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Afghanistan War: Kandahar Worries About Future As Foreigners Are Set To Go
By HEIDI VOGT Associated Pressm03/11/2012
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - By switching from studying business management to training as a nurse, 19-year-old Anita Taraky has placed a bet on the future of the southern Afghan city of Kandahar – that once foreign troops are gone, private-sector jobs will be fewer but nursing will always be in demand.
Besides, if the Taliban militants recapture the southern Afghan city that was their movement's birthplace and from which they were expelled by U.S.-led forces 11 years ago, nursing will likely be one of the few professions left open to women.
Taraky is one of thousands of Kandaharis who are weighing their options with the approaching departure of the U.S. and its coalition partners. But while she has opted to stay, businessman Esmatullah Khan is leaving.
Khan, 29, made his living in property dealing and supplying services to the Western contingents operating in the city. Property prices are down, and business with foreigners is already shrinking, so he is pulling out, as are many others, he said.
Many are driven by a certainty that the Taliban will return, and that there will be reprisals.
"From our baker to our electrician to our plumber, everyone was engaged with the foreign troops and so they are all targets for the Taliban. And unless the government is much stronger, when the foreign troops leave, that is the end," Khan said.
The stakes are high. Kandahar, Afghanistan's second city, is the southern counterweight to Kabul, the capital. Keeping Kandahar under central government control is critical to preventing the country from breaking apart into warring fiefdoms as it did in the 1990s.
"Kandahar is the gate of Afghanistan," said Asan Noorzai, director of the provincial council. "If Kandahar is secure, the whole country is secure. If it is insecure, the whole country will soon be fighting."
Even though Kandahar city has traffic jams and street hawkers to give it an atmosphere of normality, there are dozens of shuttered stores on the main commercial street, it's almost too easy to find a parking space these days, and shopkeepers are feeling the pinch.
Dost Mohammad Nikzad said his profits from selling sweets have dropped by a half or more in the past year, to about $30 a day, and he has had to cut back on luxuries.
He said that every month he would buy a new shalwar kameez, the tunic favored by Afghan men; now he buys one every other month.
"I only go out to eat at a restaurant once a week. Before I would have gone multiple times a week," Nikzad said, as he stood behind his counter, waiting for customers to show.
The measurements of violence levels contradict each other. On the one hand, many Kandaharis say things are better this year. On the other hand, the types of violence have changed and, to some minds, gotten worse.
"Before, we were mostly worried about bomb blasts. Now ... we are afraid of worse things like assassinations and suicide attacks," said Gul Mohammad Stanakzai, 34, a bank cashier.
Prying open the Taliban grip on Kandahar and its surrounding province has cost the lives of more than 400 international troops since 2001, and many more Afghans, including hundreds of public officials who have been assassinated by the Taliban.
Kandahar province remains the most violent in the country, averaging more than five "security incidents" a day, according to independent monitors. In Kandahar city, suicide attacks have more than doubled so far this year compared with the same period of 2011, according to U.N. figures.
"They are not fighting in the open the way they were before. Instead they are planting bombs and trying to get at us through the police and the army," said Qadim Patyal, the deputy provincial governor.
The Taliban have said in official statements that they are focusing more on infiltrating Afghan and international forces to attack them. In the Kandahar governor's office, armed Afghan soldiers are barred from meetings with American officials lest they turn on them, Patyal said.
And many point out that the "better security" is only relative. By all measures – attacks, bombings and civilian casualties – Kandahar is a much more violent city now than in 2008, before U.S. President Barack Obama ordered a troop surge.
There are no statistics on how many people have left the city of 500,000, but people are fleeing the south more than any other part of the country, according to U.N. figures. About 32 percent of the approximately 397,000 people who were recorded as in-country refugees were fleeing violence in the south, according to U.N. figures from the end of May.
The provincial government, which is supposed to fill the void left by the departing international forces, has suffered heavily from assassinations. It suffered a double blow in July last year with the killing of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half-brother of President Hamid Karzai who was seen as the man who made things work in Kandahar, and Ghulam Haider Hamidi, the mayor of the city.
Now, Noorzai says, he can neither get the attention of ministers in Kabul nor trust city officials to do their jobs.
He remembers 2001, when he and others traveled to the capital flying the Afghan flag which had just been reinstated in place of that of the ousted Taliban. "People were throwing flowers and money on our car, they were so happy to have the Afghan flag flying again," he said.
"When we got power, what did we give them in return? Poverty, corruption, abuse."
Mohammad Omer, Kandahar's current mayor, insists that if people are leaving the city, it is to return to villages they fled in previous years because now security has improved.
Zulmai Hafez disagrees. He has felt like a marked man since his father went to work for the government three years ago, and is too frightened to return to his home in the Panjwai district outside Kandahar city. He refused to have his picture taken or to have a reporter to his home, instead meeting at the city's media center.
"It's the Taliban who control the land, not the government," Hafez said. He notes that the government administrator for his district sold off half his land, saying he would not be able to protect the entire farm from insurgents. Many believe the previous mayor was murdered because he went after powerful land barons.
Land reform is badly needed, and the mayor is angry about people who steal land, but he offers no solution. Kandahar only gets electricity about half the day. The mayor says it's up to the Western allies to fix that. But the foreign aid is sharply down. Aid coming to Kandahar province through the U.S. Agency for International Development, the largest donor, has fallen to $63 million this year from $161 million in 2011, according to U.S. Embassy figures.
The mayor prefers to talk about investing in parks and planting trees. "I can't resolve the electricity problem, but at least I can provide a place in the city for people to relax," he said.
The only people thinking long-term appear to be the Taliban.
"The Americans are going and the Taliban need the people's support, so they are trying to avoid attacks that result in civilian casualties," said Noor Agha Mujahid, a member of the Taliban shadow government for Kandahar province, where he oversees operations in a rural district. "After 2014 ... it will not take a month to take every place back."
One of the biggest worries is the fate of women who have made strides in business and politics since the ouster of the Taliban.
"What will these women do?" asked Ehsanullah Ehsan, director of a center that trains more than 800 women a year in computers, English and business. It was at his center where Anita Taraky studied before switching to nursing.
"Even if the Taliban don't come back, even if the international community just leaves, there will be fewer opportunities for women," he said.
On the outskirts of the city stands one of the grandest projects of post-Taliban Kandahar – the gated community of Ayno Maina with tree-lined cement homes, wi-fi and rooftop satellite dishes.
Khan, the departing businessman, says he bought bought 10 lots for $66,000 in Ayno Maina and has yet to sell any of them despite slashing the price,
He recalled that when he first went to the project office it was packed with buyers. "Now it is full of empty houses. No one goes there," Khan said.
Only about 15,000 of the 40,000 lots have been sold, and 2,400 homes built and occupied, according to Mahmood Karzai, one of the development's main backers and a brother of President Karzai. He argues, however, that prices are down all over Afghanistan, and that Ayno Maina is still viable, provided his brother gets serious about reform that will attract investors.
"Afghanistan became a game," he said over lunch at the Ayno Maina office. "The game is to make money and get the hell out of here. That goes for politicians. That goes for contractors."
He shrugged off allegations that he skimmed money from Ayno Maina, saying the claims were started by competitors in Kabul who assume everyone who is building something in Afghanistan is also stealing money.
He said the money went where it was needed: to Western-style building standards and security.
In downtown Kandahar, a deserted park and Ferris wheel serve as another reminder of thwarted hopes. Built in the mid-2000s, the wheel has been idle for two years according to a guard, Abdullah Jan Samad. It isn't broken, he said, it just needs electricity. A major U.S.-funded project to get reliable electricity to the city has floundered and generators that were supposed to provide a temporary solution only operate part-time because of fuel shortages.
"The government should be paying for maintenance for the Ferris wheel," the guard said. "When you build something you should also make sure to maintain it."
____
Associated Press Writer Mirwais Khan contributed to this report from Kandahar.
Afghanistan: When Should Longest U.S. War End?
NPR November 1, 2012
Transcript
The war in Afghanistan has gone largely unmentioned by both presidential campaigns. With a withdrawal scheduled for 2014, public opinion has turned ever more negative on America's longest war. Amid continued insider attacks, many ask why we continue to risk American lives.
NEAL CONAN, HOST:
This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan in Washington. The war in Afghanistan has gone largely unmentioned by both presidential campaigns. When it does come up, conversations focus not so much on what happening now but withdrawal.
If timetables hold, the U.S. and NATO will hand over combat operations to Afghan forces by the end of 2014, but plans call for American troops to stay on for many years in support and counterterrorism roles.
But if the candidates agree, the public has concluded it's past time to end America's longest war, after a spate of insider attacks by men in Afghan uniforms and continued frustration with a corrupt and ineffectual government. What's at risk if we leave now? What might we gain by staying? We want to hear from those of you personally affected by this war: soldiers, family members, Afghans, nonprofit workers. What convinced you one way or the other?
Our phone number, 800-989-8255. Email talk@npr.org. You can also join the conversation on our website. That's at npr.org. Click on TALK OF THE NATION. Later in the program, the struggles to aid senior citizens and the disabled stranded by Superstorm Sandy.
But first Afghanistan, and we begin with retired General Jack Keane, former vice chief of staff of the Army, now chairman of the Institute for the Study of War. He joins us here in Studio 3A, and nice to have you back on the program.
JACK KEANE: Good to be back, Neal.
CONAN: And in a piece you wrote for the Wall Street Journal, you argued that the principal mission of the United States in Afghanistan, the defeat of al-QaIda, has yet to be achieved.
KEANE: Yeah, that's correct. I mean, the fact of the matter is we've driven a lot of the al-QaIda out of Afghanistan. I mean, that's indisputable. They've tried to come back a number of times. But it has always been to them their number one sanctuary, and they're sitting across the border, as we all know, not too far from Afghanistan itself.
They have relationships with Mullah Omar, and...
CONAN: The head of the Taliban.
KEANE: Taliban leader. And most of us who watch this closely know that this is where they really want to be. In terms of a safe haven, the mountainous terrain, the Taliban support for them, if they were able to regain control, it gives them license and liberty that they have no place else. And they're certainly used to that because that's what they had in the past.
So at times we lose sight of this, and certainly I can understand our listening audience's frustration with a war that has gone on as long as this has. Much of that is due to decisions we made when we prioritized Iraq over Afghanistan and put Afghanistan on a diet from, you know, essentially 2002 all the way to 2009, when the president made a decision to in fact increase our forces and escalate the war so we can possibly bring it to a quicker termination.
CONAN: Yet if there's going to be an eventual turnover to Afghan troops, doesn't the quality of those forces, don't the quality of the government, aren't those principal concerns? And neither seems to be up to the task right now.
KEANE: Those are, you know, absolutely valid points. Let's take the quality of the troops first. I've spent a lot of time on this in my assessments in Afghanistan for General Petraeus and also for General Allen and General Mattis because after all, the future success of Afghanistan will largely be determined by Afghanistan security forces and Afghanistan political leadership. That's indisputable.
The fact of the matter is the Afghan security forces, in our judgments, are adequate to the task, and we spent a lot of time looking at this. We won't know for certain until they're truly conducting independence, but we've now had some insight.
Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, the two places where the surge forces were applied, is where we've enjoyed the greatest success in Afghanistan since 2001 when we deposed the Taliban. We literally have beaten back the Taliban rather dramatically, and now, beginning in the summer, we turned over to the Afghan security forces, and they're doing pretty well.
We didn't know for sure. We thought they would, but it has to go out there and do it. So, now we have some insight, and we'll eventually begin to transition to them in other areas where they're on their own conducting operations. Now let's be realistic also. We're not too far away right now, and we can still provide some assistance, particularly intellectual assistance in terms of how best to handle this particular problem.
And at some point we will not have that. But the early signs are good. What we have to do here is keep the numbers of these forces at the proper level. Right now I know the command wants to keep it at the 352,000 level, which is about...
CONAN: That's for Afghan forces.
KEANE: This is for Afghan forces, 352,000, and that requires funding. And there'll be discussions within the administration, whether it's this one or a new one, you know, at what the appropriate funding levels should be. And we should keep an eye on that. If that goes down - if the funding isn't there to maintain that at 352,000, and it's reduced dramatically, which some options are considering as dramatic a reduction as 352,000 to 230,000, then I do think the future success of Afghanistan will be at risk.
In terms of the political aspect of it, there will be definitely be an election in 2014. I think we have to be realistic about that, in the sense that we probably will not get a transformational government, which will solve all the major problems in Afghanistan.
I think we'll get a government that will make some progress at change, and it'll take a number of governments to truly have the kind of effectiveness that we're used to seeing. And we have to be realistic about it. But it will be an improvement over the Karzai government.
They know the number one issue is corruption. They know they're not well-connected to the people at the local level, although local governance has improved rather dramatically. They know they have work to do, and all the candidates, you know, will be espousing that view. But it will be better, but it's not going to be a panacea for the problems they have.
CONAN: Let's bring another voice into the conversation, retired Army Colonel Andrew Bacevich, professor of international relations and history at Boston University, right now a visiting research fellow at the University of Notre Dame, and he joins us from a studio there in South Bend. Nice to have you back on TALK OF THE NATION.
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, thanks very much.
CONAN: And what's the - what's the risk of withdrawing 68,000 American forces from Afghanistan right now, as the majority of the American people would like to see?
BACEVICH: Well, I mean, I'm listening to General Keane's presentation, and I have to say I find it very persuasive, if in fact, we could conclude that prevailing in Afghanistan, winning in Afghanistan, would somehow equal winning the global war on terrorism, and we could declare victory and go home.
The problem with the analysis is that there's nothing that indicates that success in Afghanistan will solve the larger problem. That Wall Street Journal op-ed that General Keane wrote, that you referred to, he says that while we have been exerting ourselves in Afghanistan in recent years that al-QaIda has grown in strength in Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Sinai, Syria, Iraq.
So it's hard for me to understand how staying the course in Afghanistan gets to the larger problem. Indeed, I'd make an argument that says that to some considerable degree, it's the American penchant for meddling in the Islamic world, in particular the penchant for military intervention and occupation in the Islamic world, that fuels anti-Americanism that finds a violent expression.
And so rather than staying the course in Afghanistan, it seems to me what we ought to do is to ask the much broader question about the war with and which Afghanistan forms a part and say what is the strategy that is going to ultimately lead to success because the strategy we've been doing for the last decade is not putting us on a road to success.
CONAN: It's hard to argue there's a strategy that would be universal to cover Afghanistan, Yemen, where drones are being extensive; Syria, where the United States is not involved; and Iraq, where the United States is not involved.
BACEVICH: I disagree with you. I mean, I think it's too easy for us to say that there is no such strategy. Let's recall that in the wake of 9/11, President George W. Bush did conceive of a strategy. He called the Freedom Agenda, and it was based on the assumption that the vigorous use of American military power was going to enable to us to transform the greater Middle East, to fix the problems in the region so that people would no longer hate us and want to attack us.
Well, that strategy failed, and since then we haven't had one, and quite frankly I think that the argument that General Keane makes about let's stay the course in Afghanistan even as al-QaIda gains in strength elsewhere is indicative of this strategic failure.
CONAN: General Keane, we'll get more from you, and then we'll take a break and get some callers in on the conversation.
KEANE: Yeah, sure. Well, you know, first of all I agree with part of what, you know, the colonel is saying is that we really don't have an effective strategy, and that's absolutely true, and that's why we have the rise of al-QaIda, who's certainly - and they're not the catalyst for the revolutionary change that's taken place in the Middle East, but they certainly are taking advantage of it.
And I think the current administration has an unstated strategy in the Middle East of disengagement. And I think that's why al-QaIda is taking advantage of the situation in Libya and Syria. They're twice the size that they were when we departed from Iraq a little over a year ago.
And now they're clearly on the move, and you don't defeat the al-QaIda by shooting them. That's the harsh reality of it. I agree with the colonel on that. I'm not suggesting we don't - didn't go to war, we shouldn't have gone to war in Afghanistan because obviously we needed to eliminate that sanctuary.
But at the same time, we have to help influence and shape outcomes in the Middle East and give these transitional governments and others who are struggling to deal with political, social and economic injustices that exist in the Middle East and revolutionary change that's taken place, and the al-QaIda and the Iranians see that as advantageous to their political objectives.
We have to be involved in that process. It's not necessarily being involved with guns, it's being involved diplomatically and helping to shore up these transitional governments that are starting to manifest themselves as opposed to pulling away from them.
And I think that happened in Iraq, it just happened in Libya. We should have been training, helping to train those Libyan security forces not with U.S. military but providing contract services for them. They have some money to do it. We have some money, and we could have stayed engaged.
CONAN: Colonel Bacevich, do you see us pulling out of the Middle East, withdrawing?
BACEVICH: It's been over 20 years since I was a colonel, but if you guys want to call me that, that's OK.
(LAUGHTER)
KEANE: I can't help myself, I'm sorry.
BACEVICH: I guess I go back to the argument I was trying to emphasize before. The assumption here, the assumption that has existed at least since 9/11 and frankly that's existed since Carter promulgated the Carter doctrine back in 1980, is that the commitment of U.S. military power to the region will enhance the stability of the region.
I mean, we began trying to stabilize the Persian Gulf. We've ended up trying to stabilize the greater Middle East. But stability has not occurred as a consequence of deploying U.S. military power. The region is less stable today than it was back in 1980, than it was 2001. That ought to cause us to question the effectiveness of U.S. military power as an instrument to address this particular problem.
It could be that the commitment of U.S. military power is in fact counterproductive.
CONAN: We'll call him Professor Andrew Bacevich, with us from the University of Notre Dame in South Bend Indiana; retired General Jack Keane is with us here in Studio 3A. We're talking about the way ahead in Afghanistan. When is it time to end America's longest war? If you've been personally affected, what convinced you one way or the other? Give us a call, 800-989-8255. Email us, talk@npr.org. It's the TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.
(SOUNDBITE OF MUSIC)
CONAN: This is TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News. I'm Neal Conan. After a series of so-called insider attacks earlier this year, U.S. and NATO troops suspended joint patrols and training operations with Afghans. At least 50 international troops were killed by Afghan police or security forces this year.
After closer vetting of those allies, NATO resumed joint operations. Earlier this week, another apparent insider attack. A man wearing an Afghan police uniform shot and killed two British soldiers at a checkpoint in southern Afghanistan.
Polls in the United States show growing dissatisfaction with the war. Both candidates for president agree in general terms to a handover of combat operations by the end of 2014. We're talking today about when to end America's longest war. What's at risk if we leave now? What might we gain by staying?
We want to hear from those of you personally affected; family members, soldiers, Afghans, nonprofit workers. What convinced you one way or the other? 800-989-8255. Email talk@npr.org.
Our guests, former General Jack Keane, with us here in Studio 3A; and Professor Andrew Bacevich at Boston University, now a research fellow at the University of Notre Dame. Josh is with us on the line from Jonesboro in Arkansas.
JOSH: Yes, thank you Neal. My question was about - they stated that, actually both of the gentlemen stated that when we first started, and when we couldn't support the communist occupation in Afghanistan, we actually supplied local militias and supported local militias. And after that, we are now - we're in Afghanistan, we have supported the same militias, the same people.
How can we be sure that we are going to have a structured government in that region in order to affect the surrounding regions when we do withdraw and not keep them from overpowering the government because they still have the strongest regional and tribal power in their areas. What can we do? What steps do you think we can take to actually make this a more structured withdrawal, similar to Iraq?
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, it's probably fair to say some of the former warlords are on the government side, and some are on the other side.
BACEVICH: Well, that's right. I mean referring to my earlier argument about whether or not we're creating stability or instability, I mean, the good news-bad news story of the first Afghanistan war is that the effective covert support for the mujahedeen embarrassed the Soviet Union, may well have contributed to the collapse of communism. Oh, by the way, those same forces have come back and bitten us in the butt.
I mean, to Josh's question we can pontificate all we want to on the radio, but no one can say for certain whether or not the Afghan government and security forces, whenever we leave, will be able to support themselves. My own view would be that at the end of the day, the Afghans are going to determine their own future, and quite frankly, I don't think we have a particularly - any particular ability to shape outcomes in this country.
And we ought to acknowledge the fact that the Afghans have their right to self-determination, and they should be allowed to exercise it. I mean, in the broader sense, just in the way we talk about U.S. policy in this part of the world, we need to manifest some amount of modesty, especially based on the frustrations and disappointments of the past decade.
And the notion that we can shape the course of events in the Islamic world is nonsense, and we need to grow up and get over it.
CONAN: General Keane, we keep reading reports - Josh, thanks very much for the call - about groups in Afghanistan seemingly preparing for the next civil war as they carve up resources in the military and in the police and as they position their various militias in preparation.
KEANE: Well, certainly there's huge political factions inside of Afghanistan, and I mean, the real problem is clearly what the Taliban's objectives are and what they would like to do, you know, strategically, politically and militarily, sometime post-2014. I think that really is a major issue.
And obviously this administration and its instrument, the United States military and the Department of State, are trying to prevent that reality from taking place. And so I still think we have a chance to succeed here. I mean, our challenges have been exacerbated a little bit when the president made the decision to pull the surge forces out, you know, in our judgment prematurely over the objection of General Petraeus, who wanted to keep them in there through 2013, and they're already gone.
So we haven't been able to achieve the same military success in the east that we were able to achieve in the south and give the Afghans, in a sense, a better hand to play, you know, post-2014.
Yeah, make no mistake about it. I mean, this is a complicated issue, and you've got the Pakistanis with their hands in this, as well. They clearly would like to see a relatively stable Afghanistan but not a particularly strong one, and they certainly do not want it geopolitically aligned, you know, with India.
And one of the reasons why they, you know, are providing aid and assistance to the Taliban, which is one of the most tragic occurrences in that part of the world, because every single day, the Taliban are, in fact, affecting the operations on U.S. and NATO forces as a result of that assistance.
So, yeah, geopolitically a very complicated situation to be sure, and post-2014, we'll see what in fact is going to take place as we make this transition. No one, I think, here now can predict it.
CONAN: Let's go next to Rita and Rita with us from Covington in Kentucky.
RITA: Hello.
CONAN: You're on the air, go ahead please.
RITA: Thank you. My son-in-law is sent to Afghanistan or Iraq, you know, while we were going to Iraq, alternately, and the thing is that nobody trains the extended family for making up this gap. The last - last year my daughter went into labor early. My son-in-law was still in Iraq. And so the extended family has to band together in order to make up this gap for, you know, two wars that - because when you consider them historically, they were lost from the very beginning.
You know, Afghanistan is not a cohesive country, it never was. And regardless of whether Saddam Hussein was there or not, he did hold Iraq together, and it was a cohesive country. But now, our families are being torn apart because they have - the government has torn apart these two countries.
CONAN: General Keane, I know this goes to your heart, the strain on the Army and the strain on Army families.
KEANE: Yeah, well, certainly it does, and Rita, we certainly appreciate the service that he's provided and the sacrifice that families are making and that you are making as you touch them. You know, this is a relatively new experience for me in understanding our own history in our country, where never before have we asked so few to do so much for so long for so many.
And one of my real frustrations has been that we've been unwilling to grow the size of the active-duty force that would permit a more reasonable and realistic rotation experience, you know, for these wars that we've been fighting. The military doesn't choose these wars, we execute them.
And there has been an enormous burden on these ground forces, you know, to bear this brunt, you know, for 11 years and for their families, as well. And listen, it's extraordinary the morale and the discipline of this force. The only way you can judge a military is its performance on the battlefield. I mean, and its performance is exceptional.
It is exceptional right now as we speak, as it was a number of years ago, despite the multiple tours. The resiliency of the people who are wearing this uniform and their families and what they are doing is extraordinary, and obviously, there are sacrifices being made here, and we should be doing everything as an institution and as a country to make certain that these families are taken care of.
CONAN: Rita, where is your son-in-law now?
RITA: He's currently in Washington, D.C., but of course we're holding our breath to see whether he's going to be sent back or not.
CONAN: Well, we wish you and him the best of luck. Thanks very much for calling.
RITA: Thank you.
CONAN: All right. Go ahead, Colonel - Andrew Bacevich.
BACEVICH: I mean, there's no question that the U.S. forces have demonstrated astonishing durability that sees people like Rita's son-in-law going back again and again for these tours in these two, long, drawn-out wars. And I think there's no exception - no question that at the level of the individual soldier, down where platoons and companies operate, the force has performed very admirably. But in the larger sense, it hasn't performed in an exceptional way. It hasn't performed in an exceptional way in the sense that it hasn't been able - the United States military, neither in Iraq nor in Afghanistan, has been able to achieve conclusive success in a timely way, anywhere close to the amount of money that the politicians thought they were going to spend when these wars began.
And I think that we ought to acknowledge that disappointment and that failure of performance and engage in a serious conversation about why that disappointment occurred. When you go back and look at the U.S. Army doctrine in the 1990s, U.S. Army doctrine said that there was - that the mission was defined as victory. Nothing short of victory was going to be acceptable. Victory, said the Army - said Army doctrine, was going to be achieved quickly and decisively. Well, guess what? It hasn't happened, and it's not going to happen in Afghanistan. And we ought to have enough guts to ask why the performance has fallen so short of expectations in that regard.
CONAN: Let's see if we can go next to Chad. Chad with us from Saint Louis.
CHAD: Yes. Hello. Thank you. I am a three-time veteran of - two times with the Marine Corps in Iraq (unintelligible) in the last year. I just returned from Afghanistan in April with (unintelligible) the Missouri National Guard. I definitely see that we have not progressed lately. This was a totally different deployment (unintelligible) with - in Afghanistan and we've kind of gotten stagnant. I worked, not side by side, but definitely saw the Afghan military. I don't think that they are going to be prepared anytime in the future to take over.
And I, kind of, question if the government will ever also be able to take over because of the tribal society that they have. I also - what I'm more concerned and my question is: I saw a trend of, as U.S. troops are moving out, civilian contractors coming in and replacing them. And right before I left, I kind of noticed - I was standing in the chow hall line and 60 percent of the people in that line were not wearing a uniform. They were civilians, and I would say 50 percent of those are not U.S. citizens.
So we have all this money that's going into Afghanistan with rebuilding it, and I think if we pull out, what is the plan and where will all the money go? I mean, are we still going to finance private companies and citizens that sometimes don't have ties with the U.S. to fight our war? Or we just - do we walk away and leave it all to the country?
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, what happens in that circumstance?
BACEVICH: Well, I mean, this is one of the ugly secrets of the past decade that really isn't all that much of a secret. I mean, General Keane is correct that the military has been too small for the wars in which we have engaged. The American people are not willing to step up to the plate. Indeed, they haven't been asked to step up to the plate in terms of expanding the size of the force. And so the difference is made up by turning the war in very substantial ways over to contractors. I think this is pernicious. It invites corruption. It undermines the military professional ethic, and quite frankly, is another one of those fundamental questions that that needs to be addressed along with the larger purpose of these wars.
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, now a research fellow at the University of Notre Dame, professor of international relations and history at Boston University, author most recently of "Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War." Also with us, retired Army General Jack Keane, a former vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, chairman of the Institute for the Study of War. You're listening to TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News. And, General Keane, the situation when we withdraw - should it be tomorrow, or should it be 2014 - is it going to be substantially different? What would we achieve in the intervening months?
KEANE: Well, what we're trying to do is to orderly transition, you know, to 2014 where our forces obviously will be gone by the end of that year.
CONAN: Our combat troops.
KEANE: If that - yes. Well, our forces, period, except for a residual force, which will be much smaller, somewhere around 20 or 30,000. So the reality of that is the transition is already taking place, where we're turning over districts and provinces to the Afghan national security forces. And for Chad's sake - and, Chad, thanks so much for all your years of service. It's quite commendable. The fact of the matter is, based on what we are currently doing in those districts and provinces where we pull Marines out and where we're pulling Army troops out in Helmand and Kandahar province, were satisfied with the progress, and that's the good news.
That doesn't mean that this transition will be completely successful. It does not. But the early signs of it are encouraging. And we're not looking at this thing, you know, through a prism of wanting to be successful. I mean, we deal with the harsh reality of what is actually taking place on the ground and face up to it. So we'll see. No one knows for sure, you know, what's that going to be like. The enemy has objectives as well that they're going to want to achieve post-2014.
The contractor issue, I mean, 20 - 75 percent of the ground forces are support troops, in the sense that they support those who do the - who pull triggers, who actually do the engaging and fighting, about 25 percent of them. So to reduce strain on the military, a decision the key leaders made, because of the size of the military, was to have some of that support functions be performed by contractors. And actually, we began to do that in the 1990s in Bosnia, Herzegovina and just reduce the strain on the force on the - if you can reduce that 75 percent and have some contractors do that, those are reasons why those decisions would - are made. Now, you can make arguments, like Andy does, that there's issues involved with those decisions, and they certainly are.
CONAN: I wanted to give Andrew Bacevich the last word. What justifies the lost of blood and treasure in the next months to make a significant difference in Afghanistan?
BACEVICH: Oh, gosh. I'm not - I don't think I am able to answer that question. I mean, the - you're asking me to somehow see - is it possible to justify the sacrifice of American lives in this war? Was it - was the sacrifice made by Americans in a war - in the war in Iraq - justified? Was it worth it? I don't think I can answer that question. All I can say is that whatever value adheres to sacrifice is in the act itself. And I don't think that the rest of us really are in the position to comment on whether or not it was worth it.
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, thanks very much for your time.
BACEVICH: Thank you.
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, with us from South Bend in Indiana where he's a research fellow at the University of Notre Dame at the moment. And our thanks to Jack Keane, a retired Army general, now chairman of the Institute for the Study of War, here in Studio 3A. Appreciate it.
KEANE: Thanks, Neal.
CONAN: When we come back, we'll find out what's being done to help the many older and disabled vet - residents who found themselves facing Superstorm Sandy with nowhere else to go. Stay with us. I'm Neal Conan. It's the TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.
Lawmakers Call for Revision of 2014 Election Date
TOLOnews.com By Saleha Soadat Saturday, 03 November 2012
Afghan lawmakers on Saturday claimed that the election timetable announced by the Independent Election Commission (IEC) went against Afghanistan's constitution because it has a poll for both the president and the provincial councils on the same day.
Parliamentarians criticised the IEC decision saying that the provincial council elections should be held a year before the presidential poll, as per Afghanistan's constitution.
The IEC revealed Wednesday that the date for presidential and provincial councils poll will be Hamal 16, 1391 (April 5 2014).
"Provincial council elections should be held a year prior to presidential election. Holding both elections of the presidential and provincial councils at the same time is in contradiction with the constitution," said Bamyan MP Fakoori Beheshti on Saturday.
Speaker of the parliament Abdurraouf Ibrahimi said the decision need to be studied again by the IEC.
"In the constitution, holding both elections on the same date is not allowed. This issue should be inspected and officials of Independent Elections Commissions should respond," he said.
Aside from this criticism, a number of MPs raised concerns that the start of April was too early to have the election given that some of the roads to remote areas will be closed by wintery conditions.
"On 16th of Hamal, all the [remote] roads are closed due to snow and rain. Therefore, all of the people living in the remote areas will not be able to participate in the elections," said Ghazni MP Mohammed Ali Akhlaqi. Ghor MP Keramuddin Rezazada agreed.
"In most of the areas, such as the provinces Badakhshan, Daikondi, and Bamyan, most of the roads are closed even until quite close to summer, therefore the residents of these areas will be deprived from their civil right as they will not be able to participate in the elections," he said.
Despite the elections being held a year and a half from now, serious concerns have been raised over insecurity, lack of adequate census and population statistics, and the use of old voting cards.
Another pressing issue is the Lower House decision to allow two international members out of seven commissioners in the Electoral Complaints Commissions, a decision heavily criticised by President Hamid Karzai. The Senate is yet to approve the decision.
Credible and Legitimate Elections Are a Must
Olive Branch By Omar Samad November 1, 2012
By announcing April 5, 2014, as the official date to hold the much-anticipated Afghan presidential elections, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) set in motion the critical process of political transfer of power from Hamid Karzai to the next elected president. However, this announcement comes at a time when the country is rife with Taliban–infested violence, is in doubt about the future of reconciliation overtures, is anxious about the end-of-NATO-mission in 2014 and is uncertain about several key transitions - all happening within a short time-frame.
Furthermore, there are contentious outstanding technicalities. These include: lingering questions about pending electoral laws under review by the government, controversy about foreign membership in the election complaints commission (ECC), how to finalize a practical and inclusive voter id/registration mechanism, and guaranteeing non-interference in the electoral process by relevant authorities and strongmen.
Nonetheless, the announcement was welcomed by the president and most Afghan political groupings as an encouraging sign of political will, even though some remain skeptical about an early spring date that is too close to the snow-melting season, which may hamper campaigning and electoral preparations in elevated regions of the country. (See my colleague Scott Smith’s article on how this issue has affected controversies over the electoral date in previous elections).
The announcement also called for provincial council elections to be held at the same time as the main ballot for what was termed as “cost-cutting purposes”. A timetable leading to elections and beyond was also announced in Kabul, Wednesday, by Fazl Ahmad Mahnawi, head of the IEC that includes the following target dates:
April 21, 2013: start of voter registration period
Sept. 16 – Oct. 6, 2013: Candidate nomination/sign-up period
Nov. 17, 2013 – April 2, 2014: Electoral campaign period
April 5, 2014: Election day
April 6 – April 20, 2014: vote tally/counting period
April 7 – May 7, 2014: election complaints evaluation period
May 17, 2014: Final announcement of presidential election results
May 28, 2014: potential run-off vote
June 7, 2014: Final announcement of provincial council election results
Mahnawi expressed optimism about resolving technicalities to assure a free, fair and transparent process, but warned that the “debate is about the challenges posed by security.” Although officials said Afghan forces would take all necessary measures to ensure security during elections, there is little hope that most voter centers in insecure areas could be safeguarded, or that the Taliban would either agree to cessation of hostilities or be politically reconciled by election time.
That whole quandary is tied to larger geo-political and regional dynamics. Most Afghans believe that Pakistan’s decision-making apparatus is indirectly part of the equation. Political elites consider their neighbor’s hazy outlook and continued hedging as a source of concern as they see the Taliban, to a large extent, act as a strategic arm that provides Islamabad with end-game leverage.
Afghans are looking forward to some degree of reckoning on the part of Islamabad’s policy gurus that would promote new ideas based on a mutually-beneficial paradigm best suited to 21st century trends emerging as part of regional cooperation, most importantly among the youth and internet-savvy generation, who are more prone to achieving harmony, prosperity and growth than embracing radical politics.
Despite Taliban opposition to the constitutional order, Mahnawi said the IEC would not discriminate, and is prepared to “pave the way for the armed opposition, be it Taliban or Hezb-e Islami to participate in elections, either as voters or candidates.”
Eventually, an ostracized Taliban would either have to choose between continued fighting that will be hotly contested by a mobilized Afghan population and energized security forces, or enter into earnest talks to end the war for the sake of reconciliation. Most Afghans believe that the best scenario would be for a political settlement by election time that would allow most mainstream Taliban fighters to lay down their arms and join the political process. The benefits of such an outcome would undoubtedly have far reaching consequences across the region.
In case security becomes an impediment to holding inclusive and fair elections in large swaths of the country, a constitutional crisis may lead to annulment, postponement or the declaration of a state-of-emergency, all options that will heighten tensions domestically and eventually lead to regional complications.
On the other hand, if elections were to be held with relative success, viewed as credible by most Afghans and international stakeholders, and result in a legitimate transfer of power to a new elected leader, not only will the process of transition be made easier for Western nations, and the overall post-2001 mission be perceived as a success, but President Karzai would also be toasted as a statesman leaving behind a valuable historic legacy. (See USIP President Jim Marshall’s New York Times op-ed, "How Karzai Could Make Himself a Hero.")
Another upside to holding successful elections in Afghanistan is the fact that the international community would deliver on its multi-year pledges recently made in Bonn II, Chicago and Tokyo to help fund the Afghan security forces and help the country move toward sustainable development and better governance over the next decade. A fraudulent election runs the risk of seriously diminishing donor commitments estimated at more than $16 billion over the next few years, or wiping it out altogether.
Part of the responsibility for a desirable outcome rests on President Karzai, who is in a unique position during this short window of opportunity to steer the country and his own legacy toward an historic path, while another part rests on the political elites to offer Afghans a clear alternative, and a way out of eventual turmoil by coalescing around a solid and unified bloc that can re-energize the Afghan electorate and focus on a reform agenda. Coalition-building outreach and efforts are already underway in the country’s main political bazaars, and will speed up now that a date has been set. Too early to tell though what shape and compositions these blocs might take.
Meanwhile, as political actors wrangle over critical voter registration, electoral law and ECC composition over the next few weeks, a unique opportunity has presented itself to attain a win-win outcome if the Afghan political transition is handled with strategic vision, political will and astuteness within the short time-span ahead of Afghans and international stakeholders, who have invested heavily in this vital post 9-11 mission, and whose aim should be to help secure a successful and sustainable transition and prospects for a better future.
Weak Justice is the Root of Insecurity: Fahim
TOLOnews.com By Shahla Murtazaie Saturday, 03 November 2012
First Vice President Mohammad Qasim Fahim criticised Afghanistan's judicial system on Saturday in a meeting with attorney generals from all over the country, saying that the judicial weakness is at the root of security problems.
Fahim said at the Kabul meeting that when the rule of law accommodates all people equally, the country would be safe.
He was also critical of what he described as a lack of honest cooperation between attorney generals.
"The security forces detain many insurgents under the name of kidnapers, thieves, corrupt, but after a while they are released back and then they return to doing their actions again, and more strongly than before," he told those gathered.
"If they were to be punished under the country's laws, the security will be better in society. [But] now, no one feels safe except of those who are in power," he added.
Head of Oversight and Anti-Corruption Azizullah Lodin, who attended the meeting, said that nearly he will send some documents of high officials to the Attorney General office with evidence embezzlement and land-grabbing among high-ranking government officials.
"Soon, I will send the documents to the Attorney General showing $350 million in embezzlement and grabbing of governmental assets by some ministers and high officials," he said.
Afghan Boxer Challenges Rahimi to Fight
TOLOnews.com By Mir Sayed Saturday, 03 November 2012
An Afghan boxer has challenged Germany-based Afghan boxer Hamid Rahimi to fight him after Rahimi defeated Tanzanian boxer Said Mbelwa last week in Afghanistan's first professional boxing match.
Manqushudin Nasimi, 33, who is a member of the Afghan National Boxing team, wants to face Rahimi in a professional bout.
"I have a message for Hamid Rahimi -- I'm inviting him to fight," Nasimi said.
"The Afghan people are thirsty for peace. I want to hold a boxing competition for peace. Rahimi should decide the date and exact location of the competition," he added.
Nasimi has competed in international boxing competitions and said he has won four gold medals, five silver and five bronze in his past 18 years of fighting in countries including Italy, Germany, Turkey, Spain, India, Pakistan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Austria.
Nasimi has also collected two of the highest honours from the Afghan leaders, receiving both the medal of "Ghazi Mir Bacha Khan" from the former King of Afghanistan and father of the nation, Mohammad Zahir, and the medal of "Ghazi Amaullah Khan" from President Hamid Karzai.
The challenge comes after Rahimi beat his Tanzanian rival Tuesday night in Kabul's Loya Jirga tent under tight security, watched by millions of Afghans around the country via the live broadcast.
Rahimi defeated Mbelwa in round seven of the match to claim the World Boxing Organisation Intercontinental middleweight belt.
After the win, Rahimi said it is a fresh beginning for the country.
In the six years since he began professional boxing, Rahimi has fought 21 times and only lost once.
Rahimi, 29, won the World Boxing Union championship this year. Born in Kabul in 1983, his family fled the ongoing civil war in 1992 and settled in Germany where Rahimi is still based today.
Afghan Embassy Calls for Govt Action on Ariana
TOLOnews.com By Zabihullah Jhanmal Saturday, 03 November 2012
Officials at Afghanistan's Embassy in the United Arab Emirates called on the government to step in on the dispute between the Afghan state carrier Ariana Airlines and the UAE-based group Airlines Company, saying it is in the dark on the matter.
"We did not guarantee the deal and we have no correspondence on it. The previous leadership of the Afghanistan Embassy in the UAE should be asked about this subject," Afghanistan Embassy advisor Mir Fazlullah Rishteen told TOLOnews on Thursday.
A primary court in Sharjah last month ordered Ariana to pay $10.5 million to the Airlines Company over the alleged failure to pay for the hire of aircraft over eight years ago.
The embassy called on the Afghan government to address the UAE court decision which the officials argue is controversial because the UAE company's claim is more than seven years old and the court gave its verdict without the presence of Afghan representatives.
The embassy has rejected the court's decision claiming that Ariana is not in debt to Airlines Company.
Ariana officials told TOLOnews Wednesday that the UAE company made a trumped up claim. They said Ariana's only link to the company was through Ariana hiring planes in 2004 from the now defunct Afghan private company Pamir Airlines which had hired the planes from Airlines Company.
Ariana said it had paid its account to Pamir but the UAE company was seeking to recoup costs that Pamir failed to pay.
"We have not corresponded with the Arabian company, in fact the company did not directly deal with us. Surely they should not be able to take money [from us]," Ariana chief Nasir Ahmad Hakimi said, adding that he believes the court decision was illegal.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
By HEIDI VOGT Associated Pressm03/11/2012
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - By switching from studying business management to training as a nurse, 19-year-old Anita Taraky has placed a bet on the future of the southern Afghan city of Kandahar – that once foreign troops are gone, private-sector jobs will be fewer but nursing will always be in demand.
Besides, if the Taliban militants recapture the southern Afghan city that was their movement's birthplace and from which they were expelled by U.S.-led forces 11 years ago, nursing will likely be one of the few professions left open to women.
Taraky is one of thousands of Kandaharis who are weighing their options with the approaching departure of the U.S. and its coalition partners. But while she has opted to stay, businessman Esmatullah Khan is leaving.
Khan, 29, made his living in property dealing and supplying services to the Western contingents operating in the city. Property prices are down, and business with foreigners is already shrinking, so he is pulling out, as are many others, he said.
Many are driven by a certainty that the Taliban will return, and that there will be reprisals.
"From our baker to our electrician to our plumber, everyone was engaged with the foreign troops and so they are all targets for the Taliban. And unless the government is much stronger, when the foreign troops leave, that is the end," Khan said.
The stakes are high. Kandahar, Afghanistan's second city, is the southern counterweight to Kabul, the capital. Keeping Kandahar under central government control is critical to preventing the country from breaking apart into warring fiefdoms as it did in the 1990s.
"Kandahar is the gate of Afghanistan," said Asan Noorzai, director of the provincial council. "If Kandahar is secure, the whole country is secure. If it is insecure, the whole country will soon be fighting."
Even though Kandahar city has traffic jams and street hawkers to give it an atmosphere of normality, there are dozens of shuttered stores on the main commercial street, it's almost too easy to find a parking space these days, and shopkeepers are feeling the pinch.
Dost Mohammad Nikzad said his profits from selling sweets have dropped by a half or more in the past year, to about $30 a day, and he has had to cut back on luxuries.
He said that every month he would buy a new shalwar kameez, the tunic favored by Afghan men; now he buys one every other month.
"I only go out to eat at a restaurant once a week. Before I would have gone multiple times a week," Nikzad said, as he stood behind his counter, waiting for customers to show.
The measurements of violence levels contradict each other. On the one hand, many Kandaharis say things are better this year. On the other hand, the types of violence have changed and, to some minds, gotten worse.
"Before, we were mostly worried about bomb blasts. Now ... we are afraid of worse things like assassinations and suicide attacks," said Gul Mohammad Stanakzai, 34, a bank cashier.
Prying open the Taliban grip on Kandahar and its surrounding province has cost the lives of more than 400 international troops since 2001, and many more Afghans, including hundreds of public officials who have been assassinated by the Taliban.
Kandahar province remains the most violent in the country, averaging more than five "security incidents" a day, according to independent monitors. In Kandahar city, suicide attacks have more than doubled so far this year compared with the same period of 2011, according to U.N. figures.
"They are not fighting in the open the way they were before. Instead they are planting bombs and trying to get at us through the police and the army," said Qadim Patyal, the deputy provincial governor.
The Taliban have said in official statements that they are focusing more on infiltrating Afghan and international forces to attack them. In the Kandahar governor's office, armed Afghan soldiers are barred from meetings with American officials lest they turn on them, Patyal said.
And many point out that the "better security" is only relative. By all measures – attacks, bombings and civilian casualties – Kandahar is a much more violent city now than in 2008, before U.S. President Barack Obama ordered a troop surge.
There are no statistics on how many people have left the city of 500,000, but people are fleeing the south more than any other part of the country, according to U.N. figures. About 32 percent of the approximately 397,000 people who were recorded as in-country refugees were fleeing violence in the south, according to U.N. figures from the end of May.
The provincial government, which is supposed to fill the void left by the departing international forces, has suffered heavily from assassinations. It suffered a double blow in July last year with the killing of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half-brother of President Hamid Karzai who was seen as the man who made things work in Kandahar, and Ghulam Haider Hamidi, the mayor of the city.
Now, Noorzai says, he can neither get the attention of ministers in Kabul nor trust city officials to do their jobs.
He remembers 2001, when he and others traveled to the capital flying the Afghan flag which had just been reinstated in place of that of the ousted Taliban. "People were throwing flowers and money on our car, they were so happy to have the Afghan flag flying again," he said.
"When we got power, what did we give them in return? Poverty, corruption, abuse."
Mohammad Omer, Kandahar's current mayor, insists that if people are leaving the city, it is to return to villages they fled in previous years because now security has improved.
Zulmai Hafez disagrees. He has felt like a marked man since his father went to work for the government three years ago, and is too frightened to return to his home in the Panjwai district outside Kandahar city. He refused to have his picture taken or to have a reporter to his home, instead meeting at the city's media center.
"It's the Taliban who control the land, not the government," Hafez said. He notes that the government administrator for his district sold off half his land, saying he would not be able to protect the entire farm from insurgents. Many believe the previous mayor was murdered because he went after powerful land barons.
Land reform is badly needed, and the mayor is angry about people who steal land, but he offers no solution. Kandahar only gets electricity about half the day. The mayor says it's up to the Western allies to fix that. But the foreign aid is sharply down. Aid coming to Kandahar province through the U.S. Agency for International Development, the largest donor, has fallen to $63 million this year from $161 million in 2011, according to U.S. Embassy figures.
The mayor prefers to talk about investing in parks and planting trees. "I can't resolve the electricity problem, but at least I can provide a place in the city for people to relax," he said.
The only people thinking long-term appear to be the Taliban.
"The Americans are going and the Taliban need the people's support, so they are trying to avoid attacks that result in civilian casualties," said Noor Agha Mujahid, a member of the Taliban shadow government for Kandahar province, where he oversees operations in a rural district. "After 2014 ... it will not take a month to take every place back."
One of the biggest worries is the fate of women who have made strides in business and politics since the ouster of the Taliban.
"What will these women do?" asked Ehsanullah Ehsan, director of a center that trains more than 800 women a year in computers, English and business. It was at his center where Anita Taraky studied before switching to nursing.
"Even if the Taliban don't come back, even if the international community just leaves, there will be fewer opportunities for women," he said.
On the outskirts of the city stands one of the grandest projects of post-Taliban Kandahar – the gated community of Ayno Maina with tree-lined cement homes, wi-fi and rooftop satellite dishes.
Khan, the departing businessman, says he bought bought 10 lots for $66,000 in Ayno Maina and has yet to sell any of them despite slashing the price,
He recalled that when he first went to the project office it was packed with buyers. "Now it is full of empty houses. No one goes there," Khan said.
Only about 15,000 of the 40,000 lots have been sold, and 2,400 homes built and occupied, according to Mahmood Karzai, one of the development's main backers and a brother of President Karzai. He argues, however, that prices are down all over Afghanistan, and that Ayno Maina is still viable, provided his brother gets serious about reform that will attract investors.
"Afghanistan became a game," he said over lunch at the Ayno Maina office. "The game is to make money and get the hell out of here. That goes for politicians. That goes for contractors."
He shrugged off allegations that he skimmed money from Ayno Maina, saying the claims were started by competitors in Kabul who assume everyone who is building something in Afghanistan is also stealing money.
He said the money went where it was needed: to Western-style building standards and security.
In downtown Kandahar, a deserted park and Ferris wheel serve as another reminder of thwarted hopes. Built in the mid-2000s, the wheel has been idle for two years according to a guard, Abdullah Jan Samad. It isn't broken, he said, it just needs electricity. A major U.S.-funded project to get reliable electricity to the city has floundered and generators that were supposed to provide a temporary solution only operate part-time because of fuel shortages.
"The government should be paying for maintenance for the Ferris wheel," the guard said. "When you build something you should also make sure to maintain it."
____
Associated Press Writer Mirwais Khan contributed to this report from Kandahar.
Afghanistan: When Should Longest U.S. War End?
NPR November 1, 2012
Transcript
The war in Afghanistan has gone largely unmentioned by both presidential campaigns. With a withdrawal scheduled for 2014, public opinion has turned ever more negative on America's longest war. Amid continued insider attacks, many ask why we continue to risk American lives.
NEAL CONAN, HOST:
This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Neal Conan in Washington. The war in Afghanistan has gone largely unmentioned by both presidential campaigns. When it does come up, conversations focus not so much on what happening now but withdrawal.
If timetables hold, the U.S. and NATO will hand over combat operations to Afghan forces by the end of 2014, but plans call for American troops to stay on for many years in support and counterterrorism roles.
But if the candidates agree, the public has concluded it's past time to end America's longest war, after a spate of insider attacks by men in Afghan uniforms and continued frustration with a corrupt and ineffectual government. What's at risk if we leave now? What might we gain by staying? We want to hear from those of you personally affected by this war: soldiers, family members, Afghans, nonprofit workers. What convinced you one way or the other?
Our phone number, 800-989-8255. Email talk@npr.org. You can also join the conversation on our website. That's at npr.org. Click on TALK OF THE NATION. Later in the program, the struggles to aid senior citizens and the disabled stranded by Superstorm Sandy.
But first Afghanistan, and we begin with retired General Jack Keane, former vice chief of staff of the Army, now chairman of the Institute for the Study of War. He joins us here in Studio 3A, and nice to have you back on the program.
JACK KEANE: Good to be back, Neal.
CONAN: And in a piece you wrote for the Wall Street Journal, you argued that the principal mission of the United States in Afghanistan, the defeat of al-QaIda, has yet to be achieved.
KEANE: Yeah, that's correct. I mean, the fact of the matter is we've driven a lot of the al-QaIda out of Afghanistan. I mean, that's indisputable. They've tried to come back a number of times. But it has always been to them their number one sanctuary, and they're sitting across the border, as we all know, not too far from Afghanistan itself.
They have relationships with Mullah Omar, and...
CONAN: The head of the Taliban.
KEANE: Taliban leader. And most of us who watch this closely know that this is where they really want to be. In terms of a safe haven, the mountainous terrain, the Taliban support for them, if they were able to regain control, it gives them license and liberty that they have no place else. And they're certainly used to that because that's what they had in the past.
So at times we lose sight of this, and certainly I can understand our listening audience's frustration with a war that has gone on as long as this has. Much of that is due to decisions we made when we prioritized Iraq over Afghanistan and put Afghanistan on a diet from, you know, essentially 2002 all the way to 2009, when the president made a decision to in fact increase our forces and escalate the war so we can possibly bring it to a quicker termination.
CONAN: Yet if there's going to be an eventual turnover to Afghan troops, doesn't the quality of those forces, don't the quality of the government, aren't those principal concerns? And neither seems to be up to the task right now.
KEANE: Those are, you know, absolutely valid points. Let's take the quality of the troops first. I've spent a lot of time on this in my assessments in Afghanistan for General Petraeus and also for General Allen and General Mattis because after all, the future success of Afghanistan will largely be determined by Afghanistan security forces and Afghanistan political leadership. That's indisputable.
The fact of the matter is the Afghan security forces, in our judgments, are adequate to the task, and we spent a lot of time looking at this. We won't know for certain until they're truly conducting independence, but we've now had some insight.
Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, the two places where the surge forces were applied, is where we've enjoyed the greatest success in Afghanistan since 2001 when we deposed the Taliban. We literally have beaten back the Taliban rather dramatically, and now, beginning in the summer, we turned over to the Afghan security forces, and they're doing pretty well.
We didn't know for sure. We thought they would, but it has to go out there and do it. So, now we have some insight, and we'll eventually begin to transition to them in other areas where they're on their own conducting operations. Now let's be realistic also. We're not too far away right now, and we can still provide some assistance, particularly intellectual assistance in terms of how best to handle this particular problem.
And at some point we will not have that. But the early signs are good. What we have to do here is keep the numbers of these forces at the proper level. Right now I know the command wants to keep it at the 352,000 level, which is about...
CONAN: That's for Afghan forces.
KEANE: This is for Afghan forces, 352,000, and that requires funding. And there'll be discussions within the administration, whether it's this one or a new one, you know, at what the appropriate funding levels should be. And we should keep an eye on that. If that goes down - if the funding isn't there to maintain that at 352,000, and it's reduced dramatically, which some options are considering as dramatic a reduction as 352,000 to 230,000, then I do think the future success of Afghanistan will be at risk.
In terms of the political aspect of it, there will be definitely be an election in 2014. I think we have to be realistic about that, in the sense that we probably will not get a transformational government, which will solve all the major problems in Afghanistan.
I think we'll get a government that will make some progress at change, and it'll take a number of governments to truly have the kind of effectiveness that we're used to seeing. And we have to be realistic about it. But it will be an improvement over the Karzai government.
They know the number one issue is corruption. They know they're not well-connected to the people at the local level, although local governance has improved rather dramatically. They know they have work to do, and all the candidates, you know, will be espousing that view. But it will be better, but it's not going to be a panacea for the problems they have.
CONAN: Let's bring another voice into the conversation, retired Army Colonel Andrew Bacevich, professor of international relations and history at Boston University, right now a visiting research fellow at the University of Notre Dame, and he joins us from a studio there in South Bend. Nice to have you back on TALK OF THE NATION.
ANDREW BACEVICH: Well, thanks very much.
CONAN: And what's the - what's the risk of withdrawing 68,000 American forces from Afghanistan right now, as the majority of the American people would like to see?
BACEVICH: Well, I mean, I'm listening to General Keane's presentation, and I have to say I find it very persuasive, if in fact, we could conclude that prevailing in Afghanistan, winning in Afghanistan, would somehow equal winning the global war on terrorism, and we could declare victory and go home.
The problem with the analysis is that there's nothing that indicates that success in Afghanistan will solve the larger problem. That Wall Street Journal op-ed that General Keane wrote, that you referred to, he says that while we have been exerting ourselves in Afghanistan in recent years that al-QaIda has grown in strength in Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Sinai, Syria, Iraq.
So it's hard for me to understand how staying the course in Afghanistan gets to the larger problem. Indeed, I'd make an argument that says that to some considerable degree, it's the American penchant for meddling in the Islamic world, in particular the penchant for military intervention and occupation in the Islamic world, that fuels anti-Americanism that finds a violent expression.
And so rather than staying the course in Afghanistan, it seems to me what we ought to do is to ask the much broader question about the war with and which Afghanistan forms a part and say what is the strategy that is going to ultimately lead to success because the strategy we've been doing for the last decade is not putting us on a road to success.
CONAN: It's hard to argue there's a strategy that would be universal to cover Afghanistan, Yemen, where drones are being extensive; Syria, where the United States is not involved; and Iraq, where the United States is not involved.
BACEVICH: I disagree with you. I mean, I think it's too easy for us to say that there is no such strategy. Let's recall that in the wake of 9/11, President George W. Bush did conceive of a strategy. He called the Freedom Agenda, and it was based on the assumption that the vigorous use of American military power was going to enable to us to transform the greater Middle East, to fix the problems in the region so that people would no longer hate us and want to attack us.
Well, that strategy failed, and since then we haven't had one, and quite frankly I think that the argument that General Keane makes about let's stay the course in Afghanistan even as al-QaIda gains in strength elsewhere is indicative of this strategic failure.
CONAN: General Keane, we'll get more from you, and then we'll take a break and get some callers in on the conversation.
KEANE: Yeah, sure. Well, you know, first of all I agree with part of what, you know, the colonel is saying is that we really don't have an effective strategy, and that's absolutely true, and that's why we have the rise of al-QaIda, who's certainly - and they're not the catalyst for the revolutionary change that's taken place in the Middle East, but they certainly are taking advantage of it.
And I think the current administration has an unstated strategy in the Middle East of disengagement. And I think that's why al-QaIda is taking advantage of the situation in Libya and Syria. They're twice the size that they were when we departed from Iraq a little over a year ago.
And now they're clearly on the move, and you don't defeat the al-QaIda by shooting them. That's the harsh reality of it. I agree with the colonel on that. I'm not suggesting we don't - didn't go to war, we shouldn't have gone to war in Afghanistan because obviously we needed to eliminate that sanctuary.
But at the same time, we have to help influence and shape outcomes in the Middle East and give these transitional governments and others who are struggling to deal with political, social and economic injustices that exist in the Middle East and revolutionary change that's taken place, and the al-QaIda and the Iranians see that as advantageous to their political objectives.
We have to be involved in that process. It's not necessarily being involved with guns, it's being involved diplomatically and helping to shore up these transitional governments that are starting to manifest themselves as opposed to pulling away from them.
And I think that happened in Iraq, it just happened in Libya. We should have been training, helping to train those Libyan security forces not with U.S. military but providing contract services for them. They have some money to do it. We have some money, and we could have stayed engaged.
CONAN: Colonel Bacevich, do you see us pulling out of the Middle East, withdrawing?
BACEVICH: It's been over 20 years since I was a colonel, but if you guys want to call me that, that's OK.
(LAUGHTER)
KEANE: I can't help myself, I'm sorry.
BACEVICH: I guess I go back to the argument I was trying to emphasize before. The assumption here, the assumption that has existed at least since 9/11 and frankly that's existed since Carter promulgated the Carter doctrine back in 1980, is that the commitment of U.S. military power to the region will enhance the stability of the region.
I mean, we began trying to stabilize the Persian Gulf. We've ended up trying to stabilize the greater Middle East. But stability has not occurred as a consequence of deploying U.S. military power. The region is less stable today than it was back in 1980, than it was 2001. That ought to cause us to question the effectiveness of U.S. military power as an instrument to address this particular problem.
It could be that the commitment of U.S. military power is in fact counterproductive.
CONAN: We'll call him Professor Andrew Bacevich, with us from the University of Notre Dame in South Bend Indiana; retired General Jack Keane is with us here in Studio 3A. We're talking about the way ahead in Afghanistan. When is it time to end America's longest war? If you've been personally affected, what convinced you one way or the other? Give us a call, 800-989-8255. Email us, talk@npr.org. It's the TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.
(SOUNDBITE OF MUSIC)
CONAN: This is TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News. I'm Neal Conan. After a series of so-called insider attacks earlier this year, U.S. and NATO troops suspended joint patrols and training operations with Afghans. At least 50 international troops were killed by Afghan police or security forces this year.
After closer vetting of those allies, NATO resumed joint operations. Earlier this week, another apparent insider attack. A man wearing an Afghan police uniform shot and killed two British soldiers at a checkpoint in southern Afghanistan.
Polls in the United States show growing dissatisfaction with the war. Both candidates for president agree in general terms to a handover of combat operations by the end of 2014. We're talking today about when to end America's longest war. What's at risk if we leave now? What might we gain by staying?
We want to hear from those of you personally affected; family members, soldiers, Afghans, nonprofit workers. What convinced you one way or the other? 800-989-8255. Email talk@npr.org.
Our guests, former General Jack Keane, with us here in Studio 3A; and Professor Andrew Bacevich at Boston University, now a research fellow at the University of Notre Dame. Josh is with us on the line from Jonesboro in Arkansas.
JOSH: Yes, thank you Neal. My question was about - they stated that, actually both of the gentlemen stated that when we first started, and when we couldn't support the communist occupation in Afghanistan, we actually supplied local militias and supported local militias. And after that, we are now - we're in Afghanistan, we have supported the same militias, the same people.
How can we be sure that we are going to have a structured government in that region in order to affect the surrounding regions when we do withdraw and not keep them from overpowering the government because they still have the strongest regional and tribal power in their areas. What can we do? What steps do you think we can take to actually make this a more structured withdrawal, similar to Iraq?
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, it's probably fair to say some of the former warlords are on the government side, and some are on the other side.
BACEVICH: Well, that's right. I mean referring to my earlier argument about whether or not we're creating stability or instability, I mean, the good news-bad news story of the first Afghanistan war is that the effective covert support for the mujahedeen embarrassed the Soviet Union, may well have contributed to the collapse of communism. Oh, by the way, those same forces have come back and bitten us in the butt.
I mean, to Josh's question we can pontificate all we want to on the radio, but no one can say for certain whether or not the Afghan government and security forces, whenever we leave, will be able to support themselves. My own view would be that at the end of the day, the Afghans are going to determine their own future, and quite frankly, I don't think we have a particularly - any particular ability to shape outcomes in this country.
And we ought to acknowledge the fact that the Afghans have their right to self-determination, and they should be allowed to exercise it. I mean, in the broader sense, just in the way we talk about U.S. policy in this part of the world, we need to manifest some amount of modesty, especially based on the frustrations and disappointments of the past decade.
And the notion that we can shape the course of events in the Islamic world is nonsense, and we need to grow up and get over it.
CONAN: General Keane, we keep reading reports - Josh, thanks very much for the call - about groups in Afghanistan seemingly preparing for the next civil war as they carve up resources in the military and in the police and as they position their various militias in preparation.
KEANE: Well, certainly there's huge political factions inside of Afghanistan, and I mean, the real problem is clearly what the Taliban's objectives are and what they would like to do, you know, strategically, politically and militarily, sometime post-2014. I think that really is a major issue.
And obviously this administration and its instrument, the United States military and the Department of State, are trying to prevent that reality from taking place. And so I still think we have a chance to succeed here. I mean, our challenges have been exacerbated a little bit when the president made the decision to pull the surge forces out, you know, in our judgment prematurely over the objection of General Petraeus, who wanted to keep them in there through 2013, and they're already gone.
So we haven't been able to achieve the same military success in the east that we were able to achieve in the south and give the Afghans, in a sense, a better hand to play, you know, post-2014.
Yeah, make no mistake about it. I mean, this is a complicated issue, and you've got the Pakistanis with their hands in this, as well. They clearly would like to see a relatively stable Afghanistan but not a particularly strong one, and they certainly do not want it geopolitically aligned, you know, with India.
And one of the reasons why they, you know, are providing aid and assistance to the Taliban, which is one of the most tragic occurrences in that part of the world, because every single day, the Taliban are, in fact, affecting the operations on U.S. and NATO forces as a result of that assistance.
So, yeah, geopolitically a very complicated situation to be sure, and post-2014, we'll see what in fact is going to take place as we make this transition. No one, I think, here now can predict it.
CONAN: Let's go next to Rita and Rita with us from Covington in Kentucky.
RITA: Hello.
CONAN: You're on the air, go ahead please.
RITA: Thank you. My son-in-law is sent to Afghanistan or Iraq, you know, while we were going to Iraq, alternately, and the thing is that nobody trains the extended family for making up this gap. The last - last year my daughter went into labor early. My son-in-law was still in Iraq. And so the extended family has to band together in order to make up this gap for, you know, two wars that - because when you consider them historically, they were lost from the very beginning.
You know, Afghanistan is not a cohesive country, it never was. And regardless of whether Saddam Hussein was there or not, he did hold Iraq together, and it was a cohesive country. But now, our families are being torn apart because they have - the government has torn apart these two countries.
CONAN: General Keane, I know this goes to your heart, the strain on the Army and the strain on Army families.
KEANE: Yeah, well, certainly it does, and Rita, we certainly appreciate the service that he's provided and the sacrifice that families are making and that you are making as you touch them. You know, this is a relatively new experience for me in understanding our own history in our country, where never before have we asked so few to do so much for so long for so many.
And one of my real frustrations has been that we've been unwilling to grow the size of the active-duty force that would permit a more reasonable and realistic rotation experience, you know, for these wars that we've been fighting. The military doesn't choose these wars, we execute them.
And there has been an enormous burden on these ground forces, you know, to bear this brunt, you know, for 11 years and for their families, as well. And listen, it's extraordinary the morale and the discipline of this force. The only way you can judge a military is its performance on the battlefield. I mean, and its performance is exceptional.
It is exceptional right now as we speak, as it was a number of years ago, despite the multiple tours. The resiliency of the people who are wearing this uniform and their families and what they are doing is extraordinary, and obviously, there are sacrifices being made here, and we should be doing everything as an institution and as a country to make certain that these families are taken care of.
CONAN: Rita, where is your son-in-law now?
RITA: He's currently in Washington, D.C., but of course we're holding our breath to see whether he's going to be sent back or not.
CONAN: Well, we wish you and him the best of luck. Thanks very much for calling.
RITA: Thank you.
CONAN: All right. Go ahead, Colonel - Andrew Bacevich.
BACEVICH: I mean, there's no question that the U.S. forces have demonstrated astonishing durability that sees people like Rita's son-in-law going back again and again for these tours in these two, long, drawn-out wars. And I think there's no exception - no question that at the level of the individual soldier, down where platoons and companies operate, the force has performed very admirably. But in the larger sense, it hasn't performed in an exceptional way. It hasn't performed in an exceptional way in the sense that it hasn't been able - the United States military, neither in Iraq nor in Afghanistan, has been able to achieve conclusive success in a timely way, anywhere close to the amount of money that the politicians thought they were going to spend when these wars began.
And I think that we ought to acknowledge that disappointment and that failure of performance and engage in a serious conversation about why that disappointment occurred. When you go back and look at the U.S. Army doctrine in the 1990s, U.S. Army doctrine said that there was - that the mission was defined as victory. Nothing short of victory was going to be acceptable. Victory, said the Army - said Army doctrine, was going to be achieved quickly and decisively. Well, guess what? It hasn't happened, and it's not going to happen in Afghanistan. And we ought to have enough guts to ask why the performance has fallen so short of expectations in that regard.
CONAN: Let's see if we can go next to Chad. Chad with us from Saint Louis.
CHAD: Yes. Hello. Thank you. I am a three-time veteran of - two times with the Marine Corps in Iraq (unintelligible) in the last year. I just returned from Afghanistan in April with (unintelligible) the Missouri National Guard. I definitely see that we have not progressed lately. This was a totally different deployment (unintelligible) with - in Afghanistan and we've kind of gotten stagnant. I worked, not side by side, but definitely saw the Afghan military. I don't think that they are going to be prepared anytime in the future to take over.
And I, kind of, question if the government will ever also be able to take over because of the tribal society that they have. I also - what I'm more concerned and my question is: I saw a trend of, as U.S. troops are moving out, civilian contractors coming in and replacing them. And right before I left, I kind of noticed - I was standing in the chow hall line and 60 percent of the people in that line were not wearing a uniform. They were civilians, and I would say 50 percent of those are not U.S. citizens.
So we have all this money that's going into Afghanistan with rebuilding it, and I think if we pull out, what is the plan and where will all the money go? I mean, are we still going to finance private companies and citizens that sometimes don't have ties with the U.S. to fight our war? Or we just - do we walk away and leave it all to the country?
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, what happens in that circumstance?
BACEVICH: Well, I mean, this is one of the ugly secrets of the past decade that really isn't all that much of a secret. I mean, General Keane is correct that the military has been too small for the wars in which we have engaged. The American people are not willing to step up to the plate. Indeed, they haven't been asked to step up to the plate in terms of expanding the size of the force. And so the difference is made up by turning the war in very substantial ways over to contractors. I think this is pernicious. It invites corruption. It undermines the military professional ethic, and quite frankly, is another one of those fundamental questions that that needs to be addressed along with the larger purpose of these wars.
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, now a research fellow at the University of Notre Dame, professor of international relations and history at Boston University, author most recently of "Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War." Also with us, retired Army General Jack Keane, a former vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, chairman of the Institute for the Study of War. You're listening to TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News. And, General Keane, the situation when we withdraw - should it be tomorrow, or should it be 2014 - is it going to be substantially different? What would we achieve in the intervening months?
KEANE: Well, what we're trying to do is to orderly transition, you know, to 2014 where our forces obviously will be gone by the end of that year.
CONAN: Our combat troops.
KEANE: If that - yes. Well, our forces, period, except for a residual force, which will be much smaller, somewhere around 20 or 30,000. So the reality of that is the transition is already taking place, where we're turning over districts and provinces to the Afghan national security forces. And for Chad's sake - and, Chad, thanks so much for all your years of service. It's quite commendable. The fact of the matter is, based on what we are currently doing in those districts and provinces where we pull Marines out and where we're pulling Army troops out in Helmand and Kandahar province, were satisfied with the progress, and that's the good news.
That doesn't mean that this transition will be completely successful. It does not. But the early signs of it are encouraging. And we're not looking at this thing, you know, through a prism of wanting to be successful. I mean, we deal with the harsh reality of what is actually taking place on the ground and face up to it. So we'll see. No one knows for sure, you know, what's that going to be like. The enemy has objectives as well that they're going to want to achieve post-2014.
The contractor issue, I mean, 20 - 75 percent of the ground forces are support troops, in the sense that they support those who do the - who pull triggers, who actually do the engaging and fighting, about 25 percent of them. So to reduce strain on the military, a decision the key leaders made, because of the size of the military, was to have some of that support functions be performed by contractors. And actually, we began to do that in the 1990s in Bosnia, Herzegovina and just reduce the strain on the force on the - if you can reduce that 75 percent and have some contractors do that, those are reasons why those decisions would - are made. Now, you can make arguments, like Andy does, that there's issues involved with those decisions, and they certainly are.
CONAN: I wanted to give Andrew Bacevich the last word. What justifies the lost of blood and treasure in the next months to make a significant difference in Afghanistan?
BACEVICH: Oh, gosh. I'm not - I don't think I am able to answer that question. I mean, the - you're asking me to somehow see - is it possible to justify the sacrifice of American lives in this war? Was it - was the sacrifice made by Americans in a war - in the war in Iraq - justified? Was it worth it? I don't think I can answer that question. All I can say is that whatever value adheres to sacrifice is in the act itself. And I don't think that the rest of us really are in the position to comment on whether or not it was worth it.
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, thanks very much for your time.
BACEVICH: Thank you.
CONAN: Andrew Bacevich, with us from South Bend in Indiana where he's a research fellow at the University of Notre Dame at the moment. And our thanks to Jack Keane, a retired Army general, now chairman of the Institute for the Study of War, here in Studio 3A. Appreciate it.
KEANE: Thanks, Neal.
CONAN: When we come back, we'll find out what's being done to help the many older and disabled vet - residents who found themselves facing Superstorm Sandy with nowhere else to go. Stay with us. I'm Neal Conan. It's the TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.
Lawmakers Call for Revision of 2014 Election Date
TOLOnews.com By Saleha Soadat Saturday, 03 November 2012
Afghan lawmakers on Saturday claimed that the election timetable announced by the Independent Election Commission (IEC) went against Afghanistan's constitution because it has a poll for both the president and the provincial councils on the same day.
Parliamentarians criticised the IEC decision saying that the provincial council elections should be held a year before the presidential poll, as per Afghanistan's constitution.
The IEC revealed Wednesday that the date for presidential and provincial councils poll will be Hamal 16, 1391 (April 5 2014).
"Provincial council elections should be held a year prior to presidential election. Holding both elections of the presidential and provincial councils at the same time is in contradiction with the constitution," said Bamyan MP Fakoori Beheshti on Saturday.
Speaker of the parliament Abdurraouf Ibrahimi said the decision need to be studied again by the IEC.
"In the constitution, holding both elections on the same date is not allowed. This issue should be inspected and officials of Independent Elections Commissions should respond," he said.
Aside from this criticism, a number of MPs raised concerns that the start of April was too early to have the election given that some of the roads to remote areas will be closed by wintery conditions.
"On 16th of Hamal, all the [remote] roads are closed due to snow and rain. Therefore, all of the people living in the remote areas will not be able to participate in the elections," said Ghazni MP Mohammed Ali Akhlaqi. Ghor MP Keramuddin Rezazada agreed.
"In most of the areas, such as the provinces Badakhshan, Daikondi, and Bamyan, most of the roads are closed even until quite close to summer, therefore the residents of these areas will be deprived from their civil right as they will not be able to participate in the elections," he said.
Despite the elections being held a year and a half from now, serious concerns have been raised over insecurity, lack of adequate census and population statistics, and the use of old voting cards.
Another pressing issue is the Lower House decision to allow two international members out of seven commissioners in the Electoral Complaints Commissions, a decision heavily criticised by President Hamid Karzai. The Senate is yet to approve the decision.
Credible and Legitimate Elections Are a Must
Olive Branch By Omar Samad November 1, 2012
By announcing April 5, 2014, as the official date to hold the much-anticipated Afghan presidential elections, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) set in motion the critical process of political transfer of power from Hamid Karzai to the next elected president. However, this announcement comes at a time when the country is rife with Taliban–infested violence, is in doubt about the future of reconciliation overtures, is anxious about the end-of-NATO-mission in 2014 and is uncertain about several key transitions - all happening within a short time-frame.
Furthermore, there are contentious outstanding technicalities. These include: lingering questions about pending electoral laws under review by the government, controversy about foreign membership in the election complaints commission (ECC), how to finalize a practical and inclusive voter id/registration mechanism, and guaranteeing non-interference in the electoral process by relevant authorities and strongmen.
Nonetheless, the announcement was welcomed by the president and most Afghan political groupings as an encouraging sign of political will, even though some remain skeptical about an early spring date that is too close to the snow-melting season, which may hamper campaigning and electoral preparations in elevated regions of the country. (See my colleague Scott Smith’s article on how this issue has affected controversies over the electoral date in previous elections).
The announcement also called for provincial council elections to be held at the same time as the main ballot for what was termed as “cost-cutting purposes”. A timetable leading to elections and beyond was also announced in Kabul, Wednesday, by Fazl Ahmad Mahnawi, head of the IEC that includes the following target dates:
April 21, 2013: start of voter registration period
Sept. 16 – Oct. 6, 2013: Candidate nomination/sign-up period
Nov. 17, 2013 – April 2, 2014: Electoral campaign period
April 5, 2014: Election day
April 6 – April 20, 2014: vote tally/counting period
April 7 – May 7, 2014: election complaints evaluation period
May 17, 2014: Final announcement of presidential election results
May 28, 2014: potential run-off vote
June 7, 2014: Final announcement of provincial council election results
Mahnawi expressed optimism about resolving technicalities to assure a free, fair and transparent process, but warned that the “debate is about the challenges posed by security.” Although officials said Afghan forces would take all necessary measures to ensure security during elections, there is little hope that most voter centers in insecure areas could be safeguarded, or that the Taliban would either agree to cessation of hostilities or be politically reconciled by election time.
That whole quandary is tied to larger geo-political and regional dynamics. Most Afghans believe that Pakistan’s decision-making apparatus is indirectly part of the equation. Political elites consider their neighbor’s hazy outlook and continued hedging as a source of concern as they see the Taliban, to a large extent, act as a strategic arm that provides Islamabad with end-game leverage.
Afghans are looking forward to some degree of reckoning on the part of Islamabad’s policy gurus that would promote new ideas based on a mutually-beneficial paradigm best suited to 21st century trends emerging as part of regional cooperation, most importantly among the youth and internet-savvy generation, who are more prone to achieving harmony, prosperity and growth than embracing radical politics.
Despite Taliban opposition to the constitutional order, Mahnawi said the IEC would not discriminate, and is prepared to “pave the way for the armed opposition, be it Taliban or Hezb-e Islami to participate in elections, either as voters or candidates.”
Eventually, an ostracized Taliban would either have to choose between continued fighting that will be hotly contested by a mobilized Afghan population and energized security forces, or enter into earnest talks to end the war for the sake of reconciliation. Most Afghans believe that the best scenario would be for a political settlement by election time that would allow most mainstream Taliban fighters to lay down their arms and join the political process. The benefits of such an outcome would undoubtedly have far reaching consequences across the region.
In case security becomes an impediment to holding inclusive and fair elections in large swaths of the country, a constitutional crisis may lead to annulment, postponement or the declaration of a state-of-emergency, all options that will heighten tensions domestically and eventually lead to regional complications.
On the other hand, if elections were to be held with relative success, viewed as credible by most Afghans and international stakeholders, and result in a legitimate transfer of power to a new elected leader, not only will the process of transition be made easier for Western nations, and the overall post-2001 mission be perceived as a success, but President Karzai would also be toasted as a statesman leaving behind a valuable historic legacy. (See USIP President Jim Marshall’s New York Times op-ed, "How Karzai Could Make Himself a Hero.")
Another upside to holding successful elections in Afghanistan is the fact that the international community would deliver on its multi-year pledges recently made in Bonn II, Chicago and Tokyo to help fund the Afghan security forces and help the country move toward sustainable development and better governance over the next decade. A fraudulent election runs the risk of seriously diminishing donor commitments estimated at more than $16 billion over the next few years, or wiping it out altogether.
Part of the responsibility for a desirable outcome rests on President Karzai, who is in a unique position during this short window of opportunity to steer the country and his own legacy toward an historic path, while another part rests on the political elites to offer Afghans a clear alternative, and a way out of eventual turmoil by coalescing around a solid and unified bloc that can re-energize the Afghan electorate and focus on a reform agenda. Coalition-building outreach and efforts are already underway in the country’s main political bazaars, and will speed up now that a date has been set. Too early to tell though what shape and compositions these blocs might take.
Meanwhile, as political actors wrangle over critical voter registration, electoral law and ECC composition over the next few weeks, a unique opportunity has presented itself to attain a win-win outcome if the Afghan political transition is handled with strategic vision, political will and astuteness within the short time-span ahead of Afghans and international stakeholders, who have invested heavily in this vital post 9-11 mission, and whose aim should be to help secure a successful and sustainable transition and prospects for a better future.
Weak Justice is the Root of Insecurity: Fahim
TOLOnews.com By Shahla Murtazaie Saturday, 03 November 2012
First Vice President Mohammad Qasim Fahim criticised Afghanistan's judicial system on Saturday in a meeting with attorney generals from all over the country, saying that the judicial weakness is at the root of security problems.
Fahim said at the Kabul meeting that when the rule of law accommodates all people equally, the country would be safe.
He was also critical of what he described as a lack of honest cooperation between attorney generals.
"The security forces detain many insurgents under the name of kidnapers, thieves, corrupt, but after a while they are released back and then they return to doing their actions again, and more strongly than before," he told those gathered.
"If they were to be punished under the country's laws, the security will be better in society. [But] now, no one feels safe except of those who are in power," he added.
Head of Oversight and Anti-Corruption Azizullah Lodin, who attended the meeting, said that nearly he will send some documents of high officials to the Attorney General office with evidence embezzlement and land-grabbing among high-ranking government officials.
"Soon, I will send the documents to the Attorney General showing $350 million in embezzlement and grabbing of governmental assets by some ministers and high officials," he said.
Afghan Boxer Challenges Rahimi to Fight
TOLOnews.com By Mir Sayed Saturday, 03 November 2012
An Afghan boxer has challenged Germany-based Afghan boxer Hamid Rahimi to fight him after Rahimi defeated Tanzanian boxer Said Mbelwa last week in Afghanistan's first professional boxing match.
Manqushudin Nasimi, 33, who is a member of the Afghan National Boxing team, wants to face Rahimi in a professional bout.
"I have a message for Hamid Rahimi -- I'm inviting him to fight," Nasimi said.
"The Afghan people are thirsty for peace. I want to hold a boxing competition for peace. Rahimi should decide the date and exact location of the competition," he added.
Nasimi has competed in international boxing competitions and said he has won four gold medals, five silver and five bronze in his past 18 years of fighting in countries including Italy, Germany, Turkey, Spain, India, Pakistan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Austria.
Nasimi has also collected two of the highest honours from the Afghan leaders, receiving both the medal of "Ghazi Mir Bacha Khan" from the former King of Afghanistan and father of the nation, Mohammad Zahir, and the medal of "Ghazi Amaullah Khan" from President Hamid Karzai.
The challenge comes after Rahimi beat his Tanzanian rival Tuesday night in Kabul's Loya Jirga tent under tight security, watched by millions of Afghans around the country via the live broadcast.
Rahimi defeated Mbelwa in round seven of the match to claim the World Boxing Organisation Intercontinental middleweight belt.
After the win, Rahimi said it is a fresh beginning for the country.
In the six years since he began professional boxing, Rahimi has fought 21 times and only lost once.
Rahimi, 29, won the World Boxing Union championship this year. Born in Kabul in 1983, his family fled the ongoing civil war in 1992 and settled in Germany where Rahimi is still based today.
Afghan Embassy Calls for Govt Action on Ariana
TOLOnews.com By Zabihullah Jhanmal Saturday, 03 November 2012
Officials at Afghanistan's Embassy in the United Arab Emirates called on the government to step in on the dispute between the Afghan state carrier Ariana Airlines and the UAE-based group Airlines Company, saying it is in the dark on the matter.
"We did not guarantee the deal and we have no correspondence on it. The previous leadership of the Afghanistan Embassy in the UAE should be asked about this subject," Afghanistan Embassy advisor Mir Fazlullah Rishteen told TOLOnews on Thursday.
A primary court in Sharjah last month ordered Ariana to pay $10.5 million to the Airlines Company over the alleged failure to pay for the hire of aircraft over eight years ago.
The embassy called on the Afghan government to address the UAE court decision which the officials argue is controversial because the UAE company's claim is more than seven years old and the court gave its verdict without the presence of Afghan representatives.
The embassy has rejected the court's decision claiming that Ariana is not in debt to Airlines Company.
Ariana officials told TOLOnews Wednesday that the UAE company made a trumped up claim. They said Ariana's only link to the company was through Ariana hiring planes in 2004 from the now defunct Afghan private company Pamir Airlines which had hired the planes from Airlines Company.
Ariana said it had paid its account to Pamir but the UAE company was seeking to recoup costs that Pamir failed to pay.
"We have not corresponded with the Arabian company, in fact the company did not directly deal with us. Surely they should not be able to take money [from us]," Ariana chief Nasir Ahmad Hakimi said, adding that he believes the court decision was illegal.
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