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Afghanistan stands by bidding process for Hajigak mine
By Jon Stephenson | McClatchy Newspapers
KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines on Saturday rejected allegations of problems in the bidding for one of the country's largest mines, calling it "a fair and transparent process."
In a letter to McClatchy, the ministry's director-general for policy and promotion, A. Jalil Jumriany, said that the selection of bids for four blocks of the Hajigak iron ore mine in central Afghanistan was overseen by a team of Afghan government experts, and that a panel of international advisers found that the process was "conducted according to international standards."
However, Jumriany's letter did not challenge the main points in a McClatchy report published Friday, which raised allegations of flaws in the bidding process and that the winning bidders — a state-led Indian consortium and a Canadian firm — hadn't demonstrated that they could meet production targets.
Among the charges raised by Acatco — an Afghan-American firm that was short-listed for the contracts but failed to win mining rights — was that the winning firms hadn't shown that they'd secured adequate funding for extracting iron ore from Hajigak, often described as the jewel of Afghanistan's mining sector.
Acatco also charged that its bid was rejected despite offering clearer dates for starting production and higher royalty payments to the Afghan government. A complaints commission of the Afghan parliament has taken up the matter and summoned Afghanistan's minister of mines, Wahidullah Shahrani, who failed to appear at a hearing Saturday because he was traveling, according to a spokesman.
In its letter to McClatchy, the ministry accused Acatco's president, Nasir Shansab, of disclosing confidential information and trying to interfere in the bid evaluation process. Shansab denied the allegations.
The ministry said that the contracts to the Steel Authority of India, or SAIL, and Kilo Goldmines, the Canadian firm, hadn't yet been ratified by the Cabinet and that negotiations were ongoing. In announcing the two firms' winning bids on Nov. 28, the ministry said that the projects in Hajigak would "bring billions of dollars in mining investment and thousands of new jobs to Afghanistan."
Its letter was the ministry's first official response to McClatchy, which made repeated attempts to interview Shahrani through Tamim Asey, the ministry's director of public affairs and strategic communication. The ministry did not make Shahrani available for an interview.
(Stephenson is a McClatchy special correspondent.)
Fake senator raises alarm in Afghanistan
AFP – Sun, Feb 19, 2012
Officials in southern Afghanistan were at odds Sunday over a man some believe collected sensitive information by impersonating a parliament member in the violence-wracked country.
The unidentified man claimed to be a senator from Kabul and managed to meet the governor, police chief, and head of intelligence of the restive southern province of Kandahar last week.
"He showed a fake letter from the senate to the governor of Kandahar who then took him to a lot of places he should not have been," Mohammad Alam Ezdyar, deputy chairman of Afghanistan's senate told AFP.
"He was a cheat, he was neither a senator nor a member of provincial council. He has definitely gathered a lot of important and sensitive documents," he said.
Radio Free Europe cited Bismallah Afghanmal, who represents Kandahar in parliament's upper house, saying the supposed senator was taken to several districts in the province where he was given "every possible piece" of security information.
But Zalmai Ayubi, spokesman for the provincial government, said the man wanted to build a museum in Kandahar city and has not obtained any sensitive data.
"Last week this guy who called himself Asif Sarhadi came to Kandahar to build a museum. He introduced himself as a senator from Kabul," he said.
"He met with the police chief, head of Kandahar intelligence and the governor. He did not visit secret locations, he only had this simple informal chat with officials about his museum. We didn't know he was not a senator," he said.
Asif Sarhadi is not the name of any Afghan senator.
The man later disappeared, another source said, adding that his mobile phone was no longer taking calls.
The Taliban said that the fake senator was not one of their agents and they have called journalists to try to find out about him.
But the militants, who have fought a violent insurgency since their government was toppled in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, have in the past used false pretences to gain access to Afghan officials.
In September, a man posing as a Taliban peace envoy travelled from Kandahar to Kabul to meet Burhanuddin Rabbani, Afghanistan's top negotiator, but then blew himself and Rabbani up with a bomb hidden in his turban.
In 2010 a scammer who claimed to be a high-ranking Taliban official was brought by NATO forces to meet President Hamid Karzai for peace talks.
The country has also witnessed a steady string of assaults against Western troops by attackers wearing Afghan police and military uniforms, raising fears about infiltration of the security services.
Former Afghan FM: US Seeking to Legitimize Taliban through Negotiations
Fars News Agency February 19, 2012
TEHRAN (FNA)- A prominent Afghan opposition figure said that the US is seeking to legitimize the Taliban through holding negotiations with the belligerent group, but meantime underlined that the US has failed to attain its goal.
"… No doubt the Taliban is eager to negotiate with the US since the group sees the talks a positive step towards its legitimacy," former Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah told FNA.
He said that some foreign countries have taken advantage and get involved in Afghan peace talks after the Afghan government failed to encourage the Taliban to hold talks with the central government within the geographical borders of Afghanistan.
In January, first Vice-Speaker of the Afghan Senate Mohammad Alam Izadyar criticized the secret talks between the US and the Taliban, and stated that the so-called Afghan Peace Talks lack "transparency".
"Details of the Afghan peace talks should not be hidden from the people of the country," Izadyar told Afghanistan TV at the time.
Taliban announced at the time that they had struck a deal to open a political office in Qatar that could allow for direct negotiations.
In a statement, Zabiullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the Taliban, said that along with a preliminary deal to set up the office in Qatar, the group was asking that Taliban detainees held at the American prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, be released.
Some analysts are skeptical of the prospects for meaningful peace negotiations with the Taliban.
The developments came as Pakistani media revealed last week that the United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has removed the name of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar from the list of "most wanted terrorists."
The report came following Washington's secret meetings with the Taliban after one decade of war. US officials have held several meetings with representatives of the Afghan Taliban leader, headed by Tayyib Agha, in Germany and Qatar over the past months.
During the meetings, the US and Taliban negotiators reached a deal to transfer five Taliban militants, who are under custody in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, to Qatar. The removal of Mullah Omar's name from the terror list comes after the prisoner deal.
The founder of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, has been in hiding since the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan.
Washington removed Mullah Omar's name despite its continued allegations that the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden were behind the September, 11 attacks in the US. Mullah Omar was Bin Laden's staunchest ally and most intimate friend.
The United States invaded Afghanistan 10 years ago under the pretext of eradicating the Taliban, but its failure has forced Washington to turn to negotiation with militants.
The US government has planned new round of talks with the Taliban in early 2012.
8 killed in blast in NW Pakistan
ISLAMABAD, Feb. 19 (Xinhua) -- At least eight people were killed and four others injured in a blast that hit Pakistan's northwest tribal area of Khyber Agency bordering Afghanistan on Sunday, reported local media.
Local Urdu TV channel Aaj said that the blast took place early Sunday morning in the Tirah Vally area of Khyber Agency and it was a remote-control blast.
The target of the blast is local pro-government peace militiamen, it said, adding that the clashes between the militants and the local peace militiamen started late last night and early this morning.
There have been a series of clashes between the militants and the security forces in the afore-said area over the last couple of days.
Earlier on Friday morning, the Pakistani army launched an attack at two militants' hideouts in Khyber Agency with the backup of gunship helicopters, killing five militants and wounding eight others.
In retaliation, militants attacked a vehicle of security forces with a remote-control bomb, killing three security personnel and injuring two others.
Later on Friday night, clashes between the militants and the security forces broke out again in the area, in which 17 militants were killed and one soldier as well as three local peace militiamen also died in the clashes.
Beginning of the End
New York Times Editorial February 18, 2012
Like most Americans, we are eager to see an end to the war in Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s announcement that American forces would step back from a combat role as early as mid-2013 was welcome.
The Pentagon’s intention is to try to shift more responsibility to the Afghan security forces while the Americans are still in the country to provide help with planning, transport and intelligence, and to bail the Afghans out in a crisis. That shift is already happening in less volatile regions. And with the United States and NATO committed to bringing nearly all of their troops home by the end of 2014, the Afghans need to learn to take the lead.
If there is any chance of pulling this off, the United States must improve the quality of the Afghan army and police and strengthen central and local governments. We have yet to see a comprehensive plan for an orderly transition.
More than 1,700 Americans have been killed in Afghanistan over the last decade, and the financial cost for this country, more than $450 billion, is staggering. It did not have to be this way. In order to pursue his misguided war in Iraq, President George W. Bush denied his commanders in Afghanistan the necessary troops and support.
President Obama has done better. He poured more resources into training the Afghan army and police, and a “surge” of an additional 50,000 American troops has weakened the Taliban’s fighting forces. Stepped-up intelligence efforts have led to the deaths of Osama bin Laden and scores of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. The Taliban have recently said they want to talk.
Whether these gains can be maintained is far from clear. What is certain is that there is little time and a huge amount to be done to increase the chances that Afghanistan will not implode once most of the American troops are gone. Here are some areas that must be addressed:
GOVERNANCE There have been some improvements at the federal and regional levels, but the country — hampered by illiteracy and corruption — still lacks a fully functioning government and banking system. After spending huge sums on failed development projects, the State Department is working to better focus and design how it spends these critical dollars. It needs to move quickly.
Since Mr. Obama put in a new diplomatic and military team, public clashes with President Hamid Karzai have declined. But serious frictions remain. Washington and its allies must work harder to get Mr. Karzai to carry out reforms that will encourage credible candidates to run in 2014, when he is supposed to step aside. He must be pressed to take on high-profile corruption cases. He and his ministers need to focus a lot more attention on improving basic services, including the delivery of electricity. To attract foreign investors, Parliament needs to approve a solid legal framework for commercial relations.
TRAINING AND FINANCING AFGHAN FORCES The United States and its allies have spent tens of billions of dollars building an Afghan army and police force from the ground up. They have turned out 330,000 troops, but because of illiteracy, conflicting political loyalties and other problems, there are far too few reliable units.
NATO and the Pentagon are now talking about reducing the Afghan force to 230,000. We don’t know if that is a sound assessment of what is needed or an acknowledgement that Afghanistan and its backers cannot afford to maintain such a large force. The United States will spend $11 billion this year on the 330,000 troops; the cost is expected to drop to around $4 billion annually if the number of troops is reduced and American involvement lessens.
Weeding out less competent soldiers, or corrupt ones, makes sense. But putting tens of thousands of fighters back on the streets could be disastrous. One possible solution would be to shift them to a less costly reserve force.
Afghanistan will not be able to foot the bill for even a smaller force, and Washington will very likely bear most of the cost for years to come. It should not have to do that alone. The Obama administration should use the NATO summit meeting in Chicago in May to press allies to make concrete commitments now. And then hold them to it.
TALKING TO THE TALIBAN Most of the Republican presidential candidates insist the United States must “beat” the Taliban. That sounds good on the stump, but American military commanders say it is impossible now: it would take too many troops, too many years. The best hope is for some kind of political solution.
The Taliban have signaled what they say is a serious interest in negotiations; whether they mean it is anyone’s guess. Still, the administration is right to try. At a minimum, the fact that the Taliban leadership is talking will make more fighters on the ground — and those tempted to join them — question whether the battle is worth it.
The United States has laid down several principles for a settlement: The Taliban must renounce terrorism, cut all ties with Al Qaeda and eventually lay down their weapons and accept the Afghan Constitution — including rights for women. Both Washington and the Afghan government must stick to those principles.
American officials say they are open to a Taliban request for some “confidence-building measures,” including transferring a small number of prisoners from Guantánamo to house arrest in Qatar and lifting some sanctions on individual Taliban negotiators. In return, the Americans must, at a minimum, get assurances that the prisoners will not return to the battlefield, and that the Taliban will renounce terrorism and seriously engage in peace talks.
ECONOMIC SUPPORT Paying for the army is not the only financial problem. Afghanistan faces a potentially devastating economic slowdown when American and coalition troops and aid workers depart. The World Bank estimates that an extraordinary 97 percent of the country’s $28 billion gross domestic product comes from military and development aid and the in-country spending of foreign troops.
At a conference in Bonn, Germany, last year, President Karzai requested $10 billion a year in foreign support through 2025. The United States and its partners promised to help. Vague promises are not enough. Housing prices, salaries, store sales and factory orders are already dropping as coalition troops and aid workers prepare to withdraw. The allies need to have a concrete plan — a mix of aid and investment in the minerals industry and other private projects — in place in time for the NATO meeting.
RESIDUAL AMERICAN FORCE Defense Secretary Panetta told Congress last week that the United States was close to signing an agreement with Mr. Karzai to allow an undefined number (perhaps 15,000) Special Operations soldiers to remain after 2014. These forces would hunt down militants, and would provide air cover, intelligence, logistical support and training for Afghan forces.
We would like to see all American troops gone. But continuing to pound Al Qaeda, and increasing the odds that the Taliban do not again seize power, are in Washington’s strategic interest. The agreement would also send a message to the region that this time the United States plans to stay engaged. Two issues are blocking the deal: Mr. Karzai’s demand to immediately take control of American-run detention facilities and of nighttime raids that he says have killed too many civilians. The United States should keep insisting that Afghans can take over the raids only when they are capable. The detention facilities should be shut down.
DEALING WITH PAKISTAN Islamabad’s continued collusion with the Taliban and other extremist groups is the biggest threat to Afghanistan’s long-term stability. A decade after the Bush administration ordered them to pick sides, the Pakistanis are still cynically playing all sides.
Billions in aid have not changed their thinking. Nor has the recent suspension of some of that aid. Nor has the fact that the extremists seem nearly as eager to bring down Pakistan’s government. The Army and intelligence services are still determined to use the extremists as proxies in their endless competition with India.
The fact that Pakistan did not stop the Taliban from agreeing to negotiations with Washington may be a rare positive sign. But with Islamabad there are never any guarantees. As frustrating as it is, the administration must keep trying to cajole and pressure Pakistan into cooperating. The United States really has no choice, not least because a collapse in Pakistan — with 100 plus nuclear weapons — would be even more disastrous than a collapse in Kabul.
Bodyguards and business secure peace in Afghan west
AFP By Claire Truscott 19/02/2012
Afghan businessman Seros Alaaf paid a $300,000 ransom to free his uncle from the clutches of the mafia who once stalked Herat. Now he takes no chances, with five bodyguards at his side.
Recalling the most troubled days in Afghanistan's western city, the powerful figure in the Herat Chamber of Commerce and Industry casts around his plush office, part of the business boom that is helping to safeguard the city.
"There are far fewer kidnappings these days, but it hasn't stopped, and the only reason it's less is that whoever has money can also pay for five to 10 bodyguards," said Alaaf, blaming weak governance for the mafia's rule.
But seven months after Italian troops handed responsibility for the city to Afghans, as part of the first phase of returning control to local security forces nationwide by the end of 2014, the government says security has improved.
The Taliban are not the main threat in Herat. Instead rivalries for power and influence in the city fuel much of the trouble, with gunmen loyal to mujahideen leaders Ismail Khan and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar still at large.
Although it is early days and political opponents challenge claims of an improvement, Herat could be considered an example of how managing factions and a relatively flourishing economy can keep a region largely free of violence.
But under the surface, there are also signs of the festering rivalries, ethnic and political, that experts consider the potential undoing of a future political settlement.
The province's religious leader, Maulavi Khudadad Saleh, a conservative popular among Herat's Pashtuns, is at loggerheads with the city's Westernised technocrat governor Daud Shah Saba, a Tajik.
Government is dominated by those affiliated with the Jamiat-e-Islami Islamic party, which Ismail Khan led in the western region during the Soviet war and subsequent civil conflict.
But they are kept in check at least partly by Saba, who although from Herat has had a career in international development and is disconnected from the main local power factions.
Unlike the checkpoints and blast walls of the Afghan capital, Herat's roads are free from military intrusion and its police largely unarmed.
Only 320 police work in Herat city, while in the province's most remote district of Farsi, 160 kilometres (100 miles) away, just 42 patrol.
"It's below any kind of standard you may imagine," says Saba. "Still security's pretty good."
Sayed Ahmad Sami, the region's police chief and a fellow Tajik, agrees.
"Before transition there were a lot of problems like abduction and organised crime. Now it's close to zero. For the past month there have been no abductions," he told AFP.
Change has come piecemeal and one deal at a time. Three years ago the police force was divided into factions loyal to Ismail Khan and religious leader Saleh, and kidnapping was the biggest racket in town, with ransoms fetching up to $600,000.
The capture of a well-known money changer in late 2008 led to a shopkeepers' strike, and ultimately the sacking of 12 police commanders and the former governor who was accused of being in league with the kidnappers.
Government officials say security along major highways is improving and plans for major economic projects bring promise of future dividends.
The Italians are agreeing a $150 million soft loan to help make Herat a "transport hub" by building up the airport and creating a bypass road around the city.
Security for a major hydroelectric dam project was being provided by a protection racket whose members were extorting money from villagers. Kabul intervened last summer and the security setup was changed.
In October 2009, former Herat mayor Ghulam Yahya Akbari, dubbed the "Tajik Taliban", was killed and although his son still fights the government, officials claim insurgents are being reconciled.
But the rosy view is challenged by Ahmad Behzad, an MP for Herat and second deputy speaker for parliament, who represents the growing influence of the Hazara community in the area, and says peace is confined to the city limits.
"If there's real transition, the Taliban will advance. Apart from the provincial capital Herat city, the other parts are all insecure. Provincial MPs are always escorted with a large number of guards," he said.
Fears of a return to the civil war of the 1990s loom large and nobody expects corruption to end -- only for more deals to be done.
In three of 15 Herat districts that remain under overall control of NATO's Italian-led coalition force, competition remains fierce between Hezb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami forces.
But in 2004, Khan moved to the capital and was given the national energy and water ministry, although some of those who lost jobs with his departure have continued to wage jihad against the local government.
Hekmatyar is also engaged in peace talks with the Kabul government, which could conceivably end in him laying down his weapons.
His group is putting pressure on Kabul for "more power and jobs inside government. It's good that they are talking," said journalist Basir Bigzad. "People are worried about another civil war after foreign troops leave."
Governor Saba is confident that there will be no Taliban return to Herat "because times have changed" since the 2001 US-led invasion brought down their regime.
"The only thing that may threaten Herat is infiltration and political interference," said Saba, referring to the threat posed by commanders in neighbouring provinces, and across the western border in Iran.
The Pitfalls of Negotiations in AfPak
February 17, 2012 Marvin Weinbaum, James P. Farwell The National Interest
Over the last year, relations between Pakistan and the United States have been driven to ever-lower depths. The leaderships of both countries are struggling to rebuild the semblance of a working relationship, especially regarding Afghanistan. Pakistan has long been convinced that the United States and its allies were bound to fail in Afghanistan and that the American war on terrorism is responsible for the threats Pakistan faces from its own extremists. Meanwhile, the United States regularly complains that Pakistan plays a double game, providing logistical and intelligence assistance while also protecting and sometimes facilitating the Taliban insurgency.
While the strategic interests of Washington and Islamabad have so often clashed over Afghanistan, their interests have lately converged on an endgame for that embattled country. Their common strategic approach aims to negotiate a grand bargain with senior Taliban leaders. But it faces heavy odds and as presently conceived threatens to exclude other important stakeholders in Afghanistan—including the Karzai regime itself.
The Push for Negotiations
As U.S. and allied troops depart, there is a growing lack of confidence in the transition to Afghan security forces, resulting in a desperate diplomatic push by Washington to find a political solution to the conflict. A coalition government would provide a soft landing for a post-2014 Afghanistan and allowing the orderly exit of foreign forces. And a negotiated settlement of the conflict would ensure that the country’s constitutional and political framework was left intact and hard-won human-rights gains protected.
Pakistan is similarly anxious for a power-sharing agreement. Without one, Afghanistan could easily slip into a proxy civil war that draws in Iran, Russia and India on one side and Pakistan on the other. Pakistan’s military has held the Afghan Taliban in reserve as a force to secure Pakistan’s interests in the wake of a failed NATO counterinsurgency and a collapsing Afghanistan. But Pakistan’s generals are realists: they recognize that once in power, the Taliban will resist their manipulation. An outright Taliban victory might be undesirable and even dangerous for a Pakistan battling its own Taliban insurgency. The preferred outcome for Pakistan is instead rule by a coalition in Kabul. The Taliban’s presence would serve to blunt Indian influence while its governing partners curb any contagion of radical Islamist adventurism in Pakistan and the region.
Flawed Talks in Qatar
A previously reluctant Taliban has opened an office in Qatar. Both the United States and Pakistan see the decision as a significant breakthrough. American diplomats are convinced that conditions are ripe for talks and that pragmatists will prevail over dogmatists in the leadership circles around Mullah Muhammad Omar’s Taliban and his major allies, the Haqqani network and Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami. With the right confidence building, insurgents can presumably be induced to sever their ties to international terrorist groups—including, above all, al-Qaeda.
Fearing being left out, Pakistan had previously scuttled direct contact between Taliban leaders and potential American interlocutors. Deep suspicions exist between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani intelligence services (ISI), as was confirmed by a recent NATO report based on interrogations of captured insurgents. Yet the ISI now feels confident, having helped to bring the Taliban to Qatar, that it can ensure that Pakistan’s interests will be represented in any negotiations.
The door should always be left open for talks with an adversary. But negotiations have the greatest likelihood of making progress when there is either a serious stalemate or one of the combatants—convinced it cannot prevail—seeks the best peace terms it can get. Neither of these conditions is present in the current Afghan conflict. There seem few incentives for the Taliban to have to compromise, given their goal of imposing sharia rule in Afghanistan. With NATO military operations scheduled to end in 2014, if not earlier, the Taliban has more reason than ever to believe that it has time and God on its side. Meanwhile, although Afghans and the international community may have doubts whether there can be a strictly military solution to the conflict, they are not willing to accede to the Taliban’s basic designs for an Afghan state.
The looming talks in Qatar threaten to set back the counterinsurgency being waged by Afghan and international forces and increase chances for a new civil war. An exhausted Afghan people approve of serious negotiations for peace. But the prospect that an unreconstructed Taliban may again wield domestic power drives most Afghans to hedge their loyalties toward the Kabul regime and cooperation with foreign forces. A coalition of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras will fight rather than submit to any significant concessions to the Taliban.
Recognition of the Taliban in Qatar effectively accords the insurgency unearned legitimacy. More seriously, by taking the lead role in bringing the Taliban to the table, the United States and Pakistan have made it possible for the Taliban to exclude the Afghan government from participation in negotiations. Any peace process that fails to be inclusive of the Karzai government and all of Afghanistan’s major political stakeholders can never succeed. It will instead divide Afghans and set the stage for a protracted civil war.
Marvin G. Weinbaum is a scholar in residence at the Middle East Institute and former intelligence analyst in the U.S. Department of State. James P. Farwell is the author of The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability, and he is a Senior Research Scholar in Strategic Studies at the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies, Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.
Interior and Finance Ministers Summoned by Parliament
TOLOnews.com By Saleha Sadat Saturday, 18 February 2012
Afghan Parliament summoned Interior and Finance ministers on Sunday to answer their questions in connection with what some MPs called incompetence of the ministries.
Some MPs believed that the ministers should have been disqualified, but they weren't because some MPs were allegedly bribed and given bullet-proof vehicles.
Some also accused the Parliament of having been turned into a business place for the MPs.
The ministers should have talked about security situation in the country as well as budget related issues.
Some MPs accused the executive committee of the Parliament of supporting the ministers.
"It' was pre-planned by administrative committee to prevent MPs to ask questions, especially those who have evidences against the ministers," Abdul Rahim Ayoubi, representative of Kandahar in parliament, said.
"As an MP, I don't expect anything from this parliament," Representative of Kunar province in Parliament, Wajma Sapi said. "They are only here for their persoanl business."
Meanwhile, Finance Minister, Hazrat Omer Zakhilwal, said that major achievements of the ministry have been to increase government incomes.
He also said that nearly 5 million Afghanis was saved from the normal budget this year.
The Interior Minister said that there has been a major decrease in civilian casualties.
He blamed foreign troops for the death of 8 Afghan children in Kapisa province.
"We are still investigating, if our police is guilty in the incident, they will be punished." Interior Minister Besmellah Mohammadi told MPs.
Mr Mohammadi also called the role of Afghan local police very important in maintaining security, citing its success in Baghlan and Paktika provinces.
He said the local police was established based on a Presidential decree with the aim of improving security in different parts of the country.
Afghanistan's toxic cocktail of drugs, graft, mafia
AFP By Joris Fioriti 18/02/2012
It's below freezing, but the Afghan lies rigid in the snow of Kabul. He doesn't move. His arms and legs are bare. He has overdosed on heroin. He only lives to see another day because of a charity.
"Every night I feel I'm going to die. I sleep in the cold. I suffer," said Zaman, whose clear blue eyes stand out from his bony, filthy face as he stands shivering in the snow near the fallen addict.
"After taking heroin, I feel good. It doesn't take away the pain, but it reduces it. It's like medicine. I'm ill."
He was a policeman in southern Helmand province, a Taliban flashpoint, when he got hooked on opium. From there, it was a quick descent into heroin and after three years in Iran, he's back in Kabul "where drugs are easier to find".
A team from international charity Doctors of the World revive the man lying in the snow, but have no choice but to leave him to fend for himself down by Pul-i-Sokhta bridge, where the heroin addicts flock in their hundreds.
"Every morning we find one or two bodies," says Abdul Raheem from the charity. The pitiful state of the men seen and questioned by AFP leaves little doubt about their inability to survive through several such harsh winters.
Between 2005 and 2009, the number of Afghan heroin addicts tripled to 150,000, according to the United Nations, with 230,000 people now using opium.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on Thursday urged Afghanistan to make fighting drug trafficking a priority, as opium harvests soared last year by 61 percent and ministries are at loggerheads over how best to contain the crisis.
The top drugs official at the health ministry openly accuses the counter-narcotics ministry of corruption, while the counter-narcotics ministry accuses of the health ministry of failing to appreciate the bigger picture.
Trapped in the middle is Doctors of the World, which in 2010 started a pilot methadone programme for 200 patients, only for the counter-narcotics ministry to block it six months later.
Still responsible for 71 patients, the charity now has to fight on a daily basis just to get permission to import methadone.
"A lot of research has been done in Afghanistan. There are no reasons why they should refuse, apart from the linkage between the drug mafia and the ministry for counter-narcotics," said health ministry official Sayed Habib.
In an interview with AFP, he said that the illegal drug trade is worth $3.5 million a day in Kabul alone.
"If we distribute methadone for free, there won't be any need for heroin and the market in Afghanistan will collapse," he said.
Organised criminals "are ready to do anything" to stop this happening and buy off the Afghan authorities responsible for the war against drug production and trafficking, suggests Habib, offering to provide tape-recorded evidence.
But Abdul Qayyum Samer, spokesman for the counter-narcotics ministry, hit back: "There is no evidence of such a claim."
Afghanistan grows about 90 percent of the world's opium, says the UN drugs and crime office UNODC. It estimates that export earnings last year from Afghan opiates were worth $2.4 billion -- equivalent to 15 per cent of GDP.
Those who fled abroad to escape war, poverty and unemployment in Afghanistan are particularly vulnerable to drug abuse and becoming addicts, said UNODC Doctor Mohammad Raza.
UNODC says the answer is more and varied drug treatments, in which methadone should be part of a package available for drug users.
But the health ministry official insists methadone is the best way to treat addicts, particularly intravenous users with HIV now his biggest concern.
"By stopping drug use, you stop HIV transmission in our community. It's the most important issue for us," said Habib.
Last year, 636 HIV positive people were registered from around the country. This year, the number has doubled to about 1,200, he said.
"Those are only people registered. We expect to have more than 5,000 HIV positive people, who will not come to our health facilities because of discrimination and they will spread HIV," he said.
Doctors of the World said it was pleased with the methadone programme.
"What is great," said Ernst Wisse, one of those running the programme "is to see them arriving in a terrible state at the centre and then several days later, they're already playing volleyball!"
In Struggle With Taliban, on Guard for Charlatans
New York Times By ROD NORDLAND and ALISSA J. RUBIN February 18, 2012
KABUL, Afghanistan - In an insurgency, everyone is an imposter. The enemy wears no uniform and carries no identity card.
Just so with a mullah in Kandahar named Noorul Aziz. After trading his job as a Taliban commander for a cushy post as an Afghan government official, the story goes, he was taken last month by the military coalition on a tour of his old bases, where he made speeches to persuade the locals not to support the insurgency.
Except the locals say they never heard of him.
Then there was the Afghan “senator” who instead may have been a Taliban operative. In January, he conned his way into getting a V.I.P. tour of some of the most secret locations in Kandahar, with briefings from the American-backed provincial governor, Tooryalai Wesa, the local head of the Afghan intelligence service and the governor of the strategic district of Dand.
He did not even bother to adopt a real senator’s name. “There was no senator by that name in the entire senate,” said Bismillah Afghanmal, who is a real senator, from Kandahar.
These are hardly isolated cases. In September, a man posing as a Taliban peace envoy traveled from Kandahar to Kabul to meet the head of the High Peace Council, and used a bomb hidden in his turban to assassinate him. The year before, a scammer who persuaded the Americans that he was a high-ranking Taliban official who wanted to talk peace was flown in by a NATO helicopter to meet with President Hamid Karzai, and paid handsomely for his time. In late 2009, a CIA informer who turned out to be a Qaeda plant killed eight people in a suicide attack at an agency outpost.
Mr. Aziz, the supposed Taliban commander, showed up in Kandahar last year with 30 armed men and a letter from the Taliban leadership in Pakistan showing that he had just been appointed the shadow governor of Kunduz Province in the north.
His story was that he did not like it up north so was turning himself in as part of the government’s reintegration program, in which former Taliban fighters are offered access to community and jobs programs. The reintegration program has been off to a slow start, so to get a shadow governor of a province to walk in was a big deal. Governor Wesa and other officials greeted him with bear hugs.
In southern Afghanistan, officials say fewer than 300 Taliban insurgents have turned themselves in under the two-year-old program; many are believed to be opportunists looking for government handouts.
“We have two kinds of Taliban, fake Taliban and real Taliban,” Amanullah Hotaki, the chairman of the Oruzgan Provincial Council, said of those who have turned themselves in there. “The fake are 60 or 70, but the real ones are only five.”
In an interview last year, Mr. Aziz insisted he had been the Taliban commander in the district of Nad Ali in Helmand Province, once one of the most violent places in Afghanistan.
Elders there, however, said they had never heard of him. “We don’t know a Taliban commander by the name of Noorul Aziz,” said Haji Mirwais Khan, a tribal elder. “Maybe he has been called by a pseudonym?”
Western military intelligence officials have also cast doubt on Mr. Aziz’s bona fides. “We don’t know who he is,” said one.
Nonetheless, after his surrender, Mr. Aziz managed to become the provincial director of the Department of Hajj and Religious Affairs, a plum job that in many parts of Afghanistan has been a font of corruption. He was appointed by Governor Wesa, who reportedly also arranged the visit of the mysterious non-senator.
In the senator case, a man calling himself Muhammad Asif Sarhadi said he was a senator from Ghor Province who wanted to start a new museum and open a Kandahar branch. The governor, according to local officials, then gave him introductions to district officials, where he met with police, intelligence and government officials.
“He was not here officially and we did not deal with him officially,” said Zalmai Ayoubi, a spokesman for Governor Wesa. He conceded, however, that “Mr. Sarhadi” talked with officials about security issues as well as museums.
Mr. Aziz, the supposed former Taliban, went on tour last week in Helmand Province, visiting what he said were his former bases from his insurgency days, and meeting NATO coalition soldiers there.
“Meeting face to face with a former Taliban commander gave me mixed feelings to begin with,” said Maj. Kaido Kivistik, commander of an Estonian Army company.
Mixed feelings about Mr. Aziz are common. “We don’t know him, “ said Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, the spokesman for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. “He’s a sick man and he’s an imposter.”
Emma Watkins, a spokeswoman for the southwest regional command of the NATO-led coalition, which includes Helmand, disputed that Mr. Aziz was not genuine. “I am informed that Mr. Aziz continues to be the director of Haj in Kandahar and in particular he made a speech at the Kandahar peace conference in September last year,” she said.
Turning against the Taliban, whether sincerely or not, has become something of a family business for Mr. Aziz, who was rewarded with a house, bodyguards, money and a job. At least four of his brothers and a father have also turned themselves in — one of them, Abdul Aziz Agha, claimed to have been the Taliban commander in Panjway District, a Taliban stronghold just outside of Kandahar.
In Panjway, no one had ever heard of Mr. Agha, either.
Taimoor Shah contributed reporting from Kandahar, Afghanistan, and Sharifullah Sahak from Kabul.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
By Jon Stephenson | McClatchy Newspapers
KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghanistan's Ministry of Mines on Saturday rejected allegations of problems in the bidding for one of the country's largest mines, calling it "a fair and transparent process."
In a letter to McClatchy, the ministry's director-general for policy and promotion, A. Jalil Jumriany, said that the selection of bids for four blocks of the Hajigak iron ore mine in central Afghanistan was overseen by a team of Afghan government experts, and that a panel of international advisers found that the process was "conducted according to international standards."
However, Jumriany's letter did not challenge the main points in a McClatchy report published Friday, which raised allegations of flaws in the bidding process and that the winning bidders — a state-led Indian consortium and a Canadian firm — hadn't demonstrated that they could meet production targets.
Among the charges raised by Acatco — an Afghan-American firm that was short-listed for the contracts but failed to win mining rights — was that the winning firms hadn't shown that they'd secured adequate funding for extracting iron ore from Hajigak, often described as the jewel of Afghanistan's mining sector.
Acatco also charged that its bid was rejected despite offering clearer dates for starting production and higher royalty payments to the Afghan government. A complaints commission of the Afghan parliament has taken up the matter and summoned Afghanistan's minister of mines, Wahidullah Shahrani, who failed to appear at a hearing Saturday because he was traveling, according to a spokesman.
In its letter to McClatchy, the ministry accused Acatco's president, Nasir Shansab, of disclosing confidential information and trying to interfere in the bid evaluation process. Shansab denied the allegations.
The ministry said that the contracts to the Steel Authority of India, or SAIL, and Kilo Goldmines, the Canadian firm, hadn't yet been ratified by the Cabinet and that negotiations were ongoing. In announcing the two firms' winning bids on Nov. 28, the ministry said that the projects in Hajigak would "bring billions of dollars in mining investment and thousands of new jobs to Afghanistan."
Its letter was the ministry's first official response to McClatchy, which made repeated attempts to interview Shahrani through Tamim Asey, the ministry's director of public affairs and strategic communication. The ministry did not make Shahrani available for an interview.
(Stephenson is a McClatchy special correspondent.)
Fake senator raises alarm in Afghanistan
AFP – Sun, Feb 19, 2012
Officials in southern Afghanistan were at odds Sunday over a man some believe collected sensitive information by impersonating a parliament member in the violence-wracked country.
The unidentified man claimed to be a senator from Kabul and managed to meet the governor, police chief, and head of intelligence of the restive southern province of Kandahar last week.
"He showed a fake letter from the senate to the governor of Kandahar who then took him to a lot of places he should not have been," Mohammad Alam Ezdyar, deputy chairman of Afghanistan's senate told AFP.
"He was a cheat, he was neither a senator nor a member of provincial council. He has definitely gathered a lot of important and sensitive documents," he said.
Radio Free Europe cited Bismallah Afghanmal, who represents Kandahar in parliament's upper house, saying the supposed senator was taken to several districts in the province where he was given "every possible piece" of security information.
But Zalmai Ayubi, spokesman for the provincial government, said the man wanted to build a museum in Kandahar city and has not obtained any sensitive data.
"Last week this guy who called himself Asif Sarhadi came to Kandahar to build a museum. He introduced himself as a senator from Kabul," he said.
"He met with the police chief, head of Kandahar intelligence and the governor. He did not visit secret locations, he only had this simple informal chat with officials about his museum. We didn't know he was not a senator," he said.
Asif Sarhadi is not the name of any Afghan senator.
The man later disappeared, another source said, adding that his mobile phone was no longer taking calls.
The Taliban said that the fake senator was not one of their agents and they have called journalists to try to find out about him.
But the militants, who have fought a violent insurgency since their government was toppled in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, have in the past used false pretences to gain access to Afghan officials.
In September, a man posing as a Taliban peace envoy travelled from Kandahar to Kabul to meet Burhanuddin Rabbani, Afghanistan's top negotiator, but then blew himself and Rabbani up with a bomb hidden in his turban.
In 2010 a scammer who claimed to be a high-ranking Taliban official was brought by NATO forces to meet President Hamid Karzai for peace talks.
The country has also witnessed a steady string of assaults against Western troops by attackers wearing Afghan police and military uniforms, raising fears about infiltration of the security services.
Former Afghan FM: US Seeking to Legitimize Taliban through Negotiations
Fars News Agency February 19, 2012
TEHRAN (FNA)- A prominent Afghan opposition figure said that the US is seeking to legitimize the Taliban through holding negotiations with the belligerent group, but meantime underlined that the US has failed to attain its goal.
"… No doubt the Taliban is eager to negotiate with the US since the group sees the talks a positive step towards its legitimacy," former Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah told FNA.
He said that some foreign countries have taken advantage and get involved in Afghan peace talks after the Afghan government failed to encourage the Taliban to hold talks with the central government within the geographical borders of Afghanistan.
In January, first Vice-Speaker of the Afghan Senate Mohammad Alam Izadyar criticized the secret talks between the US and the Taliban, and stated that the so-called Afghan Peace Talks lack "transparency".
"Details of the Afghan peace talks should not be hidden from the people of the country," Izadyar told Afghanistan TV at the time.
Taliban announced at the time that they had struck a deal to open a political office in Qatar that could allow for direct negotiations.
In a statement, Zabiullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the Taliban, said that along with a preliminary deal to set up the office in Qatar, the group was asking that Taliban detainees held at the American prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, be released.
Some analysts are skeptical of the prospects for meaningful peace negotiations with the Taliban.
The developments came as Pakistani media revealed last week that the United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has removed the name of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar from the list of "most wanted terrorists."
The report came following Washington's secret meetings with the Taliban after one decade of war. US officials have held several meetings with representatives of the Afghan Taliban leader, headed by Tayyib Agha, in Germany and Qatar over the past months.
During the meetings, the US and Taliban negotiators reached a deal to transfer five Taliban militants, who are under custody in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, to Qatar. The removal of Mullah Omar's name from the terror list comes after the prisoner deal.
The founder of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, has been in hiding since the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan.
Washington removed Mullah Omar's name despite its continued allegations that the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden were behind the September, 11 attacks in the US. Mullah Omar was Bin Laden's staunchest ally and most intimate friend.
The United States invaded Afghanistan 10 years ago under the pretext of eradicating the Taliban, but its failure has forced Washington to turn to negotiation with militants.
The US government has planned new round of talks with the Taliban in early 2012.
8 killed in blast in NW Pakistan
ISLAMABAD, Feb. 19 (Xinhua) -- At least eight people were killed and four others injured in a blast that hit Pakistan's northwest tribal area of Khyber Agency bordering Afghanistan on Sunday, reported local media.
Local Urdu TV channel Aaj said that the blast took place early Sunday morning in the Tirah Vally area of Khyber Agency and it was a remote-control blast.
The target of the blast is local pro-government peace militiamen, it said, adding that the clashes between the militants and the local peace militiamen started late last night and early this morning.
There have been a series of clashes between the militants and the security forces in the afore-said area over the last couple of days.
Earlier on Friday morning, the Pakistani army launched an attack at two militants' hideouts in Khyber Agency with the backup of gunship helicopters, killing five militants and wounding eight others.
In retaliation, militants attacked a vehicle of security forces with a remote-control bomb, killing three security personnel and injuring two others.
Later on Friday night, clashes between the militants and the security forces broke out again in the area, in which 17 militants were killed and one soldier as well as three local peace militiamen also died in the clashes.
Beginning of the End
New York Times Editorial February 18, 2012
Like most Americans, we are eager to see an end to the war in Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s announcement that American forces would step back from a combat role as early as mid-2013 was welcome.
The Pentagon’s intention is to try to shift more responsibility to the Afghan security forces while the Americans are still in the country to provide help with planning, transport and intelligence, and to bail the Afghans out in a crisis. That shift is already happening in less volatile regions. And with the United States and NATO committed to bringing nearly all of their troops home by the end of 2014, the Afghans need to learn to take the lead.
If there is any chance of pulling this off, the United States must improve the quality of the Afghan army and police and strengthen central and local governments. We have yet to see a comprehensive plan for an orderly transition.
More than 1,700 Americans have been killed in Afghanistan over the last decade, and the financial cost for this country, more than $450 billion, is staggering. It did not have to be this way. In order to pursue his misguided war in Iraq, President George W. Bush denied his commanders in Afghanistan the necessary troops and support.
President Obama has done better. He poured more resources into training the Afghan army and police, and a “surge” of an additional 50,000 American troops has weakened the Taliban’s fighting forces. Stepped-up intelligence efforts have led to the deaths of Osama bin Laden and scores of Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. The Taliban have recently said they want to talk.
Whether these gains can be maintained is far from clear. What is certain is that there is little time and a huge amount to be done to increase the chances that Afghanistan will not implode once most of the American troops are gone. Here are some areas that must be addressed:
GOVERNANCE There have been some improvements at the federal and regional levels, but the country — hampered by illiteracy and corruption — still lacks a fully functioning government and banking system. After spending huge sums on failed development projects, the State Department is working to better focus and design how it spends these critical dollars. It needs to move quickly.
Since Mr. Obama put in a new diplomatic and military team, public clashes with President Hamid Karzai have declined. But serious frictions remain. Washington and its allies must work harder to get Mr. Karzai to carry out reforms that will encourage credible candidates to run in 2014, when he is supposed to step aside. He must be pressed to take on high-profile corruption cases. He and his ministers need to focus a lot more attention on improving basic services, including the delivery of electricity. To attract foreign investors, Parliament needs to approve a solid legal framework for commercial relations.
TRAINING AND FINANCING AFGHAN FORCES The United States and its allies have spent tens of billions of dollars building an Afghan army and police force from the ground up. They have turned out 330,000 troops, but because of illiteracy, conflicting political loyalties and other problems, there are far too few reliable units.
NATO and the Pentagon are now talking about reducing the Afghan force to 230,000. We don’t know if that is a sound assessment of what is needed or an acknowledgement that Afghanistan and its backers cannot afford to maintain such a large force. The United States will spend $11 billion this year on the 330,000 troops; the cost is expected to drop to around $4 billion annually if the number of troops is reduced and American involvement lessens.
Weeding out less competent soldiers, or corrupt ones, makes sense. But putting tens of thousands of fighters back on the streets could be disastrous. One possible solution would be to shift them to a less costly reserve force.
Afghanistan will not be able to foot the bill for even a smaller force, and Washington will very likely bear most of the cost for years to come. It should not have to do that alone. The Obama administration should use the NATO summit meeting in Chicago in May to press allies to make concrete commitments now. And then hold them to it.
TALKING TO THE TALIBAN Most of the Republican presidential candidates insist the United States must “beat” the Taliban. That sounds good on the stump, but American military commanders say it is impossible now: it would take too many troops, too many years. The best hope is for some kind of political solution.
The Taliban have signaled what they say is a serious interest in negotiations; whether they mean it is anyone’s guess. Still, the administration is right to try. At a minimum, the fact that the Taliban leadership is talking will make more fighters on the ground — and those tempted to join them — question whether the battle is worth it.
The United States has laid down several principles for a settlement: The Taliban must renounce terrorism, cut all ties with Al Qaeda and eventually lay down their weapons and accept the Afghan Constitution — including rights for women. Both Washington and the Afghan government must stick to those principles.
American officials say they are open to a Taliban request for some “confidence-building measures,” including transferring a small number of prisoners from Guantánamo to house arrest in Qatar and lifting some sanctions on individual Taliban negotiators. In return, the Americans must, at a minimum, get assurances that the prisoners will not return to the battlefield, and that the Taliban will renounce terrorism and seriously engage in peace talks.
ECONOMIC SUPPORT Paying for the army is not the only financial problem. Afghanistan faces a potentially devastating economic slowdown when American and coalition troops and aid workers depart. The World Bank estimates that an extraordinary 97 percent of the country’s $28 billion gross domestic product comes from military and development aid and the in-country spending of foreign troops.
At a conference in Bonn, Germany, last year, President Karzai requested $10 billion a year in foreign support through 2025. The United States and its partners promised to help. Vague promises are not enough. Housing prices, salaries, store sales and factory orders are already dropping as coalition troops and aid workers prepare to withdraw. The allies need to have a concrete plan — a mix of aid and investment in the minerals industry and other private projects — in place in time for the NATO meeting.
RESIDUAL AMERICAN FORCE Defense Secretary Panetta told Congress last week that the United States was close to signing an agreement with Mr. Karzai to allow an undefined number (perhaps 15,000) Special Operations soldiers to remain after 2014. These forces would hunt down militants, and would provide air cover, intelligence, logistical support and training for Afghan forces.
We would like to see all American troops gone. But continuing to pound Al Qaeda, and increasing the odds that the Taliban do not again seize power, are in Washington’s strategic interest. The agreement would also send a message to the region that this time the United States plans to stay engaged. Two issues are blocking the deal: Mr. Karzai’s demand to immediately take control of American-run detention facilities and of nighttime raids that he says have killed too many civilians. The United States should keep insisting that Afghans can take over the raids only when they are capable. The detention facilities should be shut down.
DEALING WITH PAKISTAN Islamabad’s continued collusion with the Taliban and other extremist groups is the biggest threat to Afghanistan’s long-term stability. A decade after the Bush administration ordered them to pick sides, the Pakistanis are still cynically playing all sides.
Billions in aid have not changed their thinking. Nor has the recent suspension of some of that aid. Nor has the fact that the extremists seem nearly as eager to bring down Pakistan’s government. The Army and intelligence services are still determined to use the extremists as proxies in their endless competition with India.
The fact that Pakistan did not stop the Taliban from agreeing to negotiations with Washington may be a rare positive sign. But with Islamabad there are never any guarantees. As frustrating as it is, the administration must keep trying to cajole and pressure Pakistan into cooperating. The United States really has no choice, not least because a collapse in Pakistan — with 100 plus nuclear weapons — would be even more disastrous than a collapse in Kabul.
Bodyguards and business secure peace in Afghan west
AFP By Claire Truscott 19/02/2012
Afghan businessman Seros Alaaf paid a $300,000 ransom to free his uncle from the clutches of the mafia who once stalked Herat. Now he takes no chances, with five bodyguards at his side.
Recalling the most troubled days in Afghanistan's western city, the powerful figure in the Herat Chamber of Commerce and Industry casts around his plush office, part of the business boom that is helping to safeguard the city.
"There are far fewer kidnappings these days, but it hasn't stopped, and the only reason it's less is that whoever has money can also pay for five to 10 bodyguards," said Alaaf, blaming weak governance for the mafia's rule.
But seven months after Italian troops handed responsibility for the city to Afghans, as part of the first phase of returning control to local security forces nationwide by the end of 2014, the government says security has improved.
The Taliban are not the main threat in Herat. Instead rivalries for power and influence in the city fuel much of the trouble, with gunmen loyal to mujahideen leaders Ismail Khan and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar still at large.
Although it is early days and political opponents challenge claims of an improvement, Herat could be considered an example of how managing factions and a relatively flourishing economy can keep a region largely free of violence.
But under the surface, there are also signs of the festering rivalries, ethnic and political, that experts consider the potential undoing of a future political settlement.
The province's religious leader, Maulavi Khudadad Saleh, a conservative popular among Herat's Pashtuns, is at loggerheads with the city's Westernised technocrat governor Daud Shah Saba, a Tajik.
Government is dominated by those affiliated with the Jamiat-e-Islami Islamic party, which Ismail Khan led in the western region during the Soviet war and subsequent civil conflict.
But they are kept in check at least partly by Saba, who although from Herat has had a career in international development and is disconnected from the main local power factions.
Unlike the checkpoints and blast walls of the Afghan capital, Herat's roads are free from military intrusion and its police largely unarmed.
Only 320 police work in Herat city, while in the province's most remote district of Farsi, 160 kilometres (100 miles) away, just 42 patrol.
"It's below any kind of standard you may imagine," says Saba. "Still security's pretty good."
Sayed Ahmad Sami, the region's police chief and a fellow Tajik, agrees.
"Before transition there were a lot of problems like abduction and organised crime. Now it's close to zero. For the past month there have been no abductions," he told AFP.
Change has come piecemeal and one deal at a time. Three years ago the police force was divided into factions loyal to Ismail Khan and religious leader Saleh, and kidnapping was the biggest racket in town, with ransoms fetching up to $600,000.
The capture of a well-known money changer in late 2008 led to a shopkeepers' strike, and ultimately the sacking of 12 police commanders and the former governor who was accused of being in league with the kidnappers.
Government officials say security along major highways is improving and plans for major economic projects bring promise of future dividends.
The Italians are agreeing a $150 million soft loan to help make Herat a "transport hub" by building up the airport and creating a bypass road around the city.
Security for a major hydroelectric dam project was being provided by a protection racket whose members were extorting money from villagers. Kabul intervened last summer and the security setup was changed.
In October 2009, former Herat mayor Ghulam Yahya Akbari, dubbed the "Tajik Taliban", was killed and although his son still fights the government, officials claim insurgents are being reconciled.
But the rosy view is challenged by Ahmad Behzad, an MP for Herat and second deputy speaker for parliament, who represents the growing influence of the Hazara community in the area, and says peace is confined to the city limits.
"If there's real transition, the Taliban will advance. Apart from the provincial capital Herat city, the other parts are all insecure. Provincial MPs are always escorted with a large number of guards," he said.
Fears of a return to the civil war of the 1990s loom large and nobody expects corruption to end -- only for more deals to be done.
In three of 15 Herat districts that remain under overall control of NATO's Italian-led coalition force, competition remains fierce between Hezb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami forces.
But in 2004, Khan moved to the capital and was given the national energy and water ministry, although some of those who lost jobs with his departure have continued to wage jihad against the local government.
Hekmatyar is also engaged in peace talks with the Kabul government, which could conceivably end in him laying down his weapons.
His group is putting pressure on Kabul for "more power and jobs inside government. It's good that they are talking," said journalist Basir Bigzad. "People are worried about another civil war after foreign troops leave."
Governor Saba is confident that there will be no Taliban return to Herat "because times have changed" since the 2001 US-led invasion brought down their regime.
"The only thing that may threaten Herat is infiltration and political interference," said Saba, referring to the threat posed by commanders in neighbouring provinces, and across the western border in Iran.
The Pitfalls of Negotiations in AfPak
February 17, 2012 Marvin Weinbaum, James P. Farwell The National Interest
Over the last year, relations between Pakistan and the United States have been driven to ever-lower depths. The leaderships of both countries are struggling to rebuild the semblance of a working relationship, especially regarding Afghanistan. Pakistan has long been convinced that the United States and its allies were bound to fail in Afghanistan and that the American war on terrorism is responsible for the threats Pakistan faces from its own extremists. Meanwhile, the United States regularly complains that Pakistan plays a double game, providing logistical and intelligence assistance while also protecting and sometimes facilitating the Taliban insurgency.
While the strategic interests of Washington and Islamabad have so often clashed over Afghanistan, their interests have lately converged on an endgame for that embattled country. Their common strategic approach aims to negotiate a grand bargain with senior Taliban leaders. But it faces heavy odds and as presently conceived threatens to exclude other important stakeholders in Afghanistan—including the Karzai regime itself.
The Push for Negotiations
As U.S. and allied troops depart, there is a growing lack of confidence in the transition to Afghan security forces, resulting in a desperate diplomatic push by Washington to find a political solution to the conflict. A coalition government would provide a soft landing for a post-2014 Afghanistan and allowing the orderly exit of foreign forces. And a negotiated settlement of the conflict would ensure that the country’s constitutional and political framework was left intact and hard-won human-rights gains protected.
Pakistan is similarly anxious for a power-sharing agreement. Without one, Afghanistan could easily slip into a proxy civil war that draws in Iran, Russia and India on one side and Pakistan on the other. Pakistan’s military has held the Afghan Taliban in reserve as a force to secure Pakistan’s interests in the wake of a failed NATO counterinsurgency and a collapsing Afghanistan. But Pakistan’s generals are realists: they recognize that once in power, the Taliban will resist their manipulation. An outright Taliban victory might be undesirable and even dangerous for a Pakistan battling its own Taliban insurgency. The preferred outcome for Pakistan is instead rule by a coalition in Kabul. The Taliban’s presence would serve to blunt Indian influence while its governing partners curb any contagion of radical Islamist adventurism in Pakistan and the region.
Flawed Talks in Qatar
A previously reluctant Taliban has opened an office in Qatar. Both the United States and Pakistan see the decision as a significant breakthrough. American diplomats are convinced that conditions are ripe for talks and that pragmatists will prevail over dogmatists in the leadership circles around Mullah Muhammad Omar’s Taliban and his major allies, the Haqqani network and Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami. With the right confidence building, insurgents can presumably be induced to sever their ties to international terrorist groups—including, above all, al-Qaeda.
Fearing being left out, Pakistan had previously scuttled direct contact between Taliban leaders and potential American interlocutors. Deep suspicions exist between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani intelligence services (ISI), as was confirmed by a recent NATO report based on interrogations of captured insurgents. Yet the ISI now feels confident, having helped to bring the Taliban to Qatar, that it can ensure that Pakistan’s interests will be represented in any negotiations.
The door should always be left open for talks with an adversary. But negotiations have the greatest likelihood of making progress when there is either a serious stalemate or one of the combatants—convinced it cannot prevail—seeks the best peace terms it can get. Neither of these conditions is present in the current Afghan conflict. There seem few incentives for the Taliban to have to compromise, given their goal of imposing sharia rule in Afghanistan. With NATO military operations scheduled to end in 2014, if not earlier, the Taliban has more reason than ever to believe that it has time and God on its side. Meanwhile, although Afghans and the international community may have doubts whether there can be a strictly military solution to the conflict, they are not willing to accede to the Taliban’s basic designs for an Afghan state.
The looming talks in Qatar threaten to set back the counterinsurgency being waged by Afghan and international forces and increase chances for a new civil war. An exhausted Afghan people approve of serious negotiations for peace. But the prospect that an unreconstructed Taliban may again wield domestic power drives most Afghans to hedge their loyalties toward the Kabul regime and cooperation with foreign forces. A coalition of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras will fight rather than submit to any significant concessions to the Taliban.
Recognition of the Taliban in Qatar effectively accords the insurgency unearned legitimacy. More seriously, by taking the lead role in bringing the Taliban to the table, the United States and Pakistan have made it possible for the Taliban to exclude the Afghan government from participation in negotiations. Any peace process that fails to be inclusive of the Karzai government and all of Afghanistan’s major political stakeholders can never succeed. It will instead divide Afghans and set the stage for a protracted civil war.
Marvin G. Weinbaum is a scholar in residence at the Middle East Institute and former intelligence analyst in the U.S. Department of State. James P. Farwell is the author of The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability, and he is a Senior Research Scholar in Strategic Studies at the Canada Centre for Global Security Studies, Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto.
Interior and Finance Ministers Summoned by Parliament
TOLOnews.com By Saleha Sadat Saturday, 18 February 2012
Afghan Parliament summoned Interior and Finance ministers on Sunday to answer their questions in connection with what some MPs called incompetence of the ministries.
Some MPs believed that the ministers should have been disqualified, but they weren't because some MPs were allegedly bribed and given bullet-proof vehicles.
Some also accused the Parliament of having been turned into a business place for the MPs.
The ministers should have talked about security situation in the country as well as budget related issues.
Some MPs accused the executive committee of the Parliament of supporting the ministers.
"It' was pre-planned by administrative committee to prevent MPs to ask questions, especially those who have evidences against the ministers," Abdul Rahim Ayoubi, representative of Kandahar in parliament, said.
"As an MP, I don't expect anything from this parliament," Representative of Kunar province in Parliament, Wajma Sapi said. "They are only here for their persoanl business."
Meanwhile, Finance Minister, Hazrat Omer Zakhilwal, said that major achievements of the ministry have been to increase government incomes.
He also said that nearly 5 million Afghanis was saved from the normal budget this year.
The Interior Minister said that there has been a major decrease in civilian casualties.
He blamed foreign troops for the death of 8 Afghan children in Kapisa province.
"We are still investigating, if our police is guilty in the incident, they will be punished." Interior Minister Besmellah Mohammadi told MPs.
Mr Mohammadi also called the role of Afghan local police very important in maintaining security, citing its success in Baghlan and Paktika provinces.
He said the local police was established based on a Presidential decree with the aim of improving security in different parts of the country.
Afghanistan's toxic cocktail of drugs, graft, mafia
AFP By Joris Fioriti 18/02/2012
It's below freezing, but the Afghan lies rigid in the snow of Kabul. He doesn't move. His arms and legs are bare. He has overdosed on heroin. He only lives to see another day because of a charity.
"Every night I feel I'm going to die. I sleep in the cold. I suffer," said Zaman, whose clear blue eyes stand out from his bony, filthy face as he stands shivering in the snow near the fallen addict.
"After taking heroin, I feel good. It doesn't take away the pain, but it reduces it. It's like medicine. I'm ill."
He was a policeman in southern Helmand province, a Taliban flashpoint, when he got hooked on opium. From there, it was a quick descent into heroin and after three years in Iran, he's back in Kabul "where drugs are easier to find".
A team from international charity Doctors of the World revive the man lying in the snow, but have no choice but to leave him to fend for himself down by Pul-i-Sokhta bridge, where the heroin addicts flock in their hundreds.
"Every morning we find one or two bodies," says Abdul Raheem from the charity. The pitiful state of the men seen and questioned by AFP leaves little doubt about their inability to survive through several such harsh winters.
Between 2005 and 2009, the number of Afghan heroin addicts tripled to 150,000, according to the United Nations, with 230,000 people now using opium.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on Thursday urged Afghanistan to make fighting drug trafficking a priority, as opium harvests soared last year by 61 percent and ministries are at loggerheads over how best to contain the crisis.
The top drugs official at the health ministry openly accuses the counter-narcotics ministry of corruption, while the counter-narcotics ministry accuses of the health ministry of failing to appreciate the bigger picture.
Trapped in the middle is Doctors of the World, which in 2010 started a pilot methadone programme for 200 patients, only for the counter-narcotics ministry to block it six months later.
Still responsible for 71 patients, the charity now has to fight on a daily basis just to get permission to import methadone.
"A lot of research has been done in Afghanistan. There are no reasons why they should refuse, apart from the linkage between the drug mafia and the ministry for counter-narcotics," said health ministry official Sayed Habib.
In an interview with AFP, he said that the illegal drug trade is worth $3.5 million a day in Kabul alone.
"If we distribute methadone for free, there won't be any need for heroin and the market in Afghanistan will collapse," he said.
Organised criminals "are ready to do anything" to stop this happening and buy off the Afghan authorities responsible for the war against drug production and trafficking, suggests Habib, offering to provide tape-recorded evidence.
But Abdul Qayyum Samer, spokesman for the counter-narcotics ministry, hit back: "There is no evidence of such a claim."
Afghanistan grows about 90 percent of the world's opium, says the UN drugs and crime office UNODC. It estimates that export earnings last year from Afghan opiates were worth $2.4 billion -- equivalent to 15 per cent of GDP.
Those who fled abroad to escape war, poverty and unemployment in Afghanistan are particularly vulnerable to drug abuse and becoming addicts, said UNODC Doctor Mohammad Raza.
UNODC says the answer is more and varied drug treatments, in which methadone should be part of a package available for drug users.
But the health ministry official insists methadone is the best way to treat addicts, particularly intravenous users with HIV now his biggest concern.
"By stopping drug use, you stop HIV transmission in our community. It's the most important issue for us," said Habib.
Last year, 636 HIV positive people were registered from around the country. This year, the number has doubled to about 1,200, he said.
"Those are only people registered. We expect to have more than 5,000 HIV positive people, who will not come to our health facilities because of discrimination and they will spread HIV," he said.
Doctors of the World said it was pleased with the methadone programme.
"What is great," said Ernst Wisse, one of those running the programme "is to see them arriving in a terrible state at the centre and then several days later, they're already playing volleyball!"
In Struggle With Taliban, on Guard for Charlatans
New York Times By ROD NORDLAND and ALISSA J. RUBIN February 18, 2012
KABUL, Afghanistan - In an insurgency, everyone is an imposter. The enemy wears no uniform and carries no identity card.
Just so with a mullah in Kandahar named Noorul Aziz. After trading his job as a Taliban commander for a cushy post as an Afghan government official, the story goes, he was taken last month by the military coalition on a tour of his old bases, where he made speeches to persuade the locals not to support the insurgency.
Except the locals say they never heard of him.
Then there was the Afghan “senator” who instead may have been a Taliban operative. In January, he conned his way into getting a V.I.P. tour of some of the most secret locations in Kandahar, with briefings from the American-backed provincial governor, Tooryalai Wesa, the local head of the Afghan intelligence service and the governor of the strategic district of Dand.
He did not even bother to adopt a real senator’s name. “There was no senator by that name in the entire senate,” said Bismillah Afghanmal, who is a real senator, from Kandahar.
These are hardly isolated cases. In September, a man posing as a Taliban peace envoy traveled from Kandahar to Kabul to meet the head of the High Peace Council, and used a bomb hidden in his turban to assassinate him. The year before, a scammer who persuaded the Americans that he was a high-ranking Taliban official who wanted to talk peace was flown in by a NATO helicopter to meet with President Hamid Karzai, and paid handsomely for his time. In late 2009, a CIA informer who turned out to be a Qaeda plant killed eight people in a suicide attack at an agency outpost.
Mr. Aziz, the supposed Taliban commander, showed up in Kandahar last year with 30 armed men and a letter from the Taliban leadership in Pakistan showing that he had just been appointed the shadow governor of Kunduz Province in the north.
His story was that he did not like it up north so was turning himself in as part of the government’s reintegration program, in which former Taliban fighters are offered access to community and jobs programs. The reintegration program has been off to a slow start, so to get a shadow governor of a province to walk in was a big deal. Governor Wesa and other officials greeted him with bear hugs.
In southern Afghanistan, officials say fewer than 300 Taliban insurgents have turned themselves in under the two-year-old program; many are believed to be opportunists looking for government handouts.
“We have two kinds of Taliban, fake Taliban and real Taliban,” Amanullah Hotaki, the chairman of the Oruzgan Provincial Council, said of those who have turned themselves in there. “The fake are 60 or 70, but the real ones are only five.”
In an interview last year, Mr. Aziz insisted he had been the Taliban commander in the district of Nad Ali in Helmand Province, once one of the most violent places in Afghanistan.
Elders there, however, said they had never heard of him. “We don’t know a Taliban commander by the name of Noorul Aziz,” said Haji Mirwais Khan, a tribal elder. “Maybe he has been called by a pseudonym?”
Western military intelligence officials have also cast doubt on Mr. Aziz’s bona fides. “We don’t know who he is,” said one.
Nonetheless, after his surrender, Mr. Aziz managed to become the provincial director of the Department of Hajj and Religious Affairs, a plum job that in many parts of Afghanistan has been a font of corruption. He was appointed by Governor Wesa, who reportedly also arranged the visit of the mysterious non-senator.
In the senator case, a man calling himself Muhammad Asif Sarhadi said he was a senator from Ghor Province who wanted to start a new museum and open a Kandahar branch. The governor, according to local officials, then gave him introductions to district officials, where he met with police, intelligence and government officials.
“He was not here officially and we did not deal with him officially,” said Zalmai Ayoubi, a spokesman for Governor Wesa. He conceded, however, that “Mr. Sarhadi” talked with officials about security issues as well as museums.
Mr. Aziz, the supposed former Taliban, went on tour last week in Helmand Province, visiting what he said were his former bases from his insurgency days, and meeting NATO coalition soldiers there.
“Meeting face to face with a former Taliban commander gave me mixed feelings to begin with,” said Maj. Kaido Kivistik, commander of an Estonian Army company.
Mixed feelings about Mr. Aziz are common. “We don’t know him, “ said Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, the spokesman for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. “He’s a sick man and he’s an imposter.”
Emma Watkins, a spokeswoman for the southwest regional command of the NATO-led coalition, which includes Helmand, disputed that Mr. Aziz was not genuine. “I am informed that Mr. Aziz continues to be the director of Haj in Kandahar and in particular he made a speech at the Kandahar peace conference in September last year,” she said.
Turning against the Taliban, whether sincerely or not, has become something of a family business for Mr. Aziz, who was rewarded with a house, bodyguards, money and a job. At least four of his brothers and a father have also turned themselves in — one of them, Abdul Aziz Agha, claimed to have been the Taliban commander in Panjway District, a Taliban stronghold just outside of Kandahar.
In Panjway, no one had ever heard of Mr. Agha, either.
Taimoor Shah contributed reporting from Kandahar, Afghanistan, and Sharifullah Sahak from Kabul.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com