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Afghan security guard kills colleagues, police
Reuters Tue Feb 7, 2012
KABUL - An Afghan security guard killed three colleagues and two police in southern Afghan city of Kandahar, the provincial authorities said on Tuesday.
"A member of a private security company (is) responsible for shooting his friends," the Kandahar media office said on its official Twitter feed. "(Two) ANP (police) were also killed and another one wounded after they intervened."
All of the victims were Afghans.
As of March 20 this year, private security firms will no longer be allowed to guard private premises.
All guard duties will be transferred to the Afghan Public Protection Force, a government-owned company which will be the sole supplier of guards to non-diplomatic and non-military operations in Afghanistan.
On Sunday, nine people were killed when a car bomb exploded in a busy area of Kandahar city.
Dozens of foreign soldiers have been killed in recent years by what NATO dubs the insider threat of "rogue" Afghan soldiers and police, complicating coalition efforts to train Afghanistan's army and police force before foreign combat troops leave by the end of 2014.
(Reporting by Mirwais Harooni and Daniel Magnowski; Editing by Nick Macfie)
In Afghanistan, Children Comprise Half Of Workforce At Brick Kilns
February 7, 2012 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
A new International Labor Organization (ILO) assessment says that half of the workforce in Afghan brick kilns are children under the age of 14.
The ILO report details brick-making as one of the worst forms of child labor, where children work in a slavish cycle of debt that is almost impossible to escape.
Though both child labor and so-called bonded work are illegal in Afghanistan, children as young as 5 produce hundreds of bricks a week for a few dollars to pay off family debts, which only swell the longer they work there.
Poor health from harsh working conditions, reliance on shelter and electricity provided by brick employers and denied education mean brick makers are tied to their work.
The United Nations estimates that almost 2 million children in Afghanistan are in full or part-time work.
With agency reports
Baby Girls Seen As Mixed Blessing In Afghanistan
February 7, 2012 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty By Farangis Najibullah, Haseeba Shaheed
At the age of 29, childbirth is nothing new to Rukhsar, yet the expectant mother can't help being apprehensive about her fifth child.
Her first four children, aged between 2 and 12, are all girls, and she feels pressure to deliver a boy to please her husband. If she gives birth to another daughter, Rukhsar says, she fears he will seek a second wife.
"I would have to organize for him to get a second wife," she says. "I don't want him to get another wife, but I would have no other choice [in order to avoid divorce]."
Not having a son has placed enormous strain on the couple's marriage, says Rukhsar, a native of the eastern Afghan district of Surkhrud who gave only her first name.
In Afghanistan, tradition among many families dictates a strong preference for boys, and blame is often placed on the mother if she gives birth to a girl.
This is for a variety of reasons: sons are seen as future breadwinners; the continuation of a family's lineage; the inheritors of the estate.
Ehsanullah, a 33-year-old Kabul resident and father of two girls and a boy, explains that sons are expected to take care of their parents in old age. For many Pashtuns, he says, it's virtually unacceptable for elderly parents to live with a son-in-law.
On the other hand, says Ehsanullah, who gave only his first name, daughters can be a financial burden, and then they grow up and marry into somebody else's family. He says that before the birth of his third child, a son, he was embarrassed to tell relatives he had daughters.
'Sorry, It's A Girl'
"It doesn't mean that I don't love my daughters," he stresses, but there is another very real extreme that reveals itself in violence against mothers who "fail" to give birth to a son.
Earlier this month, the issue made headlines when a man in Konduz Province allegedly strangled his wife after she gave birth to the couple's third girl, rather than his much-desired boy.
Women's rights activists in Afghanistan say that such extreme cases are highly unusual, but bullying and ostracizing women over the gender of their babies is not uncommon.
Ironically, most of the pressure does not come from the father of the baby girl, but from the mother-in-law and other family members. This is according to Anisa Imrani, who was recently put in charge of women's affairs in the eastern Nangarhar Province.
"A woman who gives birth to a boy gets completely different treatment after the delivery. Her husband's family feeds her with the best possible food available; they usually slaughter a chicken for her," Imrani says.
"The birth of a boy is celebrated with lavish parties. But when a girl is born, the mother feels ashamed and she has to deal with harassment by her in-laws."
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Imrani says that while no reliable statistics are available, the phenomenon is more widespread among less-educated families.
Farida Hoad, an Afghan obstetrician who has worked in Kabul's Malalai maternity hospital, places the blame on "ignorance."
"They don't understand and do not accept, that it's the father's chromosome that determines the gender of the child," says Hoad, a native of Nangarhar.
Parents' preference of sons over daughters is strongly connected to men's and women's primary roles in the deeply religious society, in which men are traditionally the bread-winners and women are the homemakers.
In more conservative families, girls and boys are treated much differently by their parents while growing up. "My sister and I are allowed to eat only after my brothers finish their food," explains Nuriya, a teenage girl from the eastern Paktia Province.
Sons As Insurance Policy
As the heads of their families, men not only look after their elderly parents but they are also expected to take care of their younger siblings if called upon. Therefore, Afghan parents see their sons as a kind of insurance policy for old age.
Gulghotai Mahmadzai, a 55-year-old housewife from the southern city of Kandahar, says the fact that she never bore a son means she now faces an uncertain future.
Mahmadzai and her husband separated after she gave birth to 10 daughters, and her husband went on to marry a 26-year-old woman in an effort to get a son. He now has two more daughters.
Moving in with one of her daughters is not an option for Mahmadzai, and she lives alone. But Mahmadzai says that if she had had a son, her life would have been completely different.
Afghan women's rights activists say education and raising awareness is key to changing the situation. They call on religious leaders and mullahs, who enjoy great respect in Afghan society, to take part in campaigns to end gender discrimination in families.
"Our religion forbade discrimination over the gender of the child, which was prevalent before the arrival of Islam," says Afghan religious scholar Mawlana Mustafa. "It's anti-Islamic and is a sign of ignorance and faithlessness."
In Surkhrud, Rukhsar's marriage hangs in the balance as she waits to find out her baby's gender. If the ultrasound determines that she isn't carrying a boy, Rukhsar says, divorce or the prospect of having to share her husband with a second wife is imminent.
"Nothing else can change my situation," Rukhsar says.
Reports on Afghanistan war too rosy? Army officer, others say yes.
An Army officer sets the Pentagon, Capitol Hill buzzing with a published complaint that US military leaders are not being honest about slow progress in the Afghanistan war. He's not the only doubter.
Christian Science Monitor By Anna Mulrine, Staff writer February 6, 2012
Washington - Are US military leaders being honest about how the war in Afghanistan is going? No – and to a troubling extent, argues an Army lieutenant colonel who served there last year.
In an article that is creating buzz in the halls of the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, Lt. Col. Daniel Davis argues that not only is the war in Afghanistan not going well, but also that his fellow US military officers – whether due to a misguided “can do” spirit or a fear of repercussions within their chains of command – are misleading the American people.
This apparent lack of candor, in turn, is creating what Davis calls a “credibility gap,” making it impossible to allow US citizens and lawmakers to “decide if the risk to blood and treasure” inherent in America’s wars is “worth it.”
IN PICTURES: Battling the Afghan insurgency
Published Sunday in Armed Forces Journal, produced by Gannett, “Truth, lies and Afghanistan: How military leaders have let us down” begins with Davis emphasizing that, upon his arrival in Afghanistan in late 2010, he was “sincerely hoping" to learn that Pentagon officials' consistent claims – "that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and the military were progressing towards self-sufficiency" – were true.
“I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured,” he writes, “but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.”
Instead, “I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.” He cites the inability of Afghan soldiers and police to handle security in many parts of the country, and the continued widespread influence of the Taliban.
“I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground,” he says, citing a 2011 report by an Afghan organization which noted that US military assessments routinely differ from those of other international military forces in the country and are “solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal.”
Defense analysts outside the Pentagon, for their part, have long grappled with disparities between official intelligence assessments and what they hear behind closed doors, but some argue that the tendency to “spin” is getting worse as US forces prepare to leave. “Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the US does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,” writes Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a piece cited by Davis.
Last week, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D) of California, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, noted just such a gap, saying during a hearing that she was “concerned by what appears to be a disparity” in public testimony among Pentagon leaders about progress in Afghanistan and “the bleaker description” in classified intelligence reports.
Rather than deliberately mislead, military officers tend to emphasize the can-do spirit expected of career soldiers rather than problems that could be jeopardizing the war effort, when they are asked to speak publicly, some analysts note. Others may worry of the career-curbing impact of delivering news that those in power may not want to hear.
In many cases, US military leaders of the current wars have internalized a troubling lesson from Vietnam, argues Army Col. Paul Yingling: “If you can’t speak the truth, speak in truisms.”
Yingling, who wrote “A Failure in Generalship,” a widely regarded and widely discussed 2007 Armed Forces Journal article, cites his picks for the top truisms of the Afghanistan war:
* We’re making progress, though it’s uneven and uncertain. * There will be setbacks and hard fighting ahead. * Our hard-won progress is fragile and reversible. * The next six months are critical.
These oft-repeated phrases tend to produce eye-rolling among many who follow the war, because they have come to mean so little. “There are almost no conceivable circumstances in which they would not be true,” notes Yingling, in an e-mail. “No matter what happens, a senior leader can point to one of these truisms and claim, ‘I warned you.’ "
More troubling is that such truisms “justify continued fighting while minimizing the likelihood of anyone being held accountable for the results of such fighting,” Yingling adds.
For his part, Davis concludes in his article that a lack of candor is not patriotic, but rather ultimately does a disservice to the United States. When it comes time to decide whether to go to war – or whether to continue one – “our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth,” he writes. “That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years.”
The Pentagon has declined to comment on Davis's article.
Hezb-e-Islami Delegation Pessimistic of Qatar Talks
TOLOnews.com Monday, 06 February 2012
The Hezb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekymatyar is pessimistic about peace negotiations in Qatar, Hekmatyar's delegation in Kabul said.
A delegation sent to Kabul by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar said that if the negotiations have good results it will be in the benefit of the Afghanistan.
Negotiations between Hezb-e-Islami and the Afghan government have not led to any results.
"We pray and hope that these negotiations bring good will to our country," Ghayrat Baheer Head of Hezb-e-Islami's political office said. "As far as Afghan solution is concerned, all political parties and different ethnic groups of Afghanistan should take part."
A high ranking delegation of Hezb-e-Islami recently arrived in Kabul to talk with Afghan government, but no progress has been reported so far.
Mr Baheer said he hoped the talks would have a positive outcome.
He dismissed reports about surrender of Hezb-e-Islami members to the government.
"Afghans never surrender and Hezb-e-Islami not at all," he said.
Despite contacts between Hezb-e-Islami and Washington, no clear sign of progress has emerged.
Meanwhile, Leader of Change and Hope Coalition, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, has criticised the peace process arguing that neither Afghan political parties, nor civil society or the people in general are part of it. He said the Afghan government does not have a transparent programme for peace talks.
"Playing with the great wish of the Afghan people which is peace in the county is a political game. If a political game is played, whether at the regional or international level, it will not only lead to peace but will also distance us from peace," the Leader of Change and Hope Coalition said at a gathering in Kabul on Sunday.
Behind the Cover Story: Luke Mogelson on the U.S. Endgame in Afghanistan
New York Times By RACHEL NOLAN February 6, 2012
Luke Mogelson is a contributing writer for the magazine based in Kabul. He wrote this week’s cover story on the endgame for the U.S. in Afghanistan. Previously for the magazine he has written about Afghan civilians killed by U.S. soldiers and the Afghan National Police.
How did you first get in touch with Echo Company?
I originally went down to Helmand to check out Marja, which was said to have become very quiet and stable since the big operation there in early 2010. Marja is indeed very quiet and stable. While there, though, I heard that a lot of fighting was still happening in the province’s northern districts — Musa Qala, Kajaki and Sangin. So I went there.
Can you tell me a little more about the relationship between the Afghan National Security Forces and U.S. Marines? You say that in one particular unit, relations were unusually close and the two groups even ate together, and maybe naïvely it surprised me that this was so unusual. In general you say the Americans regard Afghans as lazy or prone to complaining. Did you get a sense of how Afghan soldiers viewed U.S. Marines?
It really varies dramatically from unit to unit. On one end of the spectrum, you have marines and Afghans who genuinely respect and like one another. They make an effort to learn a few words from their respective languages, invite each other to share M.R.E.’s or kabuli palau, trade pinches of Copenhagen for pinches of naswa, and just generally embrace the unique camaraderie that naturally arises among fighting men confronting a common enemy. On the other end, the marines feel mainly contempt for the Afghans, who respond, predictably, by living up to the worst expectations of them: refusing to carry their own radios, blatantly smoking hash, abandoning any semblance of discipline, taking naps while on patrol. Mostly, you get something in between these two extremes.
You write that the only way to keep the Taliban from retaking control after we leave is 1) to leave behind a proficient national security force and 2) to “win them breathing room.” The extent of the second is a matter of how many operations can be accomplished in how much time. How close are we to the first?
It’s very relative. You can’t judge the Afghan National Security Forces by the same standard that you would an American military unit. You can’t expect them to fight like Americans. To me, the interesting question isn’t whether the individual soldiering skills of the men in the field will be up to the task — some will, others won’t — but whether the National Army and Police, as institutions in an incredibly corrupt government, will be capable of adequately supporting them. In Musa Qala, Lieut. Vincent Young, the leader of Echo Company’s embedded training team, which mentors the Afghan soldiers there, told me he had been trying very hard to reduce the Afghans’ reliance on the Marines. But when the Marines stopped giving them fuel, food and ammunition, Young said: “It got to the point where it was affecting operations. They couldn’t go on patrol, they couldn’t go on convoys, they couldn’t get food. So we’d refuel their vehicles and give them a barrel for the generators.” He added: “In Delaram, where their logis
tics hub is, the motor pool is stocked with vehicles, Rangers, Humvees. And they just sit there. They hoard all this stuff, and yet here we have to push our trucks to start them. The commander will come down, these guys will ask for parts and he’ll say, ‘Not my problem,’ then leave. No vehicle that’s been sent up to be repaired has made its way back.”
I also asked Young whether he thought the Afghans would be able to continue patrolling remoter areas, like Juz Ghoray, beyond district centers — places the Marines are going into now. He said: “They may try to patrol a little outside the security bubble. They feel comfortable now going out on their own. But I think it’s partly because they know we have tanks, trucks, a quick-reaction force. We have the ability to find them and help them, even push air support if they need it. And once we leave, that’s all gone. They’re on their own.”
An Afghan flag raised in Taliban territory where maybe none of the villagers have ever seen it before is one kind of victory, one kind of symbol. Hoisting an American flag over an American outpost is another type of symbol. Did anyone try to dissuade Sergeant Granados from doing it since it would so obviously put them in danger?
Actually, since I was in Kajaki, the marines there have stopped raising Granados’ flag at the outpost. It’s been replaced by an Afghan flag. My understanding is that the Afghan flag elicits the same reaction as the American one did — it gets shot at.
You’ve written other articles for the magazine from Afghanistan, on Afghan civilians killed by U.S. soldiers and on the Afghan National Police, but these assignments did not include embedding with marines. Was live combat as you expected it to be after talking to many soldiers, or did it surprise you?
It surprised me. What probably surprised me most was how calm and professional the marines were, even those who’d never been in combat before. This isn’t to say I’d expected them to behave differently — but still, it’s an impressive thing to behold.
In your first article for the magazine, you quoted novelist and Vietnam veteran Tim O’Brien, who wrote “in war you lose your sense of the definite, hence your sense of truth itself, and therefore it’s safe to say that in a war story nothing is ever absolutely true.” Did being shot at as part of the group ever make you doubt your sense of definite reality, which you are obviously trying to keep a handle on as a reporter?
If I had written the scene about the ambush on Devon Hill relying solely on my powers of observation and ability to absorb impressions under fire, it would have been a long, detailed description of the dirt I was staring at while lying on my face, quietly cursing. No, immediately after the ambush, I reviewed at length everything that happened with each of the Marines involved.
You write about the memorial service given to marines who die in Afghanistan. When Staff Sgt. Vincent Bell was killed, what was the reaction of the rest of the marines? Was there time or space to grieve there, or did they just have to carry on with their mission until it was possible to do the memorial service?
Staff Sgt. Vincent Bell was killed shortly after I left Kajaki for Sangin. The memorial I attended in Sangin was for two marines from Weapons Company, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, who’d been killed by an I.E.D. — Cpl. Zachary C. Reiff (June 24, 1989 – Nov. 21, 2011) and Lance Cpl. Joshua D. Corral (Dec. 30 1991 – Nov. 18, 2011). The memorial was held at a patrol base the day after Thanksgiving. Neither the holiday nor the deaths of Reiff and Corral stopped or slowed the work that Weapons Company was doing. My impression was that the space for grief is one largely carved out by each marine inside himself, insulated from strangers such as myself. I think the selection of Scripture by the chaplain who spoke at the memorial (Ecclesiastes 3:1-11) was very telling. It begins, “There is a time for everything/and a season for every activity under the heavens:/A time to kill and a time to heal.” For most marines, I imagine the time to heal — and to truly grieve — does not begin until they return home; and does no
t end, ever.
I know that you don’t have a crystal ball, and in your article you decline to prognosticate about Afghanistan as a whole. But after seven weeks in Helmand, what do you think is likeliest to happen there after the U.S. pulls out? A full-on Taliban revival? A mixed map? Afghans holding the line alone seems like wishful thinking given some of the scenes you describe.
Well, there are a lot of factors beyond the military one — chief among them, obviously, the success or failure of peace talks. But if, for whatever reasons, the Taliban persist in their armed resistance, then yes, I think a lot of Afghan National Security Forces will be killed in Helmand, and insurgents will backfill at least some of the areas we vacate. Many civilians might also die; 3,021 civilians were killed in Afghanistan this year — a record for the war. Most of these deaths resulted from undiscriminating tactics employed by the Taliban (suicide attacks, I.E.D.’s), which could intensify when the Americans remove from Afghanistan the abundance of sophisticated technology and equipment currently used to minimize or forestall such attacks. At the same time, it’s important to remember that the Afghan National Security Forces do not subscribe to the same rules of engagement that American soldiers and marines do. After the withdrawal, civilians will no longer enjoy that protection.
Afghan interpreters to get second chance to come to Canada
Toronto Star By Bruce Campion-Smith Ottawa Bureau chief Mon Feb 06 2012
OTTAWA - More than 100 Afghan citizens who put their lives on the line to help Canada’s Afghanistan mission are getting a second chance to resettle here.
The Prime Minister’s Office has quietly ordered the federal immigration department to review the cases of Afghan citizens who helped Canadian diplomats and soldiers in Kandahar and Kabul — often at great personal risk — but were snubbed in their bids to come to Canada, the Star has learned.
The news could mean that Sayed Shah Sharifi, an interpreter whose story has been featured in the Star, could get another shot at coming to Canada. His initial application had been rejected, even though his service to the Canadian military won him accolades.
The surprise review comes amidst criticism that the Conservative government had betrayed a promise of Canadian citizenship to Afghans who had worked alongside Canadians on the battlefield.
As well, Harper’s office has removed one contentious criterion that had been seen as a roadblock to many Afghans seeking to make a new life in Canada, according to a source familiar with the file.
No longer will applicants have to demonstrate they face “extraordinary and individualized risk and serious injury” because of their service to Canadian troops, a subjective evaluation that prevented two-thirds of the candidates from qualifying.
While the resettlement program had dangled the promise of Canadian citizenship for Afghans who aided Canadians troops and diplomats during their Kandahar mission, many of those applications in fact had been rejected out of hand.
Among those was Sharifi, a 23-year-old combat interpreter, whose bid to come to Canada was rejected even though he had served the Canadian mission for the required 12 months and had won accolades from the military.
Yet the government officials who reviewed his application doubted his claims that Taliban insurgents want to kill him as retribution. Sharifi said he had been hunted by insurgents on motorcycles because of his work with the Canadian military.
Immigration Minister Jason Kenney announced in 2009 that he wanted to protect Afghans who could show “individual risk” because they had worked with Canadians in Kandahar. In return for their work, they would be offered fast-track immigration processing to come to Canada.
Yet the program became bogged down in bureaucratic delays and as of Dec. 31, 2011, only 97 applicants, plus their family members, had actually made the move to Canada.
But before Christmas, the order came down quietly from the Prime Minister’s Office to take another look at the cases that had been turned aside.
Those instructions are to review rejected files and accept Afghan nationals, such as interpreters, cultural advisers and others who can show proof that they worked with Canadians for at least 12 months.
“Obviously it flowed down from the political leadership to change the program,” said one source familiar with the issue.
Then, at a meeting last month of Ottawa’s Afghanistan Task Force — a committee of departments involved in the country, such as the RCMP, the defence department, foreign affairs and development — immigration officials revealed that changes were afoot to the program at the behest of the PMO.
They proposed a review of rejected applications and relaxed criteria that could offer hope to those already in the pipeline.
By the end of January, 159 files were under active review, the Star has learned. Decisions will be made by Feb. 15 on who is eligible, and those accepted will have to arrive in Canada no later than July 1.
While the program is not accepting new applications, there have been questions about trying to reach interpreters who didn’t apply the first time but might now have a shot under the revised criteria.
A spokesperson for Immigration Minister Jason Kenney declined to comment whether a fresh review was underway in the department.
“The government of Canada has now received all applications under this program. Many of them remain under review. We will not comment on operational matters for ongoing programs,” Candice Malcolm said.
Afghanistan's constitutional albatross
Karzai's fury at the suggestion of democracy does not bode well for either Afghanistan or the wider region.
Aljazeera By Robert Grenier Former CIA station chief Robert Grenier heads ERG partners, a financial consultancy firm. 06 Feb 2012
Washington, DC - Afghan President Hamid Karzai, we are told, was "incredibly angry". And so, rather than being able to focus his late January discussions with Afghan officials in the way he had intended, US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman was forced to engage instead in damage control. At a January 21 press conference in Kabul, Ambassador Grossman attempted to mollify the Afghan head of state by reiterating that a peace deal could only be negotiated by Afghans, and would not be hijacked by US officials, despite current appearances to the contrary.
Apparently the US envoy's ministrations were only sufficient to bank the fires of Mr Karzai's anger, which must have burst again into flames after his departure, judging from the theatricality of a subsequent statement by US Ambassador to Kabul Ryan Crocker. Crocker attacked head-on the rumours of US support for a partition of Afghanistan - which had so unhinged Afghanistan's volatile president - characterising such stories as "lies that dishonour the sacrifice of more than 1,800 US service members who have died in the cause of a unified Afghanistan". A unified Afghanistan? The families of those fallen service members might be understandably concerned if they actually believed their loved ones to have died in service to an oxymoron.
The cause of these histrionics was a joint statement issued some days before in Berlin, following a meeting of a four-person US congressional delegation led by Congressman Dana Rohrbacher with the multi-ethnic leaders of the opposition National Front for Afghanistan. Together, they had signed a document advocating major changes in the Afghan constitution, designed to create a federal system which would devolve power from the centre to the provinces. Of the existing governmental arrangements in Afghanstan they had the following to say:
"The current system has fatally concentrated decision-making to whoever is president of the country. The Afghan president appoints the governors of each province and district, the mayor of every town, every provincial chief of police, one third of the entire Senate, and even every judge in Afghanistan.
"This centralised power has led to massive corruption, disenfranchisement of a large segment of the Afghan people, obstacles to economic development, massive abuses of power, increasing political instability, poor governance, and a vast undermining of law and order."
This is, if anything, an understatement. In place of the travesty which is the current Afghan constitution, the signers mildly suggested "decentralising the political system, making it more compatible with the diverse political, social and cultural nature of Afghanistan". And in addition to some perfectly reasonable and consistent suggestions regarding substitution of the current presidential/monarchical system with a parliamentary one built on proportional representation, the authors end with the following radical ideas:
"We also support the election of governors and empowerment of provincial councils. Such elected governors and provincial councils should also have authority for such things as creating budgets and generating revenue, overseeing police and healthcare, as well as establishing educational authority, if they so desire."
These arguments in favour of genuine democracy in Afghanistan were enough to set the diminutive Karzai, himself the chief beneficiary of foreign interference in Afghanistan, caterwauling about US-backed plots to partition the country, and complaining to the national parliament about foreigners who use the country "to do their political experiments".
The current political experiment in Afghanistan, embodied in a constitution which is largely a product of meddling foreigners trying to save themselves from Afghanistan by making it less Afghan, is an abysmal failure. Nonetheless, US officials have been at pains to distance themselves from the latest suggestion that the Afghan constitution should be revised, whatever views Afghans themselves may have on the subject, lest the Afghan president's pique interfere in their efforts to establish a Taliban office in Qatar and to begin political talks. The great irony in all of this is that, without a completely redrawn Afghan constitution, there will be no means of reaching a political accommodation with the Taliban even marginally acceptable to most Afghans - or to US officials themselves, for that matter.
Thus far, US efforts at peace making with the Taliban have been consonant with US efforts at war making with the Taliban: Both, they believe, are too important to be left to the Afghans. US officials generously allow that actual negotiations toward Afghan national reconciliation eventually will have to include the Afghan government, but their attitude and their actions do much to undermine whatever authority and credibility the Kabul regime might otherwise command. The Taliban, for its part, is happy to speak with the US, so long as they do not have to deal with a government which they consider a foreign invention. In fact, they have half a point, and the US, in apparent agreement, is willing to accommodate them. But as the final element in a political approach which could not be less viable if it were intentionally designed to fail, the US has at the same time established "red lines" for a final outcome which amount, in effect, to the moral equivalent of a Taliban surrender, including acceptance of the curre
nt Afghan constitution.
Solutions to a quagmire
If an Afghan reconciliation process is to have any chance of success, it will have to directly involve all the major Afghan political players, and sooner, rather than later. This will have to include leaders, such as those represented in the National Front for Afghanistan - often disparaged as "warlords" - who, unlike an Afghan president whose power relies largely on foreign troops and money, have authentic political weight. Moreover, any viable attempt at national reconciliation by the leading Afghan power blocs, to include those elements represented by the Taliban, will necessarily involve major changes to current political arrangements designed, among other things, to provide opportunities for the Taliban to participate in governance, while limiting their geographic reach to those areas where they can command genuine local support. Those who brand such arrangements a de-facto "partition" of the country are those most likely to benefit from Kabul's currently monopoly on power. The one thing that all Afghans
seem to share is a common sense of Afghan identity.
The Taliban, for its part, does not seek political-sharing arrangements now, as they have deluded themselves into believing that they can conquer and run a centralised state on their own. In this, they are as captive to wishful thinking as Karzai and the US government. They will eventually be disabused of such ideas.
In the meantime, the US would be well advised to adopt a long-range view of what an achievable political outcome in Afghanistan might look like, and encourage the reforms, constitutional and otherwise, which would facilitate it - rather than focusing on short-term expedients and the ephemeral tantrums of a putative national leader whose current pretentions, if encouraged further, will ensure disaster for his country and its benefactors alike.
Robert Grenier is a retired, 27-year veteran of the CIA's Clandestine Service. He was Director of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Centre from 2004 to 2006.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Taliban Leader Captured in Helmand, Isaf Says
TOLOnews.com Tuesday, 07 February 2012
A Taliban leader was captured in a joint operation conducted by Afghan and Coalition security troops in southern Helmand province on Tuesday, Isaf said.
"In Nahr-e Saraj district, Helmand province, an Afghan and coalition security force captured a Taliban leader during an operation today," Isaf said in a statement.
The leader moved supplies for fighters and directed an insurgent cell specialising in bomb attacks throughout the province, it said.
One additional suspected insurgent was detained during the operation, it added.
Meanwhile, the statement said that Afghan and coalition forces captured a Taliban facilitator during an operation in Arghandab district of Kandahar province today.
The facilitator supplied insurgents with explosives for use in attacks throughout Arghandab district. Two suspected insurgents were detained during the operation.
In Maiwand district of Kandahar province, an Afghan and coalition security force conducted an operation in search of a Taliban leader today.
The leader conducted direct-fire and roadside bomb attacks. Multiple suspected insurgents were detained during the operation.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
Reuters Tue Feb 7, 2012
KABUL - An Afghan security guard killed three colleagues and two police in southern Afghan city of Kandahar, the provincial authorities said on Tuesday.
"A member of a private security company (is) responsible for shooting his friends," the Kandahar media office said on its official Twitter feed. "(Two) ANP (police) were also killed and another one wounded after they intervened."
All of the victims were Afghans.
As of March 20 this year, private security firms will no longer be allowed to guard private premises.
All guard duties will be transferred to the Afghan Public Protection Force, a government-owned company which will be the sole supplier of guards to non-diplomatic and non-military operations in Afghanistan.
On Sunday, nine people were killed when a car bomb exploded in a busy area of Kandahar city.
Dozens of foreign soldiers have been killed in recent years by what NATO dubs the insider threat of "rogue" Afghan soldiers and police, complicating coalition efforts to train Afghanistan's army and police force before foreign combat troops leave by the end of 2014.
(Reporting by Mirwais Harooni and Daniel Magnowski; Editing by Nick Macfie)
In Afghanistan, Children Comprise Half Of Workforce At Brick Kilns
February 7, 2012 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
A new International Labor Organization (ILO) assessment says that half of the workforce in Afghan brick kilns are children under the age of 14.
The ILO report details brick-making as one of the worst forms of child labor, where children work in a slavish cycle of debt that is almost impossible to escape.
Though both child labor and so-called bonded work are illegal in Afghanistan, children as young as 5 produce hundreds of bricks a week for a few dollars to pay off family debts, which only swell the longer they work there.
Poor health from harsh working conditions, reliance on shelter and electricity provided by brick employers and denied education mean brick makers are tied to their work.
The United Nations estimates that almost 2 million children in Afghanistan are in full or part-time work.
With agency reports
Baby Girls Seen As Mixed Blessing In Afghanistan
February 7, 2012 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty By Farangis Najibullah, Haseeba Shaheed
At the age of 29, childbirth is nothing new to Rukhsar, yet the expectant mother can't help being apprehensive about her fifth child.
Her first four children, aged between 2 and 12, are all girls, and she feels pressure to deliver a boy to please her husband. If she gives birth to another daughter, Rukhsar says, she fears he will seek a second wife.
"I would have to organize for him to get a second wife," she says. "I don't want him to get another wife, but I would have no other choice [in order to avoid divorce]."
Not having a son has placed enormous strain on the couple's marriage, says Rukhsar, a native of the eastern Afghan district of Surkhrud who gave only her first name.
In Afghanistan, tradition among many families dictates a strong preference for boys, and blame is often placed on the mother if she gives birth to a girl.
This is for a variety of reasons: sons are seen as future breadwinners; the continuation of a family's lineage; the inheritors of the estate.
Ehsanullah, a 33-year-old Kabul resident and father of two girls and a boy, explains that sons are expected to take care of their parents in old age. For many Pashtuns, he says, it's virtually unacceptable for elderly parents to live with a son-in-law.
On the other hand, says Ehsanullah, who gave only his first name, daughters can be a financial burden, and then they grow up and marry into somebody else's family. He says that before the birth of his third child, a son, he was embarrassed to tell relatives he had daughters.
'Sorry, It's A Girl'
"It doesn't mean that I don't love my daughters," he stresses, but there is another very real extreme that reveals itself in violence against mothers who "fail" to give birth to a son.
Earlier this month, the issue made headlines when a man in Konduz Province allegedly strangled his wife after she gave birth to the couple's third girl, rather than his much-desired boy.
Women's rights activists in Afghanistan say that such extreme cases are highly unusual, but bullying and ostracizing women over the gender of their babies is not uncommon.
Ironically, most of the pressure does not come from the father of the baby girl, but from the mother-in-law and other family members. This is according to Anisa Imrani, who was recently put in charge of women's affairs in the eastern Nangarhar Province.
"A woman who gives birth to a boy gets completely different treatment after the delivery. Her husband's family feeds her with the best possible food available; they usually slaughter a chicken for her," Imrani says.
"The birth of a boy is celebrated with lavish parties. But when a girl is born, the mother feels ashamed and she has to deal with harassment by her in-laws."
Conservative Society
Imrani says that while no reliable statistics are available, the phenomenon is more widespread among less-educated families.
Farida Hoad, an Afghan obstetrician who has worked in Kabul's Malalai maternity hospital, places the blame on "ignorance."
"They don't understand and do not accept, that it's the father's chromosome that determines the gender of the child," says Hoad, a native of Nangarhar.
Parents' preference of sons over daughters is strongly connected to men's and women's primary roles in the deeply religious society, in which men are traditionally the bread-winners and women are the homemakers.
In more conservative families, girls and boys are treated much differently by their parents while growing up. "My sister and I are allowed to eat only after my brothers finish their food," explains Nuriya, a teenage girl from the eastern Paktia Province.
Sons As Insurance Policy
As the heads of their families, men not only look after their elderly parents but they are also expected to take care of their younger siblings if called upon. Therefore, Afghan parents see their sons as a kind of insurance policy for old age.
Gulghotai Mahmadzai, a 55-year-old housewife from the southern city of Kandahar, says the fact that she never bore a son means she now faces an uncertain future.
Mahmadzai and her husband separated after she gave birth to 10 daughters, and her husband went on to marry a 26-year-old woman in an effort to get a son. He now has two more daughters.
Moving in with one of her daughters is not an option for Mahmadzai, and she lives alone. But Mahmadzai says that if she had had a son, her life would have been completely different.
Afghan women's rights activists say education and raising awareness is key to changing the situation. They call on religious leaders and mullahs, who enjoy great respect in Afghan society, to take part in campaigns to end gender discrimination in families.
"Our religion forbade discrimination over the gender of the child, which was prevalent before the arrival of Islam," says Afghan religious scholar Mawlana Mustafa. "It's anti-Islamic and is a sign of ignorance and faithlessness."
In Surkhrud, Rukhsar's marriage hangs in the balance as she waits to find out her baby's gender. If the ultrasound determines that she isn't carrying a boy, Rukhsar says, divorce or the prospect of having to share her husband with a second wife is imminent.
"Nothing else can change my situation," Rukhsar says.
Reports on Afghanistan war too rosy? Army officer, others say yes.
An Army officer sets the Pentagon, Capitol Hill buzzing with a published complaint that US military leaders are not being honest about slow progress in the Afghanistan war. He's not the only doubter.
Christian Science Monitor By Anna Mulrine, Staff writer February 6, 2012
Washington - Are US military leaders being honest about how the war in Afghanistan is going? No – and to a troubling extent, argues an Army lieutenant colonel who served there last year.
In an article that is creating buzz in the halls of the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, Lt. Col. Daniel Davis argues that not only is the war in Afghanistan not going well, but also that his fellow US military officers – whether due to a misguided “can do” spirit or a fear of repercussions within their chains of command – are misleading the American people.
This apparent lack of candor, in turn, is creating what Davis calls a “credibility gap,” making it impossible to allow US citizens and lawmakers to “decide if the risk to blood and treasure” inherent in America’s wars is “worth it.”
IN PICTURES: Battling the Afghan insurgency
Published Sunday in Armed Forces Journal, produced by Gannett, “Truth, lies and Afghanistan: How military leaders have let us down” begins with Davis emphasizing that, upon his arrival in Afghanistan in late 2010, he was “sincerely hoping" to learn that Pentagon officials' consistent claims – "that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and the military were progressing towards self-sufficiency" – were true.
“I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured,” he writes, “but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.”
Instead, “I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.” He cites the inability of Afghan soldiers and police to handle security in many parts of the country, and the continued widespread influence of the Taliban.
“I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground,” he says, citing a 2011 report by an Afghan organization which noted that US military assessments routinely differ from those of other international military forces in the country and are “solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal.”
Defense analysts outside the Pentagon, for their part, have long grappled with disparities between official intelligence assessments and what they hear behind closed doors, but some argue that the tendency to “spin” is getting worse as US forces prepare to leave. “Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the US does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,” writes Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a piece cited by Davis.
Last week, Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D) of California, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, noted just such a gap, saying during a hearing that she was “concerned by what appears to be a disparity” in public testimony among Pentagon leaders about progress in Afghanistan and “the bleaker description” in classified intelligence reports.
Rather than deliberately mislead, military officers tend to emphasize the can-do spirit expected of career soldiers rather than problems that could be jeopardizing the war effort, when they are asked to speak publicly, some analysts note. Others may worry of the career-curbing impact of delivering news that those in power may not want to hear.
In many cases, US military leaders of the current wars have internalized a troubling lesson from Vietnam, argues Army Col. Paul Yingling: “If you can’t speak the truth, speak in truisms.”
Yingling, who wrote “A Failure in Generalship,” a widely regarded and widely discussed 2007 Armed Forces Journal article, cites his picks for the top truisms of the Afghanistan war:
* We’re making progress, though it’s uneven and uncertain. * There will be setbacks and hard fighting ahead. * Our hard-won progress is fragile and reversible. * The next six months are critical.
These oft-repeated phrases tend to produce eye-rolling among many who follow the war, because they have come to mean so little. “There are almost no conceivable circumstances in which they would not be true,” notes Yingling, in an e-mail. “No matter what happens, a senior leader can point to one of these truisms and claim, ‘I warned you.’ "
More troubling is that such truisms “justify continued fighting while minimizing the likelihood of anyone being held accountable for the results of such fighting,” Yingling adds.
For his part, Davis concludes in his article that a lack of candor is not patriotic, but rather ultimately does a disservice to the United States. When it comes time to decide whether to go to war – or whether to continue one – “our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth,” he writes. “That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years.”
The Pentagon has declined to comment on Davis's article.
Hezb-e-Islami Delegation Pessimistic of Qatar Talks
TOLOnews.com Monday, 06 February 2012
The Hezb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekymatyar is pessimistic about peace negotiations in Qatar, Hekmatyar's delegation in Kabul said.
A delegation sent to Kabul by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar said that if the negotiations have good results it will be in the benefit of the Afghanistan.
Negotiations between Hezb-e-Islami and the Afghan government have not led to any results.
"We pray and hope that these negotiations bring good will to our country," Ghayrat Baheer Head of Hezb-e-Islami's political office said. "As far as Afghan solution is concerned, all political parties and different ethnic groups of Afghanistan should take part."
A high ranking delegation of Hezb-e-Islami recently arrived in Kabul to talk with Afghan government, but no progress has been reported so far.
Mr Baheer said he hoped the talks would have a positive outcome.
He dismissed reports about surrender of Hezb-e-Islami members to the government.
"Afghans never surrender and Hezb-e-Islami not at all," he said.
Despite contacts between Hezb-e-Islami and Washington, no clear sign of progress has emerged.
Meanwhile, Leader of Change and Hope Coalition, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, has criticised the peace process arguing that neither Afghan political parties, nor civil society or the people in general are part of it. He said the Afghan government does not have a transparent programme for peace talks.
"Playing with the great wish of the Afghan people which is peace in the county is a political game. If a political game is played, whether at the regional or international level, it will not only lead to peace but will also distance us from peace," the Leader of Change and Hope Coalition said at a gathering in Kabul on Sunday.
Behind the Cover Story: Luke Mogelson on the U.S. Endgame in Afghanistan
New York Times By RACHEL NOLAN February 6, 2012
Luke Mogelson is a contributing writer for the magazine based in Kabul. He wrote this week’s cover story on the endgame for the U.S. in Afghanistan. Previously for the magazine he has written about Afghan civilians killed by U.S. soldiers and the Afghan National Police.
How did you first get in touch with Echo Company?
I originally went down to Helmand to check out Marja, which was said to have become very quiet and stable since the big operation there in early 2010. Marja is indeed very quiet and stable. While there, though, I heard that a lot of fighting was still happening in the province’s northern districts — Musa Qala, Kajaki and Sangin. So I went there.
Can you tell me a little more about the relationship between the Afghan National Security Forces and U.S. Marines? You say that in one particular unit, relations were unusually close and the two groups even ate together, and maybe naïvely it surprised me that this was so unusual. In general you say the Americans regard Afghans as lazy or prone to complaining. Did you get a sense of how Afghan soldiers viewed U.S. Marines?
It really varies dramatically from unit to unit. On one end of the spectrum, you have marines and Afghans who genuinely respect and like one another. They make an effort to learn a few words from their respective languages, invite each other to share M.R.E.’s or kabuli palau, trade pinches of Copenhagen for pinches of naswa, and just generally embrace the unique camaraderie that naturally arises among fighting men confronting a common enemy. On the other end, the marines feel mainly contempt for the Afghans, who respond, predictably, by living up to the worst expectations of them: refusing to carry their own radios, blatantly smoking hash, abandoning any semblance of discipline, taking naps while on patrol. Mostly, you get something in between these two extremes.
You write that the only way to keep the Taliban from retaking control after we leave is 1) to leave behind a proficient national security force and 2) to “win them breathing room.” The extent of the second is a matter of how many operations can be accomplished in how much time. How close are we to the first?
It’s very relative. You can’t judge the Afghan National Security Forces by the same standard that you would an American military unit. You can’t expect them to fight like Americans. To me, the interesting question isn’t whether the individual soldiering skills of the men in the field will be up to the task — some will, others won’t — but whether the National Army and Police, as institutions in an incredibly corrupt government, will be capable of adequately supporting them. In Musa Qala, Lieut. Vincent Young, the leader of Echo Company’s embedded training team, which mentors the Afghan soldiers there, told me he had been trying very hard to reduce the Afghans’ reliance on the Marines. But when the Marines stopped giving them fuel, food and ammunition, Young said: “It got to the point where it was affecting operations. They couldn’t go on patrol, they couldn’t go on convoys, they couldn’t get food. So we’d refuel their vehicles and give them a barrel for the generators.” He added: “In Delaram, where their logis
tics hub is, the motor pool is stocked with vehicles, Rangers, Humvees. And they just sit there. They hoard all this stuff, and yet here we have to push our trucks to start them. The commander will come down, these guys will ask for parts and he’ll say, ‘Not my problem,’ then leave. No vehicle that’s been sent up to be repaired has made its way back.”
I also asked Young whether he thought the Afghans would be able to continue patrolling remoter areas, like Juz Ghoray, beyond district centers — places the Marines are going into now. He said: “They may try to patrol a little outside the security bubble. They feel comfortable now going out on their own. But I think it’s partly because they know we have tanks, trucks, a quick-reaction force. We have the ability to find them and help them, even push air support if they need it. And once we leave, that’s all gone. They’re on their own.”
An Afghan flag raised in Taliban territory where maybe none of the villagers have ever seen it before is one kind of victory, one kind of symbol. Hoisting an American flag over an American outpost is another type of symbol. Did anyone try to dissuade Sergeant Granados from doing it since it would so obviously put them in danger?
Actually, since I was in Kajaki, the marines there have stopped raising Granados’ flag at the outpost. It’s been replaced by an Afghan flag. My understanding is that the Afghan flag elicits the same reaction as the American one did — it gets shot at.
You’ve written other articles for the magazine from Afghanistan, on Afghan civilians killed by U.S. soldiers and on the Afghan National Police, but these assignments did not include embedding with marines. Was live combat as you expected it to be after talking to many soldiers, or did it surprise you?
It surprised me. What probably surprised me most was how calm and professional the marines were, even those who’d never been in combat before. This isn’t to say I’d expected them to behave differently — but still, it’s an impressive thing to behold.
In your first article for the magazine, you quoted novelist and Vietnam veteran Tim O’Brien, who wrote “in war you lose your sense of the definite, hence your sense of truth itself, and therefore it’s safe to say that in a war story nothing is ever absolutely true.” Did being shot at as part of the group ever make you doubt your sense of definite reality, which you are obviously trying to keep a handle on as a reporter?
If I had written the scene about the ambush on Devon Hill relying solely on my powers of observation and ability to absorb impressions under fire, it would have been a long, detailed description of the dirt I was staring at while lying on my face, quietly cursing. No, immediately after the ambush, I reviewed at length everything that happened with each of the Marines involved.
You write about the memorial service given to marines who die in Afghanistan. When Staff Sgt. Vincent Bell was killed, what was the reaction of the rest of the marines? Was there time or space to grieve there, or did they just have to carry on with their mission until it was possible to do the memorial service?
Staff Sgt. Vincent Bell was killed shortly after I left Kajaki for Sangin. The memorial I attended in Sangin was for two marines from Weapons Company, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, who’d been killed by an I.E.D. — Cpl. Zachary C. Reiff (June 24, 1989 – Nov. 21, 2011) and Lance Cpl. Joshua D. Corral (Dec. 30 1991 – Nov. 18, 2011). The memorial was held at a patrol base the day after Thanksgiving. Neither the holiday nor the deaths of Reiff and Corral stopped or slowed the work that Weapons Company was doing. My impression was that the space for grief is one largely carved out by each marine inside himself, insulated from strangers such as myself. I think the selection of Scripture by the chaplain who spoke at the memorial (Ecclesiastes 3:1-11) was very telling. It begins, “There is a time for everything/and a season for every activity under the heavens:/A time to kill and a time to heal.” For most marines, I imagine the time to heal — and to truly grieve — does not begin until they return home; and does no
t end, ever.
I know that you don’t have a crystal ball, and in your article you decline to prognosticate about Afghanistan as a whole. But after seven weeks in Helmand, what do you think is likeliest to happen there after the U.S. pulls out? A full-on Taliban revival? A mixed map? Afghans holding the line alone seems like wishful thinking given some of the scenes you describe.
Well, there are a lot of factors beyond the military one — chief among them, obviously, the success or failure of peace talks. But if, for whatever reasons, the Taliban persist in their armed resistance, then yes, I think a lot of Afghan National Security Forces will be killed in Helmand, and insurgents will backfill at least some of the areas we vacate. Many civilians might also die; 3,021 civilians were killed in Afghanistan this year — a record for the war. Most of these deaths resulted from undiscriminating tactics employed by the Taliban (suicide attacks, I.E.D.’s), which could intensify when the Americans remove from Afghanistan the abundance of sophisticated technology and equipment currently used to minimize or forestall such attacks. At the same time, it’s important to remember that the Afghan National Security Forces do not subscribe to the same rules of engagement that American soldiers and marines do. After the withdrawal, civilians will no longer enjoy that protection.
Afghan interpreters to get second chance to come to Canada
Toronto Star By Bruce Campion-Smith Ottawa Bureau chief Mon Feb 06 2012
OTTAWA - More than 100 Afghan citizens who put their lives on the line to help Canada’s Afghanistan mission are getting a second chance to resettle here.
The Prime Minister’s Office has quietly ordered the federal immigration department to review the cases of Afghan citizens who helped Canadian diplomats and soldiers in Kandahar and Kabul — often at great personal risk — but were snubbed in their bids to come to Canada, the Star has learned.
The news could mean that Sayed Shah Sharifi, an interpreter whose story has been featured in the Star, could get another shot at coming to Canada. His initial application had been rejected, even though his service to the Canadian military won him accolades.
The surprise review comes amidst criticism that the Conservative government had betrayed a promise of Canadian citizenship to Afghans who had worked alongside Canadians on the battlefield.
As well, Harper’s office has removed one contentious criterion that had been seen as a roadblock to many Afghans seeking to make a new life in Canada, according to a source familiar with the file.
No longer will applicants have to demonstrate they face “extraordinary and individualized risk and serious injury” because of their service to Canadian troops, a subjective evaluation that prevented two-thirds of the candidates from qualifying.
While the resettlement program had dangled the promise of Canadian citizenship for Afghans who aided Canadians troops and diplomats during their Kandahar mission, many of those applications in fact had been rejected out of hand.
Among those was Sharifi, a 23-year-old combat interpreter, whose bid to come to Canada was rejected even though he had served the Canadian mission for the required 12 months and had won accolades from the military.
Yet the government officials who reviewed his application doubted his claims that Taliban insurgents want to kill him as retribution. Sharifi said he had been hunted by insurgents on motorcycles because of his work with the Canadian military.
Immigration Minister Jason Kenney announced in 2009 that he wanted to protect Afghans who could show “individual risk” because they had worked with Canadians in Kandahar. In return for their work, they would be offered fast-track immigration processing to come to Canada.
Yet the program became bogged down in bureaucratic delays and as of Dec. 31, 2011, only 97 applicants, plus their family members, had actually made the move to Canada.
But before Christmas, the order came down quietly from the Prime Minister’s Office to take another look at the cases that had been turned aside.
Those instructions are to review rejected files and accept Afghan nationals, such as interpreters, cultural advisers and others who can show proof that they worked with Canadians for at least 12 months.
“Obviously it flowed down from the political leadership to change the program,” said one source familiar with the issue.
Then, at a meeting last month of Ottawa’s Afghanistan Task Force — a committee of departments involved in the country, such as the RCMP, the defence department, foreign affairs and development — immigration officials revealed that changes were afoot to the program at the behest of the PMO.
They proposed a review of rejected applications and relaxed criteria that could offer hope to those already in the pipeline.
By the end of January, 159 files were under active review, the Star has learned. Decisions will be made by Feb. 15 on who is eligible, and those accepted will have to arrive in Canada no later than July 1.
While the program is not accepting new applications, there have been questions about trying to reach interpreters who didn’t apply the first time but might now have a shot under the revised criteria.
A spokesperson for Immigration Minister Jason Kenney declined to comment whether a fresh review was underway in the department.
“The government of Canada has now received all applications under this program. Many of them remain under review. We will not comment on operational matters for ongoing programs,” Candice Malcolm said.
Afghanistan's constitutional albatross
Karzai's fury at the suggestion of democracy does not bode well for either Afghanistan or the wider region.
Aljazeera By Robert Grenier Former CIA station chief Robert Grenier heads ERG partners, a financial consultancy firm. 06 Feb 2012
Washington, DC - Afghan President Hamid Karzai, we are told, was "incredibly angry". And so, rather than being able to focus his late January discussions with Afghan officials in the way he had intended, US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman was forced to engage instead in damage control. At a January 21 press conference in Kabul, Ambassador Grossman attempted to mollify the Afghan head of state by reiterating that a peace deal could only be negotiated by Afghans, and would not be hijacked by US officials, despite current appearances to the contrary.
Apparently the US envoy's ministrations were only sufficient to bank the fires of Mr Karzai's anger, which must have burst again into flames after his departure, judging from the theatricality of a subsequent statement by US Ambassador to Kabul Ryan Crocker. Crocker attacked head-on the rumours of US support for a partition of Afghanistan - which had so unhinged Afghanistan's volatile president - characterising such stories as "lies that dishonour the sacrifice of more than 1,800 US service members who have died in the cause of a unified Afghanistan". A unified Afghanistan? The families of those fallen service members might be understandably concerned if they actually believed their loved ones to have died in service to an oxymoron.
The cause of these histrionics was a joint statement issued some days before in Berlin, following a meeting of a four-person US congressional delegation led by Congressman Dana Rohrbacher with the multi-ethnic leaders of the opposition National Front for Afghanistan. Together, they had signed a document advocating major changes in the Afghan constitution, designed to create a federal system which would devolve power from the centre to the provinces. Of the existing governmental arrangements in Afghanstan they had the following to say:
"The current system has fatally concentrated decision-making to whoever is president of the country. The Afghan president appoints the governors of each province and district, the mayor of every town, every provincial chief of police, one third of the entire Senate, and even every judge in Afghanistan.
"This centralised power has led to massive corruption, disenfranchisement of a large segment of the Afghan people, obstacles to economic development, massive abuses of power, increasing political instability, poor governance, and a vast undermining of law and order."
This is, if anything, an understatement. In place of the travesty which is the current Afghan constitution, the signers mildly suggested "decentralising the political system, making it more compatible with the diverse political, social and cultural nature of Afghanistan". And in addition to some perfectly reasonable and consistent suggestions regarding substitution of the current presidential/monarchical system with a parliamentary one built on proportional representation, the authors end with the following radical ideas:
"We also support the election of governors and empowerment of provincial councils. Such elected governors and provincial councils should also have authority for such things as creating budgets and generating revenue, overseeing police and healthcare, as well as establishing educational authority, if they so desire."
These arguments in favour of genuine democracy in Afghanistan were enough to set the diminutive Karzai, himself the chief beneficiary of foreign interference in Afghanistan, caterwauling about US-backed plots to partition the country, and complaining to the national parliament about foreigners who use the country "to do their political experiments".
The current political experiment in Afghanistan, embodied in a constitution which is largely a product of meddling foreigners trying to save themselves from Afghanistan by making it less Afghan, is an abysmal failure. Nonetheless, US officials have been at pains to distance themselves from the latest suggestion that the Afghan constitution should be revised, whatever views Afghans themselves may have on the subject, lest the Afghan president's pique interfere in their efforts to establish a Taliban office in Qatar and to begin political talks. The great irony in all of this is that, without a completely redrawn Afghan constitution, there will be no means of reaching a political accommodation with the Taliban even marginally acceptable to most Afghans - or to US officials themselves, for that matter.
Thus far, US efforts at peace making with the Taliban have been consonant with US efforts at war making with the Taliban: Both, they believe, are too important to be left to the Afghans. US officials generously allow that actual negotiations toward Afghan national reconciliation eventually will have to include the Afghan government, but their attitude and their actions do much to undermine whatever authority and credibility the Kabul regime might otherwise command. The Taliban, for its part, is happy to speak with the US, so long as they do not have to deal with a government which they consider a foreign invention. In fact, they have half a point, and the US, in apparent agreement, is willing to accommodate them. But as the final element in a political approach which could not be less viable if it were intentionally designed to fail, the US has at the same time established "red lines" for a final outcome which amount, in effect, to the moral equivalent of a Taliban surrender, including acceptance of the curre
nt Afghan constitution.
Solutions to a quagmire
If an Afghan reconciliation process is to have any chance of success, it will have to directly involve all the major Afghan political players, and sooner, rather than later. This will have to include leaders, such as those represented in the National Front for Afghanistan - often disparaged as "warlords" - who, unlike an Afghan president whose power relies largely on foreign troops and money, have authentic political weight. Moreover, any viable attempt at national reconciliation by the leading Afghan power blocs, to include those elements represented by the Taliban, will necessarily involve major changes to current political arrangements designed, among other things, to provide opportunities for the Taliban to participate in governance, while limiting their geographic reach to those areas where they can command genuine local support. Those who brand such arrangements a de-facto "partition" of the country are those most likely to benefit from Kabul's currently monopoly on power. The one thing that all Afghans
seem to share is a common sense of Afghan identity.
The Taliban, for its part, does not seek political-sharing arrangements now, as they have deluded themselves into believing that they can conquer and run a centralised state on their own. In this, they are as captive to wishful thinking as Karzai and the US government. They will eventually be disabused of such ideas.
In the meantime, the US would be well advised to adopt a long-range view of what an achievable political outcome in Afghanistan might look like, and encourage the reforms, constitutional and otherwise, which would facilitate it - rather than focusing on short-term expedients and the ephemeral tantrums of a putative national leader whose current pretentions, if encouraged further, will ensure disaster for his country and its benefactors alike.
Robert Grenier is a retired, 27-year veteran of the CIA's Clandestine Service. He was Director of the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Centre from 2004 to 2006.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Taliban Leader Captured in Helmand, Isaf Says
TOLOnews.com Tuesday, 07 February 2012
A Taliban leader was captured in a joint operation conducted by Afghan and Coalition security troops in southern Helmand province on Tuesday, Isaf said.
"In Nahr-e Saraj district, Helmand province, an Afghan and coalition security force captured a Taliban leader during an operation today," Isaf said in a statement.
The leader moved supplies for fighters and directed an insurgent cell specialising in bomb attacks throughout the province, it said.
One additional suspected insurgent was detained during the operation, it added.
Meanwhile, the statement said that Afghan and coalition forces captured a Taliban facilitator during an operation in Arghandab district of Kandahar province today.
The facilitator supplied insurgents with explosives for use in attacks throughout Arghandab district. Two suspected insurgents were detained during the operation.
In Maiwand district of Kandahar province, an Afghan and coalition security force conducted an operation in search of a Taliban leader today.
The leader conducted direct-fire and roadside bomb attacks. Multiple suspected insurgents were detained during the operation.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com