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Pakistan Dismisses Calls to Attend Afghan Conference
VOA News November 30, 2011
Pakistan is dismissing international calls to reconsider its boycott of next week's international conference on Afghanistan.
The government decided not to attend the December 5 summit in Bonn in protest of Saturday's deadly NATO air assault that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at military posts near the Afghan border.
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani briefed reporters Wednesday on a phone conversation with Afghan President Hamid Karzai , who asked him to reconsider the decision not to attend the conference.
Prime Minister Gilani said he told President Karzai that Pakistan can not play a constructive role in the Afghan peace process until its own sovereignty, security and integrity are ensured. The Pakistani leader said he told President Karzai to talk to the United States about Afghan territory being used against Pakistan.
The Pakistani government responded to the NATO attack by shutting down NATO's Pakistani supply routes into Afghanistan and ordering U.S. personnel to evacuate an air base in Baluchistan province within two weeks.
On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Washington and Islamabad should learn lessons from the incident so the two countries can continue fighting terrorism together. She pledged a quick and thorough investigation of what she called a “tragic incident.”
Clinton also said she regrets Pakistan's withdrawal from next week's international conference on Afghanistan but hopes to secure Islamabad's cooperation in the future.
Clinton told a news conference in South Korea Wednesday that Pakistan, like the United States, has a “profound interest in a secure, stable and increasingly democratic Afghanistan.”
Also Wednesday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani, expressing solidarity with Pakistan and urging him to reconsider attending the Bonn Conference. Mr. Gilani told the German Chancellor that he regretted that he would not be able to oblige her request.
However, he did indicate his government would consider having Pakistan's ambassador to Germany represent Islamabad's interests at the conference.
Pakistani General Ashfaq Nadeem said Tuesday that the NATO assault was a “deliberate act of aggression.” He also questioned whether Pakistan would participate in Washington's investigation into the air assault.
On Wednesday, the army released video footage it said shows the remains of two bombed mountaintop outposts hit in the NATO raid. It is unclear why the video was released days after the incident.
The U.S. military has until December 23 to submit the findings of its investigation. NATO has also launched a probe.
The Associated Press quotes U.S. officials as saying investigators believe the Taliban attacked a U.S.-Afghan patrol in the border region to create confusion and draw U.S. and Pakistani forces into firing on each other.
The Bonn Conference is aimed at developing a strategy to stabilize Afghanistan as coalition forces withdraw in the coming years. Many analysts agree that peace in Afghanistan hinges on whether Pakistan plays a constructive role in the process.
The White House calls the Bonn talks very important for the future of Afghanistan and says Pakistan will play a very important role.
Afghan officials voice scant remorse to Pakistan
Washington Post By Joshua Partlow and Karin Brulliard Wednesday, November 30,2011
KABUL - The Afghan police general watched on television as Pakistani soldiers solemnly saluted the coffins of 24 of their comrades who were killed in a U.S. military airstrike Saturday.
The general stood up in disgust. “That’s the best thing America has done in 10 years here,” he said.
While U.S. officials from the war zone to the White House offered contrite condolences to the families of the dead and scrambled to repair the tattered relationship with Pakistan, Afghan officials have taken a tougher line. Frustrated by a Taliban insurgency they are convinced is supervised by and based in Pakistan, they have expressed little remorse, even accusing Pakistan of exaggerating the gravity of the situation to deflect attention from its own meddling in Afghanistan.
Afghan officials said the strike — which followed an operation by U.S. Special Operations forces and Afghan army commandos — was justified because the troops came under fire first from a Pakistani border post. “We have absolutely nothing to apologize for,” a senior official said.
The decision by Pakistan’s cabinet Tuesday to boycott next week’s international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany, seemed likely to keep the mutual suspicion between the neighbors at a strong simmer. The conference was once considered a chance to lure Taliban representatives to negotiate, but that plan never materialized.
The meeting’s importance will now depend on whether it can show that the countries in the region, as well as the West, are committed to supporting Afghanistan’s government and working together to end the war. Pakistan’s cooperation is crucial in this regard — particularly given its influence over the Taliban — and its absence would be a clear symbol that peace remains elusive.
The Pakistani cabinet, after a meeting in the eastern city of Lahore, said in a statement that it supports “stability and peace in Afghanistan and the importance of an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process of reconciliation.” But Pakistan, it said, had decided to bow out of the conference “in view of the developments and prevailing circumstances.”
According to an account by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s office, Afghan President Hamid Karzai had called Gilani to plead against a boycott, arguing that it would not encourage peace in Afghanistan. Gilani responded: “How could a country whose own sovereignty and territorial integrity were violated from the Afghan soil . . . play a constructive role?”
Karzai expressed his condolences to the Pakistani people and told Gilani that “insecurity in the region causes these kinds of incidents,” his office said.
One Western official who spoke on the condition of anonymity called the boycott “very unfortunate,” adding, “Pakistan is taking itself from the table precisely when it should be contributing to a solution in Afghanistan.”
In addition to bowing out of the Bonn conference, Pakistan has blocked NATO supply routes into Afghanistan and told U.S. officials to vacate a base in the southwestern province of Baluchistan. In a bid to repair the rift, coalition officials have offered sympathy and expressed hope that an investigation, led by U.S. Central Command, will clarify why the airstrike took place.
“The events of Saturday morning were tragic, from our point of view, and that is why the commander has not only expressed immediately his condolences but also expressed his feelings as a fellow soldier,” said Brig. Gen. Carsten Jacobson, a NATO spokesman in Kabul. “When it comes to the incident itself, all the questions — who was where, how was the situation developing, what was the use of close air support and who talked to whom — is part of the investigation, and we have to wait for the outcome.”
Pakistani officials have not appeared appeased. Pakistan has to do “some serious introspection” regarding the international effort in Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar told National Public Radio’s program “All Things Considered.” Pakistan’s role, she said, “has not be appreciated enough. And on top of that, to have an incident in which we feel, at best, giving the benefit of doubt, our soldiers lost their lives to this extremely callous attitude — this episode has obviously created a lot of rage in Pakistan.”
Two senior Pakistani military officers who briefed local editors and commentators Tuesday reiterated Islamabad’s contention that coalition forces had ignored appeals by Pakistan for NATO helicopters to stop firing on its checkpoints.
All Pakistani soldiers at the post, as well as the reinforcements sent to assist them, were uniformed, said Maj. Gen. Ashfaq Nadeem, the director general of military operations.
“All coordination procedures were violated. At multiple levels in ISAF, it was known that they were attacking Pakistani posts, but they continued with impunity,” he said, according to an editor who was present. Nadeem said the Pakistani military concluded that the strike was an “attack of blatant aggression.”
That assessment appeared to be gaining ground in Pakistan, where newspaper editorials and street protesters, including members of an association of Pakistani truckers who carry supplies to NATO troops in Afghanistan, called for an end to Pakistan’s alliance with the United States.
Asked whether she thought the attack was deliberate, Khar said, “We would like to wait for the investigations. Currently, the briefings that we have gotten seem to be pointing toward a direction which is not a happy place to be in. If it is a deliberate attempt,” she said, then the question of Pakistan’s future policy “would obviously be much, much, much more serious.”
In Lahore, Shahbaz Sharif, the top official of the opposition-led province of Punjab, met with the wife of a soldier who was killed in the airstrike. According to a statement from Sharif’s office, the widow, “despite being in a deep state of grief and sorrow, said, ‘Those we are fighting for are not our friends.’ ”
To Afghan officials frustrated by Pakistan’s perceived lack of cooperation, those sentiments ring false.
“It’s simply overreaction,” said the senior Afghan official, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. “We have suffered, they have suffered, I mean, come on. Our police and army people die in scores every day. And Pakistani civilians die every day. . . . This time, it’s been military casualties.”
A former Afghan official said Karzai is regularly frustrated by what he sees as the United States’ failure to take stronger action against Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan or pressure Pakistan’s military or intelligence agency to address the problem.
“We put all our eggs in the American basket,” he said. “The problem is, that basket has a huge hole in it, and it’s called Pakistan.”
Brulliard reported from Islamabad, Pakistan. Special correspondents Javed Hamdard in Kabul; Haq Nawaz Khan in Peshawar, Pakistan; and Shaiq Hussain in Islamabad contributed to this report.
Pakistan's Bonn conference boycott may harm Afghan reconciliation: analysts
by Muhammad Tahir
ISLAMABAD, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Pakistan's boycott of an international conference on the future of Afghanistan in protest against the killing of 24 soldiers by NATO attacks over the weekend may hamper the long-awaited reconciliation process in the war-ravaged country, analysts has said.
Pakistan announced earlier that it would send Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar to the 2011 Bonn Conference on Dec. 5. in which more than 1,000 delegates from 90 countries would attend.
"Pakistan looks forward to the success of this Conference but in view of the developments and prevailing circumstances it has decided not to participate in the Conference," said a government statement after the decision was taken at the Federal Cabinet meeting.
The decision to stay away from the Conference was in fact taken by Pakistan's top civilian and military leadership when they convened an emergency meeting Saturday, hours after the deadly NATO strikes on two Pakistani border posts in the Mohmand tribal region bordering Afghanistan.
The U.S. and NATO has pledged investigation and expressed regrets over the deaths of Pakistani soldiers but refused to apologize for the action.
Pakistan military was quick to reject NATO/U.S. regret as " insufficient". Chief military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas said Pakistan will not accept mere regrets as NATO had killed 72 Pakistan soldiers in eight previous strikes in three years. He added there was no justification for the NATO strikes as the area had been cleared of militants by the Pakistani forces and that NATO violated the defined "red lines". Pakistan also argued that the US/NATO/ISAF were mandated to operate in Afghanistan.
Pakistan's boycott decision sent alarm across several key countries and Afghan President Hamid Karzai was the first to ring up Prime Minister Gilani to express "concern" over the decision and to request a review.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel also came up with a statement that she was "very sorry" about Pakistan's boycott. She vowed to convince Islamabad to attend the very important event on the future of Afghanistan.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Wednesday also voiced regret over Pakistan's announcement and urged it to reconsider. She promised an investigation "as swiftly and thoroughly as possible."
Pressure would mount on Pakistan in the coming days to change its boycott decision as the country's role is thought to be central in Afghan peace and reconciliation in view of its deep influence on Afghan Taliban and other armed groups.
Pakistani leaders have so far not shown any signal of change in its boycott decision. Pakistani military and civilian leadership had been under tremendous internal pressure to review its relations with the U.S. and its western allies. Prime Minister Gilani pointed out the government will take a "major" decision to address the concern of the nation.
Gilani has also indicated taking more actions in the joint session of the parliament to be convened soon to determine future relationship with the U.S. and NATO. Islamabad has already closed supply line for NATO troops in Afghanistan and asked the U.S. to vacate a key airbase in Balochistan province in 15 days, which the U.S. military had been using for nearly 10 years for military operations in Afghanistan and also for spy aircraft attacks in Pakistan's tribal regions.
One of the main objectives of the Bonn Conference is to discuss prospects for encouraging Taliban leadership to join the reconciliation process, which has assumed urgency in the wake of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Taliban have so far ruled out possibility of talks and the Afghan government suspended all contacts with Taliban after the September assassination of chief of the Afghan High Peace Council Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani.
President Karzai said that Afghanistan will now hold talks with Pakistan as "representative" of Afghan Taliban. But the NATO strike has now made this opportunity more complicated.
In view of Pakistan's central role in Afghanistan's reconciliation and influence on Afghan armed groups, Afghan government has formed a joint peace commission with Pakistan and the U.S. to jointly work for reconciliation. The slain Afghan peace envoy Prof. Rabbani had chosen Islamabad as his first foreign destination after he had been appointed as chief of the peace body.
Despite reservations over Pakistan's policy about Afghanistan, many analysts still believe Pakistan is the only main factor to bring Taliban to the negotiation table. Pakistan's Bonn boycott may diminish prospects for reconciliation in Afghanistan and now it is a test for the western powers on how to address Pakistan's concerns.
NATO says Pakistan resumes some cooperation by preventing Afghanistan border incident
By Associated Press, November 30
KABUL, Afghanistan — Pakistan resumed some cooperation with U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan following NATO strikes that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers by working with the coalition to prevent another cross-border incident from escalating, a spokesman said Wednesday.
The weekend airstrikes have severely strained the already troubled relationship between Pakistan and the U.S., jeopardizing Washington’s hopes of enlisting Islamabad’s support in winding down the Afghan war.
Pakistan is still outraged by the soldiers’ deaths and has retaliated by closing its Afghan border crossings to NATO supplies, demanding the U.S. vacate an air base used by American drones and boycotting an international conference aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan.
But NATO said Islamabad communicated with the alliance to prevent an exchange of fire over the border late Tuesday from turning into another international incident.
U.S. forces received mortar and recoilless rifle fire from an area just inside the Pakistan border, said U.S. spokesman Navy Lt. Cmdr. Brian Badura. U.S. forces returned fire in self-defense while confirming with the Pakistani military that it wasn’t involved. No damage or casualties were reported by the U.S. or Pakistan, he said.
German Brig. Gen. Carsten Jacobson, a NATO spokesman in Kabul, expressed hope that Pakistan’s cooperation in resolving the incident in eastern Afghanistan’s Paktia province signaled the two sides could recover from the recent tragedy.
“We are continuing operations and it is of great importance that the incidents of Saturday, as tragic as they were, do not disrupt our capability to operate in the border area and cooperate with the Pakistani side,” said Jacobson.
The Pakistani military did not immediately respond to request for comment on the latest incident.
Pakistani and American officials have offered different accounts of how NATO aircraft attacked two Pakistan army posts before dawn Saturday. But it seems clear that a breakdown in communication contributed to the tragedy.
According to U.S. military records described to The Associated Press, the incident occurred when a joint U.S. and Afghan patrol requested backup after being hit by mortar and small arms fire by Taliban militants. Before responding, the joint U.S.-Afghan patrol first checked with the Pakistani army, which reported it had no troops in the area, the military account said.
Pakistani officials have refuted this claim and said U.S. forces must have known they were attacking Pakistani soldiers because the posts were clearly marked on maps given to NATO and the two sides were in contact immediately before and during the airstrikes.
Pentagon press secretary George Little disputed suggestions that the attack on the Pakistani troops was deliberate.
“In no way, shape or form should this be construed as an intentional attack on Pakistan by the United States. That is simply incorrect,” Little told reporters in Washington.
The Pakistan army on Wednesday released photographs and video of the posts that were attacked in the Mohmand tribal area. The images show small, damaged structures made out of stacked gray stones perched on a steep, barren mountain ridge. A white flag flew next to one of the posts.
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said he rejected person pleas from the Afghan president and the German chancellor to reconsider Islamabad’s decision to boycott the conference Monday in Bonn, Germany, on Afghanistan.
Few had high expectations for the conference, but the absence of Pakistan will make even minor progress more difficult. The Taliban called the conference an “American trap” and a plot to “further ensnare Afghanistan into the flames of occupation” in statement posted on its website Wednesday, according to Site Monitoring Services, a U.S.-based group that tracks militant websites.
Pakistan and Afghanistan have long had a strained relationship even though the two countries have ethnic and cultural similarities. Islamabad is angry at Kabul because the NATO aircraft that carried out the strikes that killed its soldiers were based in Afghanistan.
“Afghan land has been used against Pakistan, and we are protesting against this,” Gilani told reporters in the southern city of Karachi. “We don’t want the land of our brother country, which is like a twin, to be used against Pakistan.”
Pakistanis have staged small rallies protesting the strikes in the country’s major cities, many of them organized by anti-U.S. Islamist parties.
Re-establishing a workable relationship between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the U.S. is important because Islamabad is critical to the process of peace negotiations with the Taliban. Pakistan has historical ties with the group and is seen as the actor with the greatest leverage to push the Taliban to the negotiating table.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai moved forward with those efforts Wednesday, meeting with members of a council he set up to broker peace with the Taliban and reiterating the need for “honest cooperation with Pakistan for providing opportunities for negotiation with the opposition.”
Karzai also told members of the peace council that he was in favor of changing the panel’s composition to include more individuals who might be able to bridge the divide between the insurgents and the government. Tribal leaders, religious figures and clerics also should be given more opportunity to assist with the peace process, Karzai told them.
___
Khan reported from Karachi, Pakistan. Associated Press writers Sebastian Abbot in Islamabad and Lolita Baldor in Washington contributed to this report.
Afghanistan's Bonn Conference: 4 things you need to know
On Dec. 5, leaders from Afghanistan, NATO, and neighboring countries will meet in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the future of Afghanistan after US troops withdraw.
The second conference comes 10 years after the first Bonn Conference, which took place months after the Sept. 11 attacks and the American-led invasion of Afghanistan. Here’s a look at what it is, what’s at stake, and why it matters.
Christian Science Monitor By Tom A. Peter, Correspondent 29/11/2011
1. What was the first Bonn Conference?
In the wake of the American-led invasion immediately after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan needed to establish a plan for how it would govern itself and how international forces would be a part of the country's future. In December 2001 prominent Afghans met in Bonn, Germany, and created the transitional government, a path for how to draft a constitution, and a permanent government.
Members of the former Islamist government were not invited to participate, a decision that many Afghans say led to the eventual Taliban resurgence and ongoing insurgency here.
2. Is the upcoming Bonn Conference as important as the first?
A number of analysts have criticized the decision to host the conference in Bonn on the 10-year anniversary of the original conference.
Roughly once a year there are international conferences that gather Afghan and international leaders to discuss progress and the future of the country, without making any pivotal decisions. Many people say that the upcoming Bonn Conference will be no different, but argue that calling it Bonn II raises expectations that are unlikely to be met.
3. Who will come and what will they talk about?
In addition to Afghan leaders, including President Hamid Karzai, ministers and leaders from around the world will attend the Bonn Conference. Issues likely to dominate the agenda include transfer of security from international to Afghan forces, reconciliation with the insurgency, relations with Pakistan, and the role of international forces and foreign aid after the 2014 deadline for the withdraw of combat forces.
4. Pakistan says it won’t attend. Why is that important?
Following a NATO airstrike that killed – inadvertently, the US says – some 24 Pakistani soldiers on the eastern border of Afghanistan, Pakistani officials have said they plan to boycott the Bonn Conference. This could have major implications as reconciliation with the insurgency will likely be a prominent topic of conversation at the Bonn Conference. With many insurgent havens located inside Pakistan, the country could play a critical role in mediating potential talks. Without its participation at the Bonn Conference, talks with the Taliban will be markedly more difficult.
5 Things Afghan History Can Teach Us
The Huffington Post By Suleiman Wali Founder, Lapis Media 29/11/2011
The French historian Alexis de Tocqueville once said, "When the past no longer illuminates the future, the spirit walks in darkness."
As world leaders converge on Bonn, Germany, next week to discuss the future of Afghanistan after 2014, is it likely that any of them will look to history to find better answers? Probably not.
Heeding de Tocqueville's warning, if we look beyond Afghan history of the previous decade and well into the last century, five key points emerge that could help the country lay a better foundation for itself once American and NATO forces reduce their presence or leave altogether.
A man dips his finger into an ink bottle before casting his vote during the Afghan parliamentary election in Kabul in 2010. The path toward democracy has been a difficult one in Afghanistan. Two previous attempts in the 20th century have failed. Find out why in Point #1, below.
1. Remember why it's important to support Afghan democracy.
In the 20th century, Afghans underwent two experiments toward democracy, both of which were unsuccessful.
In the first case, royal Prime Minister Shah Mahmud, the king's uncle, made modest attempts in 1949 to respond to demands for political reform and fairer elections. The result was the "Liberal Parliament" that elected reform-minded lawmakers who granted new liberties, like freedom of the press.
Student unions sprang up at Kabul University and a host of newspapers were born. The targets of their anger: conservative religious leaders on the one hand, and the government on the other. Unfortunately, having neither a tradition of responsible political activism nor freedom of expression, criticism became extreme and protests erupted. By 1953, out of fear that a revolution would brew, the royals shut down all non-government newspapers and arrested "liberal" leaders.
A decade later, King Zahir took a more active role in government and ushered in the country's second experiment with democracy and socio-economic modernization. One of his first undertakings was to order the drafting of a new liberalized constitution unlike any the country had seen before.
From equal rights, universal education and health care, to a vast penal code and the return of a free press, the Afghan constitution of 1964 was arguably the finest in the Muslim world. For the first time, women were allowed to enter politics and the king appointed four to parliament.
Despite this leap toward greater liberties, illiteracy was rampant and many parts of the country did not have the financial resources or facilities to implement universal education. Meanwhile, parliament was plagued with invective, unreasoned debates and an abysmal legislative record--not unlike today's Afghan legislature.
The king was seen as lacking leadership during the political imbroglio. Although the daily business of government continued, a series of prime ministers were unable to assemble enough support to carry out effective programs. By 1972, four premiers had resigned and the system was near collapse. A year later, the king was overthrown.
In either example, the transition to a democratic system proved difficult and nearly disastrous. Afghanistan's current democracy is trying to function in a period of more daunting problems.
Since April, at least three mass protests in Kabul turned violent and even deadly. Separately, a yearlong election dispute in parliament prevented a single piece of legislation from being ratified. The impasse finally ended last month.
In 2008, more than 600 mid-level and senior government officials were prosecuted or fired over corruption charges. Four years ago, 60 MPs threatened resignation if President Hamid Karzai didn't replace his foreign minister, who they deemed incompetent. Meanwhile, Karzai, once thought to be a shrewd statesman, has been dogged by allegations of corruption, nepotism and ineffectiveness.
And although the illiteracy rate has improved from what it was in the 20th century, more than 30 years of warfare has left the education system in shambles. Some 70 percent of Afghans still cannot read or write.
The question looms: Is democracy right for Afghanistan?
Yes. Even though both of the country's previous experiments in democracy failed, they were a testament to the Afghan people's desire for a system that brought about equal rights and representation for all its citizens.
A survey last year by the Asia Foundation discovered that 81 percent of Afghans believe in this principle. The same poll found "broad support for democracy as the best form of government, even higher than many other nations in the regions."
However, in order to put democratic principles into practice, the Afghan leadership must not repeat the mistakes of the past and remember the key reasons that their brief romances with democracy have ended.
2. A strong police and military are critical to safeguarding progressive reforms and women's rights.
Throughout the 20th century, Afghanistan has struggled with its efforts toward modernization. In some cases, these initiatives have been met with violent rejection from religious fundamentalists who feared it threatened their way of life.
Between 1919 and 1929, the young King Amanullah oversaw an array of social, political, and economic changes that affected nearly every facet of Afghan society. Calling himself a "revolutionary king," he was determined to modernize his country along the lines of Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Establishing a foundation of law for Afghanistan that was more secular than ever before, Amanullah gave his nation its first written constitution that contained a Bill of Rights and ended slavery. However, his most revolutionary changes involved greater freedom for women.
During his reign, coeducational schools were opened and polygamy was discouraged. Afghanistan even became the first Muslim country to abolish the custom of the veil when the king's wife, Queen Soraya, took off her headscarf at a public event.
But these changes were too drastic for Afghanistan's conservative leaders. When Amanullah returned from a tour of Europe, tribal armies descended on Kabul and drove out the enlightened monarch--literally. He and his wife fled in the middle of the night in their Rolls Royce.
Amanullah's father-in-law, the intellectual statesman Mahmud Tarzi, would later lament: "If only he had waited for two years and built up the army as Ataturk suggested, what might he have done?"
By the late 1950s, another dynamic leader had learned from King Amanullah's mistake. With a stronger army and police force, Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud defeated several mob and tribal rebellions that were directed against his women's rights reforms.
Today, according to the Asia Foundation's 2011 Afghanistan survey, more than a third of Afghans cite insecurity as the biggest problem confronting their nation. With terror attacks against girls' schools and government leaders still at high levels, it underscores the need for a stalwart army that can retain its members.
In 2009, Afghan security forces finally got a pay raise that put their salaries within the range of Taliban fighters. The increase drew more than 2,600 new recruits in the first seven days after it was announced. The Afghan National Army now has around 160,000 personnel and is expected to reach 260,000 by 2015.
That figure comes closer to the 300,000 combat troops that western military analysts had estimated in the early 1980s that the Soviets would need in order to "pacify" the entire country. It is also close to the 300,000 soldiers that Emir Abdur Rahman had assembled during his reign in the late 19th century when he formed the country's first national army and used it to unify Afghanistan under a central government.
3. Pakistan must become a genuine partner in peace.
Ever since the creation of the Pakistani state in 1947, Afghanistan has had a contentious and, at times, hostile relationship with its eastern neighbor.
The seed of this thorny rapport can be traced back to the late 19th century when the British had colonial control over India. It was then that English diplomat Mortimer Durand coerced Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman to sign a vague agreement that demarcated spheres of influence along the Afghan-Indian border. The single-page document was essentially used by the British to divide and weaken the Pashtun tribes who lived on both sides of the line.
For decades, the Pashtun tribesmen had blocked British attempts at absorbing Afghanistan into its empire. The Great Game, as it famously came to be called, was the geopolitical battle between the British and Russian empires for dominance over Central Asia. Afghanistan was basically seen as the buffer state that could keep Russia out of India.
In 1893, Mortimer drew a poorly marked 1,600-mile line that bisected Afghanistan from its panhandle down through its southwestern border with Iran. The Emir, an ethnic Pashtun himself, feared that if he did not agree to the Durand Line, British India would wage a fierce campaign to replace him. But in his autobiography, Abdur Rahman issued a prophetic warning:
"If you should cut these tribes out of my dominions, they will neither be of any use to you or me. You will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand. But if at any time a foreign enemy appears on these borders, these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies."
Fifty-four years later, the temporary line became a permanent border. Land that was long regarded to be Afghan was absorbed into Pakistan. Validating Abdur Rahman's prophecy, it is that porous region today where the fiercest battles have been waged between al-Qaida/Taliban forces and the American military.
Throughout the 1950s, the redrawn map and its international recognition drove a wedge between Afghan Prime Minister Daoud and Pakistan. Both sides waged a fierce propaganda campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the people in the disputed territories. In retribution, goods that were transported from the Arabian Sea through Pakistan often arrived pilfered or damaged on the other side of the border.
The issue of "Pashtunistan" was a constant point of contention between Daoud and the Pakistani government, and nearly drove the two countries to war. The diplomatic rift became so intense that it caused the Durand border to be closed for a year, severely harming the Afghan economy. The issue was resolved only when Daoud resigned in 1963.
When he returned to power ten years later after staging a bloodless coup against his first-cousin, King Zahir, Islamabad grew alarmed. The Pashtunistan movement, which had been muted during the king's experiment in democracy, was amplified once again.
By 1975, a stronger and bolder Pakistan welcomed a handful of Afghanistan's fundamentalist leaders and set up secret military camps to train them as guerrilla fighters against Daoud's newly formed Republic, write authors Liz Gould and Paul Fitzgerald. Five years later, these were some of the same camps that Washington funded to fight the Soviets.
Today, that embryo of religious fanaticism--with help from elements within Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency--is full-grown and waging war on Americans, Afghans and Pakistanis. In his final congressional testimony in September, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen lambasted extremist elements within Pakistan's military for their support of terror attacks in Afghanistan.
"With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy," Mullen said, referring to the deadly strike on the American embassy in Kabul in September.
That declaration, along with the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and this past weekend's deadly NATO attack on two Pakistani military posts, has sunk U.S. relations with Islamabad to a new low.
In reprisal for Saturday's airstrike that killed more than 20 Pakistani soldiers, Islamabad has indefinitely shut down NATO's supply lines through their country, and said it was re-evaluating its intelligence, diplomatic and military links with the U.S. If this retaliatory move lasts long, it will obviously harm both American forces and the Afghan population.
Prior to this development, the American military had been trying to circumvent transit through Pakistan, finding a variety of alternate routes through Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors in what's being called the Northern Distribution Network. A top military commander told NPR that the U.S. military had to find substitute channels because it lost as much as 15 percent of its supplies through Pakistan to ambush and theft in 2008 alone.
History has shown that Islamabad has not worked in the general interest of the Afghan people. Even though many in the Pakistani government will argue that it sheltered millions of Afghan refugees during the Soviet war, it is an undisputed fact that their country benefited from that conflict. In fact, according to Lawrence Wright, "as much as half of the money the U.S. gave to the I.S.I. to fight the Soviets was diverted to build nuclear weapons."
Those weapons have been built up to shield against the threat or perceived threat that Pakistan feels is coming from neighboring India, its archrival. After all, a paranoid Islamabad wants "strategic depth" in Afghanistan in case a war breaks out with India.
Unfortunately, this kind of mentality weakens the entire region. Instead of building schools, creating a solid education system, and healing the fractured Af-Pak relationship, the region could grow into the next generation's worst enemies--bigger and bolder than ever.
4. Education must incorporate Afghan nationalism.
Through a ruthless campaign of unification in the late 1800s, Emir Abdur Rahman succeeded in breaking down Afghanistan's feudal system, and established effective control over the entire country for the first time in history. The Emir understood that without a concept of unity and nationalism, Afghanistan could easily fall back to a warring country of independent states and ethnic groups.
In his autobiography, Abdur Rahman wrote: "The first and most important advice that I can give my successors and people ... is to impress upon their minds the value of unity. Unity, and unity alone, can make Afghanistan into a great power."
A quarter-of-a-century later, that message would be echoed by his grandson, King Amanullah, who turned it into law under Article One of the country's constitution: "... all parts of the nation are to be treated as a single unit without discrimination between different parts of the country."
Amanullah's father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi, impressed this idea even further into the nation's psyche. Tarzi launched Afghanistan's first newspaper, Seraj al-Akhbar (The Torch of News), and one of its central missions was to advocate national unity and promote a love of country, particularly among the youth. According to Dr. Senzil Nawid, he even redefined the word for birthplace, "watan," to mean homeland--a word that had not existed in the Pashto or Dari languages.
Nawid writes, "[Tarzi] paid serious attention to issues of language and literature and modern education, which he saw as essential not only for national progress but for the realization of social and political homogeneity--common language, history, geography, and literature."
While King Zahir's 40-year reign was not one that was marked with remarkable equality of social classes, it can be noted for its absence of ethnic rivalries or conflict. Even as Mohammed Daoud, the first president of the Afghan Republic in the 1970s, may have supported a one-sided nationalistic movement with his tenacious effort to regain the Pashtun territories lost to Pakistan, Afghans still consider him one of their country's fiercest patriots.
Today, largely in part to the post-Soviet civil war, Afghanistan's national and cultural identities have been shattered. Ethnic divisions and strife are rampant. And with little confidence in the national government--which is the most ethnically diverse in Afghan history--a nationalistic spirit does not have a healthy place from which to emanate.
With the absence of a well-respected president or legislature, nationalism can only be taught in the schools through programs that promote unity and teach cultural heritage. The country's diversity is its greatest strength, and if this notion is not inaugurated in the children, Afghanistan as a nation is doomed to fail in the next 20 years.
Abdur Rahman may have said it best: "There is no doubt that Afghanistan is a country that will either rise to be a very strong, famous kingdom, or will be swept altogether from the surface of the earth. ... I must say that it is impossible that she ever take the middle course."
5. The Afghan leadership should become the leading voice of moderate Islam for the country.
Throughout the 264 years that the Afghan state has existed, Islam, either expressively or subtly, has played an inextricable role in the political and social fabric of its society. Most notably, it was used to bring down the Soviet goliath in the 1980s.
In more recent times, Islam was perverted and used to justify repression and evil. When properly understood, however, it is this very faith that has broken these kinds of shackles and provided periods of enlightened thought and action.
For example, during his premiership in the 1950s, Prime Minister Daoud employed legal scholars who carefully examined each modernization step to ensure it did not violate Islamic law. These young advisers received an education in the West and at Cairo's al-Azhar University, considered the finest Islamic school in the world.
Having determined that both the veil and the ban that prevented females from leaving their homes without a male escort could not be justified in Islamic law, Daoud took steps to end these traditions. Some women followed suit, others didn't--but a precedent of choice was reestablished.
When Daoud returned as president in 1973, his pilgrimage to Mecca four years later was broadcast on state television, silencing the religious fanatics who had branded him a Communist.
In the 1920s, Queen Soraya became the first Muslim queen to appear in public with her husband, before the wives of the monarchs in Persia and Egypt. When King Amanullah lifted the custom of the veil during the same period, he proclaimed: "Religion does not require women to veil their hands, feet and faces or enjoin any special type of veil. Tribal custom must not impose itself on the free will of the individual."
Against the wishes of the religious conservatives, he opened coeducational schools and championed the inclusion of women in society. In the constitution, Amanullah declared, "Jews and Hindus residing in Afghanistan would be entitled to full protection of the state."
Tarzi, the king's mentor, was heavily influenced by the enlightened Islamic thought of the era in Syria and the Ottoman Empire. His nationalist ideology, which was discussed before, was articulated within a framework of Islamic principles. According to Nawid, Tarzi believed that "Afghan Islamic identity would transcend tribal, ethnic, regional, and sectarian loyalties."
Today, religious extremists in Afghanistan, and throughout most of the Muslim world, have drowned out the voices of the moderates and intellectuals. Fundamentalist Islam has muffled spiritual Islam, which in a traumatized country like Afghanistan can help heal the damaged psyches of its population.
The millions of Afghans who have suffered through 30 years of warfare, forced migration, homelessness, torture, terrorism, death, and near collapse of cultural identity are in need of some form of collective healing that can come from their leadership. Nelson Mandela did it in South Africa, and Mahatma Gandhi in India.
According to recent figures, 81 percent of the Afghan population currently owns a radio, making it the most accessible form of media in the country. Like Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats that reassured a dispirited nation that it was going to get through the Great Depression, an Afghan president can employ a similar method to unify and give hope to a people struggling through their darkest age.
In an effort to counter the voices of extremism, while at the same time reinvigorating the national soul and helping to form a bond between this hypothetical leader and the nation, an innovative approach should be considered.
Regular "fireside prayers" conducted in Dari and Pashto that address the tragedies of everyday Afghans, and which invoke Divine intervention and remembrance of the Divine, could reach millions of households. With the high illiteracy rate, these kinds of connections to a faithful public in their local languages would be invaluable. This alternative approach is one way that the pulpits of the religious zealots can gradually be dismantled.
Of course, this leader must also embody the ideals of an enlightened human being who pursues education, arts, reconstruction, energy and economic programs that respect the environment and take positive local traditions into account.
Along with the ethereal, such an individual should produce practical results on the ground through a transparent government that is corruption-free. Many will call this vision a pipe dream, but this period of crisis requires an extraordinary leader and a team of people who think practically and spiritually.
Today, Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, a middle path between a secular and theocratic form of government. It's time to realize the potential of this compromise, and to allow the great powers of democracy and Islam to finally reconcile in Afghanistan. Its survival as a nation depends upon it
Pakistani PM says U.S. to vacate airbase by Dec. 11
ISLAMABAD, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said Wednesday the United States would vacate a strategically important Pakistani air base by Dec. 11.
The country's military and civilian leadership on Saturday asked the U.S. to vacate Shamsi airbase in Balochistan province hours after NATO fighter jets and helicopters bombed two border posts and killed 24 soldiers.
The U.S. has been using the airbase for nearly 10 years for military operations in Afghanistan and spy aircraft strikes in Pakistan's tribal regions.
"The U.S. will vacate the airbase by Dec. 11," Prime Minister Gilani told reporters in Karachi. He said Pakistan had sent a formal letter to the U.S. to vacate the airbase.
Pakistan has closed supply lines for the U.S.-led NATO troops in Afghanistan as a protest to the strikes and decided to boycott next week's Bonn Conference on the future of Afghanistan.
Gilani said Afghan President Hamid Karzai called him on Tuesday and called for a review of the Bonn Conference boycott decision, but added that "Pakistan cannot put at risk its own security for Afghanistan."
"I had told President Karzai that Afghan soil was used for attack on Pakistan and we are protesting over the attacks," he said.
"Pakistan wants a guarantee for its security," Gilani said, adding that Afghan president argued that the U.S. and NATO had carried out the attack on Pakistani posts and Afghanistan had not been involved.
"Bonn Conference will be held for Afghanistan's security but who will guarantee our security in view of NATO strikes," the prime minister said.
"We cannot attend Bonn Conference unless we get guarantee of respect to our sovereignty, independence and security," Gilani said when asked about international appeals to Pakistan to change its boycott decision.
German Chancellor Angela Markel and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton regretted Pakistan's decision and asked for its review.
Obama Refrains From a Formal ‘I’m Sorry’ to Pakistan
By HELENE COOPER and MARK MAZZETTI, The New York Times November 30, 2011
WASHINGTON — The White House has decided that President Obama will not offer formal condolences — at least for now — to Pakistan for the deaths of two dozen soldiers in NATO airstrikes last week, overruling State Department officials who argued for such a show of remorse to help salvage America’s relationship with Pakistan, administration officials said.
On Monday, Cameron Munter, the United States ambassador to Pakistan, told a group of White House officials that a formal video statement from Mr. Obama was needed to help prevent the rapidly deteriorating relations between Islamabad and Washington from cratering, administration officials said. The ambassador, speaking by videoconference from Islamabad, said that anger in Pakistan had reached a fever pitch, and that the United States needed to move to defuse it as quickly as possible, the officials recounted.
Defense Department officials balked. While they did not deny some American culpability in the episode, they said expressions of remorse offered by senior department officials and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton were enough, at least until the completion of a United States military investigation establishing what went wrong.
Some administration aides also worried that if Mr. Obama were to overrule the military and apologize to Pakistan, such a step could become fodder for his Republican opponents in the presidential campaign, according to several officials who declined to be named because they were not authorized to speak publicly.
On Wednesday, White House officials said Mr. Obama was unlikely to say anything further on the matter in the coming days.
“The U.S. government has offered its deepest condolences for the loss of life, from the White House and from Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta,” said Tommy Vietor, spokesman for the National Security Council, referring to Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, “and we are conducting an investigation into the incident. We cannot offer additional comment on the circumstances of the incident until we have the results.”
The American and Pakistani accounts of the NATO strikes vary widely. A former senior American official briefed on the exchange said Wednesday that the airstrikes came in the last 15 to 20 minutes of a running three-hour skirmish, presumably with Taliban fighters on one or both sides of the border. That is at odds with the Pakistani account that its troops were in a two-hour firefight with the Americans.
Pakistan, rejecting the American account, has blocked all NATO logistical supplies that cross the border into Afghanistan, given the Central Intelligence Agency 15 days to vacate the Shamsi air base from which it has run drone strikes into Pakistani tribal areas and announced that it will boycott an international conference on Afghanistan’s security and development next week in Bonn, Germany.
With everything at stake in the relationship with Pakistan, which the United States sees as vital as it plans to exit from Afghanistan, some former Obama administration officials said the president should make public remarks on the border episode, including a formal apology.
“Without some effective measures of defusing this issue, Pakistan will cooperate less rather than more with us, and we won’t be able to achieve our goals in Afghanistan,” said Vali Nasr, a former State Department official who specialized in Pakistan.
But David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official and the author of “Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power,” said Pakistani officials need to understand that in the next year, the Obama administration will be less accommodating to Pakistani sensibilities.
“I do think that it’s important for them to recognize that political dynamics in the United States will lead to a hardening of U.S. positions, and the president will have less and less flexibility to accept the kind of behavior that he has in the past,” Mr. Rothkopf said. “The prognosis for U.S.-Pakistani relations is bleak.”
America’s strained ties with Pakistan have been buffeted by crises this year, from the killing of two Pakistanis by a C.I.A. contractor to the raid inside Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden.
The headaches of the relationship have meant that Pakistan has few friends inside the administration. As one former senior United States official who has been briefed on the administration’s recent deliberations put it, “Right now there are no Pakistan friendlies” at the White House.
But the administration desperately needs Pakistan’s cooperation in the American plan to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan by 2014. Several senior American officials have said Pakistani help is essential to persuade the Taliban to negotiate for peace.
Twice recently, the administration has solicited help from Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, to deliver messages to Islamabad to help defuse crises in the relationship.
On Wednesday, Mr. Kerry was guarded in his comments about the border episode. “We all appreciate how deeply this tragedy has affected the Pakistani people, and we have conveyed our heartfelt condolences through multiple channels,” Mr. Kerry said in an e-mail. “Ultimately, the only way to move the ball forward is to focus on areas where our interests align and where we can really make progress. Our two countries need each other.”
Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker contributed reporting.
5 Things Afghan History Can Teach Us
The Huffington Post, 30/11/2011 By Suleiman Wali
The French historian Alexis de Tocqueville once said, "When the past no longer illuminates the future, the spirit walks in darkness."
As world leaders converge on Bonn, Germany, next week to discuss the future of Afghanistan after 2014, is it likely that any of them will look to history to find better answers? Probably not.
Heeding de Tocqueville's warning, if we look beyond Afghan history of the previous decade and well into the last century, five key points emerge that could help the country lay a better foundation for itself once American and NATO forces reduce their presence or leave altogether.
The path toward democracy has been a difficult one in Afghanistan. Two previous attempts in the 20th century have failed. Find out why in Point #1, below.
1. Remember why it's important to support Afghan democracy.
In the 20th century, Afghans underwent two experiments toward democracy, both of which were unsuccessful.
In the first case, royal Prime Minister Shah Mahmud, the king's uncle, made modest attempts in 1949 to respond to demands for political reform and fairer elections. The result was the "Liberal Parliament" that elected reform-minded lawmakers who granted new liberties, like freedom of the press.
Student unions sprang up at Kabul University and a host of newspapers were born. The targets of their anger: conservative religious leaders on the one hand, and the government on the other. Unfortunately, having neither a tradition of responsible political activism nor freedom of expression, criticism became extreme and protests erupted. By 1953, out of fear that a revolution would brew, the royals shut down all non-government newspapers and arrested "liberal" leaders.
A decade later, King Zahir took a more active role in government and ushered in the country's second experiment with democracy and socio-economic modernization. One of his first undertakings was to order the drafting of a new liberalized constitution unlike any the country had seen before.
From equal rights, universal education and health care, to a vast penal code and the return of a free press, the Afghan constitution of 1964 was arguably the finest in the Muslim world. For the first time, women were allowed to enter politics and the king appointed four to parliament.
Despite this leap toward greater liberties, illiteracy was rampant and many parts of the country did not have the financial resources or facilities to implement universal education. Meanwhile, parliament was plagued with invective, unreasoned debates and an abysmal legislative record--not unlike today's Afghan legislature.
The king was seen as lacking leadership during the political imbroglio. Although the daily business of government continued, a series of prime ministers were unable to assemble enough support to carry out effective programs. By 1972, four premiers had resigned and the system was near collapse. A year later, the king was overthrown.
In either example, the transition to a democratic system proved difficult and nearly disastrous. Afghanistan's current democracy is trying to function in a period of more daunting problems.
Since April, at least three mass protests in Kabul turned violent and even deadly. Separately, a yearlong election dispute in parliament prevented a single piece of legislation from being ratified. The impasse finally ended last month.
In 2008, more than 600 mid-level and senior government officials were prosecuted or fired over corruption charges. Four years ago, 60 MPs threatened resignation if President Hamid Karzai didn't replace his foreign minister, who they deemed incompetent. Meanwhile, Karzai, once thought to be a shrewd statesman, has been dogged by allegations of corruption, nepotism and ineffectiveness.
And although the illiteracy rate has improved from what it was in the 20th century, more than 30 years of warfare has left the education system in shambles. Some 70 percent of Afghans still cannot read or write.
The question looms: Is democracy right for Afghanistan?
Yes. Even though both of the country's previous experiments in democracy failed, they were a testament to the Afghan people's desire for a system that brought about equal rights and representation for all its citizens.
A survey last year by the Asia Foundation discovered that 81 percent of Afghans believe in this principle. The same poll found "broad support for democracy as the best form of government, even higher than many other nations in the regions."
However, in order to put democratic principles into practice, the Afghan leadership must not repeat the mistakes of the past and remember the key reasons that their brief romances with democracy have ended.
2. A strong police and military are critical to safeguarding progressive reforms and women's rights.
Throughout the 20th century, Afghanistan has struggled with its efforts toward modernization. In some cases, these initiatives have been met with violent rejection from religious fundamentalists who feared it threatened their way of life.
Between 1919 and 1929, the young King Amanullah oversaw an array of social, political, and economic changes that affected nearly every facet of Afghan society. Calling himself a "revolutionary king," he was determined to modernize his country along the lines of Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Establishing a foundation of law for Afghanistan that was more secular than ever before, Amanullah gave his nation its first written constitution that contained a Bill of Rights and ended slavery. However, his most revolutionary changes involved greater freedom for women.
During his reign, coeducational schools were opened and polygamy was discouraged. Afghanistan even became the first Muslim country to abolish the custom of the veil when the king's wife, Queen Soraya, took off her headscarf at a public event.
But these changes were too drastic for Afghanistan's conservative leaders. When Amanullah returned from a tour of Europe, tribal armies descended on Kabul and drove out the enlightened monarch--literally. He and his wife fled in the middle of the night in their Rolls Royce.
Amanullah's father-in-law, the intellectual statesman Mahmud Tarzi, would later lament: "If only he had waited for two years and built up the army as Ataturk suggested, what might he have done?"
By the late 1950s, another dynamic leader had learned from King Amanullah's mistake. With a stronger army and police force, Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud defeated several mob and tribal rebellions that were directed against his women's rights reforms.
Today, according to the Asia Foundation's 2011 Afghanistan survey, more than a third of Afghans cite insecurity as the biggest problem confronting their nation. With terror attacks against girls' schools and government leaders still at high levels, it underscores the need for a stalwart army that can retain its members.
In 2009, Afghan security forces finally got a pay raise that put their salaries within the range of Taliban fighters. The increase drew more than 2,600 new recruits in the first seven days after it was announced. The Afghan National Army now has around 160,000 personnel and is expected to reach 260,000 by 2015.
That figure comes closer to the 300,000 combat troops that western military analysts had estimated in the early 1980s that the Soviets would need in order to "pacify" the entire country. It is also close to the 300,000 soldiers that Emir Abdur Rahman had assembled during his reign in the late 19th century when he formed the country's first national army and used it to unify Afghanistan under a central government.
3. Pakistan must become a genuine partner in peace.
Ever since the creation of the Pakistani state in 1947, Afghanistan has had a contentious and, at times, hostile relationship with its eastern neighbor.
The seed of this thorny rapport can be traced back to the late 19th century when the British had colonial control over India. It was then that English diplomat Mortimer Durand coerced Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman to sign a vague agreement that demarcated spheres of influence along the Afghan-Indian border. The single-page document was essentially used by the British to divide and weaken the Pashtun tribes who lived on both sides of the line.
For decades, the Pashtun tribesmen had blocked British attempts at absorbing Afghanistan into its empire. The Great Game, as it famously came to be called, was the geopolitical battle between the British and Russian empires for dominance over Central Asia. Afghanistan was basically seen as the buffer state that could keep Russia out of India.
In 1893, Mortimer drew a poorly marked 1,600-mile line that bisected Afghanistan from its panhandle down through its southwestern border with Iran. The Emir, an ethnic Pashtun himself, feared that if he did not agree to the Durand Line, British India would wage a fierce campaign to replace him. But in his autobiography, Abdur Rahman issued a prophetic warning:
"If you should cut these tribes out of my dominions, they will neither be of any use to you or me. You will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand. But if at any time a foreign enemy appears on these borders, these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies."
Fifty-four years later, the temporary line became a permanent border. Land that was long regarded to be Afghan was absorbed into Pakistan. Validating Abdur Rahman's prophecy, it is that porous region today where the fiercest battles have been waged between al-Qaida/Taliban forces and the American military.
Throughout the 1950s, the redrawn map and its international recognition drove a wedge between Afghan Prime Minister Daoud and Pakistan. Both sides waged a fierce propaganda campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the people in the disputed territories. In retribution, goods that were transported from the Arabian Sea through Pakistan often arrived pilfered or damaged on the other side of the border.
The issue of "Pashtunistan" was a constant point of contention between Daoud and the Pakistani government, and nearly drove the two countries to war. The diplomatic rift became so intense that it caused the Durand border to be closed for a year, severely harming the Afghan economy. The issue was resolved only when Daoud resigned in 1963.
When he returned to power ten years later after staging a bloodless coup against his first-cousin, King Zahir, Islamabad grew alarmed. The Pashtunistan movement, which had been muted during the king's experiment in democracy, was amplified once again.
By 1975, a stronger and bolder Pakistan welcomed a handful of Afghanistan's fundamentalist leaders and set up secret military camps to train them as guerrilla fighters against Daoud's newly formed Republic, write authors Liz Gould and Paul Fitzgerald. Five years later, these were some of the same camps that Washington funded to fight the Soviets.
Today, that embryo of religious fanaticism--with help from elements within Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency--is full-grown and waging war on Americans, Afghans and Pakistanis. In his final congressional testimony in September, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen lambasted extremist elements within Pakistan's military for their support of terror attacks in Afghanistan.
"With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy," Mullen said, referring to the deadly strike on the American embassy in Kabul in September.
That declaration, along with the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and this past weekend's deadly NATO attack on two Pakistani military posts, has sunk U.S. relations with Islamabad to a new low.
In reprisal for Saturday's airstrike that killed more than 20 Pakistani soldiers, Islamabad has indefinitely shut down NATO's supply lines through their country, and said it was re-evaluating its intelligence, diplomatic and military links with the U.S. If this retaliatory move lasts long, it will obviously harm both American forces and the Afghan population.
Prior to this development, the American military had been trying to circumvent transit through Pakistan, finding a variety of alternate routes through Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors in what's being called the Northern Distribution Network. A top military commander told NPR that the U.S. military had to find substitute channels because it lost as much as 15 percent of its supplies through Pakistan to ambush and theft in 2008 alone.
History has shown that Islamabad has not worked in the general interest of the Afghan people. Even though many in the Pakistani government will argue that it sheltered millions of Afghan refugees during the Soviet war, it is an undisputed fact that their country benefited from that conflict. In fact, according to Lawrence Wright, "as much as half of the money the U.S. gave to the I.S.I. to fight the Soviets was diverted to build nuclear weapons."
Those weapons have been built up to shield against the threat or perceived threat that Pakistan feels is coming from neighboring India, its archrival. After all, a paranoid Islamabad wants "strategic depth" in Afghanistan in case a war breaks out with India.
Unfortunately, this kind of mentality weakens the entire region. Instead of building schools, creating a solid education system, and healing the fractured Af-Pak relationship, the region could grow into the next generation's worst enemies--bigger and bolder than ever.
4. Education must incorporate Afghan nationalism.
Through a ruthless campaign of unification in the late 1800s, Emir Abdur Rahman succeeded in breaking down Afghanistan's feudal system, and established effective control over the entire country for the first time in history. The Emir understood that without a concept of unity and nationalism, Afghanistan could easily fall back to a warring country of independent states and ethnic groups.
In his autobiography, Abdur Rahman wrote: "The first and most important advice that I can give my successors and people ... is to impress upon their minds the value of unity. Unity, and unity alone, can make Afghanistan into a great power."
A quarter-of-a-century later, that message would be echoed by his grandson, King Amanullah, who turned it into law under Article One of the country's constitution: "... all parts of the nation are to be treated as a single unit without discrimination between different parts of the country."
Amanullah's father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi, impressed this idea even further into the nation's psyche. Tarzi launched Afghanistan's first newspaper, Seraj al-Akhbar (The Torch of News), and one of its central missions was to advocate national unity and promote a love of country, particularly among the youth. According to Dr. Senzil Nawid, he even redefined the word for birthplace, "watan," to mean homeland--a word that had not existed in the Pashto or Dari languages.
Nawid writes, "[Tarzi] paid serious attention to issues of language and literature and modern education, which he saw as essential not only for national progress but for the realization of social and political homogeneity--common language, history, geography, and literature."
While King Zahir's 40-year reign was not one that was marked with remarkable equality of social classes, it can be noted for its absence of ethnic rivalries or conflict. Even as Mohammed Daoud, the first president of the Afghan Republic in the 1970s, may have supported a one-sided nationalistic movement with his tenacious effort to regain the Pashtun territories lost to Pakistan, Afghans still consider him one of their country's fiercest patriots.
Today, largely in part to the post-Soviet civil war, Afghanistan's national and cultural identities have been shattered. Ethnic divisions and strife are rampant. And with little confidence in the national government--which is the most ethnically diverse in Afghan history--a nationalistic spirit does not have a healthy place from which to emanate.
With the absence of a well-respected president or legislature, nationalism can only be taught in the schools through programs that promote unity and teach cultural heritage. The country's diversity is its greatest strength, and if this notion is not inaugurated in the children, Afghanistan as a nation is doomed to fail in the next 20 years.
Abdur Rahman may have said it best: "There is no doubt that Afghanistan is a country that will either rise to be a very strong, famous kingdom, or will be swept altogether from the surface of the earth. ... I must say that it is impossible that she ever take the middle course."
5. The Afghan leadership should become the leading voice of moderate Islam for the country.
Throughout the 264 years that the Afghan state has existed, Islam, either expressively or subtly, has played an inextricable role in the political and social fabric of its society. Most notably, it was used to bring down the Soviet goliath in the 1980s.
In more recent times, Islam was perverted and used to justify repression and evil. When properly understood, however, it is this very faith that has broken these kinds of shackles and provided periods of enlightened thought and action.
For example, during his premiership in the 1950s, Prime Minister Daoud employed legal scholars who carefully examined each modernization step to ensure it did not violate Islamic law. These young advisers received an education in the West and at Cairo's al-Azhar University, considered the finest Islamic school in the world.
Having determined that both the veil and the ban that prevented females from leaving their homes without a male escort could not be justified in Islamic law, Daoud took steps to end these traditions. Some women followed suit, others didn't--but a precedent of choice was reestablished.
When Daoud returned as president in 1973, his pilgrimage to Mecca four years later was broadcast on state television, silencing the religious fanatics who had branded him a Communist.
In the 1920s, Queen Soraya became the first Muslim queen to appear in public with her husband, before the wives of the monarchs in Persia and Egypt. When King Amanullah lifted the custom of the veil during the same period, he proclaimed: "Religion does not require women to veil their hands, feet and faces or enjoin any special type of veil. Tribal custom must not impose itself on the free will of the individual."
Against the wishes of the religious conservatives, he opened coeducational schools and championed the inclusion of women in society. In the constitution, Amanullah declared, "Jews and Hindus residing in Afghanistan would be entitled to full protection of the state."
Tarzi, the king's mentor, was heavily influenced by the enlightened Islamic thought of the era in Syria and the Ottoman Empire. His nationalist ideology, which was discussed before, was articulated within a framework of Islamic principles. According to Nawid, Tarzi believed that "Afghan Islamic identity would transcend tribal, ethnic, regional, and sectarian loyalties."
Today, religious extremists in Afghanistan, and throughout most of the Muslim world, have drowned out the voices of the moderates and intellectuals. Fundamentalist Islam has muffled spiritual Islam, which in a traumatized country like Afghanistan can help heal the damaged psyches of its population.
The millions of Afghans who have suffered through 30 years of warfare, forced migration, homelessness, torture, terrorism, death, and near collapse of cultural identity are in need of some form of collective healing that can come from their leadership. Nelson Mandela did it in South Africa, and Mahatma Gandhi in India.
According to recent figures, 81 percent of the Afghan population currently owns a radio, making it the most accessible form of media in the country. Like Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats that reassured a dispirited nation that it was going to get through the Great Depression, an Afghan president can employ a similar method to unify and give hope to a people struggling through their darkest age.
In an effort to counter the voices of extremism, while at the same time reinvigorating the national soul and helping to form a bond between this hypothetical leader and the nation, an innovative approach should be considered.
Regular "fireside prayers" conducted in Dari and Pashto that address the tragedies of everyday Afghans, and which invoke Divine intervention and remembrance of the Divine, could reach millions of households. With the high illiteracy rate, these kinds of connections to a faithful public in their local languages would be invaluable. This alternative approach is one way that the pulpits of the religious zealots can gradually be dismantled.
Of course, this leader must also embody the ideals of an enlightened human being who pursues education, arts, reconstruction, energy and economic programs that respect the environment and take positive local traditions into account.
Along with the ethereal, such an individual should produce practical results on the ground through a transparent government that is corruption-free. Many will call this vision a pipe dream, but this period of crisis requires an extraordinary leader and a team of people who think practically and spiritually.
Today, Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, a middle path between a secular and theocratic form of government. It's time to realize the potential of this compromise, and to allow the great powers of democracy and Islam to finally reconcile in Afghanistan. Its survival as a nation depends upon it.
Suleiman Wali is an Afghan-American writer and producer who has worked in the fields of media and public relations for more than 10 years. He holds a Masters degree in Film & Video from American University in Washington, D.C.
Suleiman Wali is the founder of Lapis Media, a company which aims to produce documentaries, films and multimedia projects that help heal the psychocultural scars of diasporas through engaging and educational storytelling about their homelands.
Bulgaria announces plan for troops withdrawal from Afghanistan
SOFIA, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Bulgaria announced Wednesday it would withdraw three quarters of its 610-member contingent in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
According to a strategy adopted by the government, Bulgaria will pull out its medical team from the city of Herat by the end of 2012 and the country's contingent based in Kabul and Kandahar would return home at the beginning of 2013 and by the end of 2014 respectively.
But the country would continue to help train the Afghan security forces after 2014, the government said.
Bulgaria, which joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, has been participating in the NATO-led ISAF mission since 2002.
3 insurgents killed, 14 detained in Afghanistan
KABUL, Nov.30 (Xinhua) -- Afghan police, backed by army and NATO-led Coalition forces, during operations killed three armed insurgents and captured 14 other suspects over the past 24 hours, Afghan Interior Ministry said on Wednesday.
"Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Army and Coalition Forces launched four joint operations in surrounding areas of the Kandahar, Khost and Herat provinces over the past 24 hours,"the ministry said in a statement.
"As a result of these operations, three armed insurgent were killed, three wounded and 14 others were arrested by ANP," it said, adding a handful of weapons and ammunition were also found and seized by police in the same operations.
Afghan officials often use the word "insurgents" referring to Taliban.
Taliban insurgents, whose regime was toppled in a U.S.-led incursion in late 2001, have intensified activities since the militant group announced to launch spring offensive against Afghan security forces and NATO-led troops stationed in Afghanistan on May 1, have yet to make comments.
Senate urges Obama to hasten return of troops from Afghanistan
The Senate on Wednesday quietly approved a measure requiring President Obama to more swiftly withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
By Lisa Mascaro November 30, 2011 Los Angeles Times
The Senate on Wednesday quietly approved a measure requiring President Obama to more swiftly withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
The amendment from Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) was attached to a broader defense bill making its way through the Senate. It was approved by a voice vote, without dissent.
“It is time to bring our men and women home,” Merkley said. “The U.S. Senate sent that message to the president today in unequivocal terms.”
The Afghanistan amendment requires the president to develop an accelerated plan to withdraw troops ahead of the planned December 2014 deadline and transition security operations to the government of Afghanistan and submit that proposal to Congress within 90 days of the bill’s passage.
Earlier this week, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have ended the authority for the war in Iraq.
The broader defense bill is must-pass legislation that sets Pentagon policy for fiscal 2012. The White House has threatened to veto the defense bill over objections to provisions on the treatment of detainees in suspected terrorism investigations.
Several insurgents detained in former Taliban stronghold: NATO
KABUL, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Afghan and NATO-led forces during a joined operation in Taliban former stronghold Kandahar, 450 km south of Afghan capital city Kabul, captured several insurgents on Wednesday, a statement of the alliance released here said.
"A combined Afghan and coalition security force conducted an operation in search of a Taliban facilitator in Shah Wali Kot district, Kandahar province, today and arrested multiple insurgents during the operations," the statement added.
However, the statement did not provide more details.
Taliban militants fighting Afghan and NATO-led troops have yet to make comment.
Kandahar, the birthplace of Taliban and former stronghold of the insurgents, have been the scene of Taliban-linked militancy over the past couple of years.
Kabul police discover explosive device, foil terrorist attack
KABUL, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- The Afghan police discovered explosive device from a suburb outside Afghan capital Kabul on Tuesday and thus foiled a terrorist attack, a statement of the Interior Ministry released here Wednesday said.
"Some 20 kg explosive device planted by terrorists in Mulayan village, Sarubi district of Kabul province was found by police yesterday and thus thwarted a terrorist offensive," the statement went on to say.
Taliban militants fighting Afghan and NATO-led troops have been largely relying on suicide and roadside bombings over the past couple of years. In the latest roadside bombing for which the Taliban outfit claimed responsibility, one NATO soldier sustained injuries in northern Baghlan province on Tuesday.
Unknown men splash acid on 3 sisters in northern Afghan town
KUNDUZ, Afghanistan, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Three girls of a family in Kunduz province 250 km north of Afghan capital Kabul have been disfigured as unknown men sprayed acid on their faces Tuesday night, Nadira Gia, the Director of Women Affairs Department in Kunduz province said Wednesday.
"Some unidentified men entered a house in Bulakawal village in the outskirt of Kunduz provincial capital the Kunduz city last night and after beating the members of the family dozed acid on the faces of three sisters," Gia told press.
The innocent suffered girls are 8, 12 and 17 years old and the condition of the elder one is critical, she added.
Gia also said the attackers had badly beaten the father of the innocent girls before leaving the house.
The attackers have made their good escape and no one has been arrested so far, she further said.
Violence against women in Afghanistan is on the rise despite government efforts to protect women rights. More than 2,290 cases of violence against women including forced marriages, under-aged marriages, beating by in-laws and family members had been registered in 2010, according to Afghan Human Rights Commission.
In some countryside and villages held by Taliban militants, some women have even been stoned to death by the insurgents over the past couple of years.
Pentagon, USGS launch new initiative to explore mineral resources in Afghanistan
WASHINGTON, Nov. 29 (Xinhua) -- The Pentagon and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) on Tuesday launched a new initiative to help Afghans better explore their mineral resources.
The Pentagon's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), in partnership with the USGS, will provide training and equipment specific to airborne geophysical exploration to the Afghan Geological Survey, the Pentagon said in a statement.
"This initiative is part of the U.S. Government's continuing efforts to help the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan identify and develop its vast deposits of mineral resources in a transparent and responsible fashion," the Pentagon said.
A key component of the new effort is to train Afghan geoscientists in collecting, processing and interpreting high- resolution geophysical data themselves.
"By working with the Afghan Geological Survey on an airborne geophysical exploration program, we are taking an important step in preparing the Afghan government to conduct their own mineral exploration efforts," said Emily Scott, director of natural resource development for the TFBSO. "The goal of this training is to enable the Afghan government to give the best information possible to international investors."
The Pentagon has already worked extensively with the USGS to develop an ongoing survey of mineral resources and rare earth elements in Afghanistan.
The Pentagon announced last year that Afghanistan could become one of the world's leading sources of mineral wealth, as an estimated 1 trillion dollars of untapped mineral deposits have been discovered in the country.
The mineral deposits, including gold, cobalt, iron ore, copper, aluminum, silver, molybdenum and lithium -- used in cell phone batteries -- are spread throughout the country, especially in the battle-scarred border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Exploration of natural resources and its utilization would enable Afghans to be no longer dependent on international community and rather help them to stand on their feet.
Still, analysts said that robust development of the mining industry is unlikely to occur until the security situation is under control.
Kyrgyzstan’s outgoing leader says fate of US base depends on Afghan situation
Associated Press November 29 , 2011
BISHKEK, Kyrgyzstan - Kyrgyzstan’s outgoing president said Tuesday that the decision on whether to allow the U.S. air base to remain in the country after its lease ends in 2014 depends on developments in nearby Afghanistan.
Roza Otunbayeva said she favors turning the Manas base at the capital’s main airport into a civilian aviation facility, but conceded that the illegal drug trafficking business poses a security threat to Kyrgyzstan.
The United States has used the base in the ex-Soviet Central Asian nation as a key logistical hub for military operations in Afghanistan since 2001.
Otunbayeva’s successor, Almaz Atambayev, who will take power on Thursday, has said the base should be closed when the lease expires out of fears that it could leave Kyrgyzstan vulnerable to retaliatory strikes from targets of U.S. military action.
Manas has been the subject of protracted wrangling between successive Kyrgyz governments and the United States over the size of lease payments. That has prompted some observers to speculate that Kyrgyz authorities may be willing to extend the lease past the current June 2014 expiration date in exchange for better commercial terms.
Also in her final statement Tuesday, Otunbayeva voiced pride at the progress she says her country has made in deepening democratic values.
Atambayev won more than 60 percent of votes in October’s election, easily pushing aside nationalist rivals. Authorities hope his presidency will usher in a period of political stability in a country that has been roiled over the past year and a half by political and ethnic violence.
Otunbayeva took over after the overthrow of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in April 2010 and often struggled to impress her authority on a country that looked on the verge of collapse.
For all the enduring tensions bubbling under the surface, Otunbayeva said her government had managed to pursue an agenda of transparency and equality.
“There are no people here that do not see themselves in this country, nobody is being harassed, nobody is being persecuted,” she said.
Those claims will likely ring hollow to many members of the minority ethnic Uzbek community, however, who complain that they were disproportionately singled out for police action after a wave of ethnic clashes in June 2010 that left almost 500 people dead. The Uzbek minority, which suffered the heaviest losses in the violence, has seen its role in the local economy relentlessly stamped out.
The most notable achievement registered under Otunbayeva’s 20-month leadership has been the transition to a more parliamentary style of government and the watering down of the presidency.
Central Asia is a region dominated by strongman presidents, and Kyrgyzstan’s attempt to forge a model of governance that uneasily balances the various branches of power is viewed with barely veiled hostility by neighboring countries. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has said that the parliamentary system could prove catastrophic for Kyrgyzstan.
Is there hope for Afghanistan?
Foreign Policy By Linda Robinson Tuesday, November 29, 2011
After spending last month in Afghanistan on my fourth trip this year, the situation can best be described as a glass half full. A multifaceted effort in the south, led by a "surge" of U.S. and Afghan troops, has increased security in the southern Pashtun heartland this year. But a steady drumbeat of high-profile attacks, including a brazen assault on the U.S. embassy and assassinations of key Afghan officials, has had an outsized impact on the population by eroding already weak confidence in the Afghan government and the forces supporting it. As I was ending my trip with a few days in Kabul, an SUV packed with 700 kilos of explosives rammed an armored "Rhino" bus, killing a dozen Americans and inflicting horrific burns on others in a targeted, planned attack reminiscent of the worst days in Baghdad. The U.S. military has adopted the line that these "spectacular attacks" are in fact signs of the Taliban's weakness, and points instead to a notable decline in the number of enemy initiated attacks.
But numbers matter less than perception in these wars -- and shaping perception is precisely how terrorist groups fight and win. The dominant narrative in Afghanistan is: the Americans are leaving, the government is weak, the Taliban is still strong, and Pakistan is the problem. And though the details of the cross-border NATO bombardment Saturday, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, are still murky, it will undoubtedly send U.S.-Pakistan relations into a further downward spiral. Unless the reality underlying these perceptions about the United States in the region are addressed, sustainable momentum on the government side cannot be generated. The U.S. surge may have started to turn around the momentum that is currently favoring the Taliban, but Afghan political and military actions are required to create a perception -- and the reality -- that the Afghan government is capable of surviving and prevailing. Addressing several factors bedeviling the Afghan campaign between now and next summer, when the traditional fighting season resumes and more troops go home, might turn perception and thus momentum in the Afghan government's favor. Six are most critical:
Promptly reaching a strategic partnership agreement in which the United States pledges to continue providing security and economic assistance after 2014 could go a long way toward reducing Afghan fears of abandonment. The U.S. and Afghan governments have been negotiating such an agreement for over a year, and the general idea of a partnership (albeit with a 10-year limit on American forces in Afghanistan after 2014) was approved at President Hamid Karzai's Loya Jirga this week; both sides hope to finalize it before the Bonn summit next month. The sticking points are night raids, which Karzai would like to end, and the transfer of detainees to Afghan control, despite a recent U.N. report cataloguing abusive practices in Afghan intelligence detention centers. The first issue can be postponed or finessed, but the United States is bound by international convention not to turn over detainees if it believes they will be tortured or mistreated. In the run-up to the Bonn Conference, Karzai will hopefully stay focused on the need to reassure Afghans of ongoing U.S. support and assistance as coalition troop levels decline over the coming years.
Forging a common front with his main backer, the United States, would help Karzai repair some of the image of weakness that plagues his government. Veteran U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)'s top commander Gen. John Allen have worked hard to "reset" the relationship with Karzai since they arrived this summer. One of his frequent interlocutors notes that Karzai "is exhausted, and he knows he is irritable and unpredictable." Nader Nadery, a commissioner of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, chides Karzai for his "lack of firmness. There is no clarity on where he stands." And, like many Afghans I spoke to, Nadery sees the president's tolerance of corrupt activity as a major weakness. Yet despite these failings, many Afghans I've talked to still see him as currently the only leader who can balance the myriad rivalries and swirling tensions that beset Afghan national politics, in particular the concern that Tajik leaders may be girding for an all-out civil war once the U.S. departs. The assassination of former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Tajik head of Karzai's High Peace Council, significantly ratcheted up those concerns.
Afghan security forces need to move demonstrably into the lead. The U.S. plans to push Afghan forces out front in more and more operations, if only to determine just how ready they are to take the lead and where the weak links are. To get them ready, U.S. forces must make partnering with and mentoring their Afghan partners its top priority, which it is not. By the military's own count in the latest DOD report mandated by Congress, 95 Afghan units in critical areas have no coalition partner whatsoever, and many others are only loosely mentored.
Afghans will have to step up if the three stated objectives of the military campaign are to be accomplished -- namely, to secure the south, the populated corridor along Highway One up to Kabul, and key areas of the east, especially the crucial provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost. The south has been greatly stabilized over the past year, but the job is not yet done. I spent ten days in Kandahar province, where the longtime Taliban strongholds of Zhari, Panjwayi and Maiwand are still heavily contested. Returning from Maiwand, which is mostly still Taliban dominated, I passed through the Panjwayi district center, where a car bomb detonated a short while later. We stopped in Kandahar city for dinner -- one of the few times I have been with a U.S. military unit that felt comfortable dining at night in an Afghan city. The company commander ordered roast chickens, pilaf and delicious nan bread for all his men, and we picnicked amid the city's bustling nightlife, surrounded by curious Afghan men and children. Yet that reality coexisted with a frontal assault, hours earlier, on the Kandahar provincial reconstruction team, located just across from the provincial governor's office.
The current priority is to expand the security bubble beyond Kabul to Wardak, Logar and then Ghazni and Zabul provinces, thus securing the country's major highway all the way down to Kandahar. After that, the campaign plans to shift to the east, but it needs to tightly focus on the key population areas. There is a danger of focusing too much on sparsely populated provinces and neglecting the Khost to Gardez corridor, which has a large population and has been both an insurgent stronghold and transit route from the beginning of the war. Attempting to cut every ratline in the country is a sure fire way to fritter away forces. The only way that the campaign objectives can be achieved is if coalition forces focus on the important areas, and if Afghan security forces take more of the lead.
The expanding self-defense initiative may increase security. Security out in the countryside, where the insurgency is based, is starting to get a lift from the year-old Afghan Local Police program, but it is too early to judge the net effect of the program. It now has 8,500 recruits, mostly farmers who have volunteered and been trained to do checkpoint security and patrols in their villages. I've visited a half dozen of the 57 sites, where Special Operations Forces train and mentor the ALP and work with the district police chief, who is the Afghan official charged with their formal command and control, as well as providing them with salaries, trucks, weapons and ammunition. The program, strongly backed by ISAF, is funded and approved to grow to 30,000 in 100 districts, but the painstaking process of gaining community support and ensuring that the government exercises proper oversight means it will be another year or more before the program is fully implemented.
Thus far, RAND quarterly assessments done for the Special Operations Forces command in Afghanistan say that the program is broadly supported by local residents and that security in the sites has improved. The principal concern expressed by the program's critics is that these small groups (limited to 300 per district) will become militias, which historically have been armies of 30,000 or more under the command of a single warlord. The ALP program aims to prevent that by creating a strong link to district and provincial police chiefs from the outset. A recent Human Rights Watch Report catalogued allegations of abuse, disputes and ethnic tensions in some areas, although U.S. officials dispute some of the claims, which are under official investigation.
The ALP program features greater oversight and vetting mechanisms than earlier similar efforts, but continuing vigilance is necessary, as with all security forces. The Special Forces team in Maiwand told me about an ALP member who went AWOL, and along with his brother, started holding up cars for bribes on Highway One, the highway linking Kandahar to Kabul. The Taliban shot him dead. ALP commanders have fired numerous members they feel are not up to snuff. One of the sites, in Baghlan, is a unique case in that the Afghan government asked SOF to form a local police unit out of former insurgents from the small Hezb-e Islami faction; insurgents are not the recruiting base for ALP, unlike the Sons of Iraq program. The tensions in the area are increased by the fact that the area is a pocket of Pashtuns surrounded by a larger Tajik population. The Afghan interior ministry official who has national oversight of the program, Brig. Gen. Ali Shah Ahmadzai, told me that he has put the ALP commander, who is under investigation, on notice that he will be arrested "if he does not behave."
Promises to rural Afghans should be moderated but honored. The reality is that the dysfunctional Afghan bureaucracy cannot deliver funds to individual provinces, let alone the district level where 76 percent of the Afghan population ekes out a subsistence living. At present, most district governments are fig leafs for the distribution of international aid projects. I sat in the Khas Kunar district governor's office as he talked to the provincial governor's secretary about getting funds for a backhoe to dig out canals damaged in recent floods. A U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) official had suggested he seek to tap the $25,000 "performance based" fund that USAID provides each month to provincial governors. The district governor smiled and nodded as the conversation concluded, then turned to us and said, "It will take a year for the necessary paperwork and to get approval from Kabul." Yet there has been progress - in many areas district governors did not even visit, let alone live in, their districts last year. Many areas have now been pacified sufficiently for them to return. During the week I spent in Maiwand, I saw the governor preside over four meetings, although he still returns to Kandahar city each weekend where his family lives. Prioritizing needs is essential, since USAID funds and staff are slated to decline significantly, and the civilian state-building effort will focus on the provincial level rather than the districts. The district delivery program, for example, will end next year after reaching only 45 of the country's 398 districts. This program, which supports training and salary increases for district officials, is current under way in only 12 districts. A number of civilian officials and nongovernmental organizations believe dispute resolution, primarily through the traditional local mediation practices system, should be the highest priority in conflict-ridden areas where land and other disputes often fuel insurgent violence.
Pakistan is the glaring problem that has dramatically worsened and must be addressed. A senior U.S. official in Kabul declared flatly to me, "We will not succeed unless the Pakistan safe havens are reduced." He does not believe Pakistan will come around, despite countless U.S. pleas for more action. Pakistan balks at getting tough on the Afghan insurgent groups that are the central cards in its hedging strategy -- particularly the deadly Haqqani network, based in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal agency. And U.S. officials recognize that an assault into the agency simply is not going to happen.
The United States and Afghanistan will have to neutralize the threat from Waziristan through their own efforts, and indeed these efforts have stepped up dramatically. Operation Knife Edge rounded up many Haqqani operatives last month. A senior Haqqani facilitator, Mali Khan, was nabbed as he crossed the border, and another, Janbaz Zadran, was killed by a suspected CIA drone attack on October 13. During the week I spent in Paktika, U.S. forces dropped 33,000 pounds of bombs on the border to close mountain passes that the insurgents use. A U.S. commander there pointed out a dozen "POOs" or points of origin, of artillery or rockets fired from Pakistan into Afghanistan. They were all within sight of Pakistani Frontier Corps outposts - leaving little doubt about active or passive support for militants among some Pakistani forces. U.S. and Afghan forces are under direct attack from Pakistani territory, and Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti assured me that when they take "effective" fire, U.S. forces shoot back.
The dilemma, however, is that Pakistan holds a critical trump card, as it demonstrated this week by its ability to close major commercial crossings in retaliation for Saturday's cross-border strike. When I visited that part of the border area last month, Special Forces soldiers told me that an insurgent camp near the two border posts was a major source of attacks in the region.
If the Afghan and U.S. governments can agree on a common plan, backed by a lower but sustainable level of U.S. troops, they just might start winning the battle of perceptions. Given the insurgents' lack of popularity -- they rely on intimidation -- the Afghan government should be able to prevail in either defeating the insurgency or forcing them into a political accommodation if the United States remains willing to lend a hand. It might take five or ten years. But the alternative is not a pretty one to contemplate: the U.S. departs, Afghanistan crumbles, and the war fought to avenge the 9/11 attacks is perceived to be a failure. As I wrote in my last book on the Iraq war, Americans need to be prepared for wars to last a decade. The Afghan war, which the United States attempted to fight largely through a counterterrorism approach for the first seven years, has only begun in earnest in the last three. There is a third choice between the current large-scale U.S. counterinsurgency campaign and reverting to a counter-terrorism approach, and that is an Afghan-led counterinsurgency effort that that the United States can support in a sustainable way.
Linda Robinson is Adjunct Senior Fellow for U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is writing a book on the war in Afghanistan.
Sesame Street goes to Afghanistan
Singing, dancing and barking are out, but Sesame Street is teaching Afghan children to count, read and write
The Guardian By Jon Boone Wednesday 30 November 2011
Kabul - Ever since they made their first appearance on a New York sidestreet in the 1960s, Big Bird and his pals have taught children around the world how to count, read and write.
Now the cast of Sesame Street has made it all the way to Afghanistan, with a few nips and tucks to make them palatable to the local audience.
Launching on Thursday evening, out goes anything that could be interpreted as encouraging children to sing, dance – or even bark like dogs.
With parents thought likely to frown on their children singing and dancing in front of the TV, the stars of Baghch-e-Simsin exhort their young viewers to "exercise" instead.
"We tested a scene where Ernie is barking like a dog and getting Bert to copy him, but we found that parents were dead set against it," says Tania Farzana the Afghan-American executive producer of the show. "A dog is considered to be unclean, so the parents didn't understand it."
The programme is a co-production between the non-profit Sesame Workshop and Moby Media, an Afghan company that specialises in bringing western TV formats such as Pop Idol and Deal or No Deal to Afghan screens.
With funding from the US state department, 26 programmes have been made at the scruffy central Kabul street where Moby is based. The programme will air four times a week on both its Dari and Pashtu language channels. But, although Big Bird has been renamed "King of the birds", the cultural accommodation has not all been one way.
Sesame Workshop executives in the US keep tight control over how their international partners refit their show. One segment recorded in Afghanistan involving a family car ride had to be dropped because, as with nearly all local motorists, no one was wearing a seatbelt.
And in a country where health and safety is unheard of, producers struggled to find a building site to film where workmen wore hard hats, sturdy shoes and protective clothing.
Nonetheless, the Sesame Street formula remains fundamentally intact, with cheery, brightly coloured puppets keeping children entertained while the programme delivers some carefully targeted educational messages, including the famous "letter of the day" and plenty of maths.
"In a country with an extremely young population and an education system that is not up to standard, then reaching millions of kids through television seems to us the way to go," said Saad Mohseni, chief executive of Moby Media.
Also present in the Afghan version is the social activism that once caused consternation in parts of 1970s America with its portrayal of a racially harmonious inner-city neighbourhood. For a film about a girl's first day at school, the Afghan production team deliberately chose a character from the Hazara community, a much put-upon minority in a country where there are growing fears of ethnic fragmentation.
Sherrie Westin, vice-president of Sesame Workshop, said the programme's daily mini-documentaries about the daily lives Afghan children "celebrate diversity and introduce children from Afghanistan's various provinces to each other".
Compared to many of the other 22 international Sesame co-productions there will be no new puppeteering in Afghanistan for the time being. Instead, the show's makers pick from vast amounts of already recorded video, which is then voiced over.
Moby Media, with its stable of Indian and Turkish soaps that have to be translated into local languages, has mastered the art of dubbing.
But revoicing a muppet poses different challenges, says Ali Abdullah Vakili, the 23-year-old voice of Big Bird. Because they speak by "mouth flapping" the Afghan scripts have to match the same syllables as the English original. "It's much harder than doing humans," Vakili says. "The first time I saw it I thought it was impossible."
Road to recovery in Afghanistan goes through the countryside
As NATO troops prepare to leave Afghanistan in 2014, donor countries must rethink their aid to that war-torn country. Edward Girardet, who has reported on Afghanistan for more than 30 years, writes that they must focus on rural areas, where most Afghans live.
Christian Science Monitor By Edward Girardet November 29, 2011
Geneva - When the West first intervened in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, experienced aid coordinators, journalists, and diplomats had some simple advice:
Don’t get carried away with wasteful military campaigns or a Sisyphean anti-narcotics drive. They contribute little to long-term peace. To help Afghanistan, focus instead on modest but doable development initiatives in the countryside, where nearly 80 percent of Afghans live.
This largely ignored advice still holds, as high-level delegations gather in Bonn, Germany, on Dec. 5 to consider the way forward in Afghanistan, which has suffered from more than three decades of war. It’s a critical time as NATO-led security forces seek to transition toward 2014, when most troops are expected to leave.
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Western and Afghan leaders first met in this German town a decade ago to kick-start a proposed “Marshall Plan” for the reconstruction of this largely impoverished mountainous and desert country.
And yet, at their peril, many nations involved in the “Bonn process” often sought to impose their own agendas – through arrogance or a poor understanding of the situation on the ground. These agendas largely failed to take into account the interests of Afghans.
They have led not only to a disastrous war but also a recovery effort with only limited impact. Afghanistan has reached “a permanent condition of rottenness,” says Anders Fange, the respected former head of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan.
The question now is whether the international community will have the imagination – and commitment – to remedy the situation. As it stands, the coalition death toll – more than 2,800 – is fast approaching the number of people who perished in 9/11, while insurgents are operating in areas where they never did before.
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True, the donors have helped bring about improvements, such as schooling for 7 million children, one third of them girls. Another 7 million, however, have yet to benefit from education. In many areas, health care is far better than 10 years ago, but many Afghans still don’t have even basic health services.
Various initiatives, such as paved roads and 24-hour electricity, have enhanced life in Kabul and other cities, and urban women can study at university or work outside the home. More than a quarter of the country’s parliament now consists of women, one of the highest ratios in the world.
However, for the majority of Afghans, especially in rural areas where many suffer from malnutrition and hunger, there is enormous frustration, even anger. Many wonder where the billions of dollars of aid money have gone. In certain parts, change has been brought about by cross-border trade and private investment, not development support.
Washington has yet to recognize that by allowing US military interests to dictate policy for the past decade, it has heavily undermined the recovery process. Numerous Afghans regard NATO forces as the “new occupation.” But they also fear the insurgents, who have infiltrated government ministries, including the army and police. Civilian casualties, the majority of them rebel-inflicted, are up compared to last year.
Even coalition claims of increased “kills” do not imply success in what has become a classic guerrilla war. If anything, wiping out key commanders with drone predators may actually impair peace talks by eliminating the very people who need to be included. Those who replace them, often young recruits brought up in Pakistan with no sense of Afghan culture, are far more intransigent than their 30-40-year-old elders.
The deployment of “provincial reconstruction teams,” which double as army intelligence and development operations, is another area where the military has dangerously compromised recovery by confusing the role between soldiers and aid workers.
Last year, gunmen executed 10 international and Afghan medical volunteers, including two Americans who had been working in Afghanistan for over 30 years. The message? Insurgents no longer differentiate between humanitarians and the military.
Coalition troops seek to improve contacts with local populations by building schools, digging wells, or building bridges. The problem is that most operate on six-month deployments. There is rarely adequate consideration for what happens after they leave. Aid agencies say the military should not become involved with humanitarian activities except as a last resort.
If only a fraction of the war effort had been spent on tangible recovery, then Afghanistan might be a far different place today. More than 60 percent of US development support is geared toward security, such as hiring mercenaries. The current obsession for military responses needs to revert to more traditional diplomacy coupled with what experts describe as “intelligent” aid and investment.
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The Obama administration, however, is now cutting by half – from $4 billion in 2010 to around $2 billion in 2012 – precisely the sort of development funding needed to stimulate the change that should have happened years ago. “The absurdity is that we have spent over $50 billion on a pointless war and a reconstruction effort that is proving a dismal failure,” notes one USAID official.
Foreign funds keep the Afghan economy going. But these will decrease drastically over the next two or three years, prompting the collapse of government programs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private businesses. Tens of thousands of jobs will disappear.
In Bonn, the nearly 100 delegations should consider who will support the 352,000-strong Afghan security force ($7 billion dollars a year) projected to take over from NATO. The Soviet-backed communist regime collapsed in the early 1990s when funding dwindled and most well-trained soldiers, police, and militia switched sides. The result? A bitter civil war that cost the lives of thousands. Steps the "Bonn conference" can take
The Kabul government clearly does not wish to be abandoned by its foreign partners. Yet without a relatively well-functioning state, the likelihood of defeating a motivated insurgent force is small indeed. Nor will it have the capacity to manage effective recovery, which may take another 20 or 30 years.
Nevertheless, there are practical ways to help Afghanistan move toward real peace and recovery. These ideas are not new, but they must be adopted urgently. The international community should:
• Place greater emphasis on job creation and development in the countryside to prevent mass migration to the cities. This includes better access to roads bringing farmers closer to markets.
• Instead of the anti-opium focus, aid should be directed more toward export and storage of legal produce, such as apples, pears, and other fruit attractive to Saudi, Pakistani, Indian, and other markets.
• Development assistance should encourage quality rural industries: eco-tourism and woodcraft (toys and furniture), while natural resources need to be developed.
• Coordinate pay scales to prevent income inflation. Doctors, teachers, and other civil servants should receive higher salaries and incentives to prevent corruption, and also encourage a return to the countryside. This would save hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
• Concentrate aid on two vital social needs: health care and education.
• Adopt a 20-30 year approach toward helping Afghans achieve full recovery.
• Cut wasteful spending. The international community needs to stop contracting to private corporations that require armed mercenaries in order to operate, plus rely on massive overheads with costly consultants. Instead, donor countries should support NGOs or private initiatives that work closely with local communities as their best security, that hire Afghans, and that are committed to the long-term.
• Encourage a “real” Afghan economy, not one reliant on war. Afghanistan can be a commercial crossroads serving the Middle East and Indian subcontinent, instead of one that benefits foreign militaries or political interests of its meddling neighbors (case in point: Pakistan, which says it will boycott the Bonn conference over NATO airstrikes that killed its soldiers on the Pakistan-Afghan border).
• Adopt a more realistic approach toward the armed opposition by focusing on individuals rather than terrorist labels. The rebels now consist of an array of local and foreign insurgents, including rogue elements within the Kabul government. The term “Taliban” has become meaningless.
While some talks have taken place, the process needs to be stepped up in a neutral location such as Geneva or Istanbul by involving all factions and fronts in a broad-based reconciliation initiative, possibly under UN auspices.
Even if the official Taliban and the Haqqani network say they refuse to negotiate until all NATO soldiers have left, the outer layers of these insurgents can be peeled away through better outreach. It does not help to kill, incarcerate, or torture them. As one aid worker maintained: “Even the most hard-line commander has a family who may need medical treatment, education, or improved farming techniques” – and thus has an interest in Afghanistan’s recovery.
And negotiations must focus on Afghans – not foreigners, as happened with disastrous consequences after the Soviets left the country. Many at Bonn will be tempted to promote a spin that justifies their military-flavored decisions to date. What’s needed, though, is a new approach that helps Afghans rebuild their own country – with them in the lead.
Edward Girardet is the author of “Killing the Cranes: A Reporter’s Journey Through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan.” He has reported widely from humanitarian and conflict zones in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere for The Christian Science Monitor, US News & World Report, and PBS News Hour. He is also co-founder of the Institute for Media and Global Governance (IMGG) in Geneva and is editor of “The Essential Field Guides to Humanitarian and Conflict Zones: Afghanistan."
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
VOA News November 30, 2011
Pakistan is dismissing international calls to reconsider its boycott of next week's international conference on Afghanistan.
The government decided not to attend the December 5 summit in Bonn in protest of Saturday's deadly NATO air assault that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers at military posts near the Afghan border.
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani briefed reporters Wednesday on a phone conversation with Afghan President Hamid Karzai , who asked him to reconsider the decision not to attend the conference.
Prime Minister Gilani said he told President Karzai that Pakistan can not play a constructive role in the Afghan peace process until its own sovereignty, security and integrity are ensured. The Pakistani leader said he told President Karzai to talk to the United States about Afghan territory being used against Pakistan.
The Pakistani government responded to the NATO attack by shutting down NATO's Pakistani supply routes into Afghanistan and ordering U.S. personnel to evacuate an air base in Baluchistan province within two weeks.
On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Washington and Islamabad should learn lessons from the incident so the two countries can continue fighting terrorism together. She pledged a quick and thorough investigation of what she called a “tragic incident.”
Clinton also said she regrets Pakistan's withdrawal from next week's international conference on Afghanistan but hopes to secure Islamabad's cooperation in the future.
Clinton told a news conference in South Korea Wednesday that Pakistan, like the United States, has a “profound interest in a secure, stable and increasingly democratic Afghanistan.”
Also Wednesday, German Chancellor Angela Merkel called Pakistani Prime Minister Gilani, expressing solidarity with Pakistan and urging him to reconsider attending the Bonn Conference. Mr. Gilani told the German Chancellor that he regretted that he would not be able to oblige her request.
However, he did indicate his government would consider having Pakistan's ambassador to Germany represent Islamabad's interests at the conference.
Pakistani General Ashfaq Nadeem said Tuesday that the NATO assault was a “deliberate act of aggression.” He also questioned whether Pakistan would participate in Washington's investigation into the air assault.
On Wednesday, the army released video footage it said shows the remains of two bombed mountaintop outposts hit in the NATO raid. It is unclear why the video was released days after the incident.
The U.S. military has until December 23 to submit the findings of its investigation. NATO has also launched a probe.
The Associated Press quotes U.S. officials as saying investigators believe the Taliban attacked a U.S.-Afghan patrol in the border region to create confusion and draw U.S. and Pakistani forces into firing on each other.
The Bonn Conference is aimed at developing a strategy to stabilize Afghanistan as coalition forces withdraw in the coming years. Many analysts agree that peace in Afghanistan hinges on whether Pakistan plays a constructive role in the process.
The White House calls the Bonn talks very important for the future of Afghanistan and says Pakistan will play a very important role.
Afghan officials voice scant remorse to Pakistan
Washington Post By Joshua Partlow and Karin Brulliard Wednesday, November 30,2011
KABUL - The Afghan police general watched on television as Pakistani soldiers solemnly saluted the coffins of 24 of their comrades who were killed in a U.S. military airstrike Saturday.
The general stood up in disgust. “That’s the best thing America has done in 10 years here,” he said.
While U.S. officials from the war zone to the White House offered contrite condolences to the families of the dead and scrambled to repair the tattered relationship with Pakistan, Afghan officials have taken a tougher line. Frustrated by a Taliban insurgency they are convinced is supervised by and based in Pakistan, they have expressed little remorse, even accusing Pakistan of exaggerating the gravity of the situation to deflect attention from its own meddling in Afghanistan.
Afghan officials said the strike — which followed an operation by U.S. Special Operations forces and Afghan army commandos — was justified because the troops came under fire first from a Pakistani border post. “We have absolutely nothing to apologize for,” a senior official said.
The decision by Pakistan’s cabinet Tuesday to boycott next week’s international conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany, seemed likely to keep the mutual suspicion between the neighbors at a strong simmer. The conference was once considered a chance to lure Taliban representatives to negotiate, but that plan never materialized.
The meeting’s importance will now depend on whether it can show that the countries in the region, as well as the West, are committed to supporting Afghanistan’s government and working together to end the war. Pakistan’s cooperation is crucial in this regard — particularly given its influence over the Taliban — and its absence would be a clear symbol that peace remains elusive.
The Pakistani cabinet, after a meeting in the eastern city of Lahore, said in a statement that it supports “stability and peace in Afghanistan and the importance of an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process of reconciliation.” But Pakistan, it said, had decided to bow out of the conference “in view of the developments and prevailing circumstances.”
According to an account by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s office, Afghan President Hamid Karzai had called Gilani to plead against a boycott, arguing that it would not encourage peace in Afghanistan. Gilani responded: “How could a country whose own sovereignty and territorial integrity were violated from the Afghan soil . . . play a constructive role?”
Karzai expressed his condolences to the Pakistani people and told Gilani that “insecurity in the region causes these kinds of incidents,” his office said.
One Western official who spoke on the condition of anonymity called the boycott “very unfortunate,” adding, “Pakistan is taking itself from the table precisely when it should be contributing to a solution in Afghanistan.”
In addition to bowing out of the Bonn conference, Pakistan has blocked NATO supply routes into Afghanistan and told U.S. officials to vacate a base in the southwestern province of Baluchistan. In a bid to repair the rift, coalition officials have offered sympathy and expressed hope that an investigation, led by U.S. Central Command, will clarify why the airstrike took place.
“The events of Saturday morning were tragic, from our point of view, and that is why the commander has not only expressed immediately his condolences but also expressed his feelings as a fellow soldier,” said Brig. Gen. Carsten Jacobson, a NATO spokesman in Kabul. “When it comes to the incident itself, all the questions — who was where, how was the situation developing, what was the use of close air support and who talked to whom — is part of the investigation, and we have to wait for the outcome.”
Pakistani officials have not appeared appeased. Pakistan has to do “some serious introspection” regarding the international effort in Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar told National Public Radio’s program “All Things Considered.” Pakistan’s role, she said, “has not be appreciated enough. And on top of that, to have an incident in which we feel, at best, giving the benefit of doubt, our soldiers lost their lives to this extremely callous attitude — this episode has obviously created a lot of rage in Pakistan.”
Two senior Pakistani military officers who briefed local editors and commentators Tuesday reiterated Islamabad’s contention that coalition forces had ignored appeals by Pakistan for NATO helicopters to stop firing on its checkpoints.
All Pakistani soldiers at the post, as well as the reinforcements sent to assist them, were uniformed, said Maj. Gen. Ashfaq Nadeem, the director general of military operations.
“All coordination procedures were violated. At multiple levels in ISAF, it was known that they were attacking Pakistani posts, but they continued with impunity,” he said, according to an editor who was present. Nadeem said the Pakistani military concluded that the strike was an “attack of blatant aggression.”
That assessment appeared to be gaining ground in Pakistan, where newspaper editorials and street protesters, including members of an association of Pakistani truckers who carry supplies to NATO troops in Afghanistan, called for an end to Pakistan’s alliance with the United States.
Asked whether she thought the attack was deliberate, Khar said, “We would like to wait for the investigations. Currently, the briefings that we have gotten seem to be pointing toward a direction which is not a happy place to be in. If it is a deliberate attempt,” she said, then the question of Pakistan’s future policy “would obviously be much, much, much more serious.”
In Lahore, Shahbaz Sharif, the top official of the opposition-led province of Punjab, met with the wife of a soldier who was killed in the airstrike. According to a statement from Sharif’s office, the widow, “despite being in a deep state of grief and sorrow, said, ‘Those we are fighting for are not our friends.’ ”
To Afghan officials frustrated by Pakistan’s perceived lack of cooperation, those sentiments ring false.
“It’s simply overreaction,” said the senior Afghan official, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. “We have suffered, they have suffered, I mean, come on. Our police and army people die in scores every day. And Pakistani civilians die every day. . . . This time, it’s been military casualties.”
A former Afghan official said Karzai is regularly frustrated by what he sees as the United States’ failure to take stronger action against Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan or pressure Pakistan’s military or intelligence agency to address the problem.
“We put all our eggs in the American basket,” he said. “The problem is, that basket has a huge hole in it, and it’s called Pakistan.”
Brulliard reported from Islamabad, Pakistan. Special correspondents Javed Hamdard in Kabul; Haq Nawaz Khan in Peshawar, Pakistan; and Shaiq Hussain in Islamabad contributed to this report.
Pakistan's Bonn conference boycott may harm Afghan reconciliation: analysts
by Muhammad Tahir
ISLAMABAD, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Pakistan's boycott of an international conference on the future of Afghanistan in protest against the killing of 24 soldiers by NATO attacks over the weekend may hamper the long-awaited reconciliation process in the war-ravaged country, analysts has said.
Pakistan announced earlier that it would send Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar to the 2011 Bonn Conference on Dec. 5. in which more than 1,000 delegates from 90 countries would attend.
"Pakistan looks forward to the success of this Conference but in view of the developments and prevailing circumstances it has decided not to participate in the Conference," said a government statement after the decision was taken at the Federal Cabinet meeting.
The decision to stay away from the Conference was in fact taken by Pakistan's top civilian and military leadership when they convened an emergency meeting Saturday, hours after the deadly NATO strikes on two Pakistani border posts in the Mohmand tribal region bordering Afghanistan.
The U.S. and NATO has pledged investigation and expressed regrets over the deaths of Pakistani soldiers but refused to apologize for the action.
Pakistan military was quick to reject NATO/U.S. regret as " insufficient". Chief military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas said Pakistan will not accept mere regrets as NATO had killed 72 Pakistan soldiers in eight previous strikes in three years. He added there was no justification for the NATO strikes as the area had been cleared of militants by the Pakistani forces and that NATO violated the defined "red lines". Pakistan also argued that the US/NATO/ISAF were mandated to operate in Afghanistan.
Pakistan's boycott decision sent alarm across several key countries and Afghan President Hamid Karzai was the first to ring up Prime Minister Gilani to express "concern" over the decision and to request a review.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel also came up with a statement that she was "very sorry" about Pakistan's boycott. She vowed to convince Islamabad to attend the very important event on the future of Afghanistan.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Wednesday also voiced regret over Pakistan's announcement and urged it to reconsider. She promised an investigation "as swiftly and thoroughly as possible."
Pressure would mount on Pakistan in the coming days to change its boycott decision as the country's role is thought to be central in Afghan peace and reconciliation in view of its deep influence on Afghan Taliban and other armed groups.
Pakistani leaders have so far not shown any signal of change in its boycott decision. Pakistani military and civilian leadership had been under tremendous internal pressure to review its relations with the U.S. and its western allies. Prime Minister Gilani pointed out the government will take a "major" decision to address the concern of the nation.
Gilani has also indicated taking more actions in the joint session of the parliament to be convened soon to determine future relationship with the U.S. and NATO. Islamabad has already closed supply line for NATO troops in Afghanistan and asked the U.S. to vacate a key airbase in Balochistan province in 15 days, which the U.S. military had been using for nearly 10 years for military operations in Afghanistan and also for spy aircraft attacks in Pakistan's tribal regions.
One of the main objectives of the Bonn Conference is to discuss prospects for encouraging Taliban leadership to join the reconciliation process, which has assumed urgency in the wake of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Taliban have so far ruled out possibility of talks and the Afghan government suspended all contacts with Taliban after the September assassination of chief of the Afghan High Peace Council Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani.
President Karzai said that Afghanistan will now hold talks with Pakistan as "representative" of Afghan Taliban. But the NATO strike has now made this opportunity more complicated.
In view of Pakistan's central role in Afghanistan's reconciliation and influence on Afghan armed groups, Afghan government has formed a joint peace commission with Pakistan and the U.S. to jointly work for reconciliation. The slain Afghan peace envoy Prof. Rabbani had chosen Islamabad as his first foreign destination after he had been appointed as chief of the peace body.
Despite reservations over Pakistan's policy about Afghanistan, many analysts still believe Pakistan is the only main factor to bring Taliban to the negotiation table. Pakistan's Bonn boycott may diminish prospects for reconciliation in Afghanistan and now it is a test for the western powers on how to address Pakistan's concerns.
NATO says Pakistan resumes some cooperation by preventing Afghanistan border incident
By Associated Press, November 30
KABUL, Afghanistan — Pakistan resumed some cooperation with U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan following NATO strikes that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers by working with the coalition to prevent another cross-border incident from escalating, a spokesman said Wednesday.
The weekend airstrikes have severely strained the already troubled relationship between Pakistan and the U.S., jeopardizing Washington’s hopes of enlisting Islamabad’s support in winding down the Afghan war.
Pakistan is still outraged by the soldiers’ deaths and has retaliated by closing its Afghan border crossings to NATO supplies, demanding the U.S. vacate an air base used by American drones and boycotting an international conference aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan.
But NATO said Islamabad communicated with the alliance to prevent an exchange of fire over the border late Tuesday from turning into another international incident.
U.S. forces received mortar and recoilless rifle fire from an area just inside the Pakistan border, said U.S. spokesman Navy Lt. Cmdr. Brian Badura. U.S. forces returned fire in self-defense while confirming with the Pakistani military that it wasn’t involved. No damage or casualties were reported by the U.S. or Pakistan, he said.
German Brig. Gen. Carsten Jacobson, a NATO spokesman in Kabul, expressed hope that Pakistan’s cooperation in resolving the incident in eastern Afghanistan’s Paktia province signaled the two sides could recover from the recent tragedy.
“We are continuing operations and it is of great importance that the incidents of Saturday, as tragic as they were, do not disrupt our capability to operate in the border area and cooperate with the Pakistani side,” said Jacobson.
The Pakistani military did not immediately respond to request for comment on the latest incident.
Pakistani and American officials have offered different accounts of how NATO aircraft attacked two Pakistan army posts before dawn Saturday. But it seems clear that a breakdown in communication contributed to the tragedy.
According to U.S. military records described to The Associated Press, the incident occurred when a joint U.S. and Afghan patrol requested backup after being hit by mortar and small arms fire by Taliban militants. Before responding, the joint U.S.-Afghan patrol first checked with the Pakistani army, which reported it had no troops in the area, the military account said.
Pakistani officials have refuted this claim and said U.S. forces must have known they were attacking Pakistani soldiers because the posts were clearly marked on maps given to NATO and the two sides were in contact immediately before and during the airstrikes.
Pentagon press secretary George Little disputed suggestions that the attack on the Pakistani troops was deliberate.
“In no way, shape or form should this be construed as an intentional attack on Pakistan by the United States. That is simply incorrect,” Little told reporters in Washington.
The Pakistan army on Wednesday released photographs and video of the posts that were attacked in the Mohmand tribal area. The images show small, damaged structures made out of stacked gray stones perched on a steep, barren mountain ridge. A white flag flew next to one of the posts.
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said he rejected person pleas from the Afghan president and the German chancellor to reconsider Islamabad’s decision to boycott the conference Monday in Bonn, Germany, on Afghanistan.
Few had high expectations for the conference, but the absence of Pakistan will make even minor progress more difficult. The Taliban called the conference an “American trap” and a plot to “further ensnare Afghanistan into the flames of occupation” in statement posted on its website Wednesday, according to Site Monitoring Services, a U.S.-based group that tracks militant websites.
Pakistan and Afghanistan have long had a strained relationship even though the two countries have ethnic and cultural similarities. Islamabad is angry at Kabul because the NATO aircraft that carried out the strikes that killed its soldiers were based in Afghanistan.
“Afghan land has been used against Pakistan, and we are protesting against this,” Gilani told reporters in the southern city of Karachi. “We don’t want the land of our brother country, which is like a twin, to be used against Pakistan.”
Pakistanis have staged small rallies protesting the strikes in the country’s major cities, many of them organized by anti-U.S. Islamist parties.
Re-establishing a workable relationship between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the U.S. is important because Islamabad is critical to the process of peace negotiations with the Taliban. Pakistan has historical ties with the group and is seen as the actor with the greatest leverage to push the Taliban to the negotiating table.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai moved forward with those efforts Wednesday, meeting with members of a council he set up to broker peace with the Taliban and reiterating the need for “honest cooperation with Pakistan for providing opportunities for negotiation with the opposition.”
Karzai also told members of the peace council that he was in favor of changing the panel’s composition to include more individuals who might be able to bridge the divide between the insurgents and the government. Tribal leaders, religious figures and clerics also should be given more opportunity to assist with the peace process, Karzai told them.
___
Khan reported from Karachi, Pakistan. Associated Press writers Sebastian Abbot in Islamabad and Lolita Baldor in Washington contributed to this report.
Afghanistan's Bonn Conference: 4 things you need to know
On Dec. 5, leaders from Afghanistan, NATO, and neighboring countries will meet in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the future of Afghanistan after US troops withdraw.
The second conference comes 10 years after the first Bonn Conference, which took place months after the Sept. 11 attacks and the American-led invasion of Afghanistan. Here’s a look at what it is, what’s at stake, and why it matters.
Christian Science Monitor By Tom A. Peter, Correspondent 29/11/2011
1. What was the first Bonn Conference?
In the wake of the American-led invasion immediately after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan needed to establish a plan for how it would govern itself and how international forces would be a part of the country's future. In December 2001 prominent Afghans met in Bonn, Germany, and created the transitional government, a path for how to draft a constitution, and a permanent government.
Members of the former Islamist government were not invited to participate, a decision that many Afghans say led to the eventual Taliban resurgence and ongoing insurgency here.
2. Is the upcoming Bonn Conference as important as the first?
A number of analysts have criticized the decision to host the conference in Bonn on the 10-year anniversary of the original conference.
Roughly once a year there are international conferences that gather Afghan and international leaders to discuss progress and the future of the country, without making any pivotal decisions. Many people say that the upcoming Bonn Conference will be no different, but argue that calling it Bonn II raises expectations that are unlikely to be met.
3. Who will come and what will they talk about?
In addition to Afghan leaders, including President Hamid Karzai, ministers and leaders from around the world will attend the Bonn Conference. Issues likely to dominate the agenda include transfer of security from international to Afghan forces, reconciliation with the insurgency, relations with Pakistan, and the role of international forces and foreign aid after the 2014 deadline for the withdraw of combat forces.
4. Pakistan says it won’t attend. Why is that important?
Following a NATO airstrike that killed – inadvertently, the US says – some 24 Pakistani soldiers on the eastern border of Afghanistan, Pakistani officials have said they plan to boycott the Bonn Conference. This could have major implications as reconciliation with the insurgency will likely be a prominent topic of conversation at the Bonn Conference. With many insurgent havens located inside Pakistan, the country could play a critical role in mediating potential talks. Without its participation at the Bonn Conference, talks with the Taliban will be markedly more difficult.
5 Things Afghan History Can Teach Us
The Huffington Post By Suleiman Wali Founder, Lapis Media 29/11/2011
The French historian Alexis de Tocqueville once said, "When the past no longer illuminates the future, the spirit walks in darkness."
As world leaders converge on Bonn, Germany, next week to discuss the future of Afghanistan after 2014, is it likely that any of them will look to history to find better answers? Probably not.
Heeding de Tocqueville's warning, if we look beyond Afghan history of the previous decade and well into the last century, five key points emerge that could help the country lay a better foundation for itself once American and NATO forces reduce their presence or leave altogether.
A man dips his finger into an ink bottle before casting his vote during the Afghan parliamentary election in Kabul in 2010. The path toward democracy has been a difficult one in Afghanistan. Two previous attempts in the 20th century have failed. Find out why in Point #1, below.
1. Remember why it's important to support Afghan democracy.
In the 20th century, Afghans underwent two experiments toward democracy, both of which were unsuccessful.
In the first case, royal Prime Minister Shah Mahmud, the king's uncle, made modest attempts in 1949 to respond to demands for political reform and fairer elections. The result was the "Liberal Parliament" that elected reform-minded lawmakers who granted new liberties, like freedom of the press.
Student unions sprang up at Kabul University and a host of newspapers were born. The targets of their anger: conservative religious leaders on the one hand, and the government on the other. Unfortunately, having neither a tradition of responsible political activism nor freedom of expression, criticism became extreme and protests erupted. By 1953, out of fear that a revolution would brew, the royals shut down all non-government newspapers and arrested "liberal" leaders.
A decade later, King Zahir took a more active role in government and ushered in the country's second experiment with democracy and socio-economic modernization. One of his first undertakings was to order the drafting of a new liberalized constitution unlike any the country had seen before.
From equal rights, universal education and health care, to a vast penal code and the return of a free press, the Afghan constitution of 1964 was arguably the finest in the Muslim world. For the first time, women were allowed to enter politics and the king appointed four to parliament.
Despite this leap toward greater liberties, illiteracy was rampant and many parts of the country did not have the financial resources or facilities to implement universal education. Meanwhile, parliament was plagued with invective, unreasoned debates and an abysmal legislative record--not unlike today's Afghan legislature.
The king was seen as lacking leadership during the political imbroglio. Although the daily business of government continued, a series of prime ministers were unable to assemble enough support to carry out effective programs. By 1972, four premiers had resigned and the system was near collapse. A year later, the king was overthrown.
In either example, the transition to a democratic system proved difficult and nearly disastrous. Afghanistan's current democracy is trying to function in a period of more daunting problems.
Since April, at least three mass protests in Kabul turned violent and even deadly. Separately, a yearlong election dispute in parliament prevented a single piece of legislation from being ratified. The impasse finally ended last month.
In 2008, more than 600 mid-level and senior government officials were prosecuted or fired over corruption charges. Four years ago, 60 MPs threatened resignation if President Hamid Karzai didn't replace his foreign minister, who they deemed incompetent. Meanwhile, Karzai, once thought to be a shrewd statesman, has been dogged by allegations of corruption, nepotism and ineffectiveness.
And although the illiteracy rate has improved from what it was in the 20th century, more than 30 years of warfare has left the education system in shambles. Some 70 percent of Afghans still cannot read or write.
The question looms: Is democracy right for Afghanistan?
Yes. Even though both of the country's previous experiments in democracy failed, they were a testament to the Afghan people's desire for a system that brought about equal rights and representation for all its citizens.
A survey last year by the Asia Foundation discovered that 81 percent of Afghans believe in this principle. The same poll found "broad support for democracy as the best form of government, even higher than many other nations in the regions."
However, in order to put democratic principles into practice, the Afghan leadership must not repeat the mistakes of the past and remember the key reasons that their brief romances with democracy have ended.
2. A strong police and military are critical to safeguarding progressive reforms and women's rights.
Throughout the 20th century, Afghanistan has struggled with its efforts toward modernization. In some cases, these initiatives have been met with violent rejection from religious fundamentalists who feared it threatened their way of life.
Between 1919 and 1929, the young King Amanullah oversaw an array of social, political, and economic changes that affected nearly every facet of Afghan society. Calling himself a "revolutionary king," he was determined to modernize his country along the lines of Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Establishing a foundation of law for Afghanistan that was more secular than ever before, Amanullah gave his nation its first written constitution that contained a Bill of Rights and ended slavery. However, his most revolutionary changes involved greater freedom for women.
During his reign, coeducational schools were opened and polygamy was discouraged. Afghanistan even became the first Muslim country to abolish the custom of the veil when the king's wife, Queen Soraya, took off her headscarf at a public event.
But these changes were too drastic for Afghanistan's conservative leaders. When Amanullah returned from a tour of Europe, tribal armies descended on Kabul and drove out the enlightened monarch--literally. He and his wife fled in the middle of the night in their Rolls Royce.
Amanullah's father-in-law, the intellectual statesman Mahmud Tarzi, would later lament: "If only he had waited for two years and built up the army as Ataturk suggested, what might he have done?"
By the late 1950s, another dynamic leader had learned from King Amanullah's mistake. With a stronger army and police force, Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud defeated several mob and tribal rebellions that were directed against his women's rights reforms.
Today, according to the Asia Foundation's 2011 Afghanistan survey, more than a third of Afghans cite insecurity as the biggest problem confronting their nation. With terror attacks against girls' schools and government leaders still at high levels, it underscores the need for a stalwart army that can retain its members.
In 2009, Afghan security forces finally got a pay raise that put their salaries within the range of Taliban fighters. The increase drew more than 2,600 new recruits in the first seven days after it was announced. The Afghan National Army now has around 160,000 personnel and is expected to reach 260,000 by 2015.
That figure comes closer to the 300,000 combat troops that western military analysts had estimated in the early 1980s that the Soviets would need in order to "pacify" the entire country. It is also close to the 300,000 soldiers that Emir Abdur Rahman had assembled during his reign in the late 19th century when he formed the country's first national army and used it to unify Afghanistan under a central government.
3. Pakistan must become a genuine partner in peace.
Ever since the creation of the Pakistani state in 1947, Afghanistan has had a contentious and, at times, hostile relationship with its eastern neighbor.
The seed of this thorny rapport can be traced back to the late 19th century when the British had colonial control over India. It was then that English diplomat Mortimer Durand coerced Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman to sign a vague agreement that demarcated spheres of influence along the Afghan-Indian border. The single-page document was essentially used by the British to divide and weaken the Pashtun tribes who lived on both sides of the line.
For decades, the Pashtun tribesmen had blocked British attempts at absorbing Afghanistan into its empire. The Great Game, as it famously came to be called, was the geopolitical battle between the British and Russian empires for dominance over Central Asia. Afghanistan was basically seen as the buffer state that could keep Russia out of India.
In 1893, Mortimer drew a poorly marked 1,600-mile line that bisected Afghanistan from its panhandle down through its southwestern border with Iran. The Emir, an ethnic Pashtun himself, feared that if he did not agree to the Durand Line, British India would wage a fierce campaign to replace him. But in his autobiography, Abdur Rahman issued a prophetic warning:
"If you should cut these tribes out of my dominions, they will neither be of any use to you or me. You will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand. But if at any time a foreign enemy appears on these borders, these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies."
Fifty-four years later, the temporary line became a permanent border. Land that was long regarded to be Afghan was absorbed into Pakistan. Validating Abdur Rahman's prophecy, it is that porous region today where the fiercest battles have been waged between al-Qaida/Taliban forces and the American military.
Throughout the 1950s, the redrawn map and its international recognition drove a wedge between Afghan Prime Minister Daoud and Pakistan. Both sides waged a fierce propaganda campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the people in the disputed territories. In retribution, goods that were transported from the Arabian Sea through Pakistan often arrived pilfered or damaged on the other side of the border.
The issue of "Pashtunistan" was a constant point of contention between Daoud and the Pakistani government, and nearly drove the two countries to war. The diplomatic rift became so intense that it caused the Durand border to be closed for a year, severely harming the Afghan economy. The issue was resolved only when Daoud resigned in 1963.
When he returned to power ten years later after staging a bloodless coup against his first-cousin, King Zahir, Islamabad grew alarmed. The Pashtunistan movement, which had been muted during the king's experiment in democracy, was amplified once again.
By 1975, a stronger and bolder Pakistan welcomed a handful of Afghanistan's fundamentalist leaders and set up secret military camps to train them as guerrilla fighters against Daoud's newly formed Republic, write authors Liz Gould and Paul Fitzgerald. Five years later, these were some of the same camps that Washington funded to fight the Soviets.
Today, that embryo of religious fanaticism--with help from elements within Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency--is full-grown and waging war on Americans, Afghans and Pakistanis. In his final congressional testimony in September, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen lambasted extremist elements within Pakistan's military for their support of terror attacks in Afghanistan.
"With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy," Mullen said, referring to the deadly strike on the American embassy in Kabul in September.
That declaration, along with the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and this past weekend's deadly NATO attack on two Pakistani military posts, has sunk U.S. relations with Islamabad to a new low.
In reprisal for Saturday's airstrike that killed more than 20 Pakistani soldiers, Islamabad has indefinitely shut down NATO's supply lines through their country, and said it was re-evaluating its intelligence, diplomatic and military links with the U.S. If this retaliatory move lasts long, it will obviously harm both American forces and the Afghan population.
Prior to this development, the American military had been trying to circumvent transit through Pakistan, finding a variety of alternate routes through Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors in what's being called the Northern Distribution Network. A top military commander told NPR that the U.S. military had to find substitute channels because it lost as much as 15 percent of its supplies through Pakistan to ambush and theft in 2008 alone.
History has shown that Islamabad has not worked in the general interest of the Afghan people. Even though many in the Pakistani government will argue that it sheltered millions of Afghan refugees during the Soviet war, it is an undisputed fact that their country benefited from that conflict. In fact, according to Lawrence Wright, "as much as half of the money the U.S. gave to the I.S.I. to fight the Soviets was diverted to build nuclear weapons."
Those weapons have been built up to shield against the threat or perceived threat that Pakistan feels is coming from neighboring India, its archrival. After all, a paranoid Islamabad wants "strategic depth" in Afghanistan in case a war breaks out with India.
Unfortunately, this kind of mentality weakens the entire region. Instead of building schools, creating a solid education system, and healing the fractured Af-Pak relationship, the region could grow into the next generation's worst enemies--bigger and bolder than ever.
4. Education must incorporate Afghan nationalism.
Through a ruthless campaign of unification in the late 1800s, Emir Abdur Rahman succeeded in breaking down Afghanistan's feudal system, and established effective control over the entire country for the first time in history. The Emir understood that without a concept of unity and nationalism, Afghanistan could easily fall back to a warring country of independent states and ethnic groups.
In his autobiography, Abdur Rahman wrote: "The first and most important advice that I can give my successors and people ... is to impress upon their minds the value of unity. Unity, and unity alone, can make Afghanistan into a great power."
A quarter-of-a-century later, that message would be echoed by his grandson, King Amanullah, who turned it into law under Article One of the country's constitution: "... all parts of the nation are to be treated as a single unit without discrimination between different parts of the country."
Amanullah's father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi, impressed this idea even further into the nation's psyche. Tarzi launched Afghanistan's first newspaper, Seraj al-Akhbar (The Torch of News), and one of its central missions was to advocate national unity and promote a love of country, particularly among the youth. According to Dr. Senzil Nawid, he even redefined the word for birthplace, "watan," to mean homeland--a word that had not existed in the Pashto or Dari languages.
Nawid writes, "[Tarzi] paid serious attention to issues of language and literature and modern education, which he saw as essential not only for national progress but for the realization of social and political homogeneity--common language, history, geography, and literature."
While King Zahir's 40-year reign was not one that was marked with remarkable equality of social classes, it can be noted for its absence of ethnic rivalries or conflict. Even as Mohammed Daoud, the first president of the Afghan Republic in the 1970s, may have supported a one-sided nationalistic movement with his tenacious effort to regain the Pashtun territories lost to Pakistan, Afghans still consider him one of their country's fiercest patriots.
Today, largely in part to the post-Soviet civil war, Afghanistan's national and cultural identities have been shattered. Ethnic divisions and strife are rampant. And with little confidence in the national government--which is the most ethnically diverse in Afghan history--a nationalistic spirit does not have a healthy place from which to emanate.
With the absence of a well-respected president or legislature, nationalism can only be taught in the schools through programs that promote unity and teach cultural heritage. The country's diversity is its greatest strength, and if this notion is not inaugurated in the children, Afghanistan as a nation is doomed to fail in the next 20 years.
Abdur Rahman may have said it best: "There is no doubt that Afghanistan is a country that will either rise to be a very strong, famous kingdom, or will be swept altogether from the surface of the earth. ... I must say that it is impossible that she ever take the middle course."
5. The Afghan leadership should become the leading voice of moderate Islam for the country.
Throughout the 264 years that the Afghan state has existed, Islam, either expressively or subtly, has played an inextricable role in the political and social fabric of its society. Most notably, it was used to bring down the Soviet goliath in the 1980s.
In more recent times, Islam was perverted and used to justify repression and evil. When properly understood, however, it is this very faith that has broken these kinds of shackles and provided periods of enlightened thought and action.
For example, during his premiership in the 1950s, Prime Minister Daoud employed legal scholars who carefully examined each modernization step to ensure it did not violate Islamic law. These young advisers received an education in the West and at Cairo's al-Azhar University, considered the finest Islamic school in the world.
Having determined that both the veil and the ban that prevented females from leaving their homes without a male escort could not be justified in Islamic law, Daoud took steps to end these traditions. Some women followed suit, others didn't--but a precedent of choice was reestablished.
When Daoud returned as president in 1973, his pilgrimage to Mecca four years later was broadcast on state television, silencing the religious fanatics who had branded him a Communist.
In the 1920s, Queen Soraya became the first Muslim queen to appear in public with her husband, before the wives of the monarchs in Persia and Egypt. When King Amanullah lifted the custom of the veil during the same period, he proclaimed: "Religion does not require women to veil their hands, feet and faces or enjoin any special type of veil. Tribal custom must not impose itself on the free will of the individual."
Against the wishes of the religious conservatives, he opened coeducational schools and championed the inclusion of women in society. In the constitution, Amanullah declared, "Jews and Hindus residing in Afghanistan would be entitled to full protection of the state."
Tarzi, the king's mentor, was heavily influenced by the enlightened Islamic thought of the era in Syria and the Ottoman Empire. His nationalist ideology, which was discussed before, was articulated within a framework of Islamic principles. According to Nawid, Tarzi believed that "Afghan Islamic identity would transcend tribal, ethnic, regional, and sectarian loyalties."
Today, religious extremists in Afghanistan, and throughout most of the Muslim world, have drowned out the voices of the moderates and intellectuals. Fundamentalist Islam has muffled spiritual Islam, which in a traumatized country like Afghanistan can help heal the damaged psyches of its population.
The millions of Afghans who have suffered through 30 years of warfare, forced migration, homelessness, torture, terrorism, death, and near collapse of cultural identity are in need of some form of collective healing that can come from their leadership. Nelson Mandela did it in South Africa, and Mahatma Gandhi in India.
According to recent figures, 81 percent of the Afghan population currently owns a radio, making it the most accessible form of media in the country. Like Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats that reassured a dispirited nation that it was going to get through the Great Depression, an Afghan president can employ a similar method to unify and give hope to a people struggling through their darkest age.
In an effort to counter the voices of extremism, while at the same time reinvigorating the national soul and helping to form a bond between this hypothetical leader and the nation, an innovative approach should be considered.
Regular "fireside prayers" conducted in Dari and Pashto that address the tragedies of everyday Afghans, and which invoke Divine intervention and remembrance of the Divine, could reach millions of households. With the high illiteracy rate, these kinds of connections to a faithful public in their local languages would be invaluable. This alternative approach is one way that the pulpits of the religious zealots can gradually be dismantled.
Of course, this leader must also embody the ideals of an enlightened human being who pursues education, arts, reconstruction, energy and economic programs that respect the environment and take positive local traditions into account.
Along with the ethereal, such an individual should produce practical results on the ground through a transparent government that is corruption-free. Many will call this vision a pipe dream, but this period of crisis requires an extraordinary leader and a team of people who think practically and spiritually.
Today, Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, a middle path between a secular and theocratic form of government. It's time to realize the potential of this compromise, and to allow the great powers of democracy and Islam to finally reconcile in Afghanistan. Its survival as a nation depends upon it
Pakistani PM says U.S. to vacate airbase by Dec. 11
ISLAMABAD, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said Wednesday the United States would vacate a strategically important Pakistani air base by Dec. 11.
The country's military and civilian leadership on Saturday asked the U.S. to vacate Shamsi airbase in Balochistan province hours after NATO fighter jets and helicopters bombed two border posts and killed 24 soldiers.
The U.S. has been using the airbase for nearly 10 years for military operations in Afghanistan and spy aircraft strikes in Pakistan's tribal regions.
"The U.S. will vacate the airbase by Dec. 11," Prime Minister Gilani told reporters in Karachi. He said Pakistan had sent a formal letter to the U.S. to vacate the airbase.
Pakistan has closed supply lines for the U.S.-led NATO troops in Afghanistan as a protest to the strikes and decided to boycott next week's Bonn Conference on the future of Afghanistan.
Gilani said Afghan President Hamid Karzai called him on Tuesday and called for a review of the Bonn Conference boycott decision, but added that "Pakistan cannot put at risk its own security for Afghanistan."
"I had told President Karzai that Afghan soil was used for attack on Pakistan and we are protesting over the attacks," he said.
"Pakistan wants a guarantee for its security," Gilani said, adding that Afghan president argued that the U.S. and NATO had carried out the attack on Pakistani posts and Afghanistan had not been involved.
"Bonn Conference will be held for Afghanistan's security but who will guarantee our security in view of NATO strikes," the prime minister said.
"We cannot attend Bonn Conference unless we get guarantee of respect to our sovereignty, independence and security," Gilani said when asked about international appeals to Pakistan to change its boycott decision.
German Chancellor Angela Markel and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton regretted Pakistan's decision and asked for its review.
Obama Refrains From a Formal ‘I’m Sorry’ to Pakistan
By HELENE COOPER and MARK MAZZETTI, The New York Times November 30, 2011
WASHINGTON — The White House has decided that President Obama will not offer formal condolences — at least for now — to Pakistan for the deaths of two dozen soldiers in NATO airstrikes last week, overruling State Department officials who argued for such a show of remorse to help salvage America’s relationship with Pakistan, administration officials said.
On Monday, Cameron Munter, the United States ambassador to Pakistan, told a group of White House officials that a formal video statement from Mr. Obama was needed to help prevent the rapidly deteriorating relations between Islamabad and Washington from cratering, administration officials said. The ambassador, speaking by videoconference from Islamabad, said that anger in Pakistan had reached a fever pitch, and that the United States needed to move to defuse it as quickly as possible, the officials recounted.
Defense Department officials balked. While they did not deny some American culpability in the episode, they said expressions of remorse offered by senior department officials and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton were enough, at least until the completion of a United States military investigation establishing what went wrong.
Some administration aides also worried that if Mr. Obama were to overrule the military and apologize to Pakistan, such a step could become fodder for his Republican opponents in the presidential campaign, according to several officials who declined to be named because they were not authorized to speak publicly.
On Wednesday, White House officials said Mr. Obama was unlikely to say anything further on the matter in the coming days.
“The U.S. government has offered its deepest condolences for the loss of life, from the White House and from Secretary Clinton and Secretary Panetta,” said Tommy Vietor, spokesman for the National Security Council, referring to Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, “and we are conducting an investigation into the incident. We cannot offer additional comment on the circumstances of the incident until we have the results.”
The American and Pakistani accounts of the NATO strikes vary widely. A former senior American official briefed on the exchange said Wednesday that the airstrikes came in the last 15 to 20 minutes of a running three-hour skirmish, presumably with Taliban fighters on one or both sides of the border. That is at odds with the Pakistani account that its troops were in a two-hour firefight with the Americans.
Pakistan, rejecting the American account, has blocked all NATO logistical supplies that cross the border into Afghanistan, given the Central Intelligence Agency 15 days to vacate the Shamsi air base from which it has run drone strikes into Pakistani tribal areas and announced that it will boycott an international conference on Afghanistan’s security and development next week in Bonn, Germany.
With everything at stake in the relationship with Pakistan, which the United States sees as vital as it plans to exit from Afghanistan, some former Obama administration officials said the president should make public remarks on the border episode, including a formal apology.
“Without some effective measures of defusing this issue, Pakistan will cooperate less rather than more with us, and we won’t be able to achieve our goals in Afghanistan,” said Vali Nasr, a former State Department official who specialized in Pakistan.
But David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official and the author of “Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power,” said Pakistani officials need to understand that in the next year, the Obama administration will be less accommodating to Pakistani sensibilities.
“I do think that it’s important for them to recognize that political dynamics in the United States will lead to a hardening of U.S. positions, and the president will have less and less flexibility to accept the kind of behavior that he has in the past,” Mr. Rothkopf said. “The prognosis for U.S.-Pakistani relations is bleak.”
America’s strained ties with Pakistan have been buffeted by crises this year, from the killing of two Pakistanis by a C.I.A. contractor to the raid inside Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden.
The headaches of the relationship have meant that Pakistan has few friends inside the administration. As one former senior United States official who has been briefed on the administration’s recent deliberations put it, “Right now there are no Pakistan friendlies” at the White House.
But the administration desperately needs Pakistan’s cooperation in the American plan to withdraw militarily from Afghanistan by 2014. Several senior American officials have said Pakistani help is essential to persuade the Taliban to negotiate for peace.
Twice recently, the administration has solicited help from Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, to deliver messages to Islamabad to help defuse crises in the relationship.
On Wednesday, Mr. Kerry was guarded in his comments about the border episode. “We all appreciate how deeply this tragedy has affected the Pakistani people, and we have conveyed our heartfelt condolences through multiple channels,” Mr. Kerry said in an e-mail. “Ultimately, the only way to move the ball forward is to focus on areas where our interests align and where we can really make progress. Our two countries need each other.”
Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker contributed reporting.
5 Things Afghan History Can Teach Us
The Huffington Post, 30/11/2011 By Suleiman Wali
The French historian Alexis de Tocqueville once said, "When the past no longer illuminates the future, the spirit walks in darkness."
As world leaders converge on Bonn, Germany, next week to discuss the future of Afghanistan after 2014, is it likely that any of them will look to history to find better answers? Probably not.
Heeding de Tocqueville's warning, if we look beyond Afghan history of the previous decade and well into the last century, five key points emerge that could help the country lay a better foundation for itself once American and NATO forces reduce their presence or leave altogether.
The path toward democracy has been a difficult one in Afghanistan. Two previous attempts in the 20th century have failed. Find out why in Point #1, below.
1. Remember why it's important to support Afghan democracy.
In the 20th century, Afghans underwent two experiments toward democracy, both of which were unsuccessful.
In the first case, royal Prime Minister Shah Mahmud, the king's uncle, made modest attempts in 1949 to respond to demands for political reform and fairer elections. The result was the "Liberal Parliament" that elected reform-minded lawmakers who granted new liberties, like freedom of the press.
Student unions sprang up at Kabul University and a host of newspapers were born. The targets of their anger: conservative religious leaders on the one hand, and the government on the other. Unfortunately, having neither a tradition of responsible political activism nor freedom of expression, criticism became extreme and protests erupted. By 1953, out of fear that a revolution would brew, the royals shut down all non-government newspapers and arrested "liberal" leaders.
A decade later, King Zahir took a more active role in government and ushered in the country's second experiment with democracy and socio-economic modernization. One of his first undertakings was to order the drafting of a new liberalized constitution unlike any the country had seen before.
From equal rights, universal education and health care, to a vast penal code and the return of a free press, the Afghan constitution of 1964 was arguably the finest in the Muslim world. For the first time, women were allowed to enter politics and the king appointed four to parliament.
Despite this leap toward greater liberties, illiteracy was rampant and many parts of the country did not have the financial resources or facilities to implement universal education. Meanwhile, parliament was plagued with invective, unreasoned debates and an abysmal legislative record--not unlike today's Afghan legislature.
The king was seen as lacking leadership during the political imbroglio. Although the daily business of government continued, a series of prime ministers were unable to assemble enough support to carry out effective programs. By 1972, four premiers had resigned and the system was near collapse. A year later, the king was overthrown.
In either example, the transition to a democratic system proved difficult and nearly disastrous. Afghanistan's current democracy is trying to function in a period of more daunting problems.
Since April, at least three mass protests in Kabul turned violent and even deadly. Separately, a yearlong election dispute in parliament prevented a single piece of legislation from being ratified. The impasse finally ended last month.
In 2008, more than 600 mid-level and senior government officials were prosecuted or fired over corruption charges. Four years ago, 60 MPs threatened resignation if President Hamid Karzai didn't replace his foreign minister, who they deemed incompetent. Meanwhile, Karzai, once thought to be a shrewd statesman, has been dogged by allegations of corruption, nepotism and ineffectiveness.
And although the illiteracy rate has improved from what it was in the 20th century, more than 30 years of warfare has left the education system in shambles. Some 70 percent of Afghans still cannot read or write.
The question looms: Is democracy right for Afghanistan?
Yes. Even though both of the country's previous experiments in democracy failed, they were a testament to the Afghan people's desire for a system that brought about equal rights and representation for all its citizens.
A survey last year by the Asia Foundation discovered that 81 percent of Afghans believe in this principle. The same poll found "broad support for democracy as the best form of government, even higher than many other nations in the regions."
However, in order to put democratic principles into practice, the Afghan leadership must not repeat the mistakes of the past and remember the key reasons that their brief romances with democracy have ended.
2. A strong police and military are critical to safeguarding progressive reforms and women's rights.
Throughout the 20th century, Afghanistan has struggled with its efforts toward modernization. In some cases, these initiatives have been met with violent rejection from religious fundamentalists who feared it threatened their way of life.
Between 1919 and 1929, the young King Amanullah oversaw an array of social, political, and economic changes that affected nearly every facet of Afghan society. Calling himself a "revolutionary king," he was determined to modernize his country along the lines of Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Establishing a foundation of law for Afghanistan that was more secular than ever before, Amanullah gave his nation its first written constitution that contained a Bill of Rights and ended slavery. However, his most revolutionary changes involved greater freedom for women.
During his reign, coeducational schools were opened and polygamy was discouraged. Afghanistan even became the first Muslim country to abolish the custom of the veil when the king's wife, Queen Soraya, took off her headscarf at a public event.
But these changes were too drastic for Afghanistan's conservative leaders. When Amanullah returned from a tour of Europe, tribal armies descended on Kabul and drove out the enlightened monarch--literally. He and his wife fled in the middle of the night in their Rolls Royce.
Amanullah's father-in-law, the intellectual statesman Mahmud Tarzi, would later lament: "If only he had waited for two years and built up the army as Ataturk suggested, what might he have done?"
By the late 1950s, another dynamic leader had learned from King Amanullah's mistake. With a stronger army and police force, Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud defeated several mob and tribal rebellions that were directed against his women's rights reforms.
Today, according to the Asia Foundation's 2011 Afghanistan survey, more than a third of Afghans cite insecurity as the biggest problem confronting their nation. With terror attacks against girls' schools and government leaders still at high levels, it underscores the need for a stalwart army that can retain its members.
In 2009, Afghan security forces finally got a pay raise that put their salaries within the range of Taliban fighters. The increase drew more than 2,600 new recruits in the first seven days after it was announced. The Afghan National Army now has around 160,000 personnel and is expected to reach 260,000 by 2015.
That figure comes closer to the 300,000 combat troops that western military analysts had estimated in the early 1980s that the Soviets would need in order to "pacify" the entire country. It is also close to the 300,000 soldiers that Emir Abdur Rahman had assembled during his reign in the late 19th century when he formed the country's first national army and used it to unify Afghanistan under a central government.
3. Pakistan must become a genuine partner in peace.
Ever since the creation of the Pakistani state in 1947, Afghanistan has had a contentious and, at times, hostile relationship with its eastern neighbor.
The seed of this thorny rapport can be traced back to the late 19th century when the British had colonial control over India. It was then that English diplomat Mortimer Durand coerced Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman to sign a vague agreement that demarcated spheres of influence along the Afghan-Indian border. The single-page document was essentially used by the British to divide and weaken the Pashtun tribes who lived on both sides of the line.
For decades, the Pashtun tribesmen had blocked British attempts at absorbing Afghanistan into its empire. The Great Game, as it famously came to be called, was the geopolitical battle between the British and Russian empires for dominance over Central Asia. Afghanistan was basically seen as the buffer state that could keep Russia out of India.
In 1893, Mortimer drew a poorly marked 1,600-mile line that bisected Afghanistan from its panhandle down through its southwestern border with Iran. The Emir, an ethnic Pashtun himself, feared that if he did not agree to the Durand Line, British India would wage a fierce campaign to replace him. But in his autobiography, Abdur Rahman issued a prophetic warning:
"If you should cut these tribes out of my dominions, they will neither be of any use to you or me. You will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand. But if at any time a foreign enemy appears on these borders, these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies."
Fifty-four years later, the temporary line became a permanent border. Land that was long regarded to be Afghan was absorbed into Pakistan. Validating Abdur Rahman's prophecy, it is that porous region today where the fiercest battles have been waged between al-Qaida/Taliban forces and the American military.
Throughout the 1950s, the redrawn map and its international recognition drove a wedge between Afghan Prime Minister Daoud and Pakistan. Both sides waged a fierce propaganda campaign to win over the hearts and minds of the people in the disputed territories. In retribution, goods that were transported from the Arabian Sea through Pakistan often arrived pilfered or damaged on the other side of the border.
The issue of "Pashtunistan" was a constant point of contention between Daoud and the Pakistani government, and nearly drove the two countries to war. The diplomatic rift became so intense that it caused the Durand border to be closed for a year, severely harming the Afghan economy. The issue was resolved only when Daoud resigned in 1963.
When he returned to power ten years later after staging a bloodless coup against his first-cousin, King Zahir, Islamabad grew alarmed. The Pashtunistan movement, which had been muted during the king's experiment in democracy, was amplified once again.
By 1975, a stronger and bolder Pakistan welcomed a handful of Afghanistan's fundamentalist leaders and set up secret military camps to train them as guerrilla fighters against Daoud's newly formed Republic, write authors Liz Gould and Paul Fitzgerald. Five years later, these were some of the same camps that Washington funded to fight the Soviets.
Today, that embryo of religious fanaticism--with help from elements within Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency--is full-grown and waging war on Americans, Afghans and Pakistanis. In his final congressional testimony in September, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen lambasted extremist elements within Pakistan's military for their support of terror attacks in Afghanistan.
"With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy," Mullen said, referring to the deadly strike on the American embassy in Kabul in September.
That declaration, along with the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and this past weekend's deadly NATO attack on two Pakistani military posts, has sunk U.S. relations with Islamabad to a new low.
In reprisal for Saturday's airstrike that killed more than 20 Pakistani soldiers, Islamabad has indefinitely shut down NATO's supply lines through their country, and said it was re-evaluating its intelligence, diplomatic and military links with the U.S. If this retaliatory move lasts long, it will obviously harm both American forces and the Afghan population.
Prior to this development, the American military had been trying to circumvent transit through Pakistan, finding a variety of alternate routes through Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors in what's being called the Northern Distribution Network. A top military commander told NPR that the U.S. military had to find substitute channels because it lost as much as 15 percent of its supplies through Pakistan to ambush and theft in 2008 alone.
History has shown that Islamabad has not worked in the general interest of the Afghan people. Even though many in the Pakistani government will argue that it sheltered millions of Afghan refugees during the Soviet war, it is an undisputed fact that their country benefited from that conflict. In fact, according to Lawrence Wright, "as much as half of the money the U.S. gave to the I.S.I. to fight the Soviets was diverted to build nuclear weapons."
Those weapons have been built up to shield against the threat or perceived threat that Pakistan feels is coming from neighboring India, its archrival. After all, a paranoid Islamabad wants "strategic depth" in Afghanistan in case a war breaks out with India.
Unfortunately, this kind of mentality weakens the entire region. Instead of building schools, creating a solid education system, and healing the fractured Af-Pak relationship, the region could grow into the next generation's worst enemies--bigger and bolder than ever.
4. Education must incorporate Afghan nationalism.
Through a ruthless campaign of unification in the late 1800s, Emir Abdur Rahman succeeded in breaking down Afghanistan's feudal system, and established effective control over the entire country for the first time in history. The Emir understood that without a concept of unity and nationalism, Afghanistan could easily fall back to a warring country of independent states and ethnic groups.
In his autobiography, Abdur Rahman wrote: "The first and most important advice that I can give my successors and people ... is to impress upon their minds the value of unity. Unity, and unity alone, can make Afghanistan into a great power."
A quarter-of-a-century later, that message would be echoed by his grandson, King Amanullah, who turned it into law under Article One of the country's constitution: "... all parts of the nation are to be treated as a single unit without discrimination between different parts of the country."
Amanullah's father-in-law, Mahmud Tarzi, impressed this idea even further into the nation's psyche. Tarzi launched Afghanistan's first newspaper, Seraj al-Akhbar (The Torch of News), and one of its central missions was to advocate national unity and promote a love of country, particularly among the youth. According to Dr. Senzil Nawid, he even redefined the word for birthplace, "watan," to mean homeland--a word that had not existed in the Pashto or Dari languages.
Nawid writes, "[Tarzi] paid serious attention to issues of language and literature and modern education, which he saw as essential not only for national progress but for the realization of social and political homogeneity--common language, history, geography, and literature."
While King Zahir's 40-year reign was not one that was marked with remarkable equality of social classes, it can be noted for its absence of ethnic rivalries or conflict. Even as Mohammed Daoud, the first president of the Afghan Republic in the 1970s, may have supported a one-sided nationalistic movement with his tenacious effort to regain the Pashtun territories lost to Pakistan, Afghans still consider him one of their country's fiercest patriots.
Today, largely in part to the post-Soviet civil war, Afghanistan's national and cultural identities have been shattered. Ethnic divisions and strife are rampant. And with little confidence in the national government--which is the most ethnically diverse in Afghan history--a nationalistic spirit does not have a healthy place from which to emanate.
With the absence of a well-respected president or legislature, nationalism can only be taught in the schools through programs that promote unity and teach cultural heritage. The country's diversity is its greatest strength, and if this notion is not inaugurated in the children, Afghanistan as a nation is doomed to fail in the next 20 years.
Abdur Rahman may have said it best: "There is no doubt that Afghanistan is a country that will either rise to be a very strong, famous kingdom, or will be swept altogether from the surface of the earth. ... I must say that it is impossible that she ever take the middle course."
5. The Afghan leadership should become the leading voice of moderate Islam for the country.
Throughout the 264 years that the Afghan state has existed, Islam, either expressively or subtly, has played an inextricable role in the political and social fabric of its society. Most notably, it was used to bring down the Soviet goliath in the 1980s.
In more recent times, Islam was perverted and used to justify repression and evil. When properly understood, however, it is this very faith that has broken these kinds of shackles and provided periods of enlightened thought and action.
For example, during his premiership in the 1950s, Prime Minister Daoud employed legal scholars who carefully examined each modernization step to ensure it did not violate Islamic law. These young advisers received an education in the West and at Cairo's al-Azhar University, considered the finest Islamic school in the world.
Having determined that both the veil and the ban that prevented females from leaving their homes without a male escort could not be justified in Islamic law, Daoud took steps to end these traditions. Some women followed suit, others didn't--but a precedent of choice was reestablished.
When Daoud returned as president in 1973, his pilgrimage to Mecca four years later was broadcast on state television, silencing the religious fanatics who had branded him a Communist.
In the 1920s, Queen Soraya became the first Muslim queen to appear in public with her husband, before the wives of the monarchs in Persia and Egypt. When King Amanullah lifted the custom of the veil during the same period, he proclaimed: "Religion does not require women to veil their hands, feet and faces or enjoin any special type of veil. Tribal custom must not impose itself on the free will of the individual."
Against the wishes of the religious conservatives, he opened coeducational schools and championed the inclusion of women in society. In the constitution, Amanullah declared, "Jews and Hindus residing in Afghanistan would be entitled to full protection of the state."
Tarzi, the king's mentor, was heavily influenced by the enlightened Islamic thought of the era in Syria and the Ottoman Empire. His nationalist ideology, which was discussed before, was articulated within a framework of Islamic principles. According to Nawid, Tarzi believed that "Afghan Islamic identity would transcend tribal, ethnic, regional, and sectarian loyalties."
Today, religious extremists in Afghanistan, and throughout most of the Muslim world, have drowned out the voices of the moderates and intellectuals. Fundamentalist Islam has muffled spiritual Islam, which in a traumatized country like Afghanistan can help heal the damaged psyches of its population.
The millions of Afghans who have suffered through 30 years of warfare, forced migration, homelessness, torture, terrorism, death, and near collapse of cultural identity are in need of some form of collective healing that can come from their leadership. Nelson Mandela did it in South Africa, and Mahatma Gandhi in India.
According to recent figures, 81 percent of the Afghan population currently owns a radio, making it the most accessible form of media in the country. Like Franklin Roosevelt's fireside chats that reassured a dispirited nation that it was going to get through the Great Depression, an Afghan president can employ a similar method to unify and give hope to a people struggling through their darkest age.
In an effort to counter the voices of extremism, while at the same time reinvigorating the national soul and helping to form a bond between this hypothetical leader and the nation, an innovative approach should be considered.
Regular "fireside prayers" conducted in Dari and Pashto that address the tragedies of everyday Afghans, and which invoke Divine intervention and remembrance of the Divine, could reach millions of households. With the high illiteracy rate, these kinds of connections to a faithful public in their local languages would be invaluable. This alternative approach is one way that the pulpits of the religious zealots can gradually be dismantled.
Of course, this leader must also embody the ideals of an enlightened human being who pursues education, arts, reconstruction, energy and economic programs that respect the environment and take positive local traditions into account.
Along with the ethereal, such an individual should produce practical results on the ground through a transparent government that is corruption-free. Many will call this vision a pipe dream, but this period of crisis requires an extraordinary leader and a team of people who think practically and spiritually.
Today, Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, a middle path between a secular and theocratic form of government. It's time to realize the potential of this compromise, and to allow the great powers of democracy and Islam to finally reconcile in Afghanistan. Its survival as a nation depends upon it.
Suleiman Wali is an Afghan-American writer and producer who has worked in the fields of media and public relations for more than 10 years. He holds a Masters degree in Film & Video from American University in Washington, D.C.
Suleiman Wali is the founder of Lapis Media, a company which aims to produce documentaries, films and multimedia projects that help heal the psychocultural scars of diasporas through engaging and educational storytelling about their homelands.
Bulgaria announces plan for troops withdrawal from Afghanistan
SOFIA, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Bulgaria announced Wednesday it would withdraw three quarters of its 610-member contingent in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
According to a strategy adopted by the government, Bulgaria will pull out its medical team from the city of Herat by the end of 2012 and the country's contingent based in Kabul and Kandahar would return home at the beginning of 2013 and by the end of 2014 respectively.
But the country would continue to help train the Afghan security forces after 2014, the government said.
Bulgaria, which joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, has been participating in the NATO-led ISAF mission since 2002.
3 insurgents killed, 14 detained in Afghanistan
KABUL, Nov.30 (Xinhua) -- Afghan police, backed by army and NATO-led Coalition forces, during operations killed three armed insurgents and captured 14 other suspects over the past 24 hours, Afghan Interior Ministry said on Wednesday.
"Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan National Army and Coalition Forces launched four joint operations in surrounding areas of the Kandahar, Khost and Herat provinces over the past 24 hours,"the ministry said in a statement.
"As a result of these operations, three armed insurgent were killed, three wounded and 14 others were arrested by ANP," it said, adding a handful of weapons and ammunition were also found and seized by police in the same operations.
Afghan officials often use the word "insurgents" referring to Taliban.
Taliban insurgents, whose regime was toppled in a U.S.-led incursion in late 2001, have intensified activities since the militant group announced to launch spring offensive against Afghan security forces and NATO-led troops stationed in Afghanistan on May 1, have yet to make comments.
Senate urges Obama to hasten return of troops from Afghanistan
The Senate on Wednesday quietly approved a measure requiring President Obama to more swiftly withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
By Lisa Mascaro November 30, 2011 Los Angeles Times
The Senate on Wednesday quietly approved a measure requiring President Obama to more swiftly withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
The amendment from Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) was attached to a broader defense bill making its way through the Senate. It was approved by a voice vote, without dissent.
“It is time to bring our men and women home,” Merkley said. “The U.S. Senate sent that message to the president today in unequivocal terms.”
The Afghanistan amendment requires the president to develop an accelerated plan to withdraw troops ahead of the planned December 2014 deadline and transition security operations to the government of Afghanistan and submit that proposal to Congress within 90 days of the bill’s passage.
Earlier this week, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have ended the authority for the war in Iraq.
The broader defense bill is must-pass legislation that sets Pentagon policy for fiscal 2012. The White House has threatened to veto the defense bill over objections to provisions on the treatment of detainees in suspected terrorism investigations.
Several insurgents detained in former Taliban stronghold: NATO
KABUL, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Afghan and NATO-led forces during a joined operation in Taliban former stronghold Kandahar, 450 km south of Afghan capital city Kabul, captured several insurgents on Wednesday, a statement of the alliance released here said.
"A combined Afghan and coalition security force conducted an operation in search of a Taliban facilitator in Shah Wali Kot district, Kandahar province, today and arrested multiple insurgents during the operations," the statement added.
However, the statement did not provide more details.
Taliban militants fighting Afghan and NATO-led troops have yet to make comment.
Kandahar, the birthplace of Taliban and former stronghold of the insurgents, have been the scene of Taliban-linked militancy over the past couple of years.
Kabul police discover explosive device, foil terrorist attack
KABUL, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- The Afghan police discovered explosive device from a suburb outside Afghan capital Kabul on Tuesday and thus foiled a terrorist attack, a statement of the Interior Ministry released here Wednesday said.
"Some 20 kg explosive device planted by terrorists in Mulayan village, Sarubi district of Kabul province was found by police yesterday and thus thwarted a terrorist offensive," the statement went on to say.
Taliban militants fighting Afghan and NATO-led troops have been largely relying on suicide and roadside bombings over the past couple of years. In the latest roadside bombing for which the Taliban outfit claimed responsibility, one NATO soldier sustained injuries in northern Baghlan province on Tuesday.
Unknown men splash acid on 3 sisters in northern Afghan town
KUNDUZ, Afghanistan, Nov. 30 (Xinhua) -- Three girls of a family in Kunduz province 250 km north of Afghan capital Kabul have been disfigured as unknown men sprayed acid on their faces Tuesday night, Nadira Gia, the Director of Women Affairs Department in Kunduz province said Wednesday.
"Some unidentified men entered a house in Bulakawal village in the outskirt of Kunduz provincial capital the Kunduz city last night and after beating the members of the family dozed acid on the faces of three sisters," Gia told press.
The innocent suffered girls are 8, 12 and 17 years old and the condition of the elder one is critical, she added.
Gia also said the attackers had badly beaten the father of the innocent girls before leaving the house.
The attackers have made their good escape and no one has been arrested so far, she further said.
Violence against women in Afghanistan is on the rise despite government efforts to protect women rights. More than 2,290 cases of violence against women including forced marriages, under-aged marriages, beating by in-laws and family members had been registered in 2010, according to Afghan Human Rights Commission.
In some countryside and villages held by Taliban militants, some women have even been stoned to death by the insurgents over the past couple of years.
Pentagon, USGS launch new initiative to explore mineral resources in Afghanistan
WASHINGTON, Nov. 29 (Xinhua) -- The Pentagon and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) on Tuesday launched a new initiative to help Afghans better explore their mineral resources.
The Pentagon's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), in partnership with the USGS, will provide training and equipment specific to airborne geophysical exploration to the Afghan Geological Survey, the Pentagon said in a statement.
"This initiative is part of the U.S. Government's continuing efforts to help the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan identify and develop its vast deposits of mineral resources in a transparent and responsible fashion," the Pentagon said.
A key component of the new effort is to train Afghan geoscientists in collecting, processing and interpreting high- resolution geophysical data themselves.
"By working with the Afghan Geological Survey on an airborne geophysical exploration program, we are taking an important step in preparing the Afghan government to conduct their own mineral exploration efforts," said Emily Scott, director of natural resource development for the TFBSO. "The goal of this training is to enable the Afghan government to give the best information possible to international investors."
The Pentagon has already worked extensively with the USGS to develop an ongoing survey of mineral resources and rare earth elements in Afghanistan.
The Pentagon announced last year that Afghanistan could become one of the world's leading sources of mineral wealth, as an estimated 1 trillion dollars of untapped mineral deposits have been discovered in the country.
The mineral deposits, including gold, cobalt, iron ore, copper, aluminum, silver, molybdenum and lithium -- used in cell phone batteries -- are spread throughout the country, especially in the battle-scarred border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Exploration of natural resources and its utilization would enable Afghans to be no longer dependent on international community and rather help them to stand on their feet.
Still, analysts said that robust development of the mining industry is unlikely to occur until the security situation is under control.
Kyrgyzstan’s outgoing leader says fate of US base depends on Afghan situation
Associated Press November 29 , 2011
BISHKEK, Kyrgyzstan - Kyrgyzstan’s outgoing president said Tuesday that the decision on whether to allow the U.S. air base to remain in the country after its lease ends in 2014 depends on developments in nearby Afghanistan.
Roza Otunbayeva said she favors turning the Manas base at the capital’s main airport into a civilian aviation facility, but conceded that the illegal drug trafficking business poses a security threat to Kyrgyzstan.
The United States has used the base in the ex-Soviet Central Asian nation as a key logistical hub for military operations in Afghanistan since 2001.
Otunbayeva’s successor, Almaz Atambayev, who will take power on Thursday, has said the base should be closed when the lease expires out of fears that it could leave Kyrgyzstan vulnerable to retaliatory strikes from targets of U.S. military action.
Manas has been the subject of protracted wrangling between successive Kyrgyz governments and the United States over the size of lease payments. That has prompted some observers to speculate that Kyrgyz authorities may be willing to extend the lease past the current June 2014 expiration date in exchange for better commercial terms.
Also in her final statement Tuesday, Otunbayeva voiced pride at the progress she says her country has made in deepening democratic values.
Atambayev won more than 60 percent of votes in October’s election, easily pushing aside nationalist rivals. Authorities hope his presidency will usher in a period of political stability in a country that has been roiled over the past year and a half by political and ethnic violence.
Otunbayeva took over after the overthrow of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev in April 2010 and often struggled to impress her authority on a country that looked on the verge of collapse.
For all the enduring tensions bubbling under the surface, Otunbayeva said her government had managed to pursue an agenda of transparency and equality.
“There are no people here that do not see themselves in this country, nobody is being harassed, nobody is being persecuted,” she said.
Those claims will likely ring hollow to many members of the minority ethnic Uzbek community, however, who complain that they were disproportionately singled out for police action after a wave of ethnic clashes in June 2010 that left almost 500 people dead. The Uzbek minority, which suffered the heaviest losses in the violence, has seen its role in the local economy relentlessly stamped out.
The most notable achievement registered under Otunbayeva’s 20-month leadership has been the transition to a more parliamentary style of government and the watering down of the presidency.
Central Asia is a region dominated by strongman presidents, and Kyrgyzstan’s attempt to forge a model of governance that uneasily balances the various branches of power is viewed with barely veiled hostility by neighboring countries. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has said that the parliamentary system could prove catastrophic for Kyrgyzstan.
Is there hope for Afghanistan?
Foreign Policy By Linda Robinson Tuesday, November 29, 2011
After spending last month in Afghanistan on my fourth trip this year, the situation can best be described as a glass half full. A multifaceted effort in the south, led by a "surge" of U.S. and Afghan troops, has increased security in the southern Pashtun heartland this year. But a steady drumbeat of high-profile attacks, including a brazen assault on the U.S. embassy and assassinations of key Afghan officials, has had an outsized impact on the population by eroding already weak confidence in the Afghan government and the forces supporting it. As I was ending my trip with a few days in Kabul, an SUV packed with 700 kilos of explosives rammed an armored "Rhino" bus, killing a dozen Americans and inflicting horrific burns on others in a targeted, planned attack reminiscent of the worst days in Baghdad. The U.S. military has adopted the line that these "spectacular attacks" are in fact signs of the Taliban's weakness, and points instead to a notable decline in the number of enemy initiated attacks.
But numbers matter less than perception in these wars -- and shaping perception is precisely how terrorist groups fight and win. The dominant narrative in Afghanistan is: the Americans are leaving, the government is weak, the Taliban is still strong, and Pakistan is the problem. And though the details of the cross-border NATO bombardment Saturday, which killed 24 Pakistani soldiers, are still murky, it will undoubtedly send U.S.-Pakistan relations into a further downward spiral. Unless the reality underlying these perceptions about the United States in the region are addressed, sustainable momentum on the government side cannot be generated. The U.S. surge may have started to turn around the momentum that is currently favoring the Taliban, but Afghan political and military actions are required to create a perception -- and the reality -- that the Afghan government is capable of surviving and prevailing. Addressing several factors bedeviling the Afghan campaign between now and next summer, when the traditional fighting season resumes and more troops go home, might turn perception and thus momentum in the Afghan government's favor. Six are most critical:
Promptly reaching a strategic partnership agreement in which the United States pledges to continue providing security and economic assistance after 2014 could go a long way toward reducing Afghan fears of abandonment. The U.S. and Afghan governments have been negotiating such an agreement for over a year, and the general idea of a partnership (albeit with a 10-year limit on American forces in Afghanistan after 2014) was approved at President Hamid Karzai's Loya Jirga this week; both sides hope to finalize it before the Bonn summit next month. The sticking points are night raids, which Karzai would like to end, and the transfer of detainees to Afghan control, despite a recent U.N. report cataloguing abusive practices in Afghan intelligence detention centers. The first issue can be postponed or finessed, but the United States is bound by international convention not to turn over detainees if it believes they will be tortured or mistreated. In the run-up to the Bonn Conference, Karzai will hopefully stay focused on the need to reassure Afghans of ongoing U.S. support and assistance as coalition troop levels decline over the coming years.
Forging a common front with his main backer, the United States, would help Karzai repair some of the image of weakness that plagues his government. Veteran U.S. ambassador Ryan Crocker and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)'s top commander Gen. John Allen have worked hard to "reset" the relationship with Karzai since they arrived this summer. One of his frequent interlocutors notes that Karzai "is exhausted, and he knows he is irritable and unpredictable." Nader Nadery, a commissioner of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, chides Karzai for his "lack of firmness. There is no clarity on where he stands." And, like many Afghans I spoke to, Nadery sees the president's tolerance of corrupt activity as a major weakness. Yet despite these failings, many Afghans I've talked to still see him as currently the only leader who can balance the myriad rivalries and swirling tensions that beset Afghan national politics, in particular the concern that Tajik leaders may be girding for an all-out civil war once the U.S. departs. The assassination of former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Tajik head of Karzai's High Peace Council, significantly ratcheted up those concerns.
Afghan security forces need to move demonstrably into the lead. The U.S. plans to push Afghan forces out front in more and more operations, if only to determine just how ready they are to take the lead and where the weak links are. To get them ready, U.S. forces must make partnering with and mentoring their Afghan partners its top priority, which it is not. By the military's own count in the latest DOD report mandated by Congress, 95 Afghan units in critical areas have no coalition partner whatsoever, and many others are only loosely mentored.
Afghans will have to step up if the three stated objectives of the military campaign are to be accomplished -- namely, to secure the south, the populated corridor along Highway One up to Kabul, and key areas of the east, especially the crucial provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost. The south has been greatly stabilized over the past year, but the job is not yet done. I spent ten days in Kandahar province, where the longtime Taliban strongholds of Zhari, Panjwayi and Maiwand are still heavily contested. Returning from Maiwand, which is mostly still Taliban dominated, I passed through the Panjwayi district center, where a car bomb detonated a short while later. We stopped in Kandahar city for dinner -- one of the few times I have been with a U.S. military unit that felt comfortable dining at night in an Afghan city. The company commander ordered roast chickens, pilaf and delicious nan bread for all his men, and we picnicked amid the city's bustling nightlife, surrounded by curious Afghan men and children. Yet that reality coexisted with a frontal assault, hours earlier, on the Kandahar provincial reconstruction team, located just across from the provincial governor's office.
The current priority is to expand the security bubble beyond Kabul to Wardak, Logar and then Ghazni and Zabul provinces, thus securing the country's major highway all the way down to Kandahar. After that, the campaign plans to shift to the east, but it needs to tightly focus on the key population areas. There is a danger of focusing too much on sparsely populated provinces and neglecting the Khost to Gardez corridor, which has a large population and has been both an insurgent stronghold and transit route from the beginning of the war. Attempting to cut every ratline in the country is a sure fire way to fritter away forces. The only way that the campaign objectives can be achieved is if coalition forces focus on the important areas, and if Afghan security forces take more of the lead.
The expanding self-defense initiative may increase security. Security out in the countryside, where the insurgency is based, is starting to get a lift from the year-old Afghan Local Police program, but it is too early to judge the net effect of the program. It now has 8,500 recruits, mostly farmers who have volunteered and been trained to do checkpoint security and patrols in their villages. I've visited a half dozen of the 57 sites, where Special Operations Forces train and mentor the ALP and work with the district police chief, who is the Afghan official charged with their formal command and control, as well as providing them with salaries, trucks, weapons and ammunition. The program, strongly backed by ISAF, is funded and approved to grow to 30,000 in 100 districts, but the painstaking process of gaining community support and ensuring that the government exercises proper oversight means it will be another year or more before the program is fully implemented.
Thus far, RAND quarterly assessments done for the Special Operations Forces command in Afghanistan say that the program is broadly supported by local residents and that security in the sites has improved. The principal concern expressed by the program's critics is that these small groups (limited to 300 per district) will become militias, which historically have been armies of 30,000 or more under the command of a single warlord. The ALP program aims to prevent that by creating a strong link to district and provincial police chiefs from the outset. A recent Human Rights Watch Report catalogued allegations of abuse, disputes and ethnic tensions in some areas, although U.S. officials dispute some of the claims, which are under official investigation.
The ALP program features greater oversight and vetting mechanisms than earlier similar efforts, but continuing vigilance is necessary, as with all security forces. The Special Forces team in Maiwand told me about an ALP member who went AWOL, and along with his brother, started holding up cars for bribes on Highway One, the highway linking Kandahar to Kabul. The Taliban shot him dead. ALP commanders have fired numerous members they feel are not up to snuff. One of the sites, in Baghlan, is a unique case in that the Afghan government asked SOF to form a local police unit out of former insurgents from the small Hezb-e Islami faction; insurgents are not the recruiting base for ALP, unlike the Sons of Iraq program. The tensions in the area are increased by the fact that the area is a pocket of Pashtuns surrounded by a larger Tajik population. The Afghan interior ministry official who has national oversight of the program, Brig. Gen. Ali Shah Ahmadzai, told me that he has put the ALP commander, who is under investigation, on notice that he will be arrested "if he does not behave."
Promises to rural Afghans should be moderated but honored. The reality is that the dysfunctional Afghan bureaucracy cannot deliver funds to individual provinces, let alone the district level where 76 percent of the Afghan population ekes out a subsistence living. At present, most district governments are fig leafs for the distribution of international aid projects. I sat in the Khas Kunar district governor's office as he talked to the provincial governor's secretary about getting funds for a backhoe to dig out canals damaged in recent floods. A U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) official had suggested he seek to tap the $25,000 "performance based" fund that USAID provides each month to provincial governors. The district governor smiled and nodded as the conversation concluded, then turned to us and said, "It will take a year for the necessary paperwork and to get approval from Kabul." Yet there has been progress - in many areas district governors did not even visit, let alone live in, their districts last year. Many areas have now been pacified sufficiently for them to return. During the week I spent in Maiwand, I saw the governor preside over four meetings, although he still returns to Kandahar city each weekend where his family lives. Prioritizing needs is essential, since USAID funds and staff are slated to decline significantly, and the civilian state-building effort will focus on the provincial level rather than the districts. The district delivery program, for example, will end next year after reaching only 45 of the country's 398 districts. This program, which supports training and salary increases for district officials, is current under way in only 12 districts. A number of civilian officials and nongovernmental organizations believe dispute resolution, primarily through the traditional local mediation practices system, should be the highest priority in conflict-ridden areas where land and other disputes often fuel insurgent violence.
Pakistan is the glaring problem that has dramatically worsened and must be addressed. A senior U.S. official in Kabul declared flatly to me, "We will not succeed unless the Pakistan safe havens are reduced." He does not believe Pakistan will come around, despite countless U.S. pleas for more action. Pakistan balks at getting tough on the Afghan insurgent groups that are the central cards in its hedging strategy -- particularly the deadly Haqqani network, based in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal agency. And U.S. officials recognize that an assault into the agency simply is not going to happen.
The United States and Afghanistan will have to neutralize the threat from Waziristan through their own efforts, and indeed these efforts have stepped up dramatically. Operation Knife Edge rounded up many Haqqani operatives last month. A senior Haqqani facilitator, Mali Khan, was nabbed as he crossed the border, and another, Janbaz Zadran, was killed by a suspected CIA drone attack on October 13. During the week I spent in Paktika, U.S. forces dropped 33,000 pounds of bombs on the border to close mountain passes that the insurgents use. A U.S. commander there pointed out a dozen "POOs" or points of origin, of artillery or rockets fired from Pakistan into Afghanistan. They were all within sight of Pakistani Frontier Corps outposts - leaving little doubt about active or passive support for militants among some Pakistani forces. U.S. and Afghan forces are under direct attack from Pakistani territory, and Lieutenant General Curtis Scaparrotti assured me that when they take "effective" fire, U.S. forces shoot back.
The dilemma, however, is that Pakistan holds a critical trump card, as it demonstrated this week by its ability to close major commercial crossings in retaliation for Saturday's cross-border strike. When I visited that part of the border area last month, Special Forces soldiers told me that an insurgent camp near the two border posts was a major source of attacks in the region.
If the Afghan and U.S. governments can agree on a common plan, backed by a lower but sustainable level of U.S. troops, they just might start winning the battle of perceptions. Given the insurgents' lack of popularity -- they rely on intimidation -- the Afghan government should be able to prevail in either defeating the insurgency or forcing them into a political accommodation if the United States remains willing to lend a hand. It might take five or ten years. But the alternative is not a pretty one to contemplate: the U.S. departs, Afghanistan crumbles, and the war fought to avenge the 9/11 attacks is perceived to be a failure. As I wrote in my last book on the Iraq war, Americans need to be prepared for wars to last a decade. The Afghan war, which the United States attempted to fight largely through a counterterrorism approach for the first seven years, has only begun in earnest in the last three. There is a third choice between the current large-scale U.S. counterinsurgency campaign and reverting to a counter-terrorism approach, and that is an Afghan-led counterinsurgency effort that that the United States can support in a sustainable way.
Linda Robinson is Adjunct Senior Fellow for U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. She is writing a book on the war in Afghanistan.
Sesame Street goes to Afghanistan
Singing, dancing and barking are out, but Sesame Street is teaching Afghan children to count, read and write
The Guardian By Jon Boone Wednesday 30 November 2011
Kabul - Ever since they made their first appearance on a New York sidestreet in the 1960s, Big Bird and his pals have taught children around the world how to count, read and write.
Now the cast of Sesame Street has made it all the way to Afghanistan, with a few nips and tucks to make them palatable to the local audience.
Launching on Thursday evening, out goes anything that could be interpreted as encouraging children to sing, dance – or even bark like dogs.
With parents thought likely to frown on their children singing and dancing in front of the TV, the stars of Baghch-e-Simsin exhort their young viewers to "exercise" instead.
"We tested a scene where Ernie is barking like a dog and getting Bert to copy him, but we found that parents were dead set against it," says Tania Farzana the Afghan-American executive producer of the show. "A dog is considered to be unclean, so the parents didn't understand it."
The programme is a co-production between the non-profit Sesame Workshop and Moby Media, an Afghan company that specialises in bringing western TV formats such as Pop Idol and Deal or No Deal to Afghan screens.
With funding from the US state department, 26 programmes have been made at the scruffy central Kabul street where Moby is based. The programme will air four times a week on both its Dari and Pashtu language channels. But, although Big Bird has been renamed "King of the birds", the cultural accommodation has not all been one way.
Sesame Workshop executives in the US keep tight control over how their international partners refit their show. One segment recorded in Afghanistan involving a family car ride had to be dropped because, as with nearly all local motorists, no one was wearing a seatbelt.
And in a country where health and safety is unheard of, producers struggled to find a building site to film where workmen wore hard hats, sturdy shoes and protective clothing.
Nonetheless, the Sesame Street formula remains fundamentally intact, with cheery, brightly coloured puppets keeping children entertained while the programme delivers some carefully targeted educational messages, including the famous "letter of the day" and plenty of maths.
"In a country with an extremely young population and an education system that is not up to standard, then reaching millions of kids through television seems to us the way to go," said Saad Mohseni, chief executive of Moby Media.
Also present in the Afghan version is the social activism that once caused consternation in parts of 1970s America with its portrayal of a racially harmonious inner-city neighbourhood. For a film about a girl's first day at school, the Afghan production team deliberately chose a character from the Hazara community, a much put-upon minority in a country where there are growing fears of ethnic fragmentation.
Sherrie Westin, vice-president of Sesame Workshop, said the programme's daily mini-documentaries about the daily lives Afghan children "celebrate diversity and introduce children from Afghanistan's various provinces to each other".
Compared to many of the other 22 international Sesame co-productions there will be no new puppeteering in Afghanistan for the time being. Instead, the show's makers pick from vast amounts of already recorded video, which is then voiced over.
Moby Media, with its stable of Indian and Turkish soaps that have to be translated into local languages, has mastered the art of dubbing.
But revoicing a muppet poses different challenges, says Ali Abdullah Vakili, the 23-year-old voice of Big Bird. Because they speak by "mouth flapping" the Afghan scripts have to match the same syllables as the English original. "It's much harder than doing humans," Vakili says. "The first time I saw it I thought it was impossible."
Road to recovery in Afghanistan goes through the countryside
As NATO troops prepare to leave Afghanistan in 2014, donor countries must rethink their aid to that war-torn country. Edward Girardet, who has reported on Afghanistan for more than 30 years, writes that they must focus on rural areas, where most Afghans live.
Christian Science Monitor By Edward Girardet November 29, 2011
Geneva - When the West first intervened in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, experienced aid coordinators, journalists, and diplomats had some simple advice:
Don’t get carried away with wasteful military campaigns or a Sisyphean anti-narcotics drive. They contribute little to long-term peace. To help Afghanistan, focus instead on modest but doable development initiatives in the countryside, where nearly 80 percent of Afghans live.
This largely ignored advice still holds, as high-level delegations gather in Bonn, Germany, on Dec. 5 to consider the way forward in Afghanistan, which has suffered from more than three decades of war. It’s a critical time as NATO-led security forces seek to transition toward 2014, when most troops are expected to leave.
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Western and Afghan leaders first met in this German town a decade ago to kick-start a proposed “Marshall Plan” for the reconstruction of this largely impoverished mountainous and desert country.
And yet, at their peril, many nations involved in the “Bonn process” often sought to impose their own agendas – through arrogance or a poor understanding of the situation on the ground. These agendas largely failed to take into account the interests of Afghans.
They have led not only to a disastrous war but also a recovery effort with only limited impact. Afghanistan has reached “a permanent condition of rottenness,” says Anders Fange, the respected former head of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan.
The question now is whether the international community will have the imagination – and commitment – to remedy the situation. As it stands, the coalition death toll – more than 2,800 – is fast approaching the number of people who perished in 9/11, while insurgents are operating in areas where they never did before.
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True, the donors have helped bring about improvements, such as schooling for 7 million children, one third of them girls. Another 7 million, however, have yet to benefit from education. In many areas, health care is far better than 10 years ago, but many Afghans still don’t have even basic health services.
Various initiatives, such as paved roads and 24-hour electricity, have enhanced life in Kabul and other cities, and urban women can study at university or work outside the home. More than a quarter of the country’s parliament now consists of women, one of the highest ratios in the world.
However, for the majority of Afghans, especially in rural areas where many suffer from malnutrition and hunger, there is enormous frustration, even anger. Many wonder where the billions of dollars of aid money have gone. In certain parts, change has been brought about by cross-border trade and private investment, not development support.
Washington has yet to recognize that by allowing US military interests to dictate policy for the past decade, it has heavily undermined the recovery process. Numerous Afghans regard NATO forces as the “new occupation.” But they also fear the insurgents, who have infiltrated government ministries, including the army and police. Civilian casualties, the majority of them rebel-inflicted, are up compared to last year.
Even coalition claims of increased “kills” do not imply success in what has become a classic guerrilla war. If anything, wiping out key commanders with drone predators may actually impair peace talks by eliminating the very people who need to be included. Those who replace them, often young recruits brought up in Pakistan with no sense of Afghan culture, are far more intransigent than their 30-40-year-old elders.
The deployment of “provincial reconstruction teams,” which double as army intelligence and development operations, is another area where the military has dangerously compromised recovery by confusing the role between soldiers and aid workers.
Last year, gunmen executed 10 international and Afghan medical volunteers, including two Americans who had been working in Afghanistan for over 30 years. The message? Insurgents no longer differentiate between humanitarians and the military.
Coalition troops seek to improve contacts with local populations by building schools, digging wells, or building bridges. The problem is that most operate on six-month deployments. There is rarely adequate consideration for what happens after they leave. Aid agencies say the military should not become involved with humanitarian activities except as a last resort.
If only a fraction of the war effort had been spent on tangible recovery, then Afghanistan might be a far different place today. More than 60 percent of US development support is geared toward security, such as hiring mercenaries. The current obsession for military responses needs to revert to more traditional diplomacy coupled with what experts describe as “intelligent” aid and investment.
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The Obama administration, however, is now cutting by half – from $4 billion in 2010 to around $2 billion in 2012 – precisely the sort of development funding needed to stimulate the change that should have happened years ago. “The absurdity is that we have spent over $50 billion on a pointless war and a reconstruction effort that is proving a dismal failure,” notes one USAID official.
Foreign funds keep the Afghan economy going. But these will decrease drastically over the next two or three years, prompting the collapse of government programs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private businesses. Tens of thousands of jobs will disappear.
In Bonn, the nearly 100 delegations should consider who will support the 352,000-strong Afghan security force ($7 billion dollars a year) projected to take over from NATO. The Soviet-backed communist regime collapsed in the early 1990s when funding dwindled and most well-trained soldiers, police, and militia switched sides. The result? A bitter civil war that cost the lives of thousands. Steps the "Bonn conference" can take
The Kabul government clearly does not wish to be abandoned by its foreign partners. Yet without a relatively well-functioning state, the likelihood of defeating a motivated insurgent force is small indeed. Nor will it have the capacity to manage effective recovery, which may take another 20 or 30 years.
Nevertheless, there are practical ways to help Afghanistan move toward real peace and recovery. These ideas are not new, but they must be adopted urgently. The international community should:
• Place greater emphasis on job creation and development in the countryside to prevent mass migration to the cities. This includes better access to roads bringing farmers closer to markets.
• Instead of the anti-opium focus, aid should be directed more toward export and storage of legal produce, such as apples, pears, and other fruit attractive to Saudi, Pakistani, Indian, and other markets.
• Development assistance should encourage quality rural industries: eco-tourism and woodcraft (toys and furniture), while natural resources need to be developed.
• Coordinate pay scales to prevent income inflation. Doctors, teachers, and other civil servants should receive higher salaries and incentives to prevent corruption, and also encourage a return to the countryside. This would save hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
• Concentrate aid on two vital social needs: health care and education.
• Adopt a 20-30 year approach toward helping Afghans achieve full recovery.
• Cut wasteful spending. The international community needs to stop contracting to private corporations that require armed mercenaries in order to operate, plus rely on massive overheads with costly consultants. Instead, donor countries should support NGOs or private initiatives that work closely with local communities as their best security, that hire Afghans, and that are committed to the long-term.
• Encourage a “real” Afghan economy, not one reliant on war. Afghanistan can be a commercial crossroads serving the Middle East and Indian subcontinent, instead of one that benefits foreign militaries or political interests of its meddling neighbors (case in point: Pakistan, which says it will boycott the Bonn conference over NATO airstrikes that killed its soldiers on the Pakistan-Afghan border).
• Adopt a more realistic approach toward the armed opposition by focusing on individuals rather than terrorist labels. The rebels now consist of an array of local and foreign insurgents, including rogue elements within the Kabul government. The term “Taliban” has become meaningless.
While some talks have taken place, the process needs to be stepped up in a neutral location such as Geneva or Istanbul by involving all factions and fronts in a broad-based reconciliation initiative, possibly under UN auspices.
Even if the official Taliban and the Haqqani network say they refuse to negotiate until all NATO soldiers have left, the outer layers of these insurgents can be peeled away through better outreach. It does not help to kill, incarcerate, or torture them. As one aid worker maintained: “Even the most hard-line commander has a family who may need medical treatment, education, or improved farming techniques” – and thus has an interest in Afghanistan’s recovery.
And negotiations must focus on Afghans – not foreigners, as happened with disastrous consequences after the Soviets left the country. Many at Bonn will be tempted to promote a spin that justifies their military-flavored decisions to date. What’s needed, though, is a new approach that helps Afghans rebuild their own country – with them in the lead.
Edward Girardet is the author of “Killing the Cranes: A Reporter’s Journey Through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan.” He has reported widely from humanitarian and conflict zones in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere for The Christian Science Monitor, US News & World Report, and PBS News Hour. He is also co-founder of the Institute for Media and Global Governance (IMGG) in Geneva and is editor of “The Essential Field Guides to Humanitarian and Conflict Zones: Afghanistan."
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