the village level, has to engage in complicated, almost mathematical relational calculations all the time – that's what politics are made of here. Also, it's very brutal: It's easy to get killed or beaten up. So you're constantly engaging in actions to defuse that."

Much of that political dynamic bypassed US and NATO forces as they sought to stamp out an insurgency that leapt up after US forces and intelligence shifted attention in 2002 toward Iraq. Dashed hopes

The result has been dashed hopes that were high among Afghans, after the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants were forced from power and out of Kabul by US airstrikes and Northern Alliance fighters in late 2001. Afghans expected dramatic and positive change, spearheaded by American forces, aid, and good intentions.

"People are so disappointed; expectations were normal, but they didn't finish the Taliban," says a former translator for US and British forces, who spoke in Kabul on the condition he not be named because has been threatened because of his previous translation work.

"Before [2001], people thought of the Taliban as a military power, but now they are a political power, because they can play a game and they are doing it," says the Afghan translator.

"To be honest, [the US] lost the war. With all this effort, you expect good results, but they are not there," says the translator. "Now [US forces] are trying to reduce their casualties. If they won the war, why do they want to keep 10,000 troops? It means there are still things to do, and the threats are worse [today] than five years ago. In 2001, it was so easy to finish the Taliban, [but] now the Taliban are in an offensive position."

The translator recalls hearing repeated complaints from Afghan villagers as US troops made patrols in the less-welcoming southern reaches of the country, that it was the US presence that endangered them – not only the Taliban.

"They were hating both sides, they were harmed by both sides," says the translator. "[Villagers] would say: 'Please, for God's sake, leave! You are the main reason for the problem. From the day you arrived, there was bombing.' The American commander laughed and said, 'We are bringing security to you.' They replied: 'No, we feel insecurity with you.'"

An elder from the remote eastern province of Nuristan says he heard similar sentiments.

Yacoub Nuristani, who helped US Provincial Reconstruction Teams choose and fund projects, says there is little left to show for that work besides a few clinic and school buildings.

A key road near Kamdesh is now too insecure to use. Five years ago, the Monitor reported on Taliban killings of elders who cooperated with US forces, which later withdrew completely from the province.

"The people of Kamdesh fought against the Taliban when the Americans were there, they were threatened by the Taliban," says Mr. Nuristani, speaking in Kabul. "Now the Taliban are there, but they don't threaten because there are no US or foreign troops."

Those who supported the government and fought the Taliban, says Nuristani, now have no government support "so they had to flee." No 'victory'

Few say they believe that the Taliban could reimpose their rule on Afghanistan before or after 2014, and some say the spate of suicide bombings in recent years – which have often targeted civilians in mosques and shops – is a sign of weakness.

However, few on the ground here use the word "victory."

"It was just a given, it was going to be a success, and if it wasn't going to be a success, it had to be made to look like a success," says Bijlert of the Afghanistan Analysts Network. "That skewed everything, so it became difficult to say, 'Actually, this is very hard, and maybe we should rethink.'

Thus emerged a pattern of expectation, that a solution was just around the corner, if this step were taken to win hearts and minds, or that troop surge was implemented. Instead, the insurgency continues.

Says Bijlert: "Some of it was almost like an evangelical belief, that something was on the verge of happening that would change everything."


Governor Atta Meets Dostum, Discusses Elections
TOLOnews.com Tuesday, 08 January 2013
Balkh Governor Atta Mohammad Noor on Sunday met former warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, now chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the army, to discuss the upcoming elections and post-2014 challenges.

The two are among the most powerful figures in northern Afghanistan. They discussed coordination and alliances among political parties ahead of the presidential elections in 2014.

"The two figures discussed security issues after the withdrawal of foreign troops, presidential elections and coordination of political parties in the elections," Balkh Provincial Spokesman Ahmad Farhad Munir said.

Atta has expressed interest in potentially running for president and is doing the complex work of establishing coalitions and securing allegiances.

Dostum and Atta were bitter enemies in the past, having been on the opposite sides of the civil war and subsequent conflicts. But Atta's spokesman added that the meeting was cordial.


Investments Increase 26% in 2012: AISA
TOLOnews.com By Shahla Murtazaie Tuesday, 08 January 2013
Investments by domestic and foreign companies increased by 26 percent in 2012, said Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) Monday.

Aviation, industrial, agricultural and real estate sectors received the greatest amount of investments, AISA said.

Investment in 2011 was $463 million, which increased to $585 million in 2012, AISA's statistics reflect. Two new steel plants, two new aviation companies as well as a number of companies in the real estate and agricultural sectors drove the increase.

AISA added that a number of these companies have shifted from working on Isaf-funded projects to investing in longer term projects in 2012, especially in the industrial, agricultural and mining sectors.

This reflects a positive overall trend and might help offset some worries that the country's economy might suffer a strong setback when international aid recedes.

But the large investments were accompanied by a slew of small and medium businesses closing their doors. The Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries said that the number of small and medium companies decreased by 20% last year, mainly due to challenges such as shortage of power.

"On the one hand, investments increased; on the other, some investors faced challenges, which impedes new investments," said ACCI Deputy Director Khan Jan Alokozai.


Senator Slams Khalili's Letter to President
TOLOnews.com By Azim Arash Tuesday, 08 January 2013
Senator Zalmai Zabuli, head of the Senate Commission on Hearing Complaints, said Tuesday that Vice President Khalili had misused his authority by sending a letter to President Karzai to protest allegations that he was involved in land grabbing.

The vice president's letter had called the allegations without evidence, but Senator Zabuli pushed back. Speaking in a press conference in Kabul, Zabuli emphasized that it was the courts that have accused Khalili's brother, Haji Nabi, of land grabbing in the Balwan area of Baghlan province.

"Mr Khalili has illegally sent the letter to the president," Zabuli said.

The vice president is implicated for allegedly misusing his authority to facilitate his brother's large land purchase.

Khalili's chief of staff Abbas Basir defended the vice president and said that every citizen of the country has the right to defend themselves against libel if they are illegally accused of something they haven't done.

"The letter that was sent to the president was legal and it is the right of every citizen to defend their prestige against false accusations," Basir told TOLOnews in a phone interview.

For his part, Haji Nabi denied the allegations and emphasized that he bought the land legally.

"I bought 500 acres of land legally in the Dasht-e-Balwan area of Kunduz after approval by three different courts," he told TOLOnews on the phone.

Vice President Khalili was accused of involvement in land grabbing recently. In response to the accusation, Kahlili sent a letter of protest to President Karzai and criticised the accusation.

"Freedom of expression is everyone's right, but it should not be used to lower the prestige of other people, and government officials should not be accused without evidence," he said in the letter, adding that allegations against him should be investigated.


Extortion by Police Must End: Kandahar Residents
TOLOnews.com Tuesday, 08 January 2013
A number of Kandahar residents complain about misbehavior and extortion from the police and asked the government to curb the abuse.

Police at checkpoints ask for a share of firewood and other commodities that residents carry home, people told TOLOnews.

"There are about seven to eight police checkpoints on the way to where we buy firewood. At each checkpoint, they ask for firewood," one resident said.

Local officials said that some of the extortion is because a number of residents transport fuels illegally, adding that the extortion will end if residents stop the illegal transport of fuel.

But Provincial Spokesman Jawid Faisal said the police force is provided firewood to keep themselves warm during the winter and that extortion by the police is illegal.

"The laws are the same for all regardless of if a person is the police chief, the district governor or an ordinary citizen. Every victim of extortion should get legal recourse," Faisal added.

Provincial Officials added that several residents illegally shift duel if the residents stop this action there is no one to request them blackmail.

www.afghanistannewscenter.com