[Afghan News] December 21, 2011

[یاسمینه]

Afghanistan opening first major train service, providing key link for US supplies, trade
By Associated Press, December 21
KABUL, Afghanistan — Operators ran the first train down Afghanistan’s first major railroad Wednesday, clearing the way for a long-awaited service from the northern border that should speed up the U.S. military’s crucial supply flow and become a hub for future trade.
A cargoless train chugged into a newly built station in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif on Wednesday after a 47-mile (75-kilometer) trial run from the border with Uzbekistan, said Deputy Public Works Minister Noor Gul Mangal, who was on hand for the arrival.
The new rail line is the first stage of an ambitious plan to link landlocked Afghanistan to its neighbors’ extensive railways for the first time, eventually opening up new trade routes for goods traveling between Europe and Asia.
Afghanistan has never had a functional rail network, though many projects have been begun and later abandoned, victims of maneuvers of the 19th century Great Game rivalry between Russia and Britain, and then political bickering in the early 20th century. Soviet occupiers abandoned a few rail projects in the 1980s, and later years of bitter civil war made such construction impossible.
So the line from the border town of Hairatan to Mazar-i-Sharif marks a milestone in a violence-wracked country eager for good news on the horizon. It also could be a key route for the U.S. troop withdrawal beginning next year and, eventually, a gateway for Afghan exports that would travel to its neighbors, said Fred Starr, chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University in Washington
“It’s actually a big deal. It’s very significant both practically and symbolically,” Starr said.
In the short term, service will help release a bottleneck at Hairatan dry port that is now holding up goods — including fuel and other supplies for American troops — while they are loaded off of trains and onto trucks for a hazardous journey over Afghanistan’s northern mountain roads.
“This port of Hairatan is where the bulk of commercial cargo is coming from into the country, so it is very important,” said Juan Miranda, head of Central and West Asia Department of the Asian Development Bank, which funded the $165 million project.
Allowing trains to come straight in will help Hairatan handle up to 10 times as much cargo, from 4,000 tons per month now to 25,000-40,000 tons per month once the service is fully operating, the ADB says. Once in Mazar-i-Sharif, the goods can be transferred to most of the rest of Afghanistan on surface roads.
Uzbekistan’s state-owned SE Sogdiana Trans will run the commercial train service, ADB’s Afghanistan representative Noriko Sato said.
A U.S. military spokesman says the new railway will be key to supplying American troops — and possibly also withdrawing non-lethal cargo during the American troop pullout set to begin next year.
“We do not have numbers yet, (but) we anticipate that the rail line will be able to speed the transit of cargo into Afghanistan and out of it,” said Cmdr. Bill Speaks of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The U.S. has recently shifted much of its supply line to the north from routes going through Pakistan, and the northern routes’ importance was brought into sharp focus last month when Pakistan — angered by a disputed NATO strike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers — closed its two border crossings for U.S. supplies.
Just three years ago, about 90 percent of nonmilitary supplies to Afghanistan went through Karachi, Pakistan. Today, close to 75 percent of cargo is shipped through the northern network.
Just as the Pakistani supply line has been attacked by insurgents, the newer northern routes through Mazar-i-Sharif and other cities are likely to also become targets. In 2009, Taliban forces in the northern province of Kunduz hijacked two fuel trucks, resulting in a fiery NATO airstrike that killed dozens.
While many fear instability or even civil war in Afghanistan after 2014 when most foreign forces leave, others are busy planning for a future in which the country could be a hub in a New Silk Road reconnecting spice and silk routes from centuries past.
The 10-country Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation project — supported by the ADB along with the U.N., World Bank and International Monetary Fund — envisions a network of some 2,250 miles (3,600 kilometers) of roads and 1,250 miles (2,000 kilometers) of railway linking China and India to the Middle East and Europe, although the project is far from complete.
For years, Afghanistan’s poor roads and rails have been the project’s missing link to much of that network.
With the northern Hairatan rail line ready to open for business, Afghan officials are already planning to expand its infant railroad with another proposed line to Turkmenistan to the northwest, Mangal said Wednesday.
He said a delegation would meet with Turkmenistan officials to discuss the expansion at the official inauguration for the Hairatan-Mazar-i-Sharif line, which he said would come soon though he wouldn’t give a date.
“This is the first railway in Afghanistan and of course when we inaugurate it there will be a big ceremony,” Mangal said.
___
Johnson reported from Bangkok.

Afghan rail plan to boost mineral exports
Financial Times By Matthew Green December 20, 2011
Islamabad - The Asian Development Bank wants to raise $1bn to expand a newly-completed stretch of railway in Afghanistan into a countrywide network to export iron ore and copper to global markets.
Afghanistan is due to open the 75-km link between the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif and the Uzbek border on Wednesday as a first step towards building routes to ferry freight and passengers between Kabul and other main cities.
Railways will be crucial to realising the Afghan government’s dream of exploiting huge untapped mineral resources to shore up the economy as allies scale back support ahead of a security handover in 2014.
But with many donors facing economic crises at home, and fears lingering that Afghanistan may once again collapse into civil war, it may be many years before plans to lay track through mountains, plains and desert are realised.
“What we hope will happen is that we will have a network around the whole country, but we’ve got to do these things in stages, especially since we need to find the money,” said Juan Miranda, head of the ADB’s Central and West Asia Department.
Locomotives had conducted test runs on the new line but would haul their first commercial cargo on Wednesday in the form of a wheat shipment belonging to the World Food Programme, the UN relief agency, said an ADB official in Kabul.
Soviet invaders built a small stretch of track during the 1980s, but the project represents the most ambitious rail scheme undertaken in Afghanistan.
Mr Miranda said the the UK and Japan had provided start-up money for a new Afghan infrastructure fund to finance transport projects, adding that he would be seeking to attract more contributors next year. The ADB was also pushing ahead with plans to complete a final, north-western stretch of a ring road linking big cities around Afghanistan within the next four years, he said.
Aid and military contracts have driven rapid economic growth in Afghanistan in the past decade, raising the risk that the withdrawal of most Nato forces will trigger a sharp slow-down that could undermine the fragile state.
The ADB’s transport projects seem to complement the Obama administration’s hopes of putting Afghanistan’s economy on a more sustainable footing by promoting its role as a trade hub reminiscent of the “Silk Road” of antiquity. But talk of a new Silk Road has been greeted with scepticism by experts who say the enormous economic and political barriers to greater regional trade mean the concept may have more appeal as a rhetorical device than as a realistic proposal.
Afghanistan’s hopes of developing mining – which currently accounts for less than 0.3 per cent of gross domestic product – received a boost last month when the state-owned Steel Authority of India won a bid to start developing Hajigak, a giant iron ore deposit in the centre of the country.
A Chinese consortium has started work at the Aynak copper deposit west of Kabul after winning a tender in 2008, though progress has been limited.
The lack of rail to export ore is just one of a gamut of obstacles to large-scale mining ranging from the security risks posed by insurgents to the enormous logistical challenges of working in land-locked Afghanistan’s hostile terrain.
Although the new stretch of railway may be a modest first step compared with some of the grander visions for Afghanistan, it could spur trade in the north, where security is better than in the south and east. The line starts at a dry port at Hairatan on the Uzbek border, which accounts for a large proportion of Afghan imports.
Plans are on the drawing board to extend the line to the western city of Herat, near the border with Iran, and to the central town of Bamiyan, close to the Hajigak iron ore deposit, before reaching Kabul and the eastern city of Jalalabad, near Pakistan.

Five Polish soldiers killed by Afghanistan bomb
21 December 2011 BBC News
A roadside bomb has killed five Polish soldiers in a Nato convoy in eastern Afghanistan, Poland's heaviest single loss of life since the mission began.
Polish media said the soldiers were a few miles from their base in Ghazni province when the bomb exploded.
Three soldiers died at the scene. Another two were said to have died of their wounds at a military hospital.
Poland has 2,500 troops in Afghanistan who are responsible for handling security in Ghazni.
The soldiers were part of a provincial reconstruction team, according to Polish reports, who were in an all-terrain M-ATV vehicle.
A witness in the Rawza area of Ghazni told AFP news agency that their vehicle had been completely destroyed.
The soldiers had been part of a convoy of around 30 vehicles which was heading to the opening of a mausoleum, described by Polish media as one of the projects the reconstruction team had funded.
The Taliban said it carried out the attack.
In the nine years that Polish forces have taken part in the Nato-led mission in Afghanistan, 36 have been killed. But Wednesday's attack was the bloodiest they have suffered since their arrival in March 2002.
Polish troops, in common with other Nato forces, are scheduled to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
Although Nato did not reveal their nationality, it confirmed that "five International Security Assistance Force service members died following an improvised explosive device attack in eastern Afghanistan".
So far this year, 532 people serving with the Nato-led forces have died.

Kabul has independent policy toward Islamabad: Karzai
The New York Times By Alissa Johannsen Rubin 20/12/2011
KABUL - The senior American commander in Afghanistan suggested Tuesday that American forces could remain in the country beyond 2014 despite President Obama’s pledge to withdraw them by then. The commander’s remarks amounted to the most emphatic signal to date that the United States military intended to secure a presence here, possibly for years.
In an interview with The New York Times, the commander, Lt. Gen. John R. Allen, avoided talking about troop levels as America begins to wind down its operations in the war on the Taliban insurgency, now 10 years old. But he said that negotiations with the government of President Hamid Karzai on a so-called Strategic Partnership Agreement would “almost certainly” include “a discussion with Afghanistan of what a post-2014 force will look like.”
President Karzai, the general said, had “in fact just the other day talked about his desire to have conversations with the U.S. about a post-2014 force, we would probably see some number of advisers, trainers, intelligence specialists here for some period of time beyond 2014.”
Other American officials, including members of the Obama administration, have said that 2014 is not a hard deadline for military withdrawal. Earlier this month the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Ryan C. Crocker, said the United States was open to keeping armed forces here if the Afghanistan government asked for them. But General Allen was the highest-ranking American military official so far to explicitly state that possibility.
General Allen emphasized what he called the need for a long-term military and civilian commitment to the country that stretches beyond 2014. His proposal for Afghanistan contrasted with the outcome of America’s other war, the conflict in Iraq, where the last American troops just exited the country and almost immediately the political instability there worsened.
The general also laid out his vision for American and NATO troops for the next few years.
Starting in 2012, the general said, he expected more military trainers and mentors to come into Afghanistan to work with Afghan troops. Still more would arrive in 2013 as the Afghan security forces are asked to do more. Currently most Afghan units are partnered with NATO forces, but in a number of places the NATO troops still have a dominant role. The idea would be that the gradual departure of NATO forces would be cushioned by some Western military support for the Afghan forces in the field.
At the same time, American Special Operations forces, who are heavily involved in many intelligence-driven raids as well as larger and often more dangerous operations, would remain at current levels or increase even as conventional troops are reduced, General Allen said.
The exception may be in Eastern Afghanistan, where General Allen said “a pretty virulent insurgency” remains a problem and convention troop levels will not be withdrawn, because insurgent fighters taking refuge in neighboring Pakistan can quickly deploy across the border.
He emphasized, as other American officials have done, that Afghan forces will play a much larger role in the coming years and signaled that much training is still needed. “The indigenous forces must be the defeat mechanism of the enemy’s insurgency,” said General Allen.
He said he had instructed subordinates to push the Afghan forces and “get them used to being in combat, doing the planning necessary, the execution of missions, the recovery back, refitting after operations and going back out again.”
His comments were a reminder that despite the American public’s exhaustion with the war and resentment of its cost, from a military standpoint the effort will require at least three more years. Whether Congress will be willing to commit the tens of billions of dollars needed is far less clear.
If other countries and foreign donors maintain a presence in Afghanistan, as they say they will, then the insurgency’s hope of free rein after 2014 would be undercut, which could erode its credibility with followers, General Allen said.
“So if you are the insurgency and you had to rely on popular local support or if you are the insurgency and part of the foundational dimension of your doctrine has been — I am just being a little facetious here- that on 1 January ‘15 it is going to be the Afghan government against the insurgency, that doctrine is now at risk,” he said.
Whether foreign countries will fulfill their pledges to continue to support Afghanistan is not clear. Privately, representatives from a number foreign countries and organizations have raised questions about their longevity in Afghanistan, particularly those in Europe, where economic travails have weakened the appetite for financial commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
General Allen insisted that there seemed to be an opening now to weaken the insurgency, and that some of its members were known to be questioning its potency.
“In 2011 the campaign didn’t go well for them and you can hear that chatter in the insurgent leadership,” he said referring to conversations overhead through electronic eavesdropping. He said the eavesdropping had revealed particular concern among insurgents that they are losing popular support in southern Afghanistan, which was once an epicenter of their strength.
The portrait of the insurgency drawn by General Allen was considerably complex, spanning two countries—Afghanistan and Pakistan—and composed of different groups. He underscored that while the safe havens were important to the insurgency’s survival, it also continued to draw sustenance from the local Afghan population, suggesting that the government had not yet won people over.
General Allen also was cautious in talking about making any progress. He appeared to be mindful that insurgent combatants in the Afghan war had proved tenacious.
The future role of Pakistan is not yet clear. For now, General Allen said, he was focused on repairing the damage done to the relationship after a NATO air attack struck a Pakistani border post killing 25 soldiers. Since then the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been closed to NATO trucks. American-Pakistani relations, already deeply troubled by the raid that killed Osama Bin Laden in a Pakistani safe house last May, have worsened.
“Afghanistan is going to be here a long time and what’s critical is that Afghanistan’s relationship with its neighbors are, to the maximum extent they can be, constructive and operationally useful,” said General Allen.

Pakistani, Afghan MPs call for extradition treaty
ISLAMABAD, Dec. 21 (Xinhua) -- Afghan and Pakistani members of parliament on Wednesday asked their governments to sign a treaty of extradition of criminals on both sides and form a commission on prisoners that could facilitate exchange of those prisoners who have not committed heinous crimes.
The MPs issued a 23-point Joint Declaration at the conclusion of their two-day dialogue, stressing Pakistan and Afghanistan should also develop bilateral cooperation between the armed forces and security agencies of the two countries.
The two-day Pakistan-Afghanistan Parliamentarians' Dialogue discussed trade and travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan, investment opportunities by investors of both countries and prospects of Pak-Afghan relations in post-NATO/US Forces withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The Joint Declaration called upon the governments to improve coordination on counter-terrorism operations and address apprehensions regarding terrorists' safe havens.
On narcotics and terrorist-financing, the MPs stressed the need to install effective control on growth and supply of drugs fuelling terrorism in the region and to enhance border management and intelligence-sharing and cooperation.
They called for liberalising visa regimes, enhancing communication networks including air travel, road and rail network (Kabul to Peshawer). They also proposed facilitating media exchanges and greater support and facilitation for Afghan students.
They proposed that central banks of both Pakistan and Afghanistan should follow the Basel Committee III on supervision of Banks especially on money laundering and terrorist financing. They called for a visa free regime between parliamentarians of two countries.
On trade ties, the Joint Declaration said that Pakistani and Afghan investors and business persons should get reciprocal incentives in each country to strengthen business and trade. They also called for early return of Afghan refugees in Pakistan to Afghanistan with dignity and honour and facilitation of youth and cultural exchanges.
Parliamentarians agreed that trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan needs to be promoted further for strengthening bilateral relationship and well-built bridges of friendship of the two countries.
They also agreed that the existing conducive regional environment should be utilised for economic engagement of the international community with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistani PM sets conditions for relations with U.S.
ISLAMABAD, Dec. 21 (Xinhua) -- Pakistani Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani on Wednesday said Pakistan wanted new rules of engagement with the United States with a guarantee to respect the country's sovereignty and assurance of "no Abbottabad-like unilateral action in future".
The prime minister said in case any credible and actionable information was available, it must be shared with Pakistan for necessary action. He stressed that the drone attacks must be stopped, which were causing collateral damage and were grossly detrimental to the government's efforts to isolate terrorists from local population.
The prime minister was addressing the meeting of Afghan and Pakistani parliamentary delegations held under the auspicious of Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency at the PM House.
Gilani said Pakistan cut off NATO supplies, got Shamsi airbase vacated, and boycotted the Bonn Conference in the aftermath of the NATO attack on Pakistani Army checkpost on Nov. 26.
He said Pakistan wanted sovereign, independent, prosperous and stable Afghanistan, which was in its interest. Pakistan is a part of the solution and not part of the problem, the prime minister said.
The prime minister said the assassination of Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Afghan High Peace Council, was a severe setback to the peace and reconciliation efforts as he was a great supporter of friendship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
During the meeting, Senator Besmellah Afghanmal, member of Meshrano Jirga and co-chairman of delegation, extended the best wishes to the Pakistani prime minister on behalf of the Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He recalled the statement of President Karzai that if Pakistan was attacked either by the United States or India, his country would stand by Pakistan.

Cameron visits UK troops in Afghanistan
AFP – Tue, Dec 20, 2011 AFP
Prime Minister David Cameron paid a pre-Christmas visit to British troops in Afghanistan on Tuesday, although his plans were upset by a dust storm, officials and media said.
Cameron had intended to visit Camp Bastion in the restive southern province of Helmand, where the majority of Britain's 9,500 troops are based, but his Royal Air Force flight was forced to divert to Kandahar airfield.
Wearing a black fleece, khaki trousers and boots, the premier told reporters travelling with him that the change of plan was "disappointing" but welcomed the chance to meet some RAF pilots flying Tornado jets from the NATO base.
He was given a tour around one of the planes and also shared a cup of tea and a chat with soldiers and air personnel in their canteen.
A dust storm had enveloped the runway at Camp Bastion and forced its closure, causing the prime minister's plane to divert to the base in neighbouring Kandahar province.
He was also forced to cancel a planned meeting with the governor of Helmand in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah, and a visit to a frontline base.
However, Cameron called Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the two leaders agreed to meet in London early next year, probably January, to sign a strategic agreement, officials said.
During the conversation Cameron told Karzai the security situation in Helmand and Kandahar has "improved", a statement from the president's office said.
"Cameron... said that Britain wanted the continuation of the peace process and talks with the armed opposition," the statement said, referring to the need for reconciliation with the Taliban.
The prime minister had arrived in Afghanistan under a security-imposed news blackout for a trip aimed at boosting morale in the armed forces as they head into holiday season under pressure from military budget cuts and job losses.
In Kandahar, Cameron met US General James Huggins, the head of International Security Assistance Force Regional Command South, for talks on military progress in Afghanistan.
Britain intends to pull out all its combat troops by 2014, starting with 500 troops next year, and Cameron indicated more could be withdrawn in 2013 to avoid a sharp pull-out in three years' time.
"I don't want to see some massive cliff-edge in 2014 -- I don't think that's practical. But I don't think we need to make hard and fast decisions at this stage," Cameron told reporters.
A newspaper report earlier this month claimed Britain was mulling pulling out up to 4,000 troops before the end of 2013.
Cameron said there was "an ongoing conversation with our allies" about how and when NATO forces would be withdrawn.
"I'm absolutely clear that the British public deserve to know there is an endpoint to our involvement in Afghanistan and that endpoint is 2014," he said.
Cameron last visited Afghanistan in July, when he managed to get to Camp Bastion but decided to scrap a visit to Lashkar Gah after a British soldier went missing from a checkpoint in Helmand and was later found dead.
A total of 391 British troops have died in Afghanistan since the US-led war against the Taliban regime began following the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Tuesday's visit coincided with the announcement of a new British governmental committee designed to protect the interests of the armed forces, from the pay of serving soldiers to the education of their children back home.
Cameron, who will chair the committee's inaugural meeting in January, said: "There will always be an ongoing debate about what more we can do as a nation to thank and reward people who serve the crown in this way."

What David Cameron should do about Afghanistan
The PM must ensure Britain succeeds in its mission. An early exit risks failure and would send the wrong signal to the region
Guardian.co.uk By Luke Coffey Tuesday 20 December 2011
You can bet that the reason for David Cameron's visit to Afghanistan this week was more than simply wishing frontline troops a happy Christmas. He will be listening attentively to military commanders and officials to determine if progress is really being made after the recent surge of troops and resources.
The outcome of this trip will shape his views on Britain's role up to end of the combat operations in 2015, and will probably be the most important visit to the country he will make as prime minister. Decisions taken now will determine Britain's legacy in Afghanistan. This is why commanders will be telling him we must stay the course, keep British troop numbers at significant levels until the end of 2014 and continue with transferring responsibility for security to the Afghans.
On 12 May 2010 the war in Afghanistan became Cameron's war. As leader of the opposition he saw that the previous strategy wasn't working. He was a believer in the McChrystal plan and had the foresight to support it long before Gordon Brown or Barack Obama.
He has also injected a bit of realism into the mission in a way that his Labour predecessors were either unwilling or unable to do. He has rightly brought Britain away from the nation-building rhetoric used by the previous government, and made the reason for Britain's involvement in Afghanistan first and foremost about national security.
The strategy in place is finally working, and progress is being made. There is a lot to be optimistic about. The people that represent our ticket out of Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces, are for the first time reaching a standard of capability required to carry out autonomous operations. The ANSF are far from being perfect, but that was never the goal. The goal is to get the forces to a level where they can handle the insurgency themselves, without tens of thousands of western troops on the ground. Paraphrasing TE Lawrence on the Arabs, it is better that they do it tolerably than we do it perfectly.
Levels of violence are also lower across the country, and we should not let recent attacks in Kabul discourage us. Although Kabul accounts for almost 15% of the country's population it accounts for less than 1% of its violence. Nationally, the level of enemy-initiated attacks during the last three months is 24% lower compared with the same period in 2010. This is a result of the relentless pressure exerted on the insurgency by Isaf and Afghan forces since the surge was started last year.
While there is some movement on the political front there is still a long road ahead. The transition process is working better than most expected. The recent announcement on transition means that 50% of the population will soon be under the security control of the Afghans. We are on target for full security transition by 2015.
As with all counter-insurgencies, the conflict in Afghanistan will be brought to an end when there is a political settlement. There was much alarm over the fact that neither the Pakistanis nor the Taliban were at the recent Bonn conference. As westerners we tend to attach far too much importance to these huge international conferences, staged in some of the most glamorous cities in Europe and the US.
The political problems we face in Afghanistan will be settled in Kabul, Kandahar, Quetta and Islamabad – and not Bonn, London, Paris or Washington. In central Asia, history and culture dictate that we need local solutions for local problems. In fact, the next major international conference should be hosted in either Afghanistan itself or in Pakistan.
I realise that there are economic pressures at home, and that the war in Afghanistan is largely unpopular, but the point of a war is to win it – not to leave it as quickly as possible. The commanders on the ground need the tools to get the job done. If you give a commander half the resources, he cannot deliver half a victory. If Afghanistan is about national security, as we have been told, then the decision to keep significant troop numbers there until 2015 should not be a problem for Downing Street.
British military forces have not been defeated in Helmand – far from it. In the last two years these British forces have turned into a relatively stable area a part of central Helmand that has only 1% of Afghanistan's population but, at its peak, accounted for about 20% of the country's violence.
This is testament to the leadership and capabilities of the British military. We owe it to those on the frontline to let them finish the job. They must be given the chance to succeed. An unnecessarily early withdrawal could undo all the hard work and sacrifice already made.
It would also send the wrong signal to others in the region – the signal that we do not have the fortitude to see a mission through. If Britain fails in Afghanistan, historians will show that it was lost in London, and not in Helmand. The prime minister has shown real leadership on cutting the deficit, on Europe, and on Libya. I hope he will support our commanders and do the same for Afghanistan.

Why Biden Isn't Necessarily Wrong About the Taliban
FOX News By Kerry Patton 20/12/2011
Vice President Biden opened up yet another can of worms which sparked uproar among many Americans when he stated that the Taliban was not an enemy to the United States. Unfortunately, with more than ten years of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, it is obvious that the vast majority of Americans remain undereducated in understanding the Taliban. Needless to say, for once, I don’t necessarily disagree with the statement claiming the Taliban is not an enemy to the United States.
The United States has become a nation of labels. Everyone has a label placed on them. Labeling terms are loosely thrown at individuals carelessly. In Afghanistan, virtually anyone who fought against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been labeled as the Taliban—such label is absolutely wrong.
Throughout my years serving in Afghanistan, I have actually met many so called "Taliban." Some were actual militants fighting against the Afghan government, some fought specifically against the United States, some fought on the side of the coalition, some didn’t fight at all rather served in security positions for government and non-government organizations, and others simply had nothing to do with picking up arms.
How could this be? How could Afghans actually align themselves in so many different capacities working either for or against the coalition yet all be labeled as Taliban? It’s actually not as complicated as one may believe.
The word Taliban stems from the Arabic word “Talib” meaning “student.” When I operated in Afghanistan, some persons considered me to be an actual Talib considering the magnitude of research and intelligence which I collected on the local populace. The data collected served as an educational phenomenon later used to assist in “teaching” U.S. decision makers about the tactical battle space. It was critical that I first become the student and allow the Afghans to be the teachers.
Of course, an actual Taliban militant group exists. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (the TTP) often referred to as the Pakistan Taliban is the only Taliban militant group in existence. Other militant opposition groups which evolved from the Russian-Afghan war exist such as Hezb Islami Gullbidine (HIG), Hezb Islami Khalis (HIK), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), and a dozen or so more throughout Afghanistan but that does not mean they are actual Taliban even though many align themselves with the Pakistan Taliban.
There is another militant movement in Afghanistan that exists which many Americans fail to acknowledge or accept—the locally disgruntled villagers. Afghanistan is a tribal nation. With tribal nations comes a magnitude of issues to include clan wars.
Unfortunately, many Afghan tribal elements simply wish the United States would stay clear of their domains. We foolishly oftentimes label such persons as Taliban when in fact these persons often hate the Taliban as much as you or I.
These tribes have weapons like the majority of Afghans. They use these weapons against ISAF as a means to keep “occupiers” out of their area. More often than not, when ISAF and the tribes engage in what are commonly referred to as “TIC’s” (Troops in Contact), reports are generated labeling enemy as Taliban when such label is not necessarily accurate.
A lazy American culture has promoted a need to label everyone. We have failed in understanding those different than us and simply believe labeling those different will better position ourselves in understanding. Such thought is a mistake. Under-educated labeling causes more confusion and commotion then good.
We have enemies throughout the world. In Afghanistan, our enemy may or may not be the Taliban. Then again, when we discuss the Taliban, are we simply generalizing an entire society of people vastly different than us or are we calling the spade a spade?
Central Asia and the Middle East are often referred to as "the lands of rumor." Rumors promote false senses of reality. People become socially conditioned to believe that which is not necessarily truth. Has the United States become another nation built upon rumor? When it comes to understanding Afghanistan, the people, and the Taliban, I believe the answer is yes.
Kerry Patton, a combat service disabled veteran, is a senior analyst for WIKISTRAT. He has worked in South America, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe, focusing on intelligence and security and interviewing current and former terrorists, including members of the Taliban. He is the author of Sociocultural Intelligence: The New Discipline of Intelligence Studies and the children's book American Patriotism.

Roadside Bomb Kills 5 NATO Soldiers in Afghanistan
VOA News December 21, 2011
NATO says five of its soldiers have been killed in a roadside bomb attack in eastern Afghanistan.
Local Afghan officials said an improvised explosive device went off Wednesday near a convoy of coalition troops in the province of Ghazni.
The Taliban immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, claiming that the coalition members killed were part of a Polish convoy.
Media reports in Poland said five Polish soldiers were killed in the attack.
Separately, Afghan police said they shot and killed an attempted suicide bomber before he could detonate his explosives outside a bank in the eastern province of Khost, a stronghold of the al-Qaida-linked Haqqani militant network.
It is not immediately clear whether the would-be suicide bomber was targeting the bank or a nearby police station. Police are also looking for a possible second attacker who escaped.
Meanwhile, Afghanistan's defense ministry said Wednesday that it is making progress in training security forces ahead of an expected 2014 withdrawal of foreign combat troops.
Defense Ministry spokesperson Mohammad Zahir Azimi said the number of Afghan National Army troops now stands at 180,000. The United States and NATO say they would like to see 195,000 Afghan troops in the field by October of 2012.
International forces have already begun handing over security responsibility to Afghan forces ahead of the 2014 withdrawal.

Keeping control of bad choices
Foreign Policy By Rachel Reid Tuesday, December 20, 2011
The Pentagon has just quietly released the redacted results of an inquiry into allegations of human rights abuses by U.S.-sponsored armed groups in Afghanistan. They were investigating allegations made in a report I co-authored while working for Human Rights Watch, about the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and other government-backed security forces, Just Don't Call it a Militia, published this past September. It's unusual for NGOs to elicit such a response -- 21 officials spending five weeks in 45 locations -- and tempting to think it signals how seriously they took the report.
Gen. John R. Allen, the Commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, does appear to be committed to greater transparency and a more constructive relationship with NGOs. But the Pentagon's concern with our report is probably more reflective of the centrality of ALP to its strategy in the country, particularly its exit strategy. Last week, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command, Adm. William McRaven, said he wanted to expand ALP from 10,000 to 30,000 men, and extend it beyond its stated shelf life of 2015. A more cynical explanation for the investigation could be the need to avert triggering the Leahy law, under which U.S. assistance to military units is cut when there is credible information of gross human rights abuses.
Human rights abuses are almost inevitable when injecting lightly trained forces into fractured communities that tend to lie at the edge of government control, where impunity is rampant. Significant efforts have been made to safeguard against the risk of creating lawless militias, but what compounds this risk is that it's not just the ALP that the U.S. and Afghan governments are backing. There's also the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), the Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP), the Interim Security Infrastructure (ISCI), Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS), and the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3). And these are just the groups with acronyms. Beyond them are a myriad of informal militias supported by Afghan intelligence forces, provincial officials, warlords, and unregistered private security forces, as well as the reintegrated former insurgents who are allowed to keep their arms.
Nobody is counting. And there is no demobilization strategy for these groups.
As these groups have expanded, there has been an increase in reports of abuse, including killings, rapes, unauthorized raids, and extortion. The recent investigation by the U.S. military largely focused on abuses by the ALP, and wholly or partially confirmed many of the allegations made in the Human Rights Watch report. It dismissed a significant number of allegations as "not credible," without providing evidence. These include rejecting claims that a notorious militia of Nur-ul-Haq working with U.S. Special Forces in Baghlan is associated with the insurgent Hezb-i Islami, or with criminality. (Haq is described as an ALP commander by provincial officials, though his group may not be an official one). They also rejected the suggestion that Special Operations Forces "have a poor reputation in Herat province," where they were responsible for one of the bloodiest mistakes by U.S. airstrikes, in August 2008, partly caused by their alleged alliance with abusive and rival criminal elements. Other allegations are dis
missed as unverifiable because Human Rights Watch would not breach the confidentiality of witnesses' names and contacts.
More encouragingly, the investigation makes some welcome recommendations, including introducing procedures for disciplining and firing ALP officers, exercising greater precautions when placing ALP units in faction-riven areas, and suggesting that Gen. Allen lead a quarterly review of ALP to assess problem units and abuse allegations.
Fundamentally though, the investigating team concludes that ALP works, and that its critics do not appreciate the security dividends generated by the militias' presence. However, this depends on your definition of security. The U.S. military measures security through its daily data stream of attack levels. By this metric, ALP and groups like it may improve security. Some communities agree, and welcome local security forces as the most immediate way of holding back Taliban incursions. But in many parts of the country there is alarm about the rapid reactivation of old commander networks, and concern about the potential for civil war. These fears are fueled by the looming withdrawal of the bulk of international forces by the end of 2014, the prospect of economic collapse as the foreign funds dry out, increasing ethnic tensions, deep divisions over the prospect of talks with the Taliban, and uncertainty about the interest of the Taliban leadership in a political settlement.
Sadly, Afghanistan only seems to have a series of bad choices ahead. In this context, ALP may be a flawed but necessary tool, at least in some areas. But partnering with notoriously abusive commanders is a dangerous strategy. Since U.S. forces began closely partnering with the Kandahari Police Commander Abdul Raziq, whom they described as an "Afghan folk hero," his star has risen. Raziq's crimes have been well reported, and may include extra-judicial executions. Several U.S. officials have privately told me they'd like to see him removed, but President Karzai appears to resent the volte-face. Recently a notorious private militia commander linked to U.S. Special Forces, Azizullah, was made head of ALP in Paktika. There will be many more like Raziq and Azizullah with track records of abuse, whose power in the coming months and years will become more and more entrenched, beyond the point of return.
The United States should respect its own regulations about not supporting known rights abusers, curb the relentless drive to expand armed groups in Afghanistan, and instead focus on increasing quality and capacity. In addition to reining in the chaotic proliferation of armed groups, Afghanistan and its allies should develop demobilization plans before the 2014 transition. Otherwise, by the time the U.S. military has mostly withdrawn, it could leave behind tens of thousands of armed men that most Afghans can't identify, who can abuse their authority with impunity, and whose allegiances are often to their own commanders, not to their communities or the state.
The proliferation of abusive militias is not most Afghans' definition of security, even when threatened by the brutality of the Taliban. But with more patience and precaution from the Afghan government and the U.S. military, the choices may not yet be so grim.
Rachel Reid is the co-author of "Just Don't Call it a Militia: Impunity, Militias, and the ‘Afghan Local Police.'" She is now the Senior Policy Advisor on Afghanistan and Pakistan for the Open Society Foundations.

U.S. General in Afghanistan Says Troops May Stay Past 2014
New York Times By ALISSA J. RUBIN December 20, 2011
KABUL, Afghanistan - The senior American commander in Afghanistan suggested Tuesday that American forces could remain in the country beyond 2014 despite President Obama’s pledge to withdraw them by then. The commander’s remarks amounted to the most emphatic signal to date that the United States military intended to secure a presence here, possibly for years.
In an interview with The New York Times, the commander, Gen. John R. Allen, avoided talking about troop levels as America begins to wind down its operations in the war on the Taliban insurgency, now 10 years old. But he said negotiations with the government of President Hamid Karzai on a strategic partnership agreement would “almost certainly” include “a discussion with Afghanistan of what a post-2014 force will look like.”
Mr. Karzai had, “in fact, just the other day talked about his desire to have conversations with the U.S. about a post-2014 force,” the general said. “We would probably see some number of advisers, trainers, intelligence specialists here for some period of time beyond 2014.”
Other American officials, including members of the Obama administration, have said 2014 is not a hard deadline for military withdrawal. The United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Ryan C. Crocker, said this month that the United States was open to keeping armed forces here if the Afghanistan government asked for them. But General Allen is the highest-ranking American military official so far to explicitly state that possibility.
General Allen emphasized what he called the need for a long-term military and civilian commitment to the country beyond 2014. His proposal for Afghanistan, if followed, might help avoid the outcome of America’s other war, in Iraq, where the political instability worsened almost immediately after the last American troops departed.
The general also laid out his vision for American and NATO troops for the next few years.
He expects more military trainers and mentors to come into Afghanistan to work with Afghan troops starting in 2012, he said. Still more would arrive in 2013 as the Afghan security forces were asked to do more. Currently, most Afghan units are partners with NATO forces, and in a number of places the NATO troops still have a dominant role. The idea is that the gradual departure of NATO forces would be cushioned by some Western military support for the Afghan forces in the field.
At the same time, American Special Operations forces, who are heavily involved in many intelligence-driven raids as well as larger and often more dangerous operations, would remain at current levels or increase even as conventional troops were reduced, General Allen said.
The exception may be in eastern Afghanistan, where, General Allen said, “a pretty virulent insurgency” remains a problem and where the level of conventional troops will not be drawn down, because insurgent fighters taking refuge in neighboring Pakistan can quickly deploy across the border.
He emphasized, as other American officials have done, that Afghan forces would play a much larger role in the coming years and signaled that much training was still needed. “The indigenous forces must be the defeat mechanism of the enemy’s insurgency,” General Allen said.
He said he had instructed subordinates to push the Afghan forces and “get them used to being in combat, doing the planning necessary, the execution of missions, the recovery back, refitting after operations and going back out again.”
His comments were a reminder that despite the American public’s exhaustion with the war and resentment of its cost, from a military standpoint the effort will require at least three more years. Whether Congress will be willing to commit the tens of billions of dollars needed is far less clear.
General Allen said that if other countries and foreign donors maintained a presence in Afghanistan, as they say they will, the insurgency’s hope of free rein after 2014 would be undercut, which could erode its credibility with followers.
“So if you are the insurgency and you had to rely on popular local support, or if you are the insurgency and part of the foundational dimension of your doctrine has been — I am just being a little facetious here — that on 1 January ’15, it is going to be the Afghan government against the insurgency, that doctrine is now at risk,” he said.
Whether foreign countries will fulfill their pledges to continue to support Afghanistan is not clear. Privately, representatives from a number of foreign countries and organizations have raised questions about their longevity in Afghanistan, particularly those in Europe, where economic travails have weakened the appetite for financial commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
General Allen insisted that there seemed to be an opening now to weaken the insurgency, and that some of its members were known to be questioning its potency.
“In 2011, the campaign didn’t go well for them, and you can hear that chatter in the insurgent leadership,” he said, referring to conversations overheard through electronic eavesdropping. He said the eavesdropping had revealed particular concern among insurgents that they were losing popular support in southern Afghanistan, which was once a base of their strength.
The portrait of the insurgency drawn by General Allen was considerably complex, spanning two countries — Afghanistan and Pakistan — and composed of different groups. He underscored that while safe havens in Pakistan were important to the insurgency’s survival, it also continued to draw sustenance from local Afghans, suggesting that the government had not yet won people over.
General Allen also was cautious in talking about making any progress. He appeared to be mindful that insurgent combatants in the Afghan war had proved tenacious.
The future role of Pakistan is not yet clear. For now, General Allen said, he is focused on repairing the damage done to American-Pakistani relations after a NATO air attack struck two Pakistani border posts last month, killing 25 soldiers. Since then, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has been closed to NATO trucks. The relationship, already deeply troubled by the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in a Pakistani safe house in May, has worsened.
“Afghanistan is going to be here a long time, and what’s critical is that Afghanistan’s relationship with its neighbors are, to the maximum extent they can be, constructive and operationally useful,” General Allen said.

Afghan police gun down suspected suicide bomber
KABUL, Dec. 21 (Xinhua) -- Afghan police gunned down a suspected suicide bomber in Khost province 150 km southeast of Afghan capital Kabul on Wednesday, a press release of Interior Ministry issued here said.
"A suicide bomber attempting to enter the branch of Kabul bank in Khost city the capital of Khost province this morning was identified and gunned down by police at 10:00 a.m. today," the press release added.
One of the guards of the Kabul bank received injuries in the incident, it added said.
Previously, few militants including suicide bombers entered a branch of the private Kabul bank in eastern Jalalabad city in February leaving 38 people dead and injuring 71 others.

Peace with Taliban is like dancing with the devil, says Afghan expert
Examiner.com By Ahmar Mustikhan, Baltimore Foreign Policy Examiner December 20, 2011 Guest column by Wahid Monawar
Last week, the Washington Examiner quoted a top U.S. official stating that the Taliban can never be brought into the political process in Afghanistan as long as the group's fanatical leader – the most wanted terrorist in the world with a 10 million dollar bounty on his head –is still a fugitive. The article also indicates hunting Mullah Omar has become a top priority for American military and intelligence clandestine units operating in Pakistan. The U.S. official added that: “Mullah Omar's death would be as important to securing Afghanistan's future as killing bin Laden was to destabilizing al Qaeda.”
Yet, The Hindu, a leading Indian newspaper broke the news that the US officials along with their German counterparts, excluding the Afghan government, were in the process of establishing a political shop for the Taliban in Qatar.
From an Afghan perspective, this idea could convey a message that the U.S. may be coming to see that the Taliban are in some ways irrelevant to Afghanistan’s political life proper, by offering carrots to some Taliban and in the process creating a facture among the leadership, or as a last ditch effort to attempt reintegration.
When the United States decided to help the Afghan people get rid of the Taliban proxy regime in Afghanistan back in 2001, after more than 3,000 innocent American civilians were murdered by a Taliban VIP guest – Osama bin Laden – its engagement was not only to address the U.S. national security needs, but to make sure that U.S. will fulfill its noble obligation as well, in stabilizing Afghanistan and making sure that the right of individuals, especially minorities & women that were savagely violated by the Taliban regime, were protected.
While the national security aspect of the U.S. foreign policy may no longer be in a serious danger, as the latest military surge has rendered the Taliban a desperate group that is incapable of protecting or offering sanctuary for al Qaeda in Afghanistan – unless it is on the other side of the Durand Line in Pakistan – the noble aspect of US engagement in Afghanistan still needs lots of work.
Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and senior analyst at the Brookings Institution, said if the U.S. and Afghanistan have any chance to reconcile with members of the Taliban, Mullah Omar must be removed. "Omar is an ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan) trained fanatic who dreams of ruling again."
Riedel rightly argues that it will be very difficult for the Obama administration –in the midst of an election year– to explain to the American people that it’s allowing a political office for a group whose leader is one the most wanted terrorist on planet earth. By the same token, an appeasement of this nature to the Taliban sends the wrong message to most Afghans who have diligently fought against the Taliban tyranny in the past 10 years.
Despite NATO’s shortcoming and a few military operational mistakes, Taliban’s inveterate terrorist behavior has won little sympathy with the Afghan people. Just last week, Taliban facilitated logistic support to a Pakistani extremists group to commission homicide-bombings during Shia’s holy day of Ashura, that slaughtered more than 56 innocent Afghan civilians.
The Taliban’s proven track record of catering to Afghanistan’s enemies upholds the authenticity of a group’s pledge to terrorism, while cowardly using Islam as a front. Not to discount Taliban’s commitment to deadening the rights of individuals, whether an Afghan woman, or an Afghan minority.
However, the main driver, behind dressing a new tailored identity for the Taliban is Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service also known as BND. An agency, indirectly responsible for the death of more than 5000 thousand American servicemen and one million Iraqis by providing utterly bad intelligence to the U.S. government on Iraq’s WMD. Ever since, BND has tried very hard to regain stature with the U.S intelligence community to repair its reputation.
Alas, historically, most decisions on the future of the Afghan people have been exogenous phenomena, nonetheless, the contempt that BND and its partners demonstrate for the intelligence of the Afghan people no longer finds validation in the context of passing terrorists for politicians.
Suppose, sadly, the Karzai regime allows an office for the Taliban in Kabul or in their incubator in Saud Arabia, one highly doubts Afghans will eagerly line up to join them. If they are permitting a shop for the purpose of negotiations, then who are they negotiating with? Mullah Omar, the most wanted terrorist? Jalaludin & Sarajuddin Haqqani both designated as dangerous terrorist under Executive Order No. 13224? Or are they negotiating with Mullah Zaeef who is definitely a persona non-grata with the Quetta Shura?
Even, Taliban’s most staunch evangelist Alex Strick van Linschoten recently had said that the Quetta Shura has lost control of some of its younger field commanders, who are extremely violent and unreconstructed. In other words, Mullah Omar and his cohorts have lost their motivational or stirring leadership spiel to extract allegiance from these commanders.
Linschoten is trying cleverly & desperately to exonerate Mullah Omar. However, hunting down Mullah Omar is like capturing the Godfather. Just as a symbol he is a strong inspiration. So in contrast to bin Laden, where parading our killing of him makes us look good but doesn’t do much on the ground, capturing or killing Mullah Omar would have the complementary effect: most people won’t know who he is but it will make a psychological difference in the minds of the fighter on the ground by having the symbol of Taliban strength and leadership fall.
Thus, as the power shifts to individual commanders on the field, it defeats the purpose of conjuring up an office for individuals such as Mullah Zaeef who have no added value in determining the course of this conflict. If we are serious about ending this senseless war, then we must be serious about its process too. While, it’s fundamentally a bad policy to end the war on drugs by legalizing cocaine, ending the Afghan war by fabricating an identity for the Taliban that is incongruent with their character falls in the same category.
The Afghan government has a historical responsibility, too. The role of Afghan leaders is to put Afghanistan’s future first and depart from the notion of obsession of clinging to the power through an imperial presidency. History must be a guiding light that honors the concept that Afghan people deserve inspirational leadership, and not a coercive leadership that uses state offices as carrots to extract performance and loyalty out of the people, their commitment must be in protecting the rights of minorities, and investment in innovative politics and hope in the Afghan people.
Wahid Monawar is a former senior diplomat & the Co-founder of the Neo-Conservative Party of Afghanistan. He is currently an associate of Zurich Partners. Follow him @AfghanPolicy

Afghan gov't to push for peace with Taliban amid increasing militancy
by Abdul Haleem
KABUL, Dec. 21 (Xinhua) -- In spite of Taliban-led increasing militancy and attacks on government interests, the Afghan government is determined to pursue peace efforts with the Taliban outfit, local media on Wednesday quoted Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Jawed Ludin as saying.
"We believe the process may benefit from the establishment of an office, within or outside Afghanistan, whereby formal talks between relevant Afghan authorities and representatives of the armed opposition, including the Taliban could be facilitated," the English Daily Outlook Afghanistan quoted Ludin as reporting on Wednesday.
The Afghan diplomat, according to the newspaper, during a debate at the United Nations Security Council on Monday also appealed the international community to help boost talks with the Taliban and other armed outfits.
Making appeal by Afghan ranking diplomat for international community's support to facilitate dialogue between government and Taliban is taking place just days after reported opening of Taliban office in Qatar.
Following the surfacing report of opening Taliban office in Qatar, the Afghan government, according to local media, had recalled its ambassador to Qatar for consultation.
Earlier, Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs Zalmai Rasoul said that the government would not oppose if Taliban open office for negotiation either inside the country Afghanistan or abroad.
"Our priority is that such office should be inside Afghanistan or in another Islamic country preferably Saudi Arabia or Turkey," Rasoul told a questionnaire during a press briefing on Dec. 18.
He also rejected the reported opening of Taliban office in Qatar, saying any office opened for dialogue with Taliban should be opened in consultation with the government of Afghanistan.
Furthermore, Afghan presidential spokesman Aimal Faizi, according to local media reports, has also said that "the government accepts wherever the Taliban open their office as our main goal is peace through talks with the opposition group."
The government of Afghanistan has suspended peace talks with the Taliban outfit after the assassination of Afghan peace chief negotiator Burhanudin Rabbani by an alleged Taliban fighter on Sept. 20 this year.
Meantime, a former Taliban official and member of the government-backed peace body, the High Council for Peace, Mawlawi Arsala Rahmani said days ago that the Taliban are willing to open office in an Islamic country to hold face-to-face peace talks with Afghan government.
Taliban militants fighting Afghan government and have conditioned any talks with the pull out of NATO-led forces from Afghanistan have yet to make comment on opening office in Qatar or any other country.

UAE, Britain announce Afghan highway project
AFP 20/12/2011
The United Arab Emirates and Britain signed an agreement on Tuesday to build an important highway in Afghanistan, the official WAM news agency reported.
It was signed by the UAE foreign minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahayan and his British counterpart William Hague, who is on a one-day visit to the Gulf federation.
The project is "a demonstration of the UAE and the UK's commitment to peace and stability in Afghanistan," the agency quoted Sheikh Abdullah as saying.
No further details were immediately available on the new highway's route, cost or timetable.
During his visit, Hague was also expected to discuss with UAE officials the situation in Syria and Yemen, the Middle East peace process and global warming, the British embassy in Dubai said in a statement.
It said Hague would also visit Abu Dhabi's Al-Dhafra air base, the largest in the UAE's seven emirates.

'Everyone on the take': Aussie aid worker jailed for Afghan bribes
The Age By Simon Mann December 21, 2011
Washington - Friends and workmates had warned Australian aid contractor Neil Campbell that he was on the verge of “burn-out” and should leave Afghanistan to spend time with his family back in Queensland: that he had “lost the ability to think straight”.
"I had lost interest in my job and was just going through the motions,” he told a US court today, where he was being sentenced for having solicited $US190,000 in kick-backs.
“They thought I'd get myself killed.”
In an emotional plea, the 62-year-old from Mooloolaba, who spent four months in India's notorious Tihar Prison before being extradited to the US in February, apologised for having tried to steal US government aid money.
“I had no idea what I was thinking,” he told Judge Rosemary Collyer in Washington's District Court.
“For this I am truly sorry. This is a shame I will have to take back with me to my home town and live with long after everyone in this country has forgotten about it ...
“Being in a war zone, you just get worn down. In the end, you lose your ability to think clearly.”
Campbell, who spent five years working on reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, was sentenced to 22 months' jail by Judge Collyer, who said she had taken into account the “hard time” spent in Tihar and in the over-crowded Washington prison where he has been held for the past 10 months.
She described the sentence as “just”, while acknowledging that Campbell's crime could possibly have been the result of a form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), although this had not been diagnosed.
Judge Collyer added that it was clear that Afghanistan was “really a hard place to maintain your equilibrium”.
Campbell is believed to be the first Australian caught by US authorities in a bribery case involving US aid money.
According to court evidence, Campbell had tried to extract the payments from a local building company after claiming the credit for awarding contracts worth more than $US15 million for the construction of a hospital and teacher training college.
The projects were commissioned by the International Organisation for Migration, to whom Campbell was contracted, and funded by USAid, which has ploughed more than $US260 million into Afghanistan projects.
Caught in a sting by US investigators, Campbell had received a “down-payment” of $US10,000 cash before flying to New Delhi where he expected to collect a further $US180,000. There he was arrested and taken into custody.
Today's jail term was 27 months less than US prosecutors had sought and a fraction of the maximum 10 years' imprisonment under US bribery laws.
Arguing for the stiffer penalty, Ryan Faulconer, for the US Department of Justice, said Campbell had not hesitated when trying to solicit the money.
“He knew exactly what he was doing,” Mr Faulconer told the court. “He didn't just want [the money]. He flew to India to get it.”
He said the offence “corrupted the integrity of efforts to fund reconstruction efforts in the Afghan war zone”. “There are people risking their lives in Afghanistan ... It's hard to get justice for corruption offences ... When we do get a case, it's important for the court to send a message as a deterrent.”
Prosecutors also pushed for a fine of more than $US7000 on top of the forfeited bribe money – the balance that Campbell had on him when arrested – noting that he was not short of funds.
His net pay in Afghanistan had been $US140,000 annually and in the last five years he had managed to transfer his family home to his two adult children, worth $US700,000, as well as a surfboard collection worth $US100,000.
However, Judge Collyer ruled a fine inappropriate. She ordered two years' of supervised release on top of the jail term. Noting that Campbell would be deported immediately on his release, she added: “Once deported, don't come back without permission.”
In his plea to the court, Campbell described a milieu of corruption that gripped Afghanistan and permeated every aspect of life, as well as a dangerous frontier in which he found appropriate sites for projects and monitored their construction.
“It always seemed that everyone wanted their cut,” he said. “And I don't think that's going to change ... Everyone was on the take, everyone was being paid off in Afghanistan. That's just a part of the Afghan culture.”
Those Campbell had dealt with were also offering gifts. He had been gifted more Afghan rugs than he knew what to do with.
He said he had survived an attempted kidnapping, had been caught in crossfire during an ambush and at one stage had a $10,000 bounty put on his head by the Taliban.
Campbell told Judge Collyer he would accept his punishment before returning to Australia to “bear the shame” of his crime: “to get on with my life and I hope to be a better father and better friend”.
“I've learnt what life is all about and appreciate the most important things – family, friends and my work”.
As well as Campbell's children, his fiancee of five years and his 89-year-old father were also waiting for him to return.

www.afghanistannewscenter.com