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6 wounded in suicide car bomb attack on Afghan-NATO base
JALALABAD, Afghanistan, Nov. 23 (Xinhua) -- At least six Afghan security guards were wounded as a suicide car bomb went off outside an Afghan-NATO military base in eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar Friday evening, a provincial police spokesman said.
"The bomber rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into the wall of the base near the entrance of the compound at about 18:40 local time," Housain Mashriqiwall told Xinhua.
He could not confirm whether there was any foreign casualties in the blast.
The camp is located in Torkham, a town close to the border with Pakistan, he said.
No one has claimed responsibility for the attack, though the bombing bears the hallmark of Taliban insurgent group.
Earlier Friday, three civilians were killed and 90 others wounded when the Taliban carried out a suicide bombing on a police station in Wardak province 35 km west of Kabul.
Kabul streets get overdue facelift
The Washington Post By Pamela Constable November 23, 2012
KABUL - On an ordinary weekday, the streets of Kabul are choked with traffic, fetid with clogged drains and crammed with carts displaying potatoes or used sweaters. Shoppers, school children and commuters on bicycles dodge and dart through the hazardous maze, often taking their lives in their hands.
As bad as that is, the ordeal just got much worse.
For the past two months, bulldozers and backhoes have been tearing up dozens of busy city streets, gouging deep gulches for new drainage pipes and dumping piles of gravel, dirt and tangled steel bars in the middle. Workmen swarm between lines of traffic, hopping in and out of ditches and shouting through the din.
The ambitious, $45 million project — financed largely by the government of Japan and supervised by the Kabul mayor’s office — will eventually produce 60 miles of smooth pavement and modern drainage in an aged, war-savaged capital where the population has exploded from 2 million to 5 million in the past decade. For now, though, it has produced mostly chaos and complaints.
“I can’t sleep at night because the machines are so loud, and I can’t breathe during the day because of all the dust,” said Mir Hazrat, 70, the caretaker of a mosque in the Qalai-Fatullah district. He and his friend Fahim Hasibullah, a legless land-mine victim in a wheelchair, spend their days on the sidewalk, watching the work inch ahead. “I just pray they get done before the snow comes,” Hazrat says darkly.
The tumult is most intense along the 10-block commercial stretch between Qalai-Fatullah and Shar-i-Nau, which is lined with a hodgepodge of bakeries, barbers, fish markets, plumbing suppliers and fashion boutiques with mannequins in sequined gowns. Beggars, phone-card hawkers and onion-cart pushers complete the tableau, squeezing between stuck cars and mountains of rubble.
Mohammed Ismael, 65, owns a stylish real estate office on one of the worst-hit blocks. With no customers, he spent last week watching workmen pound metal struts into the ditch below his doorstep. “They should have done this years ago,” he said. “Now the foreigners are leaving, business is dead, and I can’t find a place to park my car.”
Like every project here, the street work has created an economic pyramid that reflects the stark stratification of Afghan society today. At the bottom are the jump-suited laborers, some in their 60s, who earn about $8 per day digging ditches and carrying loads. Many said they were jobless before the project started.
“I feel very lucky to have this job,” said Mohammed Karim, 38, leaning on his shovel. He said he left school after third grade, and has been working with his hands ever since. He spent years doing construction in Iran, but his visa expired last year and he was deported. His wife and six children live in northern Afghanistan’s Takhar province, and he takes a bus to see them once a month. “I bring them money to buy food, and then I come back,” he said.
Further up the ladder are the crew managers, safety inspectors and site engineers, who wear bright yellow vests and carry clipboards. They include Afghan university students working part-time and Pakistanis who have been brought by contractors because there are still not enough skilled Afghans to do technical tasks, even after a decade of international aid and education programs.
The safety officers and traffic police at each work site have a nearly impossible job. In a capital full of powerful men with big Land Cruisers and guns, asking aggressive drivers to wait for a bulldozer or take a detour can be futile.
“We get cursed a lot. I get in arguments with drivers and bodyguards all the time,” said Mowahid Anwari, 29, an engineer at the Qalai-Fatullah site. “It’s the government officials that give us the most trouble. They insist on getting through, and they don’t allow us to get the work done.”
Sometimes the men in SUVs are construction contractors, members of the new Kabul elite with offices in posh districts where the streets were paved long ago. They tour the work sites several times a day, jumping out with bodyguards at their sides and barking orders on walkie-talkies as they clamber over dirt piles in shined shoes.
The intellectual godfather of the project is an Afghan of the old school, a gray-bearded engineer and deputy mayor named Abdul Ahad Wahid. Pointing to the city maps covering his office walls, he insists there is method in the madness that has turned parts of the capital — which was nearly destroyed during the civil war of the 1990s — into a combination strip mine, slalom course and battle zone.
But Wahid has little time to explain the finer points of Kabul’s master plan, which is gradually transforming the city’s infrastructure with support from Japan and the World Bank. He is too busy juggling work delays, traffic jams and a hundred other problems that arise when a small army of men and machines invades a densely crowded city and tries to shut down dozens of streets.
“The population has grown so fast that the entire city is congested. We have no alternative routes where we can send the traffic,” Wahid said. As a result, the project keeps falling behind schedule. “We are pushing the contractors really hard,” he said. “I told them we have to finish before winter. If they work two day shifts and one at night, maybe we will get it done by then.”
The abysmal state of Kabul’s many dirt streets, which turn to dust in summer and mud in winter, has been a source of public criticism for years. But now that they’re finally being improved, Wahid said, “we get nothing but complaints. In the past two years we’ve paved 400 miles of road, built five bridges and the first flyover in Afghanistan, and still nobody’s happy.”
Nazir Mohammed, 40, has worked at his family barber shop in Qalai-Fatullah for half his life. He has seen civil war destroy the street, and Taliban repression empty it. He, too, is unhappy about the mess outside his shop, and he fears the improvement will do little to salvage the city’s economy as foreign troops, aid and investment flee.
But like many Afghans, Mohammed has the resourceful instincts of a survivor. He has kept the twinkling lights turned on above his shelves of shaving cream and cologne, and he has laid a wooden plank over the abyss between his doorway and the street, just in case.
Suicide Bomber Devastates a Government Hub in Afghanistan
New York Times By ALISSA J. RUBIN November 23, 2012
MAIDAN SHAHR, Afghanistan - A suicide bomber driving a truck made his way to the heart of a provincial capital in Afghanistan on Friday and exploded his bomb, leveling many government and security buildings, badly damaging a prison and leaving the governor without an office.
The bomber struck in Maidan Shahr, in Wardak Province, killing two police officers and a young woman and wounding 90 others, including police officers and civilians, officials said. Though the province has long been sharply contested, this was the first such attack on Maidan Shahr, about an hour’s drive from the nation’s capital, Kabul, residents said.
Wardak’s governor, Abdul Majid Khogyani, was keeping track of the casualties on a piece of paper as he met with police officers and elders in the courtyard of the main government compound. It was so badly damaged that none of the rooms in the buildings were usable.
“If I had been here, I and my family would have been killed,” said Mr. Khogyani, gesturing to a guesthouse where he had been living. It was among the most heavily damaged of the structures still standing.
In a statement e-mailed to reporters, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it was revenge for the execution of Taliban prisoners this week by the Afghan government. However, Mr. Khogyani said he believed that his recent efforts to reconcile a number of Wardak’s villages with the government had angered the Taliban, who rely on rural support. He received warnings from security officials on Wednesday, the same day as the executions, that an explosives-laden truck had entered the city, suggesting that the attack had been planned well before the decision to hang the Taliban prisoners.
The bomb was so powerful that not only were windows blown out for blocks, but window and door frames close to the blast were also warped and askew, some wrenched from their fittings so that passers-by could see piles of furniture, glass and chunks of the walls inside the houses. The buildings closest to the blast were reduced to rubble. The bomb left a crater at least 20 feet across and 10 feet deep.
In the aftermath, the streets were filled with the sound of scraping glass as shopkeepers and security guards swept out broken windowpanes, leaving small piles on the streets. “There’s never been anything like this in our city,” said Naquibullah, who has a small grocery and dry goods store and, like many Afghans, uses only one name. “The rural areas and Saydabad are not safe, but the city has always been fine.”
Among the buildings demolished were the local government records office, where Afghans get their national identification card, known as the tazkera; the local office of the National Directorate of Security; a midwife’s center; and a women’s hostel. The prison was so badly damaged that Amir Mohammad Jamshidi, the head of prisons at the Interior Ministry, said the government would have to transfer all 146 prisoners to Pul-i-Charkhi, the main prison in neighboring Kabul Province.
“Today’s suicide attack injured 20 prisoners and 15 police officers,” Mr. Jamshidi said. “Three prisoners who tried to flee during the chaos were arrested by security forces.”
Close to sundown, several residents with bandages on their foreheads or arms wandered back to the scene, looking incredulously at the damage.
One of the medics, who had patched up dozens right after the blast, was back at the site helping American soldiers who had arrived to gather information.
“It was just horrific,” said the medic, who would not give his name. “I treated 45 people today. It’s a disaster; people lost so much.”
Sharifullah Sahak and Jawad Sukhanyar contributed reporting.
Why U.S. troops must stay in Afghanistan
Washington Post By Kimberly Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan Saturday, November 24, 2012
Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War. Frederick Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Will the United States continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia? That question is central to any discussion about U.S. troop presence and mission in Afghanistan. The answer can be yes only if we pursue and support the current strategy, retaining roughly 68,000 troops in Afghanistan into 2014 and about half that number thereafter.
Amateurs can discuss imaginary, over-the-horizon “light footprint” strategies. Professionals must consider logistics. Physics and military reality dictate the minimum number of troops needed to have any U.S. presence in Afghanistan without inviting calamities worse than the events in Benghazi, Libya. The presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan alone permits counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. It’s this simple: Either we keep the necessary number of troops in Afghanistan or operations against al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan cease.
The principal terrorist concentrations in South Asia are in Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas. Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have sought safety in Afghanistan primarily in Konar and Nuristan provinces. U.S. forces could target terrorists without maintaining a ground presence in three ways: using armed Predator drones, special mission units or precision-guided munitions dropped from manned aircraft. Without bases in Afghanistan, the tyranny of distance rules out the first two options; the requirement for accuracy and certainty rules out the last.
North Waziristan is more than 600 miles from the nearest coastline; the other sanctuaries are farther. The U.S. Air Force reports that armed Predator drones have a range of about 1,150 miles — not enough to get to Waziristan and back again from the coast, much less to orbit and observe a target. Special mission units would have to parachute from transport aircraft because no helicopter in the U.S. inventory can fly that far. But they could not return because aircraft cannot land in the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan or in Pakistan. Manned aircraft can drop precision weapons on targets in Afghanistan, but they fly too fast to loiter over potential targets. Their bombs hit precisely what they are aimed at, but fast-moving aircraft cannot ensure that the target was actually there. There is no over-the-horizon solution to targeting terrorists in South Asia.
Bases in Afghanistan obviate all these problems. U.S. forces operating from Khost, Jalalabad and Kandahar can strike targets in Afghanistan (or Pakistan) with Predators and special mission units. Such operations have been critical to the success of counterterrorism operations in this region, including the killing of Osama bin Laden (Abbottabad is about 150 miles east of Jalalabad, 750 miles from the Indian Ocean).
The minimum U.S. footprint to sustain counterterrorism operations requires bases near Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar to reach known terrorist havens (Khost and Jalalabad are less than 100 miles apart but are separated by a 10,000-foot mountain range). Each base requires an airstrip to fly Predators and move supplies by air. Each must also have aircraft ground crews and support the special mission units.
Base security and support impose serious troop requirements. These bases are in dangerous places, and we surely will not entrust the protection of U.S. personnel to local forces as we did in Benghazi. Securing the perimeter would require at least two companies of soldiers (alternating guard duty) and a company-size quick-reaction force — a battalion, in other words. Each base must also have the helicopters needed to move around and conduct operations — at least a combat aviation battalion — and a field medical facility able to handle severe trauma. That adds up to one combat brigade (3,500 soldiers) and one combat aviation brigade (5,000 to 6,000 soldiers).
That’s about 10,000 troops — without counting the supply or command and control of these forces. Even if we supply each base directly by air from outside Afghanistan, with no facility near Kabul, each base still needs logistical elements, probably at least 3,000 to 5,000 combat service support troops. The most idealized version of the limited counterterrorism footprint, therefore, is around 15,000 troops. At that strength we would not be able to advise, enable, support or rely on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Since they, like our NATO allies, depend on U.S. enablers such as reconnaissance, helicopters, medevac and route-clearance packages, most of their operations would cease.
Thus this footprint would not allow our troops, our allies or the Afghans to maneuver. At best our troops and bases would become isolated islands focused on protecting themselves and irrelevant in the fight against al-Qaeda. At worst they would take losses much greater than we suffered in Benghazi.
This minimum counterterrorism footprint requires basic stability near our long-term bases to have any effect. The ANSF must sustain that stability but can only do so supported by U.S. advisers and enablers. Advising the three Afghan National Army corps and Afghan National Police zones around the bases requires at least three advise-and-assist brigades — one per corps and zone — plus support units. Such brigades are smaller than combat brigades, about 1,500 each. They must, in this concept, be located with our counterterrorism forces to avoid having to secure additional bases.
Now we’re up to around 21,500 troops total, without a central headquarters near Kabul or any reliable means of moving by road between our bases. In the real world, neither of those conditions makes sense. Adding up the security forces for a base near Kabul, a theater headquarters, route-clearance packages, theater logisticians and other ancillary units is likely to push the requirement above 30,000.
At that level U.S. forces in Afghanistan could do nothing beyond the minimum necessary to allow us to continue counterterrorism operations in South Asia: no nation-building, no effort to affect the Afghan political process or help the Afghans secure presidential elections in 2014, no development assistance; only defensive operations against the Taliban and other insurgent groups from three bases.
Moving toward this long-term posture in 2013 will likely ensure its failure. As we fall below 68,000 troops, we will have to withdraw from important terrain and lose the ability to maneuver. Our forces won’t be able to operate in most of southern Afghanistan, conduct offensive operations or help the ANSF consolidate and mature. We must create basic stability in 2013 that the ANSF can sustain to set conditions for any long-term U.S. counterterrorism operations. Doing so requires two things this White House appears to want to avoid: keeping U.S. force levels where they are for the next two years; and implementing a serious political strategy aimed not at our enemies but at the people we need to be our long-term partners.
The United States can stabilize Afghanistan if it maintains around 68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan into 2014, dropping to over 30,000 thereafter (about what we have in Korea). The idea that the war is inevitably lost is a convenient mask behind which decision-makers hide to deflect responsibility for pulling out troops who are making a real difference.
We have argued that the current defeatism about Afghanistan is overdrawn and unfounded. But it is more important for Americans to internalize a simple fact: We must either stabilize Afghanistan at this minimum level or abandon the fight against al-Qaeda and its allies in South Asia. Any alternative “light footprint” strategy is a dangerous mirage.
Our Man in Kabul?
For the U.S. and its allies, Afghanistan is now a two-front war: a military struggle against the Taliban and a bitter political rift with the Afghan president.
The Wall Street Journal By YAROSLAV TROFIMOV November 23, 2012
The darkest pages of Afghan history are reserved for a traitorous king named Shah Shuja. Enthroned by British invaders in 1839, he was ignominiously slaughtered once the routed infidels left.
President Hamid Karzai knows this story well. He hails from the same Pashtun sub-clan as the reviled 19th-century monarch. In their leaflets, poems and songs, the Taliban relentlessly mock Mr. Karzai as the modern-day Shuja, a ruler imposed by outsiders and destined to meet an unhappy end.
In a broken country whose main glory is its history of defeating invading empires, this insult is pernicious and hard to brush off. Brought to power by the U.S. invasion, Mr. Karzai understands that his legitimacy and future survival depend on proving that he is no puppet of the Western unbelievers—no matter how much he actually depends on their money and troops.
This critical contradiction, often misunderstood in the U.S., has crippled President Barack Obama's escalation of the Afghan war, America's longest foreign conflict. It also makes fresh rifts all but inevitable as U.S. troops prepare to come home in two years.
American commanders got a taste of Mr. Karzai's deep ambivalence about the war, ostensibly waged in his government's name, during a visit to Kandahar in 2010. They had flown Mr. Karzai to a meeting with elders in the Taliban's hometown, expecting him to act as a wartime commander and kick off the military offensive that was the centerpiece of Mr. Obama's troop surge.
Instead, as stunned generals looked on, Mr. Karzai called the Taliban "brothers" and told the turbaned elders that the war wouldn't end as long as he was seen as a "foreign stooge." He then asked the elders whether they wanted the offensive to begin. Hearing shouts of "no," Mr. Karzai ordered a halt to the long-planned operation to clear Afghanistan's second-largest city.
This disconnect is now deepening, as Washington begins negotiations on what enduring military presence, if any, the U.S. could have after the Western coalition's mandate ends in 2014. How to deal with an increasingly assertive Mr. Karzai is likely to become one of Mr. Obama's main foreign-policy headaches during his second term.
"We want to be your good friends, but we will never want to be your servants," said the Afghan president's chief of staff, Abdel Karim Khurram, in a rare interview.
Mr. Khurram said that the way America has waged war there since 2001 has been "counterproductive," adding that the Taliban, once seemingly vanquished, are resurgent across Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan. "This region is more radical now than 10 years ago," he said.
A close look at Mr. Karzai's growing alienation from the U.S. helps to explain why so many of America's war objectives in Afghanistan remain unfulfilled. It seems increasingly likely that the U.S. will leave behind both an undefeated Taliban insurgency and a dysfunctional government mired in corruption and utterly dependent on foreign aid.
Mr. Karzai described his relationship with the Obama administration as "tension-ridden" in an interview with The Wall Street Journal earlier this year. To many U.S. officials, these tensions have translated into a two-front war: a military struggle against the Taliban and a more insidious, parallel political tussle with the Afghan leader.
Aware of Afghanistan's history, Mr. Karzai opposed the very notion of a U.S. counterinsurgency campaign, fearing that the insertion of American troops into traditional Afghan villages, and the casualties that they cause, would end up reinvigorating the Taliban. He has also argued that U.S. military operations are meaningless without first confronting Pakistan, which provides havens and support to Afghan insurgents—allowing the Taliban to bounce back after every offensive.
As a result, between the U.S. and Mr. Karzai, said a senior former American diplomat in Kabul, "there is a fundamental difference in defining the threat and in how to deal with the threat."
In Kandahar in 2010, this meant that the U.S. had to scramble to revise the military campaign as it sought to satisfy Mr. Karzai's demands. The military abandoned plans to ring the city with Baghdad-style checkpoints, biometric control posts and walls to filter out insurgents—measures that Mr. Karzai, a Kandahar native himself, thought would erode support for his government. Major sweeps were called off.
These days, the Taliban are still a potent force in Kandahar, carrying out assassinations almost every week. Nationally, the insurgents manage to pull off more attacks, roughly 100 a day, than when Mr. Obama first entered the White House, according to the U.S.-led coalition.
Defying skeptics who once portrayed him as a faintly ridiculous "mayor of Kabul," Mr. Karzai has emerged as a surprisingly powerful figure in his struggle with Washington to claw back Afghan sovereignty. This year he forced the U.S. to stop unilateral Special Operations night raids, a key tactic in the war against the Taliban. He insisted on taking custody of hundreds of insurgent suspects held by the U.S. at the Bagram airfield, releasing many of them in a so-far failed effort to convince the Taliban to open peace talks. He also disbanded Western-backed private security firms and deftly removed cabinet ministers and provincial governors whom he suspected of becoming too close to the U.S.
"Karzai was seen in the West as a weak person. This is wrong: Karzai has dominated the Afghan political scene for a decade, and he wouldn't have been able to do that if he was not a strong personality and a clever tactician," said Kai Eide, a senior Norwegian diplomat who, as head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, closely interacted with the Afghan president. "I don't think anybody underestimates him now."
The lesson that Mr. Karzai has learned from these confrontations with Washington, a former palace insider said, is that the U.S. will end up yielding to him no matter what he demands. "He kept telling us: 'The U.S. has no breaking point; when you push them, the Americans always step back.' He said, 'They will never say that you're a bad boy and we're leaving.' "
In recent weeks, Mr. Karzai further rankled the U.S. by ordering the ouster of international representatives from the country's elections- watchdog agency and by suggesting that Afghanistan may deny U.S. troops immunity from local law after 2014—the deal-breaker in similar talks in Iraq. He also threatened to turn to China and Russia as alternative military allies and intensified his criticism of the coalition, regularly issuing statements that condemn the U.S. for causing civilian casualties.
In this posturing, Mr. Karzai may end up overplaying his hand and misjudging the public mood in the U.S. and in other coalition countries that are increasingly losing patience with Afghanistan and its president, senior U.S. officials warn.
"The constant drumbeat of criticism of the West by President Karzai is corrosive to our long-term relationship," said one senior U.S. official. "While everyone understands President Karzai's concern for Afghan sovereignty, his recent statements cause grave concerns about his willingness to see things through to 2014 and beyond."
A rupture with the U.S. could have potentially devastating consequences for Afghanistan's future. Afghan security forces would likely fracture without billions of dollars in annual foreign assistance, precipitating a civil war of the kind that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Such a national tragedy could even put in question the physical survival of Mr. Karzai and his family.
"Every morning, I wake up at 3 a.m. and ask myself, 'When will he ever get it?' " said one senior Western diplomat. Mr. Karzai, one former close aide retorts, often wonders the same about his Western counterparts.
"There is a chance we will see the whole edifice crashing down spectacularly, either in 2014 or shortly thereafter," said Bruce Riedel, a former Central Intelligence Agency official who headed the Obama administration's task force that recommended escalating the Afghan war in 2009.
At the time, Mr. Obama ordered the tripling of U.S. troop numbers here, to about 100,000, and committed hundreds of billions of dollars to the campaign. More than two-thirds of the 2,158 American troops killed in Afghanistan have died during his presidency.
Yet, as the Obama administration ramped up the war, it kept the country's president at arm's length, or worse. In 2008, Vice President Joe Biden, then a senator, threw down his napkin and walked out of a dinner with Mr. Karzai in Kabul, after Mr. Karzai minimized the extent of corruption in the government. It was a major insult in the rank-conscious Afghan culture.
Ahead of the August 2009 Afghan elections, the late Richard Holbrooke, who served as U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan, openly talked about the need to disempower the Afghan president, if not to replace him outright. "He thought he was dealing with someone like Milosevic," said Afghanistan's senior minister, Hedayat Amin Arsala.
Relations grew especially chilly after Mr. Obama's December 2010 trip to Afghanistan. Arriving at the height of the surge, Mr. Obama was supposed to visit American troops at the Bagram base, an hour's drive north of Kabul, and then to discuss the war over dinner with Mr. Karzai in the presidential palace.
That night, as Mr. Karzai waited for Mr. Obama—kebabs, Kabuli rice and fresh pomegranate juice at the ready—he received a phone call from Bagram: The American president would not be coming to dinner after all. The U.S. blamed the last-minute cancellation on rough winds that made the short chopper flight from Bagram too dangerous. But Mr. Karzai, a palace insider said, didn't buy the excuse, believing that he had been deliberately snubbed by Mr. Obama as punishment for his statements criticizing the course of the war. It didn't help that, whatever the weather in Bagram, it was a windless night in Kabul. Furious, Mr. Karzai went to his residence and refused to take a video conference call with the American president.
In the following months, Mr. Karzai hardened his stance, as civilian casualties and the destruction of Afghan property mounted during the military operations. His anger with what he perceived as occasional lack of respect from Washington translated into erratic statements, such as public threats to join the Taliban. He also embraced conspiracy theories, once accusing the U.S. of flying the Taliban to northern Afghanistan in order to destabilize that part of the country.
"He is a complex character, and he can react very emotionally, especially if he believes that he is being humiliated," said one senior Western official who frequently dealt with Mr. Karzai.
Mr. Karzai himself explains that his rift with the U.S. began emerging under President George W. Bush, well before Mr. Obama took office.
"Issues of private security firms, and civilian casualties, and violations of Afghan homes, and violations of Afghan laws [by the U.S.] had already made things tense," Mr. Karzai said in his interview with the Journal earlier this year. "I have tremendous respect for President Obama. It's not about individual relationships. It's about issues."
The most important of these issues cuts to the very heart of the U.S. war effort. The Afghan president, his aides and foreign diplomats say, was fundamentally opposed to the counterinsurgency strategy that pushed American troops deep into remote, arch-conservative Afghan countryside.
"President Karzai argued that Afghan villages are not really where the source of the problem is, and that the source is mostly outside Afghanistan," said Mr. Arsala, the senior minister who also served as vice president under Mr. Karzai. "But not much was done in that area, and the pressure was put only on the Afghan side of the border—and as a result, there were more civilian casualties. And this has created tension between the Afghan public and the international forces."
Precisely because of such concerns, Mr. Karzai repeatedly frustrated Washington by refusing to welcome Mr. Obama's troop escalation. He also rejected American requests to formally ask other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to send more troops.
Mr. Karzai remains suspicious, too, of the second main pillar of the American war plan: the creation of a 352,000-strong Afghan army and police force. Unlike his security ministers, who eagerly backed the American-funded ramp-up and the gravy train that came with it, Mr. Karzai felt that such a massive force, costing billions of dollars a year, would perpetuate Kabul's dependence on foreigners—and expose him to the possibility of a coup.
"I don't believe in a big army. I never believed in a big army," Mr. Karzai explained in his interview with the Journal. "I believe in an army that isapolitical and one paid for by the Afghan taxpayers' money."
Now that the U.S. is withdrawing from Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai and his aides feel that their concerns have been validated. They openly challenge the Obama administration's optimistic assessments of the surge's outcome.
At a recent meeting with the coalition commander, U.S. Marine Gen. John Allen, a frustrated Mr. Karzai pointed out that the Taliban now operate with impunity at the gates of Kabul, in provinces such as Wardak and Logar that were safer back in 2009, according to officials present there. "Even if there was a surge, it hasn't helped the betterment of the security situation," said Mr. Karzai's spokesman, Aimal Faizi.
This dispute colors the Afghan government's internal debate about whether to allow the U.S. to keep forces in Afghanistan and project regional influence after 2014. "If the 150,000 foreign troops haven't been successful here so far, how could the 10,000, 20,000 or 30,000 that would stay inside their bases after 2014 achieve any success?" said Mr. Khurram, the president's chief of staff. "This is a paradox and a question that must be answered."
The Taliban, for their part, have warned that whoever allows U.S. bases to remain will "go down in history as a traitor and slave like Shah Shuja."
At his meeting with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in Kabul last month, Mr. Karzai openly raised the prospect of ending his country's alliance with Washington.
"Afghans are poor and destitute, but very proud when it comes to the issue of respect to their sovereignty and security," he said, according to a palace statement. "They would even consider discontinuing the strategic partnership [with the U.S.], as any such partnership would have no practical benefit if it does not translate into peace and stability."
In a vicious cycle, such statements fuel the temptation, steadily growing in Washington and other NATO capitals, simply to walk away from Afghanistan. Mr. Karzai's remarks calling for a diminished American role here, a senior U.S. official warned, "fall into the category of 'Be careful of what you wish for.' " — Maria Abi-Habib contributed to this article
Army rushing equipment to fight IEDs to Afghanistan
USA TODAY Tom Vanden Brook November 23. 2012
WASHINGTON - Cheap, simple bombs formed from fertilizer remain the No. 1 killer of U.S.troops in Afghanistan, where 68,000 soldiers and Marines remain.
Shielding troops on foot from buried bombs and killing fleeing insurgents continue to preoccupy Pentagon researchers charged with fielding new gadgets to Afghanistan even as the war there winds down.
Cheap, simple bombs formed from fertilizer remain the No. 1 killer of U.S.troops in Afghanistan, where 68,000 soldiers and Marines remain. They're scheduled to come home by 2014. Insurgents, however, continue to plant bombs in record numbers, and agencies such as the Army's Rapid Equipping Force struggle to keep pace.
The military has mitigated the danger to troops from roadside bombs. Electronic devices jam the signals that detonate some improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and armored trucks known as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles protect them from bombs that do explode.
"But goat paths and bridges are still a problem," says Army Col. Peter Newell, who commands the Rapid Equipping Force. "The insurgent's not going to quit."
So the military is rushing several new technologies to the battlefield of Afghanistan:
• The Minotaur. A remote-controlled, small front-end loader, the Minotaur has attachments that detonate bombs sensitive to weight and radar that penetrates the ground to detect buried IEDs. The Minotaur helps clear small lanes of bombs so that troops can proceed.
• A small, portable "line charge." This device consists of a small rocket that propels a rope filled with explosives about 80 feet. The blast clears a footpath about 1 foot wide, exposing trip wires and buried bombs or disabling them.
• A tiny camera-operated missile that can be fired at insurgents hiding on rooftops, inside buildings or fleeing in cars and small trucks. The Lethal Miniature Aerial Munition System — about the size of a man's forearm — weighs just over 5 pounds and has a range of more than 6 miles.
Newell's group is also deploying mobile laboratories with small forges that can spin out devices within hours. One recent success is an adapter to recharge batteries used in hand-held mine detectors. Soldiers are encouraged, Newell says, to knock on the lab's door with ideas for new gear.
"We want to develop the little MacGyvers out there," Newell said, referring to the TV action hero from the late 1980s with a penchant for crafting gadgets.
Fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan has required foot soldiers to adapt to rapid changes in enemy tactics, the so-called "field craft" born of necessity for infantry troops, says John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a defense policy organization.
"You can do rapid innovation with infantry," Pike said. "The kit is small; it's easy to fabricate. It's not like they're creating a new helicopter. This skill is one of the great take-aways from this war. I hope they don't allow it to atrophy."
Security issues, Afghanistan on agenda in New Zealand-UK defense talks
WELLINGTON, Nov. 23 (Xinhua) -- New Zealand and United Kingdom defense chiefs held talks in Auckland on Friday to discuss common security issues and their defense partnership.
New Zealand Defence Minister Jonathan Coleman said his talks with visiting UK Armed Forces Minister Andrew Robathan were a useful opportunity to maintain the very good working relationship with the British armed forces.
The British armed forces were a key partner for the New Zealand Defence Force, in terms of training, doctrine, interoperability and capability development.
"We are natural partners in a number of areas, and our forces work together very well," Coleman said in a statement Friday.
"The visit is also a welcome signal of the importance the UK places on the bilateral defence relationship forged from a shared history," he said.
"We are discussing areas of common security interest, such as the international draw down in Afghanistan, as well as issues common with many Defence Forces -- how to deal with tightening budgets."
Coleman said the meeting would also confirm a proposed BRITANZ conference, involving the defense chiefs from Britain, Australia and New Zealand in New Zealand next year as well as their traditional links.New Zealand and UK are also partners in the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, along with Australia, Malaysia and Singapore.
Established in 1971, The Five Power Defence Arrangements provides a framework for defence cooperation between the five nations.
'Success in Afghanistan depends on Pak's commitment to fight terrorism': Panetta
Islamabad, Nov 24 (ANI): The success in Afghanistan is dependent on having a Pakistan that is ready to confront terrorism on their side, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta has said.
The Pentagon released the transcript of Panetta's presentation at the Centre for a New American Security, Washington, showing the US defence establishment wishes to rebuild its ties with Pakistan.
According to the Dawn, Panetta was asked 'what chance will the US strategy have to succeed in 2014 if more of the safe havens aren't dealt with more stridently than they've been to date'.
"Look, in many ways the success in Afghanistan is dependent on having a Pakistan that is willing to confront terrorism on their side of the border and prevent safe havens," Panetta replied.
According to the report, Panetta said that there were two factors that would determine whether the United States succeeds in achieving its objectives in Afghanistan.
"Number one, we have to have an Afghanistan that can govern itself, that can move away from corruption, that can, in fact, have the capability to provide the kind of governance that you need in order to be able to truly secure that country and govern that country for the future," he said.
"The other is Pakistan because of the safe havens in Pakistan. And the ability of terrorist groups to move across that border and to attack in Afghanistan and, obviously, the challenge that that represents," he added. (ANI)
Immunity from suits of American servicemen could derail U.S.-Afghan talks on security pact
Xinhua By Abdul Haleem Nov. 24, 2012
KABUL - The United States and Afghanistan have begun negotiations on a security pact that would govern the continued presence of American military forces in the country after the departure in 2014 of the U.S. forces along with the other foreign contingents in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The U.S. is saying that the continued military presence in the country although in a much reduced number is necessary to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan which is still under constant threat from militant groups, notably from the Taliban.
However, Afghan observers believe that the demand by the U.S. of immunity guarantee from legal suits of American soldiers stationed in Afghanistan could be the major stumbling block in the negotiations.
The proposed security pact, according to Afghan observers, would face opposition at home and abroad as some countries in the region interpret the U.S. long-term presence in Afghanistan as a potential threat to the area.
"Allaying the security concerns of Afghanistan's neighboring states is essential ahead of signing any security agreement with U. S.," a retired army general and political analyst Amrullah Aman told Xinhua in a recent interview.
Aman said that establishing U.S. military bases in Afghanistan is a sensitive issue for the neighboring countries and they will continue to oppose unless their concerns are resolved.
Kabul university professor and political analyst Ahmad Zia Rafat also echoed Aman's observation. He said the proposed judicial immunity provision remains a thorn in the security talks with U.S. since the Afghan public opinion is definitely against it.
Around 100,000 NATO-led ISAF, with over 60,000 of them Americans, are presently stationed in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban-led insurgency and to ensure durable peace in the conflict- ridden country.
Talks on security pact are part of the Afghan-U.S. strategic partnership, which was agreed upon by President Hamid Karzai and President Barack Obama during the latter's quick visit to Kabul on May 2 this year.
If signed, the pact would guarantee the presence of thousands of U.S. military troops at least for several years in Afghanistan.
Iran, the immediate neighbor of Afghanistan, has already assailed the talks. Tehran, an arch enemy of the U.S., has said that the proposed security agreement could only contribute to the further destabilization of the region.
In fact, Iran has called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops in Afghanistan even before 2014.
Reports said that several other countries, including Russia, are against the long-term presence of U.S. military in Afghanistan. For many years, Russia has been the dominant foreign power in Afghanistan. When it finally withdrew, the Taliban came in to fill the vacuum and established a hard-line Islamic state.
Washington has announced that it would maintain contingents of troops in Afghanistan to prevent the Taliban and other al-Qaida operatives to resume power in the country.
The U.S. and Afghanistan formally began negotiations on the crafting of a security pact here in Kabul on Nov. 15 this year.
Ambassadcor James Warlick, head of U.S. negotiating team, told newsmen after first round of talks that the negotiations would craft documents "to provide legal authority for the United States armed forces and our civilian components to continue presence in Afghanistan with the full approval of the government of Afghanistan."
Although many Afghans are in favor of having security pact with U.S. and the presence of U.S. military in Afghanistan at least for few more years they insist that U.S. soldiers committing crimes should be tried in Afghan courts in accordance with Afghan laws.
"Afghans would have no problems with having U.S. military bases in Afghanistan. However, guaranteeing judicial protection to American soldiers is a core issue that could hinder the talks," Aman said.
But the U.S., in all its military bases agreements with other countries, has insisted on this provision.
In the Philippines, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that allows the temporary stay of American military servicemen in the country also carries a provision on immunity from suits and this has created irritants between the two countries.
This is prompted some Filipino legislators and militant groups to call for the scrapping of the VFA.
US Ready to Fully Implement Bagram Deal: Prison Chief
Thursday, 22 November 2012 20:30 Written by Abdul Wali Arian Tolo News
The US has shown readiness to fully implement the bilateral agreement on the Bagram detention centre following heavy criticism from President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan delegation sent to investigate the prison, officials said Thursday.
"Some of the prisoners are still under US custody that should be transferred [to Afghan authority]. The US side has shown readiness for the transfer," Afghan military police commander and Bagram Detention Center chief Gen. Ghulam Farooq said.
A delegation sent by Karzai to investigate the US part of the prison reported back on Wednesday that the agreement signed in March on transferring Bagram prison to Afghanistan "has not been fully implemented by the Americans with instances of serious breach of the agreement noticed", a statement from Karzai's office said.
Karzai ordered immediate action be taken on two points, according to the statement.
These orders are to free all inmates that need to be released under Afghanistan's applicable laws and the progress be reported back to the President on Thursday (today), and secondly that all those imprisoned by the Americans since the March agreement was signed, who do not meet conditions for release, must be transferred to Afghan side without delay.
The delegation sent to investigate and meet with US officials included Farooq, the Attorney General, and the Deputy Minister of Defense.
The Americans transferred around 3,000 prisoners to Afghan authority in September, within the six month timeframe allowed in the agreement. However, the US retained custody of another 600 inmates it considered "high risk".
According to reports, as many as 20 prisoners detained by US forces and accused of having ties with the insurgency were released from Bagram and Pul-e-Charkhi detention centers recently.
"I was not against the government when I was arrested and I am not against even now, I want to live in peace," one of the released prisoners told TOLOnews.
There are fears that released inmates suspected of insurgent links will return to the insurgency.
Karzai Condemns Maidan Wardak Suicide Attack
TOLOnews.com Saturday, 24 November 2012
President Hamid Karzai condemned the suicide attack in central Maidan Wardak province on Friday that killed three civilians and wounded more than 90 others.
Karzai expressed his condolences for the families of the victims in a statement, and condemned the attack as perpetrated by "the enemies of Afghanistan".
On Friday, a suicide bomber in a car detonated the explosives near a joint Nato-Afghan security centre in the capital Maidan Shaher, provincial police chief Sardar Mohammad Zazai said.
The attack took place about 8:20 AM local time and the victims of the attack are said to include women and children, he said.
The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with spokesman Zabihulllah Mujahid saying it was carried out to avenge the execution earlier this week of four Taliban detainees.
The four were among the 14 prisoners hanged on Tuesday and Wednesday in Kabul.
The Taliban had warned before the executions took place that it would strike against the US-backed Afghan "puppet government" if the men were put to death.
The Taliban statement claimed that two suicide bombers carried out Friday's attack, and that "large numbers" of Afghan and coalition soldiers were killed.
A local official said that more than 25 houses were also destroyed in the massive suicide attack.
A second suicide attack happened Friday in eastern Nangarhar province, injuring five, according to the spokesman for the 202nd Shamshad Military Corps Ebadullah.
The attack happened on Friday night in the Mohmand Dara district, when a suicide bomber on a motorbike detonated his explosives near a Nato military base, he said.
"All the victims are the Afghan security guards of the military base," he added.
The Nato troops are due to hand over security responsibility to local forces in 2014 as coalition combat forces withdraw from Afghanistan.
Around 66,000 US troops and 37,000 troops of other nations are fighting insurgents in Afghanistan.
Afghans Unimpressed by Pakistan Talks
Negotiators say they secured commitment from Islamabad to encourage insurgents to join talks.
Institute for War and Peace Reporting By Hafizullah Gardesh 23 Nov 2012
A visit to Pakistan by the Afghan body charged with talking to the Taleban has been hailed as a major step forwards towards ending the insurgency. But analysts in Afghanistan expressed grave reservations, saying the High Peace Council had achieved little at home, so the apparent breakthrough achieved in Islamabad was likely to prove illusory.
During a three-day visit ending on November 14, the High Peace Council delegation met Pakistan’s president, prime minister, foreign minister, the army’s chief of staff and various other politicians and Muslim clerics in a bid to get them to engage wholeheartedly with a peace process for Afghanistan. In practical terms, that also means identifying insurgents who are prepared to negotiate, even if they are in custody.
The talks produced a joint declaration calling on Afghan and Pakistani officials and the international community to work together to get insurgents’ names removed from a United Nations blacklist so they could take part in negotiations, and to ensure safe passage for such individuals.
Afterwards, High Peace Council chairman Salahuddin Rabbani said he believed officials in Islamabad were now committed to a talks process involving the Afghan insurgents.
The council’s spokesman Qiamuddin Kashaf said one success from the meetings was that religious scholars in Pakistan who used to describe the Taleban’s Afghan insurgency as a “jihad” were now supportive of negotiations.
At the council’s request, the Pakistani authorities released nine Afghan Taleban members from prison, although none was a particularly senior figure. Five more were freed subsequently.
An unnamed member of the Taleban's Quetta Council indicated that the group would take the proposed negotiations seriously, according to reports in the Pakistani media.
In Afghanistan, the upper house of parliament or Meshrano Jirga poured cold water on the talks, accusing the High Peace Council of indulging in a one-way dialogue – it made concessions to the Taleban, but secured nothing in return. The releases were just a gift to the insurgents, it said.
Afghan commentators were even less impressed, saying the peace council had achieved no progress towards ending the conflict since it was set up in 2009.
"I do not believe the commitments agreed between the High Peace Council and the Pakistani government at all,” political and defence affairs expert Atiqullah Amarkhel said. “The council itself is in question – it should have been dissolved. It has done this just to demonstrate its achievements, to secure its own survival.”
Many analysts, Amarkhel among them, said pledges of good faith from Islamabad were not to be trusted, since its real stategy involved controlling Afghanistan by providing covert assistance to the Taleban to undermine security.
“The Pakistani government isn’t so stupid that it would cede Afghanistan without securing advantages and achieving its aims," Amarkhel said. "Unless Pakistan is confronted with force, it will never abandon its satanic goals in Afghanistan."
Another political analyst, Satar Saadat, agreed that Pakistan had no reason to abandon a winning position.
“It isn’t possible that Pakistan is going to work honestly with Afghanistan on the peace process, and lose the Taleban, its best military force, by persuading it to negotiate with the Afghan government,” he said.
Saadat also suggested that Islamabad wanted to underline its own central role in the future of Afghanistan, especially in light of a parallel peace process that might exclude it, where negotiations would take place with a Taleban office in the Gulf state of Qatar. (See Afghans Demand Ownership of Taleban Talks Process on this initiative.)
"Recently, Britain and the US decided to restart the Qatar negotiation process. Pakistan wants to sabotage this process, and that’s the reason it adopted a softer line on the demands made by the High Peace Council. In my view, the peace council has been entrapped in a Pakistani plot,” he said.
IWPR contacted several members of the High Peace Council for comment, but all refused to be interviewed.
On the streets of Kabul, people were divided on whether the peace process was heading the right way, or any way at all.
“We should not be downhearted. I believe every war ends though negotiations and a common understanding,” university student Nawid said. "Regardless of whether Pakistan’s intentions are honest, we must convince the Taleban – who are Afghans – that war benefits Pakistan, not us, and that they should stop fighting."
Another Kabul resident, Abdul Qayum, disagreed, suggesting that the peace council was a purely symbolic body that had to travel about and hold meetings to use up its budget and justify its existence.
As for Pakistan, he said, “politicians [there] are not like ours – they wouldn’t support anything that wasn’t to their country’s advantage”.
Hafizullah Gardesh is IWPR editor for Afghanistan.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
JALALABAD, Afghanistan, Nov. 23 (Xinhua) -- At least six Afghan security guards were wounded as a suicide car bomb went off outside an Afghan-NATO military base in eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar Friday evening, a provincial police spokesman said.
"The bomber rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into the wall of the base near the entrance of the compound at about 18:40 local time," Housain Mashriqiwall told Xinhua.
He could not confirm whether there was any foreign casualties in the blast.
The camp is located in Torkham, a town close to the border with Pakistan, he said.
No one has claimed responsibility for the attack, though the bombing bears the hallmark of Taliban insurgent group.
Earlier Friday, three civilians were killed and 90 others wounded when the Taliban carried out a suicide bombing on a police station in Wardak province 35 km west of Kabul.
Kabul streets get overdue facelift
The Washington Post By Pamela Constable November 23, 2012
KABUL - On an ordinary weekday, the streets of Kabul are choked with traffic, fetid with clogged drains and crammed with carts displaying potatoes or used sweaters. Shoppers, school children and commuters on bicycles dodge and dart through the hazardous maze, often taking their lives in their hands.
As bad as that is, the ordeal just got much worse.
For the past two months, bulldozers and backhoes have been tearing up dozens of busy city streets, gouging deep gulches for new drainage pipes and dumping piles of gravel, dirt and tangled steel bars in the middle. Workmen swarm between lines of traffic, hopping in and out of ditches and shouting through the din.
The ambitious, $45 million project — financed largely by the government of Japan and supervised by the Kabul mayor’s office — will eventually produce 60 miles of smooth pavement and modern drainage in an aged, war-savaged capital where the population has exploded from 2 million to 5 million in the past decade. For now, though, it has produced mostly chaos and complaints.
“I can’t sleep at night because the machines are so loud, and I can’t breathe during the day because of all the dust,” said Mir Hazrat, 70, the caretaker of a mosque in the Qalai-Fatullah district. He and his friend Fahim Hasibullah, a legless land-mine victim in a wheelchair, spend their days on the sidewalk, watching the work inch ahead. “I just pray they get done before the snow comes,” Hazrat says darkly.
The tumult is most intense along the 10-block commercial stretch between Qalai-Fatullah and Shar-i-Nau, which is lined with a hodgepodge of bakeries, barbers, fish markets, plumbing suppliers and fashion boutiques with mannequins in sequined gowns. Beggars, phone-card hawkers and onion-cart pushers complete the tableau, squeezing between stuck cars and mountains of rubble.
Mohammed Ismael, 65, owns a stylish real estate office on one of the worst-hit blocks. With no customers, he spent last week watching workmen pound metal struts into the ditch below his doorstep. “They should have done this years ago,” he said. “Now the foreigners are leaving, business is dead, and I can’t find a place to park my car.”
Like every project here, the street work has created an economic pyramid that reflects the stark stratification of Afghan society today. At the bottom are the jump-suited laborers, some in their 60s, who earn about $8 per day digging ditches and carrying loads. Many said they were jobless before the project started.
“I feel very lucky to have this job,” said Mohammed Karim, 38, leaning on his shovel. He said he left school after third grade, and has been working with his hands ever since. He spent years doing construction in Iran, but his visa expired last year and he was deported. His wife and six children live in northern Afghanistan’s Takhar province, and he takes a bus to see them once a month. “I bring them money to buy food, and then I come back,” he said.
Further up the ladder are the crew managers, safety inspectors and site engineers, who wear bright yellow vests and carry clipboards. They include Afghan university students working part-time and Pakistanis who have been brought by contractors because there are still not enough skilled Afghans to do technical tasks, even after a decade of international aid and education programs.
The safety officers and traffic police at each work site have a nearly impossible job. In a capital full of powerful men with big Land Cruisers and guns, asking aggressive drivers to wait for a bulldozer or take a detour can be futile.
“We get cursed a lot. I get in arguments with drivers and bodyguards all the time,” said Mowahid Anwari, 29, an engineer at the Qalai-Fatullah site. “It’s the government officials that give us the most trouble. They insist on getting through, and they don’t allow us to get the work done.”
Sometimes the men in SUVs are construction contractors, members of the new Kabul elite with offices in posh districts where the streets were paved long ago. They tour the work sites several times a day, jumping out with bodyguards at their sides and barking orders on walkie-talkies as they clamber over dirt piles in shined shoes.
The intellectual godfather of the project is an Afghan of the old school, a gray-bearded engineer and deputy mayor named Abdul Ahad Wahid. Pointing to the city maps covering his office walls, he insists there is method in the madness that has turned parts of the capital — which was nearly destroyed during the civil war of the 1990s — into a combination strip mine, slalom course and battle zone.
But Wahid has little time to explain the finer points of Kabul’s master plan, which is gradually transforming the city’s infrastructure with support from Japan and the World Bank. He is too busy juggling work delays, traffic jams and a hundred other problems that arise when a small army of men and machines invades a densely crowded city and tries to shut down dozens of streets.
“The population has grown so fast that the entire city is congested. We have no alternative routes where we can send the traffic,” Wahid said. As a result, the project keeps falling behind schedule. “We are pushing the contractors really hard,” he said. “I told them we have to finish before winter. If they work two day shifts and one at night, maybe we will get it done by then.”
The abysmal state of Kabul’s many dirt streets, which turn to dust in summer and mud in winter, has been a source of public criticism for years. But now that they’re finally being improved, Wahid said, “we get nothing but complaints. In the past two years we’ve paved 400 miles of road, built five bridges and the first flyover in Afghanistan, and still nobody’s happy.”
Nazir Mohammed, 40, has worked at his family barber shop in Qalai-Fatullah for half his life. He has seen civil war destroy the street, and Taliban repression empty it. He, too, is unhappy about the mess outside his shop, and he fears the improvement will do little to salvage the city’s economy as foreign troops, aid and investment flee.
But like many Afghans, Mohammed has the resourceful instincts of a survivor. He has kept the twinkling lights turned on above his shelves of shaving cream and cologne, and he has laid a wooden plank over the abyss between his doorway and the street, just in case.
Suicide Bomber Devastates a Government Hub in Afghanistan
New York Times By ALISSA J. RUBIN November 23, 2012
MAIDAN SHAHR, Afghanistan - A suicide bomber driving a truck made his way to the heart of a provincial capital in Afghanistan on Friday and exploded his bomb, leveling many government and security buildings, badly damaging a prison and leaving the governor without an office.
The bomber struck in Maidan Shahr, in Wardak Province, killing two police officers and a young woman and wounding 90 others, including police officers and civilians, officials said. Though the province has long been sharply contested, this was the first such attack on Maidan Shahr, about an hour’s drive from the nation’s capital, Kabul, residents said.
Wardak’s governor, Abdul Majid Khogyani, was keeping track of the casualties on a piece of paper as he met with police officers and elders in the courtyard of the main government compound. It was so badly damaged that none of the rooms in the buildings were usable.
“If I had been here, I and my family would have been killed,” said Mr. Khogyani, gesturing to a guesthouse where he had been living. It was among the most heavily damaged of the structures still standing.
In a statement e-mailed to reporters, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it was revenge for the execution of Taliban prisoners this week by the Afghan government. However, Mr. Khogyani said he believed that his recent efforts to reconcile a number of Wardak’s villages with the government had angered the Taliban, who rely on rural support. He received warnings from security officials on Wednesday, the same day as the executions, that an explosives-laden truck had entered the city, suggesting that the attack had been planned well before the decision to hang the Taliban prisoners.
The bomb was so powerful that not only were windows blown out for blocks, but window and door frames close to the blast were also warped and askew, some wrenched from their fittings so that passers-by could see piles of furniture, glass and chunks of the walls inside the houses. The buildings closest to the blast were reduced to rubble. The bomb left a crater at least 20 feet across and 10 feet deep.
In the aftermath, the streets were filled with the sound of scraping glass as shopkeepers and security guards swept out broken windowpanes, leaving small piles on the streets. “There’s never been anything like this in our city,” said Naquibullah, who has a small grocery and dry goods store and, like many Afghans, uses only one name. “The rural areas and Saydabad are not safe, but the city has always been fine.”
Among the buildings demolished were the local government records office, where Afghans get their national identification card, known as the tazkera; the local office of the National Directorate of Security; a midwife’s center; and a women’s hostel. The prison was so badly damaged that Amir Mohammad Jamshidi, the head of prisons at the Interior Ministry, said the government would have to transfer all 146 prisoners to Pul-i-Charkhi, the main prison in neighboring Kabul Province.
“Today’s suicide attack injured 20 prisoners and 15 police officers,” Mr. Jamshidi said. “Three prisoners who tried to flee during the chaos were arrested by security forces.”
Close to sundown, several residents with bandages on their foreheads or arms wandered back to the scene, looking incredulously at the damage.
One of the medics, who had patched up dozens right after the blast, was back at the site helping American soldiers who had arrived to gather information.
“It was just horrific,” said the medic, who would not give his name. “I treated 45 people today. It’s a disaster; people lost so much.”
Sharifullah Sahak and Jawad Sukhanyar contributed reporting.
Why U.S. troops must stay in Afghanistan
Washington Post By Kimberly Kagan and Frederick W. Kagan Saturday, November 24, 2012
Kimberly Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War. Frederick Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
Will the United States continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia? That question is central to any discussion about U.S. troop presence and mission in Afghanistan. The answer can be yes only if we pursue and support the current strategy, retaining roughly 68,000 troops in Afghanistan into 2014 and about half that number thereafter.
Amateurs can discuss imaginary, over-the-horizon “light footprint” strategies. Professionals must consider logistics. Physics and military reality dictate the minimum number of troops needed to have any U.S. presence in Afghanistan without inviting calamities worse than the events in Benghazi, Libya. The presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan alone permits counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. It’s this simple: Either we keep the necessary number of troops in Afghanistan or operations against al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan cease.
The principal terrorist concentrations in South Asia are in Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas. Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have sought safety in Afghanistan primarily in Konar and Nuristan provinces. U.S. forces could target terrorists without maintaining a ground presence in three ways: using armed Predator drones, special mission units or precision-guided munitions dropped from manned aircraft. Without bases in Afghanistan, the tyranny of distance rules out the first two options; the requirement for accuracy and certainty rules out the last.
North Waziristan is more than 600 miles from the nearest coastline; the other sanctuaries are farther. The U.S. Air Force reports that armed Predator drones have a range of about 1,150 miles — not enough to get to Waziristan and back again from the coast, much less to orbit and observe a target. Special mission units would have to parachute from transport aircraft because no helicopter in the U.S. inventory can fly that far. But they could not return because aircraft cannot land in the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan or in Pakistan. Manned aircraft can drop precision weapons on targets in Afghanistan, but they fly too fast to loiter over potential targets. Their bombs hit precisely what they are aimed at, but fast-moving aircraft cannot ensure that the target was actually there. There is no over-the-horizon solution to targeting terrorists in South Asia.
Bases in Afghanistan obviate all these problems. U.S. forces operating from Khost, Jalalabad and Kandahar can strike targets in Afghanistan (or Pakistan) with Predators and special mission units. Such operations have been critical to the success of counterterrorism operations in this region, including the killing of Osama bin Laden (Abbottabad is about 150 miles east of Jalalabad, 750 miles from the Indian Ocean).
The minimum U.S. footprint to sustain counterterrorism operations requires bases near Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar to reach known terrorist havens (Khost and Jalalabad are less than 100 miles apart but are separated by a 10,000-foot mountain range). Each base requires an airstrip to fly Predators and move supplies by air. Each must also have aircraft ground crews and support the special mission units.
Base security and support impose serious troop requirements. These bases are in dangerous places, and we surely will not entrust the protection of U.S. personnel to local forces as we did in Benghazi. Securing the perimeter would require at least two companies of soldiers (alternating guard duty) and a company-size quick-reaction force — a battalion, in other words. Each base must also have the helicopters needed to move around and conduct operations — at least a combat aviation battalion — and a field medical facility able to handle severe trauma. That adds up to one combat brigade (3,500 soldiers) and one combat aviation brigade (5,000 to 6,000 soldiers).
That’s about 10,000 troops — without counting the supply or command and control of these forces. Even if we supply each base directly by air from outside Afghanistan, with no facility near Kabul, each base still needs logistical elements, probably at least 3,000 to 5,000 combat service support troops. The most idealized version of the limited counterterrorism footprint, therefore, is around 15,000 troops. At that strength we would not be able to advise, enable, support or rely on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Since they, like our NATO allies, depend on U.S. enablers such as reconnaissance, helicopters, medevac and route-clearance packages, most of their operations would cease.
Thus this footprint would not allow our troops, our allies or the Afghans to maneuver. At best our troops and bases would become isolated islands focused on protecting themselves and irrelevant in the fight against al-Qaeda. At worst they would take losses much greater than we suffered in Benghazi.
This minimum counterterrorism footprint requires basic stability near our long-term bases to have any effect. The ANSF must sustain that stability but can only do so supported by U.S. advisers and enablers. Advising the three Afghan National Army corps and Afghan National Police zones around the bases requires at least three advise-and-assist brigades — one per corps and zone — plus support units. Such brigades are smaller than combat brigades, about 1,500 each. They must, in this concept, be located with our counterterrorism forces to avoid having to secure additional bases.
Now we’re up to around 21,500 troops total, without a central headquarters near Kabul or any reliable means of moving by road between our bases. In the real world, neither of those conditions makes sense. Adding up the security forces for a base near Kabul, a theater headquarters, route-clearance packages, theater logisticians and other ancillary units is likely to push the requirement above 30,000.
At that level U.S. forces in Afghanistan could do nothing beyond the minimum necessary to allow us to continue counterterrorism operations in South Asia: no nation-building, no effort to affect the Afghan political process or help the Afghans secure presidential elections in 2014, no development assistance; only defensive operations against the Taliban and other insurgent groups from three bases.
Moving toward this long-term posture in 2013 will likely ensure its failure. As we fall below 68,000 troops, we will have to withdraw from important terrain and lose the ability to maneuver. Our forces won’t be able to operate in most of southern Afghanistan, conduct offensive operations or help the ANSF consolidate and mature. We must create basic stability in 2013 that the ANSF can sustain to set conditions for any long-term U.S. counterterrorism operations. Doing so requires two things this White House appears to want to avoid: keeping U.S. force levels where they are for the next two years; and implementing a serious political strategy aimed not at our enemies but at the people we need to be our long-term partners.
The United States can stabilize Afghanistan if it maintains around 68,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan into 2014, dropping to over 30,000 thereafter (about what we have in Korea). The idea that the war is inevitably lost is a convenient mask behind which decision-makers hide to deflect responsibility for pulling out troops who are making a real difference.
We have argued that the current defeatism about Afghanistan is overdrawn and unfounded. But it is more important for Americans to internalize a simple fact: We must either stabilize Afghanistan at this minimum level or abandon the fight against al-Qaeda and its allies in South Asia. Any alternative “light footprint” strategy is a dangerous mirage.
Our Man in Kabul?
For the U.S. and its allies, Afghanistan is now a two-front war: a military struggle against the Taliban and a bitter political rift with the Afghan president.
The Wall Street Journal By YAROSLAV TROFIMOV November 23, 2012
The darkest pages of Afghan history are reserved for a traitorous king named Shah Shuja. Enthroned by British invaders in 1839, he was ignominiously slaughtered once the routed infidels left.
President Hamid Karzai knows this story well. He hails from the same Pashtun sub-clan as the reviled 19th-century monarch. In their leaflets, poems and songs, the Taliban relentlessly mock Mr. Karzai as the modern-day Shuja, a ruler imposed by outsiders and destined to meet an unhappy end.
In a broken country whose main glory is its history of defeating invading empires, this insult is pernicious and hard to brush off. Brought to power by the U.S. invasion, Mr. Karzai understands that his legitimacy and future survival depend on proving that he is no puppet of the Western unbelievers—no matter how much he actually depends on their money and troops.
This critical contradiction, often misunderstood in the U.S., has crippled President Barack Obama's escalation of the Afghan war, America's longest foreign conflict. It also makes fresh rifts all but inevitable as U.S. troops prepare to come home in two years.
American commanders got a taste of Mr. Karzai's deep ambivalence about the war, ostensibly waged in his government's name, during a visit to Kandahar in 2010. They had flown Mr. Karzai to a meeting with elders in the Taliban's hometown, expecting him to act as a wartime commander and kick off the military offensive that was the centerpiece of Mr. Obama's troop surge.
Instead, as stunned generals looked on, Mr. Karzai called the Taliban "brothers" and told the turbaned elders that the war wouldn't end as long as he was seen as a "foreign stooge." He then asked the elders whether they wanted the offensive to begin. Hearing shouts of "no," Mr. Karzai ordered a halt to the long-planned operation to clear Afghanistan's second-largest city.
This disconnect is now deepening, as Washington begins negotiations on what enduring military presence, if any, the U.S. could have after the Western coalition's mandate ends in 2014. How to deal with an increasingly assertive Mr. Karzai is likely to become one of Mr. Obama's main foreign-policy headaches during his second term.
"We want to be your good friends, but we will never want to be your servants," said the Afghan president's chief of staff, Abdel Karim Khurram, in a rare interview.
Mr. Khurram said that the way America has waged war there since 2001 has been "counterproductive," adding that the Taliban, once seemingly vanquished, are resurgent across Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan. "This region is more radical now than 10 years ago," he said.
A close look at Mr. Karzai's growing alienation from the U.S. helps to explain why so many of America's war objectives in Afghanistan remain unfulfilled. It seems increasingly likely that the U.S. will leave behind both an undefeated Taliban insurgency and a dysfunctional government mired in corruption and utterly dependent on foreign aid.
Mr. Karzai described his relationship with the Obama administration as "tension-ridden" in an interview with The Wall Street Journal earlier this year. To many U.S. officials, these tensions have translated into a two-front war: a military struggle against the Taliban and a more insidious, parallel political tussle with the Afghan leader.
Aware of Afghanistan's history, Mr. Karzai opposed the very notion of a U.S. counterinsurgency campaign, fearing that the insertion of American troops into traditional Afghan villages, and the casualties that they cause, would end up reinvigorating the Taliban. He has also argued that U.S. military operations are meaningless without first confronting Pakistan, which provides havens and support to Afghan insurgents—allowing the Taliban to bounce back after every offensive.
As a result, between the U.S. and Mr. Karzai, said a senior former American diplomat in Kabul, "there is a fundamental difference in defining the threat and in how to deal with the threat."
In Kandahar in 2010, this meant that the U.S. had to scramble to revise the military campaign as it sought to satisfy Mr. Karzai's demands. The military abandoned plans to ring the city with Baghdad-style checkpoints, biometric control posts and walls to filter out insurgents—measures that Mr. Karzai, a Kandahar native himself, thought would erode support for his government. Major sweeps were called off.
These days, the Taliban are still a potent force in Kandahar, carrying out assassinations almost every week. Nationally, the insurgents manage to pull off more attacks, roughly 100 a day, than when Mr. Obama first entered the White House, according to the U.S.-led coalition.
Defying skeptics who once portrayed him as a faintly ridiculous "mayor of Kabul," Mr. Karzai has emerged as a surprisingly powerful figure in his struggle with Washington to claw back Afghan sovereignty. This year he forced the U.S. to stop unilateral Special Operations night raids, a key tactic in the war against the Taliban. He insisted on taking custody of hundreds of insurgent suspects held by the U.S. at the Bagram airfield, releasing many of them in a so-far failed effort to convince the Taliban to open peace talks. He also disbanded Western-backed private security firms and deftly removed cabinet ministers and provincial governors whom he suspected of becoming too close to the U.S.
"Karzai was seen in the West as a weak person. This is wrong: Karzai has dominated the Afghan political scene for a decade, and he wouldn't have been able to do that if he was not a strong personality and a clever tactician," said Kai Eide, a senior Norwegian diplomat who, as head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, closely interacted with the Afghan president. "I don't think anybody underestimates him now."
The lesson that Mr. Karzai has learned from these confrontations with Washington, a former palace insider said, is that the U.S. will end up yielding to him no matter what he demands. "He kept telling us: 'The U.S. has no breaking point; when you push them, the Americans always step back.' He said, 'They will never say that you're a bad boy and we're leaving.' "
In recent weeks, Mr. Karzai further rankled the U.S. by ordering the ouster of international representatives from the country's elections- watchdog agency and by suggesting that Afghanistan may deny U.S. troops immunity from local law after 2014—the deal-breaker in similar talks in Iraq. He also threatened to turn to China and Russia as alternative military allies and intensified his criticism of the coalition, regularly issuing statements that condemn the U.S. for causing civilian casualties.
In this posturing, Mr. Karzai may end up overplaying his hand and misjudging the public mood in the U.S. and in other coalition countries that are increasingly losing patience with Afghanistan and its president, senior U.S. officials warn.
"The constant drumbeat of criticism of the West by President Karzai is corrosive to our long-term relationship," said one senior U.S. official. "While everyone understands President Karzai's concern for Afghan sovereignty, his recent statements cause grave concerns about his willingness to see things through to 2014 and beyond."
A rupture with the U.S. could have potentially devastating consequences for Afghanistan's future. Afghan security forces would likely fracture without billions of dollars in annual foreign assistance, precipitating a civil war of the kind that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Such a national tragedy could even put in question the physical survival of Mr. Karzai and his family.
"Every morning, I wake up at 3 a.m. and ask myself, 'When will he ever get it?' " said one senior Western diplomat. Mr. Karzai, one former close aide retorts, often wonders the same about his Western counterparts.
"There is a chance we will see the whole edifice crashing down spectacularly, either in 2014 or shortly thereafter," said Bruce Riedel, a former Central Intelligence Agency official who headed the Obama administration's task force that recommended escalating the Afghan war in 2009.
At the time, Mr. Obama ordered the tripling of U.S. troop numbers here, to about 100,000, and committed hundreds of billions of dollars to the campaign. More than two-thirds of the 2,158 American troops killed in Afghanistan have died during his presidency.
Yet, as the Obama administration ramped up the war, it kept the country's president at arm's length, or worse. In 2008, Vice President Joe Biden, then a senator, threw down his napkin and walked out of a dinner with Mr. Karzai in Kabul, after Mr. Karzai minimized the extent of corruption in the government. It was a major insult in the rank-conscious Afghan culture.
Ahead of the August 2009 Afghan elections, the late Richard Holbrooke, who served as U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan, openly talked about the need to disempower the Afghan president, if not to replace him outright. "He thought he was dealing with someone like Milosevic," said Afghanistan's senior minister, Hedayat Amin Arsala.
Relations grew especially chilly after Mr. Obama's December 2010 trip to Afghanistan. Arriving at the height of the surge, Mr. Obama was supposed to visit American troops at the Bagram base, an hour's drive north of Kabul, and then to discuss the war over dinner with Mr. Karzai in the presidential palace.
That night, as Mr. Karzai waited for Mr. Obama—kebabs, Kabuli rice and fresh pomegranate juice at the ready—he received a phone call from Bagram: The American president would not be coming to dinner after all. The U.S. blamed the last-minute cancellation on rough winds that made the short chopper flight from Bagram too dangerous. But Mr. Karzai, a palace insider said, didn't buy the excuse, believing that he had been deliberately snubbed by Mr. Obama as punishment for his statements criticizing the course of the war. It didn't help that, whatever the weather in Bagram, it was a windless night in Kabul. Furious, Mr. Karzai went to his residence and refused to take a video conference call with the American president.
In the following months, Mr. Karzai hardened his stance, as civilian casualties and the destruction of Afghan property mounted during the military operations. His anger with what he perceived as occasional lack of respect from Washington translated into erratic statements, such as public threats to join the Taliban. He also embraced conspiracy theories, once accusing the U.S. of flying the Taliban to northern Afghanistan in order to destabilize that part of the country.
"He is a complex character, and he can react very emotionally, especially if he believes that he is being humiliated," said one senior Western official who frequently dealt with Mr. Karzai.
Mr. Karzai himself explains that his rift with the U.S. began emerging under President George W. Bush, well before Mr. Obama took office.
"Issues of private security firms, and civilian casualties, and violations of Afghan homes, and violations of Afghan laws [by the U.S.] had already made things tense," Mr. Karzai said in his interview with the Journal earlier this year. "I have tremendous respect for President Obama. It's not about individual relationships. It's about issues."
The most important of these issues cuts to the very heart of the U.S. war effort. The Afghan president, his aides and foreign diplomats say, was fundamentally opposed to the counterinsurgency strategy that pushed American troops deep into remote, arch-conservative Afghan countryside.
"President Karzai argued that Afghan villages are not really where the source of the problem is, and that the source is mostly outside Afghanistan," said Mr. Arsala, the senior minister who also served as vice president under Mr. Karzai. "But not much was done in that area, and the pressure was put only on the Afghan side of the border—and as a result, there were more civilian casualties. And this has created tension between the Afghan public and the international forces."
Precisely because of such concerns, Mr. Karzai repeatedly frustrated Washington by refusing to welcome Mr. Obama's troop escalation. He also rejected American requests to formally ask other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to send more troops.
Mr. Karzai remains suspicious, too, of the second main pillar of the American war plan: the creation of a 352,000-strong Afghan army and police force. Unlike his security ministers, who eagerly backed the American-funded ramp-up and the gravy train that came with it, Mr. Karzai felt that such a massive force, costing billions of dollars a year, would perpetuate Kabul's dependence on foreigners—and expose him to the possibility of a coup.
"I don't believe in a big army. I never believed in a big army," Mr. Karzai explained in his interview with the Journal. "I believe in an army that isapolitical and one paid for by the Afghan taxpayers' money."
Now that the U.S. is withdrawing from Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai and his aides feel that their concerns have been validated. They openly challenge the Obama administration's optimistic assessments of the surge's outcome.
At a recent meeting with the coalition commander, U.S. Marine Gen. John Allen, a frustrated Mr. Karzai pointed out that the Taliban now operate with impunity at the gates of Kabul, in provinces such as Wardak and Logar that were safer back in 2009, according to officials present there. "Even if there was a surge, it hasn't helped the betterment of the security situation," said Mr. Karzai's spokesman, Aimal Faizi.
This dispute colors the Afghan government's internal debate about whether to allow the U.S. to keep forces in Afghanistan and project regional influence after 2014. "If the 150,000 foreign troops haven't been successful here so far, how could the 10,000, 20,000 or 30,000 that would stay inside their bases after 2014 achieve any success?" said Mr. Khurram, the president's chief of staff. "This is a paradox and a question that must be answered."
The Taliban, for their part, have warned that whoever allows U.S. bases to remain will "go down in history as a traitor and slave like Shah Shuja."
At his meeting with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in Kabul last month, Mr. Karzai openly raised the prospect of ending his country's alliance with Washington.
"Afghans are poor and destitute, but very proud when it comes to the issue of respect to their sovereignty and security," he said, according to a palace statement. "They would even consider discontinuing the strategic partnership [with the U.S.], as any such partnership would have no practical benefit if it does not translate into peace and stability."
In a vicious cycle, such statements fuel the temptation, steadily growing in Washington and other NATO capitals, simply to walk away from Afghanistan. Mr. Karzai's remarks calling for a diminished American role here, a senior U.S. official warned, "fall into the category of 'Be careful of what you wish for.' " — Maria Abi-Habib contributed to this article
Army rushing equipment to fight IEDs to Afghanistan
USA TODAY Tom Vanden Brook November 23. 2012
WASHINGTON - Cheap, simple bombs formed from fertilizer remain the No. 1 killer of U.S.troops in Afghanistan, where 68,000 soldiers and Marines remain.
Shielding troops on foot from buried bombs and killing fleeing insurgents continue to preoccupy Pentagon researchers charged with fielding new gadgets to Afghanistan even as the war there winds down.
Cheap, simple bombs formed from fertilizer remain the No. 1 killer of U.S.troops in Afghanistan, where 68,000 soldiers and Marines remain. They're scheduled to come home by 2014. Insurgents, however, continue to plant bombs in record numbers, and agencies such as the Army's Rapid Equipping Force struggle to keep pace.
The military has mitigated the danger to troops from roadside bombs. Electronic devices jam the signals that detonate some improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and armored trucks known as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles protect them from bombs that do explode.
"But goat paths and bridges are still a problem," says Army Col. Peter Newell, who commands the Rapid Equipping Force. "The insurgent's not going to quit."
So the military is rushing several new technologies to the battlefield of Afghanistan:
• The Minotaur. A remote-controlled, small front-end loader, the Minotaur has attachments that detonate bombs sensitive to weight and radar that penetrates the ground to detect buried IEDs. The Minotaur helps clear small lanes of bombs so that troops can proceed.
• A small, portable "line charge." This device consists of a small rocket that propels a rope filled with explosives about 80 feet. The blast clears a footpath about 1 foot wide, exposing trip wires and buried bombs or disabling them.
• A tiny camera-operated missile that can be fired at insurgents hiding on rooftops, inside buildings or fleeing in cars and small trucks. The Lethal Miniature Aerial Munition System — about the size of a man's forearm — weighs just over 5 pounds and has a range of more than 6 miles.
Newell's group is also deploying mobile laboratories with small forges that can spin out devices within hours. One recent success is an adapter to recharge batteries used in hand-held mine detectors. Soldiers are encouraged, Newell says, to knock on the lab's door with ideas for new gear.
"We want to develop the little MacGyvers out there," Newell said, referring to the TV action hero from the late 1980s with a penchant for crafting gadgets.
Fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan has required foot soldiers to adapt to rapid changes in enemy tactics, the so-called "field craft" born of necessity for infantry troops, says John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a defense policy organization.
"You can do rapid innovation with infantry," Pike said. "The kit is small; it's easy to fabricate. It's not like they're creating a new helicopter. This skill is one of the great take-aways from this war. I hope they don't allow it to atrophy."
Security issues, Afghanistan on agenda in New Zealand-UK defense talks
WELLINGTON, Nov. 23 (Xinhua) -- New Zealand and United Kingdom defense chiefs held talks in Auckland on Friday to discuss common security issues and their defense partnership.
New Zealand Defence Minister Jonathan Coleman said his talks with visiting UK Armed Forces Minister Andrew Robathan were a useful opportunity to maintain the very good working relationship with the British armed forces.
The British armed forces were a key partner for the New Zealand Defence Force, in terms of training, doctrine, interoperability and capability development.
"We are natural partners in a number of areas, and our forces work together very well," Coleman said in a statement Friday.
"The visit is also a welcome signal of the importance the UK places on the bilateral defence relationship forged from a shared history," he said.
"We are discussing areas of common security interest, such as the international draw down in Afghanistan, as well as issues common with many Defence Forces -- how to deal with tightening budgets."
Coleman said the meeting would also confirm a proposed BRITANZ conference, involving the defense chiefs from Britain, Australia and New Zealand in New Zealand next year as well as their traditional links.New Zealand and UK are also partners in the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, along with Australia, Malaysia and Singapore.
Established in 1971, The Five Power Defence Arrangements provides a framework for defence cooperation between the five nations.
'Success in Afghanistan depends on Pak's commitment to fight terrorism': Panetta
Islamabad, Nov 24 (ANI): The success in Afghanistan is dependent on having a Pakistan that is ready to confront terrorism on their side, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta has said.
The Pentagon released the transcript of Panetta's presentation at the Centre for a New American Security, Washington, showing the US defence establishment wishes to rebuild its ties with Pakistan.
According to the Dawn, Panetta was asked 'what chance will the US strategy have to succeed in 2014 if more of the safe havens aren't dealt with more stridently than they've been to date'.
"Look, in many ways the success in Afghanistan is dependent on having a Pakistan that is willing to confront terrorism on their side of the border and prevent safe havens," Panetta replied.
According to the report, Panetta said that there were two factors that would determine whether the United States succeeds in achieving its objectives in Afghanistan.
"Number one, we have to have an Afghanistan that can govern itself, that can move away from corruption, that can, in fact, have the capability to provide the kind of governance that you need in order to be able to truly secure that country and govern that country for the future," he said.
"The other is Pakistan because of the safe havens in Pakistan. And the ability of terrorist groups to move across that border and to attack in Afghanistan and, obviously, the challenge that that represents," he added. (ANI)
Immunity from suits of American servicemen could derail U.S.-Afghan talks on security pact
Xinhua By Abdul Haleem Nov. 24, 2012
KABUL - The United States and Afghanistan have begun negotiations on a security pact that would govern the continued presence of American military forces in the country after the departure in 2014 of the U.S. forces along with the other foreign contingents in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The U.S. is saying that the continued military presence in the country although in a much reduced number is necessary to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan which is still under constant threat from militant groups, notably from the Taliban.
However, Afghan observers believe that the demand by the U.S. of immunity guarantee from legal suits of American soldiers stationed in Afghanistan could be the major stumbling block in the negotiations.
The proposed security pact, according to Afghan observers, would face opposition at home and abroad as some countries in the region interpret the U.S. long-term presence in Afghanistan as a potential threat to the area.
"Allaying the security concerns of Afghanistan's neighboring states is essential ahead of signing any security agreement with U. S.," a retired army general and political analyst Amrullah Aman told Xinhua in a recent interview.
Aman said that establishing U.S. military bases in Afghanistan is a sensitive issue for the neighboring countries and they will continue to oppose unless their concerns are resolved.
Kabul university professor and political analyst Ahmad Zia Rafat also echoed Aman's observation. He said the proposed judicial immunity provision remains a thorn in the security talks with U.S. since the Afghan public opinion is definitely against it.
Around 100,000 NATO-led ISAF, with over 60,000 of them Americans, are presently stationed in Afghanistan to fight the Taliban-led insurgency and to ensure durable peace in the conflict- ridden country.
Talks on security pact are part of the Afghan-U.S. strategic partnership, which was agreed upon by President Hamid Karzai and President Barack Obama during the latter's quick visit to Kabul on May 2 this year.
If signed, the pact would guarantee the presence of thousands of U.S. military troops at least for several years in Afghanistan.
Iran, the immediate neighbor of Afghanistan, has already assailed the talks. Tehran, an arch enemy of the U.S., has said that the proposed security agreement could only contribute to the further destabilization of the region.
In fact, Iran has called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops in Afghanistan even before 2014.
Reports said that several other countries, including Russia, are against the long-term presence of U.S. military in Afghanistan. For many years, Russia has been the dominant foreign power in Afghanistan. When it finally withdrew, the Taliban came in to fill the vacuum and established a hard-line Islamic state.
Washington has announced that it would maintain contingents of troops in Afghanistan to prevent the Taliban and other al-Qaida operatives to resume power in the country.
The U.S. and Afghanistan formally began negotiations on the crafting of a security pact here in Kabul on Nov. 15 this year.
Ambassadcor James Warlick, head of U.S. negotiating team, told newsmen after first round of talks that the negotiations would craft documents "to provide legal authority for the United States armed forces and our civilian components to continue presence in Afghanistan with the full approval of the government of Afghanistan."
Although many Afghans are in favor of having security pact with U.S. and the presence of U.S. military in Afghanistan at least for few more years they insist that U.S. soldiers committing crimes should be tried in Afghan courts in accordance with Afghan laws.
"Afghans would have no problems with having U.S. military bases in Afghanistan. However, guaranteeing judicial protection to American soldiers is a core issue that could hinder the talks," Aman said.
But the U.S., in all its military bases agreements with other countries, has insisted on this provision.
In the Philippines, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that allows the temporary stay of American military servicemen in the country also carries a provision on immunity from suits and this has created irritants between the two countries.
This is prompted some Filipino legislators and militant groups to call for the scrapping of the VFA.
US Ready to Fully Implement Bagram Deal: Prison Chief
Thursday, 22 November 2012 20:30 Written by Abdul Wali Arian Tolo News
The US has shown readiness to fully implement the bilateral agreement on the Bagram detention centre following heavy criticism from President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan delegation sent to investigate the prison, officials said Thursday.
"Some of the prisoners are still under US custody that should be transferred [to Afghan authority]. The US side has shown readiness for the transfer," Afghan military police commander and Bagram Detention Center chief Gen. Ghulam Farooq said.
A delegation sent by Karzai to investigate the US part of the prison reported back on Wednesday that the agreement signed in March on transferring Bagram prison to Afghanistan "has not been fully implemented by the Americans with instances of serious breach of the agreement noticed", a statement from Karzai's office said.
Karzai ordered immediate action be taken on two points, according to the statement.
These orders are to free all inmates that need to be released under Afghanistan's applicable laws and the progress be reported back to the President on Thursday (today), and secondly that all those imprisoned by the Americans since the March agreement was signed, who do not meet conditions for release, must be transferred to Afghan side without delay.
The delegation sent to investigate and meet with US officials included Farooq, the Attorney General, and the Deputy Minister of Defense.
The Americans transferred around 3,000 prisoners to Afghan authority in September, within the six month timeframe allowed in the agreement. However, the US retained custody of another 600 inmates it considered "high risk".
According to reports, as many as 20 prisoners detained by US forces and accused of having ties with the insurgency were released from Bagram and Pul-e-Charkhi detention centers recently.
"I was not against the government when I was arrested and I am not against even now, I want to live in peace," one of the released prisoners told TOLOnews.
There are fears that released inmates suspected of insurgent links will return to the insurgency.
Karzai Condemns Maidan Wardak Suicide Attack
TOLOnews.com Saturday, 24 November 2012
President Hamid Karzai condemned the suicide attack in central Maidan Wardak province on Friday that killed three civilians and wounded more than 90 others.
Karzai expressed his condolences for the families of the victims in a statement, and condemned the attack as perpetrated by "the enemies of Afghanistan".
On Friday, a suicide bomber in a car detonated the explosives near a joint Nato-Afghan security centre in the capital Maidan Shaher, provincial police chief Sardar Mohammad Zazai said.
The attack took place about 8:20 AM local time and the victims of the attack are said to include women and children, he said.
The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack with spokesman Zabihulllah Mujahid saying it was carried out to avenge the execution earlier this week of four Taliban detainees.
The four were among the 14 prisoners hanged on Tuesday and Wednesday in Kabul.
The Taliban had warned before the executions took place that it would strike against the US-backed Afghan "puppet government" if the men were put to death.
The Taliban statement claimed that two suicide bombers carried out Friday's attack, and that "large numbers" of Afghan and coalition soldiers were killed.
A local official said that more than 25 houses were also destroyed in the massive suicide attack.
A second suicide attack happened Friday in eastern Nangarhar province, injuring five, according to the spokesman for the 202nd Shamshad Military Corps Ebadullah.
The attack happened on Friday night in the Mohmand Dara district, when a suicide bomber on a motorbike detonated his explosives near a Nato military base, he said.
"All the victims are the Afghan security guards of the military base," he added.
The Nato troops are due to hand over security responsibility to local forces in 2014 as coalition combat forces withdraw from Afghanistan.
Around 66,000 US troops and 37,000 troops of other nations are fighting insurgents in Afghanistan.
Afghans Unimpressed by Pakistan Talks
Negotiators say they secured commitment from Islamabad to encourage insurgents to join talks.
Institute for War and Peace Reporting By Hafizullah Gardesh 23 Nov 2012
A visit to Pakistan by the Afghan body charged with talking to the Taleban has been hailed as a major step forwards towards ending the insurgency. But analysts in Afghanistan expressed grave reservations, saying the High Peace Council had achieved little at home, so the apparent breakthrough achieved in Islamabad was likely to prove illusory.
During a three-day visit ending on November 14, the High Peace Council delegation met Pakistan’s president, prime minister, foreign minister, the army’s chief of staff and various other politicians and Muslim clerics in a bid to get them to engage wholeheartedly with a peace process for Afghanistan. In practical terms, that also means identifying insurgents who are prepared to negotiate, even if they are in custody.
The talks produced a joint declaration calling on Afghan and Pakistani officials and the international community to work together to get insurgents’ names removed from a United Nations blacklist so they could take part in negotiations, and to ensure safe passage for such individuals.
Afterwards, High Peace Council chairman Salahuddin Rabbani said he believed officials in Islamabad were now committed to a talks process involving the Afghan insurgents.
The council’s spokesman Qiamuddin Kashaf said one success from the meetings was that religious scholars in Pakistan who used to describe the Taleban’s Afghan insurgency as a “jihad” were now supportive of negotiations.
At the council’s request, the Pakistani authorities released nine Afghan Taleban members from prison, although none was a particularly senior figure. Five more were freed subsequently.
An unnamed member of the Taleban's Quetta Council indicated that the group would take the proposed negotiations seriously, according to reports in the Pakistani media.
In Afghanistan, the upper house of parliament or Meshrano Jirga poured cold water on the talks, accusing the High Peace Council of indulging in a one-way dialogue – it made concessions to the Taleban, but secured nothing in return. The releases were just a gift to the insurgents, it said.
Afghan commentators were even less impressed, saying the peace council had achieved no progress towards ending the conflict since it was set up in 2009.
"I do not believe the commitments agreed between the High Peace Council and the Pakistani government at all,” political and defence affairs expert Atiqullah Amarkhel said. “The council itself is in question – it should have been dissolved. It has done this just to demonstrate its achievements, to secure its own survival.”
Many analysts, Amarkhel among them, said pledges of good faith from Islamabad were not to be trusted, since its real stategy involved controlling Afghanistan by providing covert assistance to the Taleban to undermine security.
“The Pakistani government isn’t so stupid that it would cede Afghanistan without securing advantages and achieving its aims," Amarkhel said. "Unless Pakistan is confronted with force, it will never abandon its satanic goals in Afghanistan."
Another political analyst, Satar Saadat, agreed that Pakistan had no reason to abandon a winning position.
“It isn’t possible that Pakistan is going to work honestly with Afghanistan on the peace process, and lose the Taleban, its best military force, by persuading it to negotiate with the Afghan government,” he said.
Saadat also suggested that Islamabad wanted to underline its own central role in the future of Afghanistan, especially in light of a parallel peace process that might exclude it, where negotiations would take place with a Taleban office in the Gulf state of Qatar. (See Afghans Demand Ownership of Taleban Talks Process on this initiative.)
"Recently, Britain and the US decided to restart the Qatar negotiation process. Pakistan wants to sabotage this process, and that’s the reason it adopted a softer line on the demands made by the High Peace Council. In my view, the peace council has been entrapped in a Pakistani plot,” he said.
IWPR contacted several members of the High Peace Council for comment, but all refused to be interviewed.
On the streets of Kabul, people were divided on whether the peace process was heading the right way, or any way at all.
“We should not be downhearted. I believe every war ends though negotiations and a common understanding,” university student Nawid said. "Regardless of whether Pakistan’s intentions are honest, we must convince the Taleban – who are Afghans – that war benefits Pakistan, not us, and that they should stop fighting."
Another Kabul resident, Abdul Qayum, disagreed, suggesting that the peace council was a purely symbolic body that had to travel about and hold meetings to use up its budget and justify its existence.
As for Pakistan, he said, “politicians [there] are not like ours – they wouldn’t support anything that wasn’t to their country’s advantage”.
Hafizullah Gardesh is IWPR editor for Afghanistan.
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