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US report says confusion, graft harm Afghan guard scheme
Reuters By Daniel Magnowski Dec 17, 2011
KABUL - A scheme that pays and arms Afghans to defend their villages against insurgents is being hindered by corruption and the difficulty of distinguishing the guards from other armed groups, a U.S. military report has said.
The Afghan Local Police (ALP) units were a flagship project of U.S. General David Petraeus, who stepped down as commander of foreign forces in Afghanistan earlier this year, but they have been criticised by rights groups, including in a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report in September.
They aim to use modest salaries and foreign mentors to build or formalise local protection networks in areas with a heavy presence of insurgents and few soldiers or police, but critics say their lack of training and accountability can make them a threat to the public.
An investigation by U.S. forces in Afghanistan into the HRW allegations found that some were credible, said a report dated Dec. 6 but only made public this week.
"Many of the allegations that are tied to ALP are in fact not ALP units. Unfortunately there are many groups out there that claim to be ALP or are identified as ALP," a spokesman for U.S. forces in Afghanistan said on Saturday.
"This was a finding by the investigating team and there were recommendations made ... to address this problem," he said.
They include the possibility of introducing a standard uniform for all ALP members, and better education and awareness of the groups.
The controversial groups, formed in response to worsening security in Afghanistan, have worked in some areas, with Afghans citing improvements in security. But in others, criminals and insurgents are joining the ALP or government-backed militias, securing access to money and guns, the HRW report said.
The ALP is likely to be expanded and extended, a senior officer from the NATO-led coalition fighting in Afghanistan said on Monday, as foreign combat troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan completely by the end of 2014.
Original plans called for up to 30,000 members, although only around 10,000 are in place at the moment.
The investigation, conducted by U.S. Air Force Brigadier General James Marrs, said the ALP was "effective" and in the main complied with orders concerning human rights, but in his report he acknowledged there were shortcomings.
"Ethnic divisions, political differences, power struggles and corruption are some of the multiple challenges to overcome before the system will become most effective," Marrs wrote.
"Many of these issues are not restricted to local areas and extend up to the executive branch of the Afghan government." (Editing by Paul Tait)
1 civilian killed in night raid operation in E. Afghanistan
KABUL, Dec. 17 (Xinhua) -- At least one civilian was killed and three others injured when a joint unit of Afghan and NATO-led coalition forces carried out a night raid operation on a compound in country's eastern Paktia province, an official said on Saturday.
"A joint unit of Afghan and NATO forces raided the house of Hafizullah, head of counter-narcotics department of Pakita province, in the wee hours Saturday in provincial capital Gardez city as a result a woman was killed and three others were injured," deputy provincial governor Abdul Rahman Mangal told Xinhua.
He said Hafizullah and two of his sons were detained by troops.
The motive of the attack on the government official house had not been cleared at the moment but such kind of operations normally conduced by force to capture armed insurgents or people have links with the armed anti-government militants.
However, Mangal said an investigation was launched by local government to find why the combined forces killed the woman and detained Hafizullah along his two sons.
A total of 1,462 Afghan civilians have been killed in the first half of 2011 which indicates, a 15 percent rise in civilian deaths compared with the same period in 2010, according to the United Nations mid-year report released in Kabul in July this year.
The UN report attributed 80 percent of the civilian deaths in the first six months of this year to the attacks of Taliban insurgents and other armed groups opposing the Afghan government.
Another 14 percent of the deaths were attributed to Afghan and NATO-led forces and 6 percent were unattributed.
The Three Futures for Afghanistan
Why the Country Needs a Long-Term Commitment From the United States
FOREIGN AFFAIRS By Zalmay Khalilzad December 16, 2011
Ten years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the gains that the international coalition has made with its local partners are real but reversible. Afghanistan is no longer a global hub of terrorist activity, but a Taliban resurgence would threaten to make it one again. Reconstruction assistance has produced demonstrable progress in health, education, and economic well-being, but corruption and governance problems have undermined popular support for the government in Kabul and constrained the overall level of progress. Internationally, a coalition still backs the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military mission. However, NATO's will is waning; China, Russia, and India are largely free riders; and Pakistan and Iran publicly say the right things, while destabilizing Afghanistan by privately meddling to their own ends.
Political and economic realities in the United States make the current level of American engagement in Afghanistan unsustainable. But as the commitment of coalition partners fades, what Washington decides will shape the future of South Asia. Looking ahead, there are three different scenarios for American engagement in Afghanistan.
It remains to be seen exactly which route Washington will take. But it is clear that U.S. interests require a long-term commitment not only in Afghanistan but across the region. Lest it be forgotten, the consequences of ignoring the region in the 1990s were visited upon the United States on 9/11. So the most vital goals today are defeating the remnants of al Qaeda in Pakistan, preventing the reemergence of terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan, ensuring the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and discouraging Pakistan's use of extremism and terror as a policy instrument.
There are three ways forward. Each entails a different degree of involvement and carries varying risks and rewards. The first option is the riskiest.
Future #1: Immediate Departure and the Reallocation of Resources
Discontent among the U.S. public over the war is already at an all-time high. Increased political demands on the White House could lead U.S. President Barack Obama to accelerate the planned withdrawal. In turn, Congress would slash economic assistance. Reconstruction responsibilities in Afghanistan would be left largely to international institutions and the government in Kabul. Even if the European powers, Japan, and South Korea sustained modest economic assistance, they, too, would likely follow the U.S. out the door. The counterinsurgency mission would come to an end.
With a more limited involvement, the United States would still try to pursue basic counterterrorism operations. For example, it would deploy special forces and drone and air strikes, but obtaining bases of operation in the region for these forces might prove problematic, if not impossible. At Pakistan's request, the United States is already withdrawing from the Shamsi air base, which had been used for drone operations. The Central Asian states may be reluctant to make up for the loss of bases in Pakistan; Russia and China would likely encourage them to resist U.S. requests. And Kabul would be less willing to provide base access if Washington focuses narrowly on counterterrorism objectives without a commitment to state building in Afghanistan. That would leave the future of Afghanistan to be determined principally by two factors: the durability of the Afghan government and the outcome of regional rivalries.
After the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, the communist regime in Kabul unexpectedly held power for another three years. It was not until the Soviets abruptly cut off assistance -- and key internal alliances frayed -- that Mohammad Najibullah's regime in Kabul fell. The current Afghan government is more popular than Najibullah's was, but President Hamid Karzai's government is not without vulnerabilities and certainly would not be able to stand entirely on its own.
Consider that a sharp U.S. drawdown would make nationwide elections, scheduled for 2014, almost impossible. Instead of the Afghan people, outside powers would likely determine the fate of the central government. Pakistan would probably accelerate its support for the insurgency in an attempt to install a client regime in Kabul. China, India, Iran, Russia, and the Gulf States would pursue their interests whether elections worked or not -- by funneling support either to the Karzai government or, should it suit them, to favored proxies. In all likelihood, violence would dramatically increase and Afghanistan would, once again, be home to a vicious cycle of proxy wars.
For the United States, a rapid drawdown would have mixed consequences. On the plus side, U.S. troops would no longer be in harm's way, Congress would reallocate resources (albeit while accepting heavy losses in sunk costs), and the United States would have greater freedom of action to engage in other parts of the world.
On the negative side, terrorist sanctuaries would likely reemerge. The Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other extremists, infused with momentum, would make a renewed push for more control of the country. The United States would lose access to markets promised by the New Silk Road initiative, and it would not be able to establish enduring bases to help deal with problems in Pakistan, Iran, and the rest of a neighborhood that is, to put it mildly, dangerous.
The bottom line: After a decade's effort in blood and treasure, Afghanistan could face the 1990s all over again.
Future #2: Phased Drawdown and Internationalization of the Effort
Assuming the U.S. public and Congress allow Obama the political breathing room to pursue his announced strategy and dedicate attention and resources to Afghanistan for a bit longer, Washington would proceed with a drawdown of forces as planned, transferring security responsibility to the Afghans by 2014. The Obama administration could add a new feature to its strategy by seeking greater engagement from outside powers to stabilize Afghanistan.
Considering the significant interests of other major powers in Afghanistan, that prospect is not far-fetched. Russia and India have been the victims of terrorist attacks by groups linked to Afghanistan and Pakistan. China's western territories are vulnerable to Islamist extremists mixed with ethnic separatists. All stand to gain from either the economic growth from a New Silk Road plan or the vast mineral resources in the country.
With more time, Washington could work with others to reach consensus on desired outcomes and a joint vision for Afghanistan. Collaborating with regional partners, they would exercise coordinated influence over Pakistan and Iran to stem conflict and bring about some modicum of cooperation. China has major influence in Islamabad, and the combined efforts of China, India, and Russia could sway Tehran.
Regional cooperation amid a phased U.S. pullback is most likely to succeed if the UN, with U.S. support, establishes an enduring diplomatic forum, consisting initially of the major world powers, to work toward promoting Afghan peace and regional stability. Washington would use such a body as a vehicle for accommodating outside powers in the decision-making process but only if they contribute their fair share to the mission. Such a great power concert would negotiate redlines for the activities of regional powers in Afghanistan; monitor the Afghan reconciliation process; pressure the Afghan government to improve governance and the rule of law; provide long-term funding for economic development and the buildup and training of Afghan national army and police forces; and finally, construct infrastructure -- roads, railroads, pipelines -- to establish the new Silk Road connecting Central and South Asia into a single economic zone. The concert would enable major powers to preserve their core interests in Afghanista
n while creating the conditions needed to stabilize the country.
Even with greater involvement of outside powers, however, U.S. efforts to internationalize the mission will not succeed without a sustained level of U.S. military and civilian engagement. While the UN would facilitate the concert, the United States is the sole power capable of galvanizing and incentivizing international cooperation behind economic integration and a regional settlement. Great powers are only likely to cooperate so long as they feel that free riding is no longer an option and that cooperation with a U.S.-backed regional design remains the most viable means of securing their national interests. Without a real commitment from Washington, the best plans will fail.
The perception that the United States wishes to disengage from the region is already impeding the coalition's ability to influence key players. After all, during periods of ascendant influence, Washington was never able to persuade Pakistan to cease support for insurgents in Afghanistan. Relations with Karzai, meanwhile, have become difficult, with the coalition struggling to persuade his government to tackle corruption. Disengagement is likely to make these problems worse, as government leaders worry about their own futures.
Future #3: Sustained, Determined U.S. Engagement
A determined U.S. strategy would maintain a high level of military and civilian engagement in Afghanistan until the Kabul government is capable of policing its own territory. Washington would negotiate with the Afghan government on a long-term strategic partnership, including a sustained military presence for the foreseeable future. It could be complemented by a multilateral effort to create a great power concert to stabilize Afghanistan and the region.
U.S. engagement would need to concentrate on three goals. First, it would have to force Islamabad's hand to shift its policy from supporting the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other insurgents to facilitating a political settlement. Washington would have to offer Pakistan a variety of inducements, while addressing legitimate Pakistani concerns -- for instance, by offering a guarantee that Afghan territory is not used as a staging ground for attacks against Pakistan.
If Pakistan does not cooperate, however, Washington would escalate coercive tactics, dramatically reducing military assistance, curtailing support programs to Pakistan through international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, and increasing military operations against insurgent targets on Pakistani territory.
If this effort fails, the United States should explore a long-term effort to contain, isolate, and transform Pakistan into a more stable, moderate state. This would require a sizeable presence of residual U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan to harden the Afghan state and conduct cross-border operations on Pakistani soil. The United States would also need to enhance bilateral relations with India and strengthen Afghan security forces to the point where they can withstand Pakistan's possible escalation of pressure. These moves would give Kabul and New Delhi sufficient leverage to negotiate a reasonable agreement with Islamabad.
Second, the United States would improve the capacity of the Afghan state. It would need to continue counterinsurgency operations, conditioning its drawdown on the ability of Afghan security forces to take over. Washington would continue to push for international assistance but would need to assume greater and even unilateral responsibility to build up and train Afghanistan's national army and police.
On the political front, the United States would need to persuade the Afghan government to deal with corruption and the rule of law. Significant progress on governance issues should be linked to the completion of negotiations with the Afghan government on a strategic partnership agreement governing the post-2014 U.S. presence. If real progress is not made on the governance front, the same objective will need to be pursued by strengthening pro-reform forces in the country so that they can influence the results of the next presidential elections in 2014.
Third, Washington would pursue a positive vision for the region based on economic integration and the establishment of a New Silk Road. Preferably in conjunction with allies, the United States would strengthen Afghan institutions. While a certain amount of aid will be necessary during a transitional period, the objective would be Afghan self-reliance. Engagement with the private sector would help Afghanistan develop its agriculture sector and mineral resources. And proactive U.S. diplomacy would be the critical factor in commencing negotiations to reduce trade barriers and develop roads, rails, pipelines, and other infrastructure projects.
For now, sustained U.S. engagement is the strategy most likely to ensure regional security. Heavy combat operations need not continue indefinitely, but core U.S. interests would require the U.S. to remain in Afghanistan for another decade to build up and train Afghan forces, conduct counterterrorism operations, and respond to regional contingencies. By and large, the Obama administration has embraced a determined U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Now, it should explain the imperative of getting the endgame right. Cementing a long-term U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan would enable counterterrorism missions in the region and give Afghanistan's national security forces enough time to reach a sufficient size and capacity to assume responsibility from the coalition. The United States would have a platform for dealing with a variety of regional contingencies, such as a Pakistani state collapse in which nuclear weapons fall into the hands of extremists.
Most important, a demonstration of U.S. willpower provides the greatest hope for preventing counterproductive hedging by Afghan political players and regional powers, leaving them no choice but to accommodate the reality of a strong and stable Afghanistan with political and military ties to the United States.
Of Any Future
Regardless of which approach, or combination of approaches, the United States ultimately pursues, Washington must plan for a wide number of contingencies.
Even in a positive scenario -- in which the United States makes progress on key priorities such as counterterrorism, managing Pakistan, reconstruction, governance reforms, and a regional settlement -- consolidating gains will require other forms of U.S. engagement for some time to come. The military component would be a much smaller part of the U.S. strategy, while the relative role of diplomacy and economic involvement would increase.
Since World War II, U.S. statecraft has succeeded by sending American forces to regions of critical importance and working with partners -- for decades if needed -- to address mutual threats, build stability, and foster progress.
This formula eliminated major power wars in Europe and East Asia for more than a half century and successfully concluded the Cold War -- a historic triumph. The necessary engagement in Central and South Asia will not be nearly as difficult or expensive as those previous efforts, which involved U.S. occupation governments and a military presence large enough to counter the looming communist threat. Given the risks and the opportunities ahead, it is an investment worth making.
Read more from The Future of Afghanistan and U.S. Foreign Policy.
2 militants killed, 1 injured in Afghanistan air raid
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan, Dec. 17 (Xinhua) -- Two militants were killed and another injured when a war-plane with the NATO-led Coalition forces targeted their position in country's southern Kandahar province on Friday night, the local government said on Saturday.
"An international force plane while on routine patrol spotted and targeted three militants who were placing an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) along a road in Mazraha village of Maywand district over night," the local government said in a press release on Saturday morning.
As a result of the air attack two militants were killed and another injured in the province with Kandahar city as its capital, 450 km south of capital city of Kabul, it said.
"The injured man was captured by Afghan police shortly after the raid and an AK-47 gun, a pistol and a pick was also found and seized by police forces," it said.
Taliban militants have been largely relying on IED and suicide attacks in fighting Afghan security force and around 130,000 NATO- led troops based in Afghanistan, often causing civilian casualties as four civilians were killed and eight seriously injured when an IED hit their vehicle in country's western Farah province on Thursday.
4 insurgents killed, 24 detained in Afghanistan
KABUL, Dec. 17 (Xinhua) -- Four insurgents were killed and two dozen more were detained as Afghan and NATO-led Coalition forces launched seven military operations in different parts of the country over the past 24 hours, the country's Interior Ministry said on Saturday morning.
"Afghan police and army in collaboration with International Coalition Forces launched seven joint operations in areas surrounding Kabul, Kunduz, Kandahar, Helmand, and Wardak provinces over the last 24 hours, killing four armed insurgents and detaining 24 other suspected armed men," the ministry said in a statement.
During the operations, the Afghan National Police (ANP) also discovered and confiscated seven AK-47 assault rifles with 360 bullets, one PKM machine gun and four vehicles used by suspected insurgent to target security forces, it said.
Afghan officials often use the word "insurgents" referring to Taliban. However, the insurgent group, who launched in May this year a rebel offensive against Afghan and around 130,000 NATO forces stationed in the country, has not to make comments yet.
On GPS: Afghan President Hamid Karzai
CNN December 16th, 2011
On GPS this Sunday at 10a.m. and 1p.m. EST, an exclusive interview with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He assesses whether NATO is winning the war effort, explains why he can no longer talk to the Taliban and tells us how he intervened in the case of a woman who was imprisoned after she was raped by a close relative.
That, plus an all-star GPS panel on the Republican presidential candidates, Russia’s protests, and Europe’s woes: David Remnick from the New Yorker, Peggy Noonan of the Wall Street Journal, Kurt Anderson from TIME, and Gillian Tett of the FT.
And, ten years on from the BRICs - why the man who invented the catchy acronym thinks one of the four has been a failure.
Here are some excerpts:
Karzai on NATO
Fareed Zakaria: The Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, recently said NATO forces, the international coalition, is winning in Afghanistan. Do you believe that is a accurate statement?
Hamid Karzai: Well, the international coalition and the Afghan government have been able to provide, in the past 10 years, political stability to Afghanistan, the overall stability of Afghanistan and the presence of Afghanistan as a state, as a nation state in the international community. But we have not been able - the United States, NATO and Afghanistan government together - to provide the Afghan people with their individual personal security. That is yet to come.
Hamid Karzai on night raids
Fareed Zakaria: The one area where you have had a great deal of criticism for NATO forces and for the United States has been these so-called "night raids." Former Admiral William McRaven says they are essential and important. You say that they are feeding hostility to foreign forces.
Where do things stand? So you have a commitment from the United States that these night raids will end, or not?
Hamid Karzai: Well, this has been one of the issues between us for a long time, something that we have raised an objection to for almost eight years now. We want Afghanistan’s homes, Afghanistan’s villages to be protected, to be safe from such attacks. What we are asking for, in very specific and clear terms, that is no foreign forces should enter Afghan homes.
On Afghan rape victim released Thursday
Fareed Zakaria: Mr. President, there’s a woman named Gulnaz, who as you know, was sentenced to prison for 12 years after it was reported that her cousin’s husband raped her. She was then freed because of your personal action. The great concern of human rights activists in the West - and in Afghanistan, I should say - is that particularly once the international forces withdraw and perhaps have less of a day-to-day involvement, that these kind of events will happen day after day after day in Afghanistan. Why is this kind of thing happening in Afghanistan?
Hamid Karzai: Well, when I came to the office and upon coming to know of this, I convened a judicial meeting, in which the issue was discussed in detail, and the right inquiries made. We, on advice from the chief justice and the Minister of Justice, decided that this was a case, perhaps, of misjudgment and that it has to be resolved, and resolved by giving her a pardon immediately. That’s what I did.
But to the future...I can assure you that Afghanistan has a long tradition of judicial applications....It’s a country that has been troubled a lot. But it is also an old country, with...laws and a penal code and judicial history. I can assure you that, once the international forces are withdrawn and not as many as they are today, Afghanistan will neither go into a trouble within the country or strife or into miscarriage of justice. I can assure you of that.
Watch the full interview with Hamid Karzai this Sunday at 10a.m. and 1p.m. EST on CNN.
Iran's Intelligence Ministry says arresting CIA spy
TEHRAN, Dec. 17 (Xinhua) -- Iran's Intelligence Ministry announced Saturday that it has arrested a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spy in Iran.
Iran's Intelligence Ministry said in a statement that the spy is a CIA analyst tasked with carrying out a complex intelligence operation and infiltrating Iran's intelligence apparatus.
The CIA spy, with Iranian nationality, had experience in working for the Military Intelligence Division (MID) of the U.S. Army at military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's satellite Press TV reported.
Iran's intelligence agency identified the spy upon his arrival at the Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan, monitored his actions after he entered Iran, and later arrested him when he attempted to start espionage activities in Iran, said the statement.
The statement accused the U.S. administration of spending huge expense and designing complicated plots to penetrate into the Islamic Republic's intelligence system, in a bid to continue hostile and all-out intelligence and operational actions against Iran.
In November, an Iranian lawmaker said that Iran has been surrounded by Western spying centers near its borders in neighboring countries.
Zohre Elahian, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian parliament, said that Israeli Mossad, American CIA and British MI6 have established espionage centers in the western, northern and eastern borders of Iran.
The espionage bases are tasked with organizing terrorist actions and intelligence operations against Iran and its citizens, said the lawmaker.
Iran said that it has arrested a number of Israeli and U.S. spies in the country over past years.
Karzai: Afghans don’t have personal security despite efforts of international, Afghan troops
By Associated Press, December 17
KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghanistan has achieved political stability, yet Afghans still do not feel personally secure in their daily lives, President Hamid Karzai said in an interview to be aired on Sunday.
“The international coalition and the Afghan government have been able to provide, in the past 10 years, political stability to Afghanistan,” Karzai said on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS.”
“But we have not been able — the United States, NATO and Afghan government together — to provide the Afghan people with their individual personal security. That is yet to come.”
Karzai said the troops have slowed the mobility and activity of the Taliban and other militant groups, but he stopped short of saying the war has been won.
“I’ll have to wait a bit longer to confirm that we have reversed the trend and that the Afghan people will see the fruits of our efforts and see peace and further security,” he said, according to a transcript of the interview CNN released on Saturday.
Karzai also said his government would welcome the creation of a Taliban political office where Afghan and other officials could hold meaningful discussions about a possible political resolution to the war. If the Taliban decided to open an office, it would signal their willingness to talk peace, Karzai believes.
Efforts to reconcile with the Taliban were dealt a major setback when former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated on Sept. 20. Rabbani, who was leading the government’s campaign to broker peace with the insurgents, was killed by a suicide bomber posing as a peace emissary from the Taliban.
After Rabbani’s death, Karzai said informal peace efforts would not resume. Instead, he said, the Taliban had to stop fighting and establish an official address.
Earlier this week, Karzai said that if security concerns make it impossible to set up an office in Afghanistan, then it should be established in another Islamic nation, such as Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
“That address must have the clarity that this representative is authorized and is representing the Taliban movement,” he said.
Karzai also said that because Taliban leaders were based in neighboring Pakistan, “a meaningful peace process cannot go well or end in satisfactory results without Pakistan’s participation and help.”
U.S. officials have said that so far, Pakistani officials have not offered to bring Taliban leaders to the negotiating table.
On other issues, Karzai said that U.S. and Afghan officials are still negotiating a strategic partnership document that will govern how some American forces will stay in Afghanistan after foreign troops ends their combat mission in 2014. A sticking point in the talks are nighttime raids that target suspected insurgents and terrorists.
Karzai has repeatedly argued that the troops who push into compounds to search the premises and the residents treat too may civilians as if they are insurgents and violate citizens’ privacy in an intensely conservative society. He said the raids result in too many civilian deaths.
“What we are asking for, in very specific and clear terms, is that no foreign forces should enter Afghan homes,” Karzai said.
NATO has said that more than 90 percent of night operations are done alongside Afghan forces and that more than 85 percent are conducted without any shots fired.
The night raid controversy was evident on Saturday when the coalition and local Afghan officials released differing accounts of a raid on a home around 1 a.m. Saturday in the Ahmadaba district of Paktia province.
The provincial governor condemned what he said was a raid on the home of the provincial counternarcotics chief, said the governor’s spokesman, Rohullah Samon. He said local authorities, who believe the counternarcotics chief has not committed any crime, have contacted the coalition about getting him released.
The coalition said three men who were detained included a leader with the Haqqani militant network, which is affiliated with al-Qaida and the Taliban.
A joint Afghan-NATO force returned gunfire coming from the house, the coalition said. After the shooting stopped, they called for those inside to come out.
Two Afghan women inside were wounded and evacuated to a medical facility and one later died of a gunshot wound, the coalition said.
Pakistan PM Dismisses Rumors of Rift With Army
VOA News December 17, 2011
Pakistan's prime minister has dismissed rumors of a rift between the government and the military over a secret memo sent to Washington seeking U.S. help in preventing a feared military coup.
Tensions between the government and the military have soared recently ahead of a Supreme Court inquiry into the alleged plot. The absence of President Asif Ali Zardari, who is abroad receiving medical treatment for an illness, has only added to the speculation that the current government is in crisis.
Late Friday, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani met with army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani to discuss the memo. Gilani said in a statement after the meeting that he has rejected the notion there is any trouble between the government and the military.
The prime minister said Pakistan's government and its institutions "remain committed to their constitutional roles and obligations" to a democratic and prosperous future for Pakistan.
His comments come a day after General Kayani was quoted as saying the memo had "impacted national security." The army chief called on the Supreme Court to fully investigate the circumstances surrounding the memo's origins and who wrote it.
The existence of the document came to light in October when Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz wrote a column in "The Financial Times" accusing Ambassador Hussain Haqqani of writing the memo requesting U.S. assistance to prevent a military coup. The letter was reportedly sent in May to Admiral Mike Mullen, the top U.S. military official at the time.
The Supreme Court is scheduled to resume a hearing Monday on a petition filed by opposition leader Nawaz Sharif, demanding an investigation into the affair.
Some information for this report was provided by AP, AFP and Reuters.
Pakistan general calls for Zardari probe
Financial Times By Matthew Green December 16, 2011
Dubai - Pakistan’s army chief has raised the pressure on Asif Ali Zardari, the embattled president, by calling for a swift investigation into a claim that he sought US help to rein in the country’s powerful generals.
The allegation has sparked a furore in Pakistan and threatened to undermine Mr Zardari, who was flown to hospital in Dubai last week for medical treatment, injecting a fresh element of drama into the increasingly febrile political scene.
The controversy hinges on an allegation that Mr Zardari authorised the dispatch of a secret memo asking the US to back a plan to decisively establish civilian supremacy over Pakistan’s military, in the volatile days after the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May.
The claims have infuriated the army, which jealously guards the enormous hidden influence it has amassed during decades of military rule, and whose leadership has viewed Mr Zardari with suspicion since he assumed power in 2008.
Underscoring the degree of concern within the security establishment, General Ashfaq Kayani, the powerful head of the army, said in a statement to the Supreme Court that the memo represented an attempt to hurt national security.
“I also recommended to the prime minister that time was of the essence and that the earlier we knew the truth the better it would be to address the negative fallout for the country,” Gen Kayani said.
The remarks were published on Friday in Pakistani newspapers, which were quoting from Gen Kayani’s deposition to the Supreme Court on Thursday.
The court is examining a petition brought by Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister and prominent opposition leader, who has demanded judges launch a full investigation.
The prospect of a lengthy inquiry by the Supreme Court, which has taken an increasingly activist stance in recent years, has worried Mr Zardari’s supporters, who fear the affair has handed the military a new point of leverage over the fragile civilian government.
The affair – dubbed “Memogate” in Pakistan – claimed its first casualty last month when Husain Haqqani, one of Mr Zardari’s closest allies, was forced to resign as ambassador to the US. Political commentators believe the controversy represents one of the biggest challenges yet faced by the government of Mr Zardari, who remains a deeply unpopular figure in Pakistan.
The existence of the memo was first revealed by Mansoor Ijaz, a US businessman of Pakistani origin, in an opinion column he wrote in The Financial Times in October.
Mr Ijaz has since said Mr Haqqani asked him to deliver the memo to Admiral Mike Mullen, who was then chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff. Mr Haqqani and Mr Zardari both deny any involvement with the memo.
Mr Haqqani, who has been a critic of the military’s influence in Pakistan, has returned to Islamabad where he hopes he will be exonerated by any official investigation. The Supreme Court has barred him from leaving the country pending its inquiry. Hearings are due to begin on Monday.
The growing uncertainty in Pakistan’s political scene fuelled by the inquiry and Mr Zardari’s absence in Dubai has complicated Washington’s attempts to repair the latest crisis in US-Pakistan relations, triggered by the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a Nato air strike last month. Pakistan shut supply lines to Nato troops in Afghanistan, kicked the US out of an air base and boycotted an international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn in retaliation.
Jim Jones: Amb. Haqqani was not involved in memogate
Foreign Policy By Josh Rogin Friday, December 16, 2011
Former National Security Advisor Jim Jones has submitted a confidential affidavit, obtained by The Cable, in which he swears that he has no reason to believe that former Pakistani Ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani had any role in the scandal known as "memogate."
Jones was the go-between in the transmission of a secret memo from Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz to then Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen in the days following the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad. The memo, purportedly from the Pakistani civilian leadership, asked for U.S. government help to avoid a pending military coup in Pakistan and pledged, in return, to reorient Pakistan's foreign and national security policy to be more in line with U.S. interests.
Ijaz has claimed over and over that the memo and the scheme it contained was derived and driven by Haqqani, who has since resigned over the scandal and is now in Islamabad without permission to leave the country. Ijaz also claims that that Haqqani discussed the scheme with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, who faces increasing domestic political pressure from opponents and is in Dubai due to what is being described as a recent "mini-stroke."
Haqqani has always claimed that he had no role in the writing or delivery of the memo. Earlier this week, Jones broke his silence on the issue by signing a confidential affidavit about his role in "memogate," which he sent to Haqqani's lawyers as part of their planned libel suit against Ijaz. In the affidavit, Jones states that Ijaz never mentioned to him that the memo came from Haqqani.
"A few days before May 9, 2011, I received a phone call from Mr. Mansoor ljaz. I have known Mr. ljaz in a personal capacity since 2006. During the call Mr. Ijaz mentioned that he had a message from the ‘highest authority' in the Pakistan government which he asked me to relay to then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen," Jones wrote in the confidential affidavit.
"At no time during the call do I remember Mr. Ijaz mentioning Ambassador Haqqani, and he gave me no reason to believe that he was acting at the direction of Ambassador Haqqani, with his participation, or that Ambassador Haqqani had knowledge of the call or the contents of the message."
Jones told Ijaz he would only forward the message to Mullen if it was in writing. On May 9, Ijaz sent the unsigned memo to Jones's personal e-mail account and Jones passed it on to Mullen. Mullen has acknowledged that he received the memo but claims he gave it no credence and took no action on it whatsoever.
"It was my assumption that the memo was written by Mr. Ijaz, since the memo essentially put into writing the language he had used in our telephone conversation earlier," Jones wrote in his affidavit. "I do not recall whether Mr. Ijaz claimed that Ambassador Haqqani had anything to do with the creation of the memo. I have no reason to believe that Ambassador Haqqani had any role in the creation of the memo, nor that he had any prior knowledge of the memo."
The Jones affidavit will be used by Haqqani's legal team to bolster Haqqani's claims that Ijaz was the author's memo, not him. Ijaz's main evidence of Haqqani's involvement is a series of Blackberry Messenger communications that Ijaz claims he had with Haqqani to discuss the memo during its formation. Ijaz has said his Blackberry is being examined by Pakistani forensic experts as part of the ongoing investigation.
Ijaz's activity throughout the scandal has raised several questions about his motives. For example, he publicly disclosed the existence of the memo in an Oct. 10 op-ed in the Financial Times, purportedly to defend Mullen from attacks and slanders in Pakistan. Then, on Oct. 22, he met in London with Pakistan's Gen. Shuja Pasha, the leader of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which Ijaz's memo promised would be replaced with new, U.S.-friendly national security leaders in Pakistan.
Last week, Ijaz claimed in a Newsweek article that Haqqani and Zardari knew of the raid to kill bin Laden in advance and may have given the U.S. military tacit permission to violate Pakistani airspace. Haqqani has initiated legal action against Ijaz over those claims and the Jones affidavit is part of that litigation.
In the most interesting part of the affidavit, Jones states his personal opinion that the memo probably did not come from the Pakistani government at all.
"Upon my reading of the memo that I was asked to forward to Admiral Mullen, it struck me as highly unusual that the ‘highest authority' in the Pakistan government would use Mr. ljaz, a private citizen and part-time journalist living in Europe, as a conduit for this communication," Jones wrote. "My personal opinion was that the memo was probably not credible."
Asked for comment on Friday by The Cable, Jones declined to elaborate.
Ijaz responded to Jones' affidavit with a lengthy comment to The Cable. Here are some excerpts, after the jump:
On December 12, 2011, Gen. James L. Jones issued an Affidavit to the Supreme Court of Pakistan in which he, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, tried to recall the events of May 9, 10 and 11 of this year, which are the dates on which Amb. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's former ambassador to the United States, asked me to assist him in delivering a message that he dictated to me and whose content originated entirely from him to Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gen. Jones was the individual who I asked to deliver Haqqani's message to the admiral.
Gen. Jones and I have known each other since 2006. I consider him a friend and have learned many valuable lessons from him during the five years we've known each other. He has been a guest speaker at my charity events and I have been an overnight guest at his official home when he was NATO commander. We have published an op-ed together, ironically, in the Financial Times on the subject of Pakistan. Our families know each other, as do our spouses. He is a man of the highest possible integrity who has served the United States with unparalleled dignity and honor.
But in the case of his recollections with regard to this matter, I have a friendly disagreement with him on a number of the points he raises in his affidavit...
First, Gen. Jones states in Point 3 of his affidavit, "A few days before May 9,2011, I received a phone call from Mr. Mansoor ljaz..." This is factually incorrect for a number of reasons. The only telephone number I had for Jim at that time was his home number after he left the National Security Council. A thorough review this evening of my telephone records for the only two telephone numbers I maintain (a US cell and a UK cell) shows that on neither billing statement for that time period is there a single call to Jim's home telephone number other than the one made on the morning of May 9th after Amb. Haqqani and I spoke -- in fact just after we spoke. There are no calls at all to any number I have ever had for Jim in any single day in May prior to May 9th, and indeed, not on any date for that billing cycle going back to April 21, 2011...
Secondly, Jim states in Point 4 of his affidavit, "At no time during the call do I remember Mr. Ijaz mentioning Ambassador Haqqani, and he gave me no reason to believe that he was acting at the direction of Ambassador Haqqani, with his participation, or that Ambassador Haqqani had knowledge of the call or the contents of the message. I informed Mr.ljazthat I would not forward an oral message of this type to Admiral Mullen and that if he wanted anl.thing forwarded it would have to be in writing."
This statement is partially correct, and can be simply corrected by looking more closely at the timeline of discussion during that call. To the best of my recollection, at the outset of the call and for much of the call, I did not mention Haqqani's name because I felt it was necessary to gauge Jim's reaction to the message content first. As his skepticism of the message grew, he asked me who this was coming from and I said, exactly as Jim has stated in Point 6 of his affidavit, that it was from the highest authority in Pakistan. His skepticism persisted, and so to avoid any view from Jim about sourcing, near the end of the call I made it clear to him that the message was originating from Haqqani. He asked me, as I have stated in my Supreme Court testimony, about my relationship with Haqqani and I gave him a very short overview. He indicated his views of Haqqani, which he repeated to me in more strongly worded terms in a recent call after the controversy erupted, and the call ended.
It is important to note that I never mentioned Gen. Jones' name to Haqqani in any conversation or correspondence we had. Haqqani knew I was talking to more than one person, although it is my belief that he probably knew I would rely on Jim in the end. He certainly knew of my strong personal feelings for Jim, which I had conveyed in no uncertain terms when Haqqani took me to see President Zardari in Washington on May 5, 2009. President Zardari knew as well...
Third, Jim erroneously notes that we had spoken a "day or two earlier" in Point 6. It was on that day for the first time in a very long time.
Fourth, Jim notes that he assumed I wrote the memo since our conversation was reflected in it. Of course it was. But that doesn't mean the content of the Memorandum arose from that conversation. I say again, the content of the Memorandum to Adm. Mike Mullen originated entirely from Amb. Husain Haqqani. He dictated it to me and was responsible for all key edits.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
Reuters By Daniel Magnowski Dec 17, 2011
KABUL - A scheme that pays and arms Afghans to defend their villages against insurgents is being hindered by corruption and the difficulty of distinguishing the guards from other armed groups, a U.S. military report has said.
The Afghan Local Police (ALP) units were a flagship project of U.S. General David Petraeus, who stepped down as commander of foreign forces in Afghanistan earlier this year, but they have been criticised by rights groups, including in a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report in September.
They aim to use modest salaries and foreign mentors to build or formalise local protection networks in areas with a heavy presence of insurgents and few soldiers or police, but critics say their lack of training and accountability can make them a threat to the public.
An investigation by U.S. forces in Afghanistan into the HRW allegations found that some were credible, said a report dated Dec. 6 but only made public this week.
"Many of the allegations that are tied to ALP are in fact not ALP units. Unfortunately there are many groups out there that claim to be ALP or are identified as ALP," a spokesman for U.S. forces in Afghanistan said on Saturday.
"This was a finding by the investigating team and there were recommendations made ... to address this problem," he said.
They include the possibility of introducing a standard uniform for all ALP members, and better education and awareness of the groups.
The controversial groups, formed in response to worsening security in Afghanistan, have worked in some areas, with Afghans citing improvements in security. But in others, criminals and insurgents are joining the ALP or government-backed militias, securing access to money and guns, the HRW report said.
The ALP is likely to be expanded and extended, a senior officer from the NATO-led coalition fighting in Afghanistan said on Monday, as foreign combat troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan completely by the end of 2014.
Original plans called for up to 30,000 members, although only around 10,000 are in place at the moment.
The investigation, conducted by U.S. Air Force Brigadier General James Marrs, said the ALP was "effective" and in the main complied with orders concerning human rights, but in his report he acknowledged there were shortcomings.
"Ethnic divisions, political differences, power struggles and corruption are some of the multiple challenges to overcome before the system will become most effective," Marrs wrote.
"Many of these issues are not restricted to local areas and extend up to the executive branch of the Afghan government." (Editing by Paul Tait)
1 civilian killed in night raid operation in E. Afghanistan
KABUL, Dec. 17 (Xinhua) -- At least one civilian was killed and three others injured when a joint unit of Afghan and NATO-led coalition forces carried out a night raid operation on a compound in country's eastern Paktia province, an official said on Saturday.
"A joint unit of Afghan and NATO forces raided the house of Hafizullah, head of counter-narcotics department of Pakita province, in the wee hours Saturday in provincial capital Gardez city as a result a woman was killed and three others were injured," deputy provincial governor Abdul Rahman Mangal told Xinhua.
He said Hafizullah and two of his sons were detained by troops.
The motive of the attack on the government official house had not been cleared at the moment but such kind of operations normally conduced by force to capture armed insurgents or people have links with the armed anti-government militants.
However, Mangal said an investigation was launched by local government to find why the combined forces killed the woman and detained Hafizullah along his two sons.
A total of 1,462 Afghan civilians have been killed in the first half of 2011 which indicates, a 15 percent rise in civilian deaths compared with the same period in 2010, according to the United Nations mid-year report released in Kabul in July this year.
The UN report attributed 80 percent of the civilian deaths in the first six months of this year to the attacks of Taliban insurgents and other armed groups opposing the Afghan government.
Another 14 percent of the deaths were attributed to Afghan and NATO-led forces and 6 percent were unattributed.
The Three Futures for Afghanistan
Why the Country Needs a Long-Term Commitment From the United States
FOREIGN AFFAIRS By Zalmay Khalilzad December 16, 2011
Ten years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the gains that the international coalition has made with its local partners are real but reversible. Afghanistan is no longer a global hub of terrorist activity, but a Taliban resurgence would threaten to make it one again. Reconstruction assistance has produced demonstrable progress in health, education, and economic well-being, but corruption and governance problems have undermined popular support for the government in Kabul and constrained the overall level of progress. Internationally, a coalition still backs the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) military mission. However, NATO's will is waning; China, Russia, and India are largely free riders; and Pakistan and Iran publicly say the right things, while destabilizing Afghanistan by privately meddling to their own ends.
Political and economic realities in the United States make the current level of American engagement in Afghanistan unsustainable. But as the commitment of coalition partners fades, what Washington decides will shape the future of South Asia. Looking ahead, there are three different scenarios for American engagement in Afghanistan.
It remains to be seen exactly which route Washington will take. But it is clear that U.S. interests require a long-term commitment not only in Afghanistan but across the region. Lest it be forgotten, the consequences of ignoring the region in the 1990s were visited upon the United States on 9/11. So the most vital goals today are defeating the remnants of al Qaeda in Pakistan, preventing the reemergence of terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan, ensuring the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, and discouraging Pakistan's use of extremism and terror as a policy instrument.
There are three ways forward. Each entails a different degree of involvement and carries varying risks and rewards. The first option is the riskiest.
Future #1: Immediate Departure and the Reallocation of Resources
Discontent among the U.S. public over the war is already at an all-time high. Increased political demands on the White House could lead U.S. President Barack Obama to accelerate the planned withdrawal. In turn, Congress would slash economic assistance. Reconstruction responsibilities in Afghanistan would be left largely to international institutions and the government in Kabul. Even if the European powers, Japan, and South Korea sustained modest economic assistance, they, too, would likely follow the U.S. out the door. The counterinsurgency mission would come to an end.
With a more limited involvement, the United States would still try to pursue basic counterterrorism operations. For example, it would deploy special forces and drone and air strikes, but obtaining bases of operation in the region for these forces might prove problematic, if not impossible. At Pakistan's request, the United States is already withdrawing from the Shamsi air base, which had been used for drone operations. The Central Asian states may be reluctant to make up for the loss of bases in Pakistan; Russia and China would likely encourage them to resist U.S. requests. And Kabul would be less willing to provide base access if Washington focuses narrowly on counterterrorism objectives without a commitment to state building in Afghanistan. That would leave the future of Afghanistan to be determined principally by two factors: the durability of the Afghan government and the outcome of regional rivalries.
After the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, the communist regime in Kabul unexpectedly held power for another three years. It was not until the Soviets abruptly cut off assistance -- and key internal alliances frayed -- that Mohammad Najibullah's regime in Kabul fell. The current Afghan government is more popular than Najibullah's was, but President Hamid Karzai's government is not without vulnerabilities and certainly would not be able to stand entirely on its own.
Consider that a sharp U.S. drawdown would make nationwide elections, scheduled for 2014, almost impossible. Instead of the Afghan people, outside powers would likely determine the fate of the central government. Pakistan would probably accelerate its support for the insurgency in an attempt to install a client regime in Kabul. China, India, Iran, Russia, and the Gulf States would pursue their interests whether elections worked or not -- by funneling support either to the Karzai government or, should it suit them, to favored proxies. In all likelihood, violence would dramatically increase and Afghanistan would, once again, be home to a vicious cycle of proxy wars.
For the United States, a rapid drawdown would have mixed consequences. On the plus side, U.S. troops would no longer be in harm's way, Congress would reallocate resources (albeit while accepting heavy losses in sunk costs), and the United States would have greater freedom of action to engage in other parts of the world.
On the negative side, terrorist sanctuaries would likely reemerge. The Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other extremists, infused with momentum, would make a renewed push for more control of the country. The United States would lose access to markets promised by the New Silk Road initiative, and it would not be able to establish enduring bases to help deal with problems in Pakistan, Iran, and the rest of a neighborhood that is, to put it mildly, dangerous.
The bottom line: After a decade's effort in blood and treasure, Afghanistan could face the 1990s all over again.
Future #2: Phased Drawdown and Internationalization of the Effort
Assuming the U.S. public and Congress allow Obama the political breathing room to pursue his announced strategy and dedicate attention and resources to Afghanistan for a bit longer, Washington would proceed with a drawdown of forces as planned, transferring security responsibility to the Afghans by 2014. The Obama administration could add a new feature to its strategy by seeking greater engagement from outside powers to stabilize Afghanistan.
Considering the significant interests of other major powers in Afghanistan, that prospect is not far-fetched. Russia and India have been the victims of terrorist attacks by groups linked to Afghanistan and Pakistan. China's western territories are vulnerable to Islamist extremists mixed with ethnic separatists. All stand to gain from either the economic growth from a New Silk Road plan or the vast mineral resources in the country.
With more time, Washington could work with others to reach consensus on desired outcomes and a joint vision for Afghanistan. Collaborating with regional partners, they would exercise coordinated influence over Pakistan and Iran to stem conflict and bring about some modicum of cooperation. China has major influence in Islamabad, and the combined efforts of China, India, and Russia could sway Tehran.
Regional cooperation amid a phased U.S. pullback is most likely to succeed if the UN, with U.S. support, establishes an enduring diplomatic forum, consisting initially of the major world powers, to work toward promoting Afghan peace and regional stability. Washington would use such a body as a vehicle for accommodating outside powers in the decision-making process but only if they contribute their fair share to the mission. Such a great power concert would negotiate redlines for the activities of regional powers in Afghanistan; monitor the Afghan reconciliation process; pressure the Afghan government to improve governance and the rule of law; provide long-term funding for economic development and the buildup and training of Afghan national army and police forces; and finally, construct infrastructure -- roads, railroads, pipelines -- to establish the new Silk Road connecting Central and South Asia into a single economic zone. The concert would enable major powers to preserve their core interests in Afghanista
n while creating the conditions needed to stabilize the country.
Even with greater involvement of outside powers, however, U.S. efforts to internationalize the mission will not succeed without a sustained level of U.S. military and civilian engagement. While the UN would facilitate the concert, the United States is the sole power capable of galvanizing and incentivizing international cooperation behind economic integration and a regional settlement. Great powers are only likely to cooperate so long as they feel that free riding is no longer an option and that cooperation with a U.S.-backed regional design remains the most viable means of securing their national interests. Without a real commitment from Washington, the best plans will fail.
The perception that the United States wishes to disengage from the region is already impeding the coalition's ability to influence key players. After all, during periods of ascendant influence, Washington was never able to persuade Pakistan to cease support for insurgents in Afghanistan. Relations with Karzai, meanwhile, have become difficult, with the coalition struggling to persuade his government to tackle corruption. Disengagement is likely to make these problems worse, as government leaders worry about their own futures.
Future #3: Sustained, Determined U.S. Engagement
A determined U.S. strategy would maintain a high level of military and civilian engagement in Afghanistan until the Kabul government is capable of policing its own territory. Washington would negotiate with the Afghan government on a long-term strategic partnership, including a sustained military presence for the foreseeable future. It could be complemented by a multilateral effort to create a great power concert to stabilize Afghanistan and the region.
U.S. engagement would need to concentrate on three goals. First, it would have to force Islamabad's hand to shift its policy from supporting the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and other insurgents to facilitating a political settlement. Washington would have to offer Pakistan a variety of inducements, while addressing legitimate Pakistani concerns -- for instance, by offering a guarantee that Afghan territory is not used as a staging ground for attacks against Pakistan.
If Pakistan does not cooperate, however, Washington would escalate coercive tactics, dramatically reducing military assistance, curtailing support programs to Pakistan through international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, and increasing military operations against insurgent targets on Pakistani territory.
If this effort fails, the United States should explore a long-term effort to contain, isolate, and transform Pakistan into a more stable, moderate state. This would require a sizeable presence of residual U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan to harden the Afghan state and conduct cross-border operations on Pakistani soil. The United States would also need to enhance bilateral relations with India and strengthen Afghan security forces to the point where they can withstand Pakistan's possible escalation of pressure. These moves would give Kabul and New Delhi sufficient leverage to negotiate a reasonable agreement with Islamabad.
Second, the United States would improve the capacity of the Afghan state. It would need to continue counterinsurgency operations, conditioning its drawdown on the ability of Afghan security forces to take over. Washington would continue to push for international assistance but would need to assume greater and even unilateral responsibility to build up and train Afghanistan's national army and police.
On the political front, the United States would need to persuade the Afghan government to deal with corruption and the rule of law. Significant progress on governance issues should be linked to the completion of negotiations with the Afghan government on a strategic partnership agreement governing the post-2014 U.S. presence. If real progress is not made on the governance front, the same objective will need to be pursued by strengthening pro-reform forces in the country so that they can influence the results of the next presidential elections in 2014.
Third, Washington would pursue a positive vision for the region based on economic integration and the establishment of a New Silk Road. Preferably in conjunction with allies, the United States would strengthen Afghan institutions. While a certain amount of aid will be necessary during a transitional period, the objective would be Afghan self-reliance. Engagement with the private sector would help Afghanistan develop its agriculture sector and mineral resources. And proactive U.S. diplomacy would be the critical factor in commencing negotiations to reduce trade barriers and develop roads, rails, pipelines, and other infrastructure projects.
For now, sustained U.S. engagement is the strategy most likely to ensure regional security. Heavy combat operations need not continue indefinitely, but core U.S. interests would require the U.S. to remain in Afghanistan for another decade to build up and train Afghan forces, conduct counterterrorism operations, and respond to regional contingencies. By and large, the Obama administration has embraced a determined U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Now, it should explain the imperative of getting the endgame right. Cementing a long-term U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan would enable counterterrorism missions in the region and give Afghanistan's national security forces enough time to reach a sufficient size and capacity to assume responsibility from the coalition. The United States would have a platform for dealing with a variety of regional contingencies, such as a Pakistani state collapse in which nuclear weapons fall into the hands of extremists.
Most important, a demonstration of U.S. willpower provides the greatest hope for preventing counterproductive hedging by Afghan political players and regional powers, leaving them no choice but to accommodate the reality of a strong and stable Afghanistan with political and military ties to the United States.
Of Any Future
Regardless of which approach, or combination of approaches, the United States ultimately pursues, Washington must plan for a wide number of contingencies.
Even in a positive scenario -- in which the United States makes progress on key priorities such as counterterrorism, managing Pakistan, reconstruction, governance reforms, and a regional settlement -- consolidating gains will require other forms of U.S. engagement for some time to come. The military component would be a much smaller part of the U.S. strategy, while the relative role of diplomacy and economic involvement would increase.
Since World War II, U.S. statecraft has succeeded by sending American forces to regions of critical importance and working with partners -- for decades if needed -- to address mutual threats, build stability, and foster progress.
This formula eliminated major power wars in Europe and East Asia for more than a half century and successfully concluded the Cold War -- a historic triumph. The necessary engagement in Central and South Asia will not be nearly as difficult or expensive as those previous efforts, which involved U.S. occupation governments and a military presence large enough to counter the looming communist threat. Given the risks and the opportunities ahead, it is an investment worth making.
Read more from The Future of Afghanistan and U.S. Foreign Policy.
2 militants killed, 1 injured in Afghanistan air raid
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan, Dec. 17 (Xinhua) -- Two militants were killed and another injured when a war-plane with the NATO-led Coalition forces targeted their position in country's southern Kandahar province on Friday night, the local government said on Saturday.
"An international force plane while on routine patrol spotted and targeted three militants who were placing an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) along a road in Mazraha village of Maywand district over night," the local government said in a press release on Saturday morning.
As a result of the air attack two militants were killed and another injured in the province with Kandahar city as its capital, 450 km south of capital city of Kabul, it said.
"The injured man was captured by Afghan police shortly after the raid and an AK-47 gun, a pistol and a pick was also found and seized by police forces," it said.
Taliban militants have been largely relying on IED and suicide attacks in fighting Afghan security force and around 130,000 NATO- led troops based in Afghanistan, often causing civilian casualties as four civilians were killed and eight seriously injured when an IED hit their vehicle in country's western Farah province on Thursday.
4 insurgents killed, 24 detained in Afghanistan
KABUL, Dec. 17 (Xinhua) -- Four insurgents were killed and two dozen more were detained as Afghan and NATO-led Coalition forces launched seven military operations in different parts of the country over the past 24 hours, the country's Interior Ministry said on Saturday morning.
"Afghan police and army in collaboration with International Coalition Forces launched seven joint operations in areas surrounding Kabul, Kunduz, Kandahar, Helmand, and Wardak provinces over the last 24 hours, killing four armed insurgents and detaining 24 other suspected armed men," the ministry said in a statement.
During the operations, the Afghan National Police (ANP) also discovered and confiscated seven AK-47 assault rifles with 360 bullets, one PKM machine gun and four vehicles used by suspected insurgent to target security forces, it said.
Afghan officials often use the word "insurgents" referring to Taliban. However, the insurgent group, who launched in May this year a rebel offensive against Afghan and around 130,000 NATO forces stationed in the country, has not to make comments yet.
On GPS: Afghan President Hamid Karzai
CNN December 16th, 2011
On GPS this Sunday at 10a.m. and 1p.m. EST, an exclusive interview with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He assesses whether NATO is winning the war effort, explains why he can no longer talk to the Taliban and tells us how he intervened in the case of a woman who was imprisoned after she was raped by a close relative.
That, plus an all-star GPS panel on the Republican presidential candidates, Russia’s protests, and Europe’s woes: David Remnick from the New Yorker, Peggy Noonan of the Wall Street Journal, Kurt Anderson from TIME, and Gillian Tett of the FT.
And, ten years on from the BRICs - why the man who invented the catchy acronym thinks one of the four has been a failure.
Here are some excerpts:
Karzai on NATO
Fareed Zakaria: The Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, recently said NATO forces, the international coalition, is winning in Afghanistan. Do you believe that is a accurate statement?
Hamid Karzai: Well, the international coalition and the Afghan government have been able to provide, in the past 10 years, political stability to Afghanistan, the overall stability of Afghanistan and the presence of Afghanistan as a state, as a nation state in the international community. But we have not been able - the United States, NATO and Afghanistan government together - to provide the Afghan people with their individual personal security. That is yet to come.
Hamid Karzai on night raids
Fareed Zakaria: The one area where you have had a great deal of criticism for NATO forces and for the United States has been these so-called "night raids." Former Admiral William McRaven says they are essential and important. You say that they are feeding hostility to foreign forces.
Where do things stand? So you have a commitment from the United States that these night raids will end, or not?
Hamid Karzai: Well, this has been one of the issues between us for a long time, something that we have raised an objection to for almost eight years now. We want Afghanistan’s homes, Afghanistan’s villages to be protected, to be safe from such attacks. What we are asking for, in very specific and clear terms, that is no foreign forces should enter Afghan homes.
On Afghan rape victim released Thursday
Fareed Zakaria: Mr. President, there’s a woman named Gulnaz, who as you know, was sentenced to prison for 12 years after it was reported that her cousin’s husband raped her. She was then freed because of your personal action. The great concern of human rights activists in the West - and in Afghanistan, I should say - is that particularly once the international forces withdraw and perhaps have less of a day-to-day involvement, that these kind of events will happen day after day after day in Afghanistan. Why is this kind of thing happening in Afghanistan?
Hamid Karzai: Well, when I came to the office and upon coming to know of this, I convened a judicial meeting, in which the issue was discussed in detail, and the right inquiries made. We, on advice from the chief justice and the Minister of Justice, decided that this was a case, perhaps, of misjudgment and that it has to be resolved, and resolved by giving her a pardon immediately. That’s what I did.
But to the future...I can assure you that Afghanistan has a long tradition of judicial applications....It’s a country that has been troubled a lot. But it is also an old country, with...laws and a penal code and judicial history. I can assure you that, once the international forces are withdrawn and not as many as they are today, Afghanistan will neither go into a trouble within the country or strife or into miscarriage of justice. I can assure you of that.
Watch the full interview with Hamid Karzai this Sunday at 10a.m. and 1p.m. EST on CNN.
Iran's Intelligence Ministry says arresting CIA spy
TEHRAN, Dec. 17 (Xinhua) -- Iran's Intelligence Ministry announced Saturday that it has arrested a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spy in Iran.
Iran's Intelligence Ministry said in a statement that the spy is a CIA analyst tasked with carrying out a complex intelligence operation and infiltrating Iran's intelligence apparatus.
The CIA spy, with Iranian nationality, had experience in working for the Military Intelligence Division (MID) of the U.S. Army at military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's satellite Press TV reported.
Iran's intelligence agency identified the spy upon his arrival at the Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan, monitored his actions after he entered Iran, and later arrested him when he attempted to start espionage activities in Iran, said the statement.
The statement accused the U.S. administration of spending huge expense and designing complicated plots to penetrate into the Islamic Republic's intelligence system, in a bid to continue hostile and all-out intelligence and operational actions against Iran.
In November, an Iranian lawmaker said that Iran has been surrounded by Western spying centers near its borders in neighboring countries.
Zohre Elahian, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian parliament, said that Israeli Mossad, American CIA and British MI6 have established espionage centers in the western, northern and eastern borders of Iran.
The espionage bases are tasked with organizing terrorist actions and intelligence operations against Iran and its citizens, said the lawmaker.
Iran said that it has arrested a number of Israeli and U.S. spies in the country over past years.
Karzai: Afghans don’t have personal security despite efforts of international, Afghan troops
By Associated Press, December 17
KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghanistan has achieved political stability, yet Afghans still do not feel personally secure in their daily lives, President Hamid Karzai said in an interview to be aired on Sunday.
“The international coalition and the Afghan government have been able to provide, in the past 10 years, political stability to Afghanistan,” Karzai said on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS.”
“But we have not been able — the United States, NATO and Afghan government together — to provide the Afghan people with their individual personal security. That is yet to come.”
Karzai said the troops have slowed the mobility and activity of the Taliban and other militant groups, but he stopped short of saying the war has been won.
“I’ll have to wait a bit longer to confirm that we have reversed the trend and that the Afghan people will see the fruits of our efforts and see peace and further security,” he said, according to a transcript of the interview CNN released on Saturday.
Karzai also said his government would welcome the creation of a Taliban political office where Afghan and other officials could hold meaningful discussions about a possible political resolution to the war. If the Taliban decided to open an office, it would signal their willingness to talk peace, Karzai believes.
Efforts to reconcile with the Taliban were dealt a major setback when former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated on Sept. 20. Rabbani, who was leading the government’s campaign to broker peace with the insurgents, was killed by a suicide bomber posing as a peace emissary from the Taliban.
After Rabbani’s death, Karzai said informal peace efforts would not resume. Instead, he said, the Taliban had to stop fighting and establish an official address.
Earlier this week, Karzai said that if security concerns make it impossible to set up an office in Afghanistan, then it should be established in another Islamic nation, such as Saudi Arabia or Turkey.
“That address must have the clarity that this representative is authorized and is representing the Taliban movement,” he said.
Karzai also said that because Taliban leaders were based in neighboring Pakistan, “a meaningful peace process cannot go well or end in satisfactory results without Pakistan’s participation and help.”
U.S. officials have said that so far, Pakistani officials have not offered to bring Taliban leaders to the negotiating table.
On other issues, Karzai said that U.S. and Afghan officials are still negotiating a strategic partnership document that will govern how some American forces will stay in Afghanistan after foreign troops ends their combat mission in 2014. A sticking point in the talks are nighttime raids that target suspected insurgents and terrorists.
Karzai has repeatedly argued that the troops who push into compounds to search the premises and the residents treat too may civilians as if they are insurgents and violate citizens’ privacy in an intensely conservative society. He said the raids result in too many civilian deaths.
“What we are asking for, in very specific and clear terms, is that no foreign forces should enter Afghan homes,” Karzai said.
NATO has said that more than 90 percent of night operations are done alongside Afghan forces and that more than 85 percent are conducted without any shots fired.
The night raid controversy was evident on Saturday when the coalition and local Afghan officials released differing accounts of a raid on a home around 1 a.m. Saturday in the Ahmadaba district of Paktia province.
The provincial governor condemned what he said was a raid on the home of the provincial counternarcotics chief, said the governor’s spokesman, Rohullah Samon. He said local authorities, who believe the counternarcotics chief has not committed any crime, have contacted the coalition about getting him released.
The coalition said three men who were detained included a leader with the Haqqani militant network, which is affiliated with al-Qaida and the Taliban.
A joint Afghan-NATO force returned gunfire coming from the house, the coalition said. After the shooting stopped, they called for those inside to come out.
Two Afghan women inside were wounded and evacuated to a medical facility and one later died of a gunshot wound, the coalition said.
Pakistan PM Dismisses Rumors of Rift With Army
VOA News December 17, 2011
Pakistan's prime minister has dismissed rumors of a rift between the government and the military over a secret memo sent to Washington seeking U.S. help in preventing a feared military coup.
Tensions between the government and the military have soared recently ahead of a Supreme Court inquiry into the alleged plot. The absence of President Asif Ali Zardari, who is abroad receiving medical treatment for an illness, has only added to the speculation that the current government is in crisis.
Late Friday, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani met with army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani to discuss the memo. Gilani said in a statement after the meeting that he has rejected the notion there is any trouble between the government and the military.
The prime minister said Pakistan's government and its institutions "remain committed to their constitutional roles and obligations" to a democratic and prosperous future for Pakistan.
His comments come a day after General Kayani was quoted as saying the memo had "impacted national security." The army chief called on the Supreme Court to fully investigate the circumstances surrounding the memo's origins and who wrote it.
The existence of the document came to light in October when Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz wrote a column in "The Financial Times" accusing Ambassador Hussain Haqqani of writing the memo requesting U.S. assistance to prevent a military coup. The letter was reportedly sent in May to Admiral Mike Mullen, the top U.S. military official at the time.
The Supreme Court is scheduled to resume a hearing Monday on a petition filed by opposition leader Nawaz Sharif, demanding an investigation into the affair.
Some information for this report was provided by AP, AFP and Reuters.
Pakistan general calls for Zardari probe
Financial Times By Matthew Green December 16, 2011
Dubai - Pakistan’s army chief has raised the pressure on Asif Ali Zardari, the embattled president, by calling for a swift investigation into a claim that he sought US help to rein in the country’s powerful generals.
The allegation has sparked a furore in Pakistan and threatened to undermine Mr Zardari, who was flown to hospital in Dubai last week for medical treatment, injecting a fresh element of drama into the increasingly febrile political scene.
The controversy hinges on an allegation that Mr Zardari authorised the dispatch of a secret memo asking the US to back a plan to decisively establish civilian supremacy over Pakistan’s military, in the volatile days after the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May.
The claims have infuriated the army, which jealously guards the enormous hidden influence it has amassed during decades of military rule, and whose leadership has viewed Mr Zardari with suspicion since he assumed power in 2008.
Underscoring the degree of concern within the security establishment, General Ashfaq Kayani, the powerful head of the army, said in a statement to the Supreme Court that the memo represented an attempt to hurt national security.
“I also recommended to the prime minister that time was of the essence and that the earlier we knew the truth the better it would be to address the negative fallout for the country,” Gen Kayani said.
The remarks were published on Friday in Pakistani newspapers, which were quoting from Gen Kayani’s deposition to the Supreme Court on Thursday.
The court is examining a petition brought by Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister and prominent opposition leader, who has demanded judges launch a full investigation.
The prospect of a lengthy inquiry by the Supreme Court, which has taken an increasingly activist stance in recent years, has worried Mr Zardari’s supporters, who fear the affair has handed the military a new point of leverage over the fragile civilian government.
The affair – dubbed “Memogate” in Pakistan – claimed its first casualty last month when Husain Haqqani, one of Mr Zardari’s closest allies, was forced to resign as ambassador to the US. Political commentators believe the controversy represents one of the biggest challenges yet faced by the government of Mr Zardari, who remains a deeply unpopular figure in Pakistan.
The existence of the memo was first revealed by Mansoor Ijaz, a US businessman of Pakistani origin, in an opinion column he wrote in The Financial Times in October.
Mr Ijaz has since said Mr Haqqani asked him to deliver the memo to Admiral Mike Mullen, who was then chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff. Mr Haqqani and Mr Zardari both deny any involvement with the memo.
Mr Haqqani, who has been a critic of the military’s influence in Pakistan, has returned to Islamabad where he hopes he will be exonerated by any official investigation. The Supreme Court has barred him from leaving the country pending its inquiry. Hearings are due to begin on Monday.
The growing uncertainty in Pakistan’s political scene fuelled by the inquiry and Mr Zardari’s absence in Dubai has complicated Washington’s attempts to repair the latest crisis in US-Pakistan relations, triggered by the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a Nato air strike last month. Pakistan shut supply lines to Nato troops in Afghanistan, kicked the US out of an air base and boycotted an international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn in retaliation.
Jim Jones: Amb. Haqqani was not involved in memogate
Foreign Policy By Josh Rogin Friday, December 16, 2011
Former National Security Advisor Jim Jones has submitted a confidential affidavit, obtained by The Cable, in which he swears that he has no reason to believe that former Pakistani Ambassador to Washington Husain Haqqani had any role in the scandal known as "memogate."
Jones was the go-between in the transmission of a secret memo from Pakistani-American businessman Mansoor Ijaz to then Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen in the days following the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad. The memo, purportedly from the Pakistani civilian leadership, asked for U.S. government help to avoid a pending military coup in Pakistan and pledged, in return, to reorient Pakistan's foreign and national security policy to be more in line with U.S. interests.
Ijaz has claimed over and over that the memo and the scheme it contained was derived and driven by Haqqani, who has since resigned over the scandal and is now in Islamabad without permission to leave the country. Ijaz also claims that that Haqqani discussed the scheme with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, who faces increasing domestic political pressure from opponents and is in Dubai due to what is being described as a recent "mini-stroke."
Haqqani has always claimed that he had no role in the writing or delivery of the memo. Earlier this week, Jones broke his silence on the issue by signing a confidential affidavit about his role in "memogate," which he sent to Haqqani's lawyers as part of their planned libel suit against Ijaz. In the affidavit, Jones states that Ijaz never mentioned to him that the memo came from Haqqani.
"A few days before May 9, 2011, I received a phone call from Mr. Mansoor ljaz. I have known Mr. ljaz in a personal capacity since 2006. During the call Mr. Ijaz mentioned that he had a message from the ‘highest authority' in the Pakistan government which he asked me to relay to then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen," Jones wrote in the confidential affidavit.
"At no time during the call do I remember Mr. Ijaz mentioning Ambassador Haqqani, and he gave me no reason to believe that he was acting at the direction of Ambassador Haqqani, with his participation, or that Ambassador Haqqani had knowledge of the call or the contents of the message."
Jones told Ijaz he would only forward the message to Mullen if it was in writing. On May 9, Ijaz sent the unsigned memo to Jones's personal e-mail account and Jones passed it on to Mullen. Mullen has acknowledged that he received the memo but claims he gave it no credence and took no action on it whatsoever.
"It was my assumption that the memo was written by Mr. Ijaz, since the memo essentially put into writing the language he had used in our telephone conversation earlier," Jones wrote in his affidavit. "I do not recall whether Mr. Ijaz claimed that Ambassador Haqqani had anything to do with the creation of the memo. I have no reason to believe that Ambassador Haqqani had any role in the creation of the memo, nor that he had any prior knowledge of the memo."
The Jones affidavit will be used by Haqqani's legal team to bolster Haqqani's claims that Ijaz was the author's memo, not him. Ijaz's main evidence of Haqqani's involvement is a series of Blackberry Messenger communications that Ijaz claims he had with Haqqani to discuss the memo during its formation. Ijaz has said his Blackberry is being examined by Pakistani forensic experts as part of the ongoing investigation.
Ijaz's activity throughout the scandal has raised several questions about his motives. For example, he publicly disclosed the existence of the memo in an Oct. 10 op-ed in the Financial Times, purportedly to defend Mullen from attacks and slanders in Pakistan. Then, on Oct. 22, he met in London with Pakistan's Gen. Shuja Pasha, the leader of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which Ijaz's memo promised would be replaced with new, U.S.-friendly national security leaders in Pakistan.
Last week, Ijaz claimed in a Newsweek article that Haqqani and Zardari knew of the raid to kill bin Laden in advance and may have given the U.S. military tacit permission to violate Pakistani airspace. Haqqani has initiated legal action against Ijaz over those claims and the Jones affidavit is part of that litigation.
In the most interesting part of the affidavit, Jones states his personal opinion that the memo probably did not come from the Pakistani government at all.
"Upon my reading of the memo that I was asked to forward to Admiral Mullen, it struck me as highly unusual that the ‘highest authority' in the Pakistan government would use Mr. ljaz, a private citizen and part-time journalist living in Europe, as a conduit for this communication," Jones wrote. "My personal opinion was that the memo was probably not credible."
Asked for comment on Friday by The Cable, Jones declined to elaborate.
Ijaz responded to Jones' affidavit with a lengthy comment to The Cable. Here are some excerpts, after the jump:
On December 12, 2011, Gen. James L. Jones issued an Affidavit to the Supreme Court of Pakistan in which he, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, tried to recall the events of May 9, 10 and 11 of this year, which are the dates on which Amb. Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's former ambassador to the United States, asked me to assist him in delivering a message that he dictated to me and whose content originated entirely from him to Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Gen. Jones was the individual who I asked to deliver Haqqani's message to the admiral.
Gen. Jones and I have known each other since 2006. I consider him a friend and have learned many valuable lessons from him during the five years we've known each other. He has been a guest speaker at my charity events and I have been an overnight guest at his official home when he was NATO commander. We have published an op-ed together, ironically, in the Financial Times on the subject of Pakistan. Our families know each other, as do our spouses. He is a man of the highest possible integrity who has served the United States with unparalleled dignity and honor.
But in the case of his recollections with regard to this matter, I have a friendly disagreement with him on a number of the points he raises in his affidavit...
First, Gen. Jones states in Point 3 of his affidavit, "A few days before May 9,2011, I received a phone call from Mr. Mansoor ljaz..." This is factually incorrect for a number of reasons. The only telephone number I had for Jim at that time was his home number after he left the National Security Council. A thorough review this evening of my telephone records for the only two telephone numbers I maintain (a US cell and a UK cell) shows that on neither billing statement for that time period is there a single call to Jim's home telephone number other than the one made on the morning of May 9th after Amb. Haqqani and I spoke -- in fact just after we spoke. There are no calls at all to any number I have ever had for Jim in any single day in May prior to May 9th, and indeed, not on any date for that billing cycle going back to April 21, 2011...
Secondly, Jim states in Point 4 of his affidavit, "At no time during the call do I remember Mr. Ijaz mentioning Ambassador Haqqani, and he gave me no reason to believe that he was acting at the direction of Ambassador Haqqani, with his participation, or that Ambassador Haqqani had knowledge of the call or the contents of the message. I informed Mr.ljazthat I would not forward an oral message of this type to Admiral Mullen and that if he wanted anl.thing forwarded it would have to be in writing."
This statement is partially correct, and can be simply corrected by looking more closely at the timeline of discussion during that call. To the best of my recollection, at the outset of the call and for much of the call, I did not mention Haqqani's name because I felt it was necessary to gauge Jim's reaction to the message content first. As his skepticism of the message grew, he asked me who this was coming from and I said, exactly as Jim has stated in Point 6 of his affidavit, that it was from the highest authority in Pakistan. His skepticism persisted, and so to avoid any view from Jim about sourcing, near the end of the call I made it clear to him that the message was originating from Haqqani. He asked me, as I have stated in my Supreme Court testimony, about my relationship with Haqqani and I gave him a very short overview. He indicated his views of Haqqani, which he repeated to me in more strongly worded terms in a recent call after the controversy erupted, and the call ended.
It is important to note that I never mentioned Gen. Jones' name to Haqqani in any conversation or correspondence we had. Haqqani knew I was talking to more than one person, although it is my belief that he probably knew I would rely on Jim in the end. He certainly knew of my strong personal feelings for Jim, which I had conveyed in no uncertain terms when Haqqani took me to see President Zardari in Washington on May 5, 2009. President Zardari knew as well...
Third, Jim erroneously notes that we had spoken a "day or two earlier" in Point 6. It was on that day for the first time in a very long time.
Fourth, Jim notes that he assumed I wrote the memo since our conversation was reflected in it. Of course it was. But that doesn't mean the content of the Memorandum arose from that conversation. I say again, the content of the Memorandum to Adm. Mike Mullen originated entirely from Amb. Husain Haqqani. He dictated it to me and was responsible for all key edits.
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