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Night raids, prison control stymie U.S.-Afghan deal
Reuters By Susan Cornwell November 5, 2011
WASHINGTON - A U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership agreement is being held up by Afghan demands for limits on "night raids" against insurgents and for a timeline for Afghans to assume control over detention centers, sources following the talks told Reuters.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last week that the two nations had agreed on as much as 90 percent of the substance of the keystone deal. It is intended to provide a framework for the future U.S. role in Afghanistan as control over security is gradually transferred to the Afghans.
While U.S. officials had hoped to unveil the document for an international conference in Germany on December 5, disputes over controversial night raids on Afghan homes and the running of detention centers could delay it well beyond that date, congressional staff who follow the issue say.
"I think a more realistic expectation is now at NATO in Chicago," one congressional aide said, asking not to be named, referring to a NATO summit planned for May 2012.
The sticking points are more evidence of strains in the U.S.-Afghan relationship as Western combat forces start leaving. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly criticized Western military tactics and said recently that Afghanistan would back neighboring Pakistan if it went to war with the United States.
Under an international agreement reached last year, local Afghan forces are to be in charge of security by the end of 2014, as Western forces withdraw. Thirty-three thousand of nearly 100,000 U.S. troops will leave by next September.
But the West will likely fund Afghanistan's police and army for years to come. Clinton made clear the United States would continue playing a role in security.
"We anticipate having a transition that does include security components, not only from the United States, but also from NATO," she told lawmakers last week.
U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General John Allen, who commands U.S. and NATO forces there, are working through some of the security cooperation issues with Karzai, Clinton said.
A U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the partnership document would agree to an extended U.S. troop presence in principle, and it might define broadly what types of things troops would do beyond 2014.
But the details such as troop numbers would be worked out in a subsequent "Status of Forces" agreement, he said.
HATED MILITARY TACTIC
Night raids, in which soldiers search Afghan homes for militants under the cover of darkness, have long been one of the most hated foreign military tactics in Afghanistan. Karzai has repeatedly denounced them and pushed for them to be halted altogether.
Many western military commanders see them as an important tool against the Taliban and other insurgents, however.
But some of the raids are led by Afghan forces. Afghan commanders must sign off on all raids, Afghan forces are often present for them and lead at least 25 percent of the raids, according to a recent report by the Open Society Foundations, which is backed by philanthropist George Soros, and The Liaison Office, a Kabul-based nongovernmental organization.
U.S. officials want to make transfer of authority over detention centers in Afghanistan "conditions-based," the congressional staffer said. In particular, they want to make sure detainees now held by foreign forces will be properly treated when they are transferred to Afghan control.
NATO has already stopped sending prisoners to some Afghan jails because of U.N. warnings of torture there.
A U.N. report last month said that Afghanistan's intelligence agency and police force have been "systematically" torturing detainees, including children, at a number of jails. The Afghan government rejected many of the allegations but conceded there may have been abuse.
The Washington Post reported last week that CIA, U.S. military and State Department officials were warned of abuses at one Kabul prison run by the Afghan intelligence service, but continued to transfer prisoners to the service's custody.
The United States is also concerned about the security of Afghan prisons. In April, hundreds of prisoners escaped from a jail in Kandahar in Afghanistan's southern Taliban heartland.
"The detainee issue is pretty difficult to resolve. I don't think we or the Afghans feel a lot of pressure to conclude this (agreement) quickly," said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official who chaired Obama's 2009 review of Afghan war policy.
A State Department official would not comment on the talks' substance, but said there was no hard deadline for the deal.
"We look forward to coming to agreement soon, but we are committed to the right agreement, not fast agreement." (Additional reporting by Missy Ryan; Writing by Susan Cornwell; Editing by Warren Strobel and Eric Walsh)
Known Haqqani leader captured in Afghanistan: NATO
KABUL, Nov. 5 (Xinhua) -- Rashid Ahmad Arshad, known Haqqani facilitator, at a traffic control point in southern Afghan Laghman Province, was captured on Thursday, a press release issued by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force said on Saturday.
Arshad, detained by Afghan National Army and ISAF, "aided Haqqani by moving weapons and contraband throughout eastern Afghanistan", the press release said.
Combined forces set-up the traffic control point after receiving information of insurgent movement in the area, in Laghman Province, some 260 km east of Afghan capital Kabul.
Arshad and two other individuals were taken into ISAF custody of forces "after they were positively identified as insurgents wanted for questioning."
"Arshad remains in Coalition custody," ISAF said, adding "there were no Coalition or Afghan civilian injuries (during the operation)."
The ISAF has intensified its attacks targeting Haqqani Network after the latter was blamed for the Sept. 13 around-20-hour raid against the U.S. embassy and the ISAF headquarters in Afghan capital Kabul.
Making of an Afghan martyr
The Canberra Times BY NICHOLAS STUART 05 Nov, 2011
AFGHANISTAN - He awoke before dawn. The Afghan National Army sergeant knew exactly what he was going to do that day but there was so much to be done first; the purification ritual before becoming a martyr.
Two days earlier, on Friday, the Muslim holy day, he'd attended the mosque. On Saturday he confirmed his resolution, decided to act, and determined exactly how he'd cleanse his body before death.
Carefully, and with neat deliberation, he shaved his body, removing all his hair. Next he washed carefully, until he'd cleansed himself according to scripture. Then he put on unsoiled, spotless, underclothes. Only after that did he put on his uniform, fixing it neatly, before loading the magazines of his PKM automatic machine-gun with live ammunition, ready to kill.
Then he went on parade, mingling as normal with the 300 or so other soldiers of his kandak, or battalion.
A small unit of Australian trainers, an ''omelette'', had been attached to the kandak on and off for the previous couple of months. It had only formed in the middle of the year, because Forward Operating Base Pacemaker was outside the diggers' original zone of operations. However, it had become evident that controlling this area was vital, and the Australians had leapt at the opportunity to mentor the new kandak whey it was formed. The location was the gateway to Orzgan province and the Afghan National Army's decision to raise the unit seemed to indicate just how quickly it was expanding its ability to operate independently.
That's why the Afghan commander had originally decided to base his newly raised kandak in this particular location. It was - it is, vital. Pacemaker is located only 30km south of the main Aussie headquarters at Tarin Kowt. It sits astride the critical Main Supply Route. Nearly all of the material needed to keep the Australian forces functioning has to travel along this road.
The new kandak itself was a mix of old soldiers and recent recruits. Simply assembling it had been one of those miracles of Afghan improvisation. Its first-ever task was to concentrate all its new sub-units together after a road move - a significant feat for an army virtually without transport and proper communications. No detailed movement orders were prepared; there wasn't even a real ''concept of operations'', or way of explaining how all the groups would come together. Yet, a day or so before the move was scheduled to occur, everything somehow happened.
The Afghan soldiers were fed, trucks and buses refuelled, and the unit slipped into its new lines (barracks) in July. The new kandak was formally attached to 4 Brigade and the Australians began their mentoring.
On the October 13, Defence Minister Stephen Smith finally announced to Parliament that a small Australian force - an OMLT, pronounced omelette - would be deployed to assist the Afghans with their training at Pacemaker, even though the new forward operating base was not actually in the province the diggers were responsible for. At the time, this appeared to be a clear indication that the ongoing war against the insurgency was going well, because our troops were taking the fight against the Taliban into new areas, previously off limits to Afghan government forces.
But when the diggers went down to the FOB they quickly sensed a note of tension suspended in the air around them. The training mission is easy, but the cultural sensitivities that accompany it require delicate negotiation if the task is to be achieved. Even though the kandak itself had been newly formed, more than half of its soldiers had been fighting for years. Some had been in uniform for decades. Many had once fought the very people they were now standing alongside.
Others, like the kandak commander himself, saw the introduction of foreign troops as reflecting badly on their own military skills. He seemingly felt his authority was being threatened by having soldiers of another nation training his command. This is a very Afghan perception, because the commander often takes on direct, personal responsibility for almost everything his soldiers do. He felt he was being undermined.
This clash of cultures led to tensions between the Kandak and the OMLT. It appears, however, that a workable ''modus vivendi'' had been established between the two forces, despite their different ways of doing things. Nevertheless, this didn't mean the tensions had evaporated. The Australian's understood that they had to be careful when they moved around the base, although no one fully comprehended how immediate the danger was. They always walked around with their weapons loaded, at ''action'', ready to protect themselves at all times. It wasn't a relaxed situation.
Previously, only one digger had ever been shot by one of the soldiers he'd been sent to train, although the International Stability Assistance Force says as much as 3 per cent of the number of ''incidents'' in which coalition soldiers were involved can be described as so-called ''green on blue'' engagements: Afghans shooting at their international allies. The very fact that ISAF has a shorthand name for these events demonstrates the frequency with which they occur.
Until last week's tragedy, the Catering Corps' Lance Corporal Andrew Jones was the only Australian who'd died as the hands of the people he'd come to help. At the end of May an Afghan had shot Jones in the early hours of the morning. The soldier had gone on duty to make breakfast for a returning patrol. An Afghan in a nearby guard tower had opened fire at virtual point-blank range. His motives were unexplained, although some Afghan soldiers at this base told me last week that the assassin was ''unbalanced'', and ''not very clever''. Jones' death had come as a shock to Australians; headquarters, however, warned the attack might not be a ''one-off''. This was still the case until 8.20 last Sunday.
On that fatal morning the Kandak commander had given one of his usual, ''inspirational'' speeches to the assembled troops. The omelette stood to one side with their translators - the 'terps. When the order to ''fall out'' was given the Afghan soldiers began to break up into small groups, for a lesson on patrolling.
That was apparently the signal the martyr was waiting for. One digger, who wasn't an eyewitness to the event, says the killer had begun chanting prayers in Arabic. Another is not so sure. What everyone agrees on is that he then charged forward with a medium machine-gun, the 7.62 PKM, spraying bullets at the tight-knit group of Aussies.
Two fell at once. The hail of shots at less than 20m killed them instantly. An Afghan translator standing with them also sank to the ground, never to rise again, while another had been badly wounded by the indiscriminate shots of the PKM. Although he'd been fatally wounded, one of the diggers had incredibly managed to flick the safety catch off his weapon. He returned fire at his assassin, as did another of the seven Australian's who'd been wounded.
The Afghan died, caught in the crossfire. The whole incident had taken only seconds before it was over.
The OMLT gathered together, dragging the wounded diggers to the cover of their hardened accommodation and covering their retreat. This could, if necessary, be defended if others decided to launch an attack. The medic had been taught to bandage himself then perform first aid on his mates, and that's exactly what he did. Despite his own wounds he quickly triaged the others, binding their wounds to staunch the pulsing blood and then supervising their attempts at first aid.
Within 20 minutes helicopters were ''dusting off'' the wounded to the Role Two medical facilities at Tarin Kowt, but the wounds of the digger who'd returned fire were too serious. He died on the operating table.
The Afghan commander assured the Australians they were safe; that the attack was the action of a ''lone wolf'', one man acting on his own. The Afghans were apparently as shocked as everyone else had been by the suddenness of the assault. The commander's previously tense relationship with the diggers was forgotten; he too had been horrified by the murderous attack.
Significantly, the Taliban did not claim responsibility, indicating that the attack was genuinely not initiated by the insurgency. It appears unlikely that the military inquiry will ever be able to determine exactly what motivated the sergeant to become a martyr - no testament has yet been found to help understand what could have possibly have inspired his killing spree.
There was no doubt, however, about what the attack might mean back in the Australian headquarters at Tarin Kowt. Surprisingly, perhaps, the concerns were not about the danger of other rogue Afghan soldiers conducting similar attacks, but rather concerns about what the political dynamic might mean for support for their mission.
You see, it's not just the commanders who believe they are accomplishing the mission. Almost every digger I've spoken too over the past three weeks believes real progress has been achieved in the battle against the insurgency in Orzgan - and it's important to note that this is the consistent verdict not just of the soldiers, but of civilian analysts as well.
The reality is the tactics have changed significantly. The old theories of fighting ''war amongst the people'' have been tossed away. And it's this new approach that is being credited with the achievements that are being chalked up to the diggers.
There are two legs to the new operational method; but you won't find one of these being talked about by the military. The Special Operations Task Group has been critically effective in removing insurgent leaders from the battle-space. In other words; killing them. It's a deliberate, extremely carefully targeted policy. And it's working.
A great deal of effort has been put into intelligence. Earlier, the Task Force had tended to believe one particularly corrupt Afghan leader, who spun stories to the Aussies that his enemies were Taliban operatives. Now this has changed. The number of technical aids to collecting information - the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets - has vastly increased. These range from the ability to ''listen in'' to Taliban radio communications through to instantaneous video links from space which can show insurgents moving into ambush positions in time for them to be attacked, and destroyed, by the very patrols they were hoping to surprise.
Using accurate intelligence has transformed the war. This is passed to the SOTG, which determines when the insurgent leaders will be isolated and vulnerable. Then they strike.
There's nothing pleasant about these operations, although it isn't the intention of the commandos to kill their quarry. The Australians now run an interrogation centre at Tarin Kowt, and this has apparently provided a solid amount of so-called ''actionable intelligence''. The army claims this is run according to the Geneva conventions, and apparently the Red Cross has inspected the facility, although no journalist has been able to visit the centre.
The point is that the Taliban are apparently running out of capable leaders who can organise the insurgency in the province. This means the fight depends on local insurgents who are more likely to make mistakes or, more particularly, are simply reluctant to take on the government forces because of the high chance of dying.
The proof of the success of this strategy is twofold. Firstly, the so-called ''fighting season'' has ended about six weeks early this year. The Taliban commanders based over the border in Quetta simply can't get enough fighters to step up to build and lay improvised explosive devices. High quality technical intelligence proves it.
The second leg of the strategy has been the deployment of the mentors. In the past this force tended to operate in units that were dominated by Australian forces - now the mentors break up into the small OMLTs and allow the Afghans to lead the fight.
The problem is that this exposes the diggers to a green on blue engagement. And this is exactly what the Taliban are desperately hoping will occur again, because the insurgency is being squeezed. Hard. The bubble of government control in Orzgan has much more than doubled over the past year. The map talc is now covered with overlay that shows much of the province is now ''blue'', or ''permissive''. These areas remain what any normal person would consider unsafe, and any travel by an European without a military escort is likely to come to a sudden, abrupt end. Nevertheless, Afghan locals are responding positively to the new environment. Perhaps most particularly, the new road (built by the Dutch) means they can get their crops to market in less than a quarter of the time it took a year ago. The dynamic is changing.
The insurgency had, for example, regularly destroyed a telephone tower that provided mobile reception in the Chora valley. But eventually they realised that support for their actions among the locals was vanishing. People appreciated that development had many positive benefits. The telephone tower now sends out a clear signal.
The military still search for the ''tipping point'' which they believe will herald success. Nevertheless, and despite last weekend's attack, the Australians are planning to continue their campaign over the winter period. This is the time the insurgents normally retire to the dry twig fires to huddle against the bitter cold and mountain snow. But the OMLTs will be moving, occupying an area that's been off-limits since 2006.
The Khas Uruzgan district is the province's badland. It's territory the Australians want to seize back from the insurgency. Although it's terrible to admit, the success or failure of that mission will probably have much more relevance to the fight against the Taliban than the three terrible and tragic deaths one week ago.
Taliban steps up attacks ahead of Afghan Loya Jirga
By Abdul Haleem
KABUL, Nov. 4 (Xinhua) -- Amid Afghan government's efforts to convene Loya Jirga or traditional grand assembly to get national endorsement for inking the possible strategic partnership with the United States, the Taliban militants have intensified attacks to spoil the step.
The armed outfit fighting Afghan government and some 130,000 strong-NATO-led troops with nearly 100,000 of them Americans, in the latest attacks, targeted a logistic company providing assistance to the NATO-led forces in Herat province on Thursday killing two people and injuring three others.
Afghan government is going to convene a Loya Jirga within weeks, probably by the end of November to discuss the proposed Afghan-U.S. strategic partnership and the possible establishment of the U.S. military bases in the militancy-plagued Afghanistan.
As a sign of strong opposition to the possible formation of U.S. permanent military bases in Afghanistan, the Taliban outfit, in a statement released to media outlets days ago, termed the upcoming Loya Jirga as a trick to legalize the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and vowed to disrupt it.
"Under the orders of its masters, the Kabul administration wants to abuse a much respected custom of our country (Loya Jirga) and try to give a legal face to the establishment of permanent bases for the American occupying forces on the Islamic soil of Afghanistan," the Taliban statement, sent to media last week said.
"For its long term goal of permanently staying in Afghanistan, the Americans want to once again abuse this tradition through its stooge regime to call a supposed Loya Jirga in which faces of its preference will be gathered, food will be eaten and once again, games will be played with the fate and future of its nation," the English statement of the Taliban outfit read out.
Although the authenticity of the statement has yet to be verified, the inflexible outfit warned of dire consequence to anyone attends the traditional Loya Jirga or grand assembly including tribal elders, chieftains, parliamentarians and functionaries.
To oppose the presence of NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the post-Taliban Afghanistan and lash at government-initiated Loya Jirga, the militants have intensified their attacks recently.
On Oct. 31, the Taliban militants stormed a guesthouse in their former stronghold Kandahar 450 km south of Afghan capital Kabul leaving six people including three UN employees, dead.
Similarly, two days earlier of Kandahar offensive, on Oct. 29, the Taliban fighters, in a brazen attack, carried out a deadly suicide bombing against NATO-led troops in the fortified capital city Kabul killing 16 people including 13 Americans.
The coming four-day Loya Jirga is scheduled to be held under a giant tent inside the Polytechnic compound and as part of security measures, the government has given holidays for the students of Polytechnic during the Jirga, besides stationing police on the hilltops and roads leading to the Jirga avenue.
Taliban militants, who attacked a peace Jirge or peace gathering under the same tent in 2010, have warned sternly to disrupt the coming Loya Jirga.
"The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (name of the ousted Taliban regime) calls on its brave and courageous Mujahideen (holy warriors) to target every security guard, person with intention to participate the so-called Loya Jirga, and such traitors will be pursued by Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate in every corner of the country and will face severe repercussions," the statement warned.
7 Indicted in Bhutto Murder Case
VOA News November 5, 2011
A Pakistani anti-terrorism court has indicted two police officers and five alleged militants for the 2007 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.
Officials say the two police officers — the former Rawalpindi police chief and another senior officer — were indicted for failing to provide adequate security to former Prime Minister Bhutto in the city.
The French news agency says the five militants were charged with “criminal conspiracy” for bringing a suicide bomber from the tribal belt in the northwest and keeping him in a home in Rawalpindi.
Benazir Bhutto was killed December 27, 2007 by a suicide bomber after her election rally in the city.
All the accused have denied the charges.
New ‘Truth and Justice’ Party Looks To Shake Up Afghan Politics
RFE/RL By Frud Bezhan November 04, 2011
Boasting a self-proclaimed reformist agenda and members from across the country’s ethnic and ideological spectrum, the new Haq-wa-Edalat or Truth and Justice party officially launched this week in Afghanistan.
In doing so, it hopes to challenge the Change and Hope party, considered the only effective opposition group in the country, and provide a potential alternative to the government of President Hamid Karzai, which continues to struggle with widespread corruption.
Hamid Farooqi, one of the four temporary spokesmen of the party, summarized those aims at the party’s official launch event on November 3 in Kabul: “We hope to fulfill people’s hopes and needs in the political, economic, and social spheres of life. Those values that have unfortunately been neglected by the current government. We hope our political formation will be a healthy opposition in the political arena.”
Female Afghan politician Azita Rafat said the party aimed to provide the country’s war-weary citizens with hope.
“Our message to the suffering people of Afghanistan is that we will not leave you at a time when our country faces its greatest battle against war and terrorism. Our fate is the same as the fate of our people in their pursuit of freedom, peace, justice, security, and progress. We are standing with the people,” Rafat said.
In the more than year-long lead-up to the official launch, the party’s membership has generated considerable interest.
It boasts several high-profile dissidents from the Karzai government, including former Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and opposition figure Sima Samar, the chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.
The party has also been noted for bringing together representatives of the nation’s diverse ethnic, religious, and ideological groups.
They include Abbas Noyan, an ethnic Hazara intellectual; former Finance Minister Hamid Faruqi, a Pashtun; Assad Walwalji, an Uzbek intellectual and fierce opponent of warlord and Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum; Kabir Ranjbar, a leftist deputy who dissolved his Democratic Party to join; and a former deputy justice minister of the Taliban, Jalauddin Shinwari.
Rocky Road Ahead...Maybe
While some say the party’s promise of fresh thinking and varied demographics could shake up Afghanistan’s political scene, others predict that Truth and Justice will face significant hurdles.
Kabul-based political analyst Nasrullah Stanekzai says the party, like its predecessors, will find it difficult to gain legitimacy in the eyes of Afghan society, where there is widespread mistrust of political parties.
“People in Afghanistan have had very bad experiences with political parties in the past. Between 1978 [when leftists gained power] until the period of the mujahedin, not only have political parties not worked for the people, but they have actively worked against them bringing them war and destruction,” Stanekzai said.
Stanekzai said that a culture of true political participation has yet to surface in Afghanistan, and that trust in political parties needs time to develop after years of political turmoil.
Out of more than a dozen parties, Change and Hope, headed by the former foreign minister and presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah, is Afghanistan’s leading opposition bloc.
The party is dominated by Northern Alliance fighters who battled against the Taliban during the 1990s.
Truth and Justice, unlike Change and Hope, says it is in favor of reconciliation talks with insurgents if they are transparent and “do not sacrifice justice.”
Among its others positions, the party says it supports continued cooperation with international forces, while insisting that Afghanistan’s sovereignty be respected and that its regional relationships do not suffer as a result.
Soldier: Afghan killings were in legitimate combat
The Associated Press By GENE JOHNSON Saturday, November 5, 2011
JOINT BASE LEWIS-McCHORD, Wash. - An Army staff sergeant accused of masterminding the murders of three Afghan civilians for sport gave his first public comments about the case at his court martial Friday, denying involvement in any plot but acknowledging he took fingers off their corpses "like keeping the antlers off a deer you'd shoot."
Wearing his green uniform decorated with service ribbons, Staff Sgt. Calvin Gibbs of Billings, Mont., contradicted the accounts of co-defendants and fellow soldiers who portrayed him as an imposing, bloodthirsty sociopath. He said that as far as he knew, each of the killings was legitimate.
The 6-foot-4, 26-year-old Gibbs answered questions from his lawyer, Phil Stackhouse, before five military jurors, a judge and spectators — including his wife — at Joint Base Lewis-McChord south of Seattle. When Stackhouse asked why he took the fingers, Gibbs said he wasn't proud that he had done so.
"I think I was trying to be hard, a hard individual, and not let it affect me," he testified. "In my mind, it was like keeping the antlers off a deer you'd shoot. ... You have to come to terms with the things you're doing."
He added that he tried to disassociate the corpses from the people they had been.
"Bodies in general didn't mean anything to me," he said.
Gibbs is the highest-ranking of five soldiers charged in the killings, which took place in January, February and May of last year. Prosecutors said Gibbs and his co-defendants slaughtered the victims with grenades and powerful machine guns during patrols in Kandahar province then dropped weapons near their bodies to make them appear to have been combatants.
Gibbs wasn't present for the first killing but was accused of a providing an "off-the-books" grenade to then-Cpl. Jeremy Morlock of Wasilla, Alaska, who used it when he and Pvt. 1st Class Andrew Holmes, of Boise, Idaho, killed an Afghan teenager. Morlock and Holmes have pleaded guilty to murder.
Gibbs was accused of direct involvement in the second and third killings. He testified that the second killing was legitimate because he came under fire, and that he had nothing to do with the third killing.
Two co-defendants and other soldiers have testified against Gibbs, but Stackhouse said in his opening statement that the co-defendants conspired to blame Gibbs for what they did.
The shocking case came to light in May 2010, after a soldier who was beaten by Gibbs and others for reporting drug use in the platoon told investigators that his comrades had deliberately killed civilians. The five soldiers were arrested in Afghanistan, along with several others who faced less serious charges, including assault and drug use.
Gibbs also acknowledged Friday that he beat up the whistleblower, Pvt. 1st Class Justin Stoner, whom he described as a coward. After administering the beating, Gibbs and Morlock returned to Stoner's bunk. Gibbs admitted he displayed two of the severed fingers as he and Morlock tried to persuade Stoner not to speak with investigators.
"I didn't think it would scare Stoner because he had already seen the fingers before," Gibbs said. "He didn't really react to it."
One of the defendants, then-Spc. Adam Winfield of Cape Coral, Fla., tried to blow the whistle on the plot after the first killing by sending Facebook messages home to his parents in which he warned that more killings were planned.
"If you talk to anyone on my behalf, I have proof that they are planning another one in the form of an AK-47 they want to drop on a guy," Winfield wrote.
Calls by Winfield's father to Lewis-McChord went unheeded, and before long two more Afghan civilians had been killed — one with the AK-47 found beside his body, prosecutors said. Winfield pleaded guilty in the final killing and said he took part because he feared Gibbs would hurt him if he didn't.
Gibbs' testimony Friday was at odds with that of the other witnesses, who said he began talking about killing civilians soon after he joined the unit in late 2009. In the second killing, Morlock — who is serving 24 years for the murders — said Gibbs killed an unarmed man after firing an illicit AK-47 into the wall of a compound and tossing the weapon at the man's feet to make him appear to have been an enemy.
But Gibbs maintained the engagement was legitimate. The man started firing with the AK-47, but the gun jammed, and he and Spc. Michael Wagnon, who is also charged in that killing, returned fire, Gibbs said.
"I was engaged by an enemy combatant," he said. "Luckily his weapon appeared to malfunction and I didn't die."
Wagnon's court martial is scheduled for January.
In the third killing, Gibbs contradicted testimony from Morlock and Winfield, who said Gibbs told them to shoot as he threw a grenade at an unarmed man.
Gibbs said he had nothing to do with that killing, and didn't even witness it. He ran toward the gunfire and saw Morlock and Winfield on the ground, firing into a cloud of dust, he said. Shortly before the shooting, he said, he had chastised the two of them for going outside the compound on their own.
During cross-examination, Maj. Robert Stelle sought to portray aspects of Gibbs' story as farfetched. According to Gibbs, he noted, the second incident took place when a lone Afghan man — with no other military-age men nearby, armed with an AK-47 with no extra ammunition — attacked an entire squad of heavily armed Americans.
Gibbs faces 16 charges, covering a range of allegations from premeditated murder to assault. In one instance, he's accused of ordering his men to fire on unarmed men in a field. No one was injured, and Gibbs insisted on the stand that one of the men in the field was carrying a rocket-propelled grenade.
However, others who have testified about that shooting, including Staff Sgt. Robert Stevens, of Portland, Ore., who was at the time a close friend of Gibbs, said they knew the men were unarmed.
Gibbs could face up to life in prison if convicted. Four out of five jurors must agree for him to be convicted.
US's post-2014 Afghan agenda falters
Asian Times By M K Bhadrakumar Nov 4, 2011
There couldn't have been a more appropriate venue than the old Byzantine capital on the Bosphorus to hold a regional conference on Afghanistan at the present juncture. The conference at Istanbul on Thursday carried an impressive title - "Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia". The "heart" had 14 chambers - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The conference was packed with high drama, which was unsurprising, since its "brain" - the United States - acted almost imperviously to the beatings of the heart.
Intrigue and counter-intrigue dogged the conference from the
outset to such an extent that its eventual failure was a forgone conclusion.
The US and its Western allies began with high hopes that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner Turkey would secure from the conference a declaration - preferably signed by the "14 heartland" states - that would prepare the ground for establishing a regional security and integration mechanism on the pattern of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In turn, this declaration would take wing at the forthcoming Bonn II conference in December (to which Germany has invited 90 countries and 15 international organizations).
In the event, Thursday ended on a somewhat miserable note in Istanbul, the heart of Asia having suffered even a minor rupture. Uzbekistan broke loose and stayed away at the last minute, with the remaining 13 countries finally settling for an anodyne joint statement that will become the latest in a series of platitudes and good intentions since the US invaded Afghanistan.
Bound to crash-land The conference agenda was lop-sided in the first instance. Instead of focusing on the pivotal issue of a viable Afghan national reconciliation, how to set up such a process and how to secure it as "Afghan-led" and genuinely "Afghan-owned", the masterminds of the conference - the United States in particular - loaded it with geopolitics.
The conference was burdened with an ambitious agenda of imposing on the region under Western leadership a mechanism to mediate in a host of intra-regional disputes and differences which are, arguably, tangential issues that could have a bearing on Afghanistan's stabilization but are not the greatest concern today. This was, to put mildly, like putting the cart before the horse. The Western masterminds needlessly introduced a controversial template for a new security architecture for Central and South Asia, complete with an institutional mechanism and a "contact group" for monitoring the implementation of a matrix of "confidence-building measures".
This was an idea that was bound to crash-land, given the deep suspicions about the US's intentions in the "war on terror" in Afghanistan and the unwillingness of the regional states to accept the permanent habitation of the West as the arbiter-cum-moderator-cum-mediator in their region.
During the preparatory stages at official meetings in Oslo, Norway and Kabul through September and October, it became evident that there were no takers in the region for a new regional security organization presided over by the West. Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and most of the Central Asian countries demurred on the US proposal for a new regional security architecture. India, which resents outside mediation on its disputes, kept quiet so as not to offend the US, while probably remaining confident that Pakistan would do its job anyway.
Moscow came up with its own counterproposal in the shape of a statement of principles of regional cooperation listing political, economic and other measures to build confidence and encourage cooperation among the countries neighboring Afghanistan. The Russian approach found favor with China, Pakistan and Iran, and being unexceptional in any case, it gained traction and ultimately seems to have paved the way for Thursday's joint statement at Istanbul.
However, Washington (and Ankara) continued efforts until the last minute to somehow institutionalize a regional process through "working groups" and a "structured" form of consultations. But Pakistan would appear to have put its foot firmly down on these ideas, pointing out that an OSCE-type security related conference or a full-fledged security apparatus would be completely unacceptable since there was a world of difference between the Cold-War compulsions which initiated the Helsinki process and the prevailing Afghan situation.
Pakistan's contention is that Afghanistan's neighboring countries could at best have a supportive role in ensuring the peace, security and territorial integrity of that country and instead of proposing new mechanisms, the focus should be on implementation of the existing mechanisms for peace, security and development.
The US game plan served four objectives. One, Washington hoped to "shackle" Pakistan within the four walls of a regional security mechanism dominated by the West so that it becomes one protagonist among equals and its claim to an eminent status in any Afghan peace process gets diluted.
Two, the regional mechanism would give the US and its allies a handle to retain the lead role in the search for an Afghan settlement and also beyond during the post 2014 period. Three, Washington estimated that the regional security apparatus would inevitably come to overshadow the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the number one regional security process in Central Asia and South Asia which, in turn, would erode the dominant influence of Russia and China in Central Asia.
Finally, the US envisaged the regional mechanism to provide the security underpinning for its "New Silk Road" project, which is running on a parallel track - quintessentially a modern version of its "Greater Central Asia strategy" dating back to the George W Bush presidency. The New Silk Road proposes Afghanistan as a regional hub to bring Central Asia and South Asia closer together under the garb of regional development and integration.
Its real intent, however, is to roll back the pre-eminent position of Russia and China in Central Asia and to gain direct access to the vast mineral resources of the region through communication links that bypass Russia and Iran. The US's agenda included gaining for NATO some sort of formal, institutional role in regional security in Central Asia. (Safeguarding the energy pipelines is a newfound 21st century "challenge" that NATO proposes to assume.)
Conceivably, Moscow and Beijing spotted a red herring from day one. The most significant outcome of the Istanbul Conference, therefore, might turn out to be that the SCO will hasten its decision-making process and swiftly steer through the applications of Pakistan and India for membership of that organization.
A Russian statement issued on Monday following Foreign Ministry-level political consultations with China in Moscow stated that the two countries discussed the modalities of finalization of the membership of the two South Asian countries in SCO and "spoke of expediting the process" of membership of India and Pakistan (and Afghanistan's status as an SCO "Observer"). The likelihood is that a decision in this regard might even be formalized at the SCO Heads of Governments meeting due in St Petersburg on Monday.
Note of triumphalism Underlying all this high drama has been the realization in Washington (and the regional capitals) that the political-military situation in Afghanistan is decisively shifting in Pakistan's favor, prompting a desperate Western attempt to ensure the US and NATO's permanent military presence in the strategic Hindu Kush.
Without doubt, a dangerous period lies ahead for the US and its NATO allies with the strong possibility of Mullah Omar's forces and the Haqqani network openly collaborating with a view to intensifying the insurgent activities.
The devastating suicide car bomb attack in Kabul killing 13 American and 3 Australian soldiers may well be the harbinger of a new offensive. Its timing - on the eve of the Istanbul conference - carried a barely-disguised message to the US administration that crunch time has come and the US strategy to degrade the Taliban and force them to come to the negotiating has not only failed, but the Taliban seem more than ever convinced that they are inching toward conclusive victory.
Clearly, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton's visit to Islamabad 10 days ago has not helped reduce the huge trust deficit in the US-Pakistan relationship. The Pakistani military seems amused that Clinton made a virtue out of dire necessity by graciously "offering" to Islamabad the "primacy" to "squeeze" the Haqqanis and bring them to the negotiating table.
Whereas, the heart of the matter is that the US's covert attempts in the recent months to gain direct access to the Taliban leadership and to suo moto initiate a peace process from a position of strength lie in shambles today.
On the other hand, Pakistan's estimation is that US President Barack Obama is going to find himself more and more on the defensive as next year's election approaches, lessening even further the US's capacity to pressure Islamabad. A tone of triumphalism is appearing in the Pakistani discourses.
Indeed, the Obama administration, too, would sense that the factors of advantage are incrementally tilting in Pakistan's favor and that the US lacks any real leverage to influence the Pakistani military. The US roped in Turkey to push the agenda of the Istanbul Conference, given its traditionally warm and friendly relations with Pakistan. The Saudi and United Arab Emirates presence in Istanbul was also expected to influence Pakistan. But the Istanbul Conference may have resulted in causing some injury to Turkish-Pakistani ties. A Turkish observer wrote:
Cold winds have started to blow between the two [Turkey and Pakistan] due to the Afghan problem ... Islamabad is quite annoyed at Turkey for its role in the conference ... Basically, Pakistan is angry at Turkey and the US, which want a result oriented conference. For the conference to bear fruit an institutionalization of the process is a must. In other words in the absence of some kind of a mechanism, to monitor the process that might include implementing confidence-building measures, everything said in Istanbul will stay on paper.
Turkish diplomacy has tried to calm down the Pakistanis, telling them that the presence of Turkey in the regional framework should alleviate the concerns of Pakistanis vis-a-vis other players. After all the Turks do not have a secret agenda of strengthening the hands of India at the expense of Pakistan but I am doubtful that they succeeded in reassuring Pakistan.
All in all, from the Russian and Chinese point of view, it becomes desirable - almost imperative - from now onward while looking ahead, that Pakistan is enabled to have strategic autonomy to withstand the US pressure. Most certainly, they would appreciate Pakistan's steadfast role in frustrating the US design to install a regional security mechanism for continued interference in the Central Asian region.
On balance, the petering out of the Istanbul Conference constitutes a grave setback for the upcoming Bonn Conference II in December. With the Istanbul Conference failing to erect an institutionalized framework of regional cooperation, Bonn Conference II lacks a viable agenda except that 2011 happens to provide a great photo-op, being the 10th anniversary of the first conference in December 2001.
The original intent was to ensure that the Taliban representatives attended the Bonn Conference. But short of a miracle, that is not going to happen. That leaves the US and its NATO allies to work out the planned transition in Afghanistan in 2014 in isolation, as they gather for the alliance's summit in May in Chicago.
In sum, the regional powers are unwilling to collaborate with the US and its allies to choreograph the post-2014 regional security scenario. Russia and China insist that the central role of the international community in Afghanistan should be of the United Nations once the US and NATO's transition is completed in 2014.
Evidently, they would hope for the SCO to take a lead role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's expeditious admission as an SCO observer alongside Pakistan's induction as a full member conveys a loud message that regional security is best handled by the countries of the region, while extra-regional powers can act as facilitators. That is also the final message of the Istanbul conference.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
Diggers exposed in Taliban badlands
The Sydney Morning Herald November 5, 2011
Tensions were building before the shocking deaths of three Australian soldiers in Afghanistan, writes Nicholas Stuart.
The Afghan National Army sergeant awoke before dawn. He knew exactly what he was going to do later that day but there was much to be done first: the purification ritual before becoming a martyr.
Two days earlier, on Friday, the Muslim holy day, he'd attended the mosque. On Saturday he confirmed his resolution, decided to act, and determined how he'd cleanse his body before death.
That morning, he performed a macabre ritual. Carefully, and with neat deliberation, he shaved his entire body. Next, he cleansed himself according to scripture, before putting on spotless underclothes and his uniform, fixing it neatly. Finally, he loaded the magazines of his PKM automatic machine gun with live ammunition.
Then he went on parade, mingling as normal with the 300 or so other soldiers of his kandak, or battalion.
A small unit of Australian trainers had been attached to the kandak, on and off, for the previous couple of months. It had formed only in the middle of the year, because Forward Operating Base Pacemaker was outside the diggers' original zone of operations. But it had become evident that controlling this area was vital, and the Australians had leapt at the opportunity to mentor the new kandak when it was formed.
The location was the gateway to Oruzgan province and the Afghan National Army's decision to raise the unit seemed to indicate just how quickly it was expanding its ability to operate independently.
That's why the Afghan commander had originally decided to base his newly raised kandak here. Pacemaker is just 30 kilometres south of the main Australian headquarters at Tarin Kowt and sits astride the critical main supply route. Almost everything needed to keep the Australian forces functioning has to travel along this road.
The new kandak was a mix of old soldiers and recent recruits. Simply assembling it had been one of those miracles of Afghan improvisation. But, in July, the kandak was formally attached to the 4th Brigade and the Australians began their mentoring.
On October 13, the Defence Minister, Stephen Smith, finally told Parliament a small Operational Mentor and Liaison Team - an OMLT, pronounced omelet - would be deployed to assist the Afghans with their training at Pacemaker, even though the new forward operating base was not in the province for which the Diggers were responsible.
This appeared to be a clear indication the war against the insurgency was going well, because Australian troops were taking the fight against the Taliban into new areas previously off-limits to Afghan government forces.
But, when the Diggers arrived, they quickly sensed tension. Although the kandak was newly formed, more than half of its soldiers had been fighting for years. Some had been in uniform for decades. Many had once fought the very people they were now alongside.
Others, such as the kandak commander, saw the introduction of foreign troops as reflecting badly on their own skills. He seemingly felt his authority was being threatened by having soldiers of another nation training his command.
The Afghan way isn't to delegate. Instead, the commander bursts down through the ranks to (literally) grab an individual soldier and physically demonstrate how particular actions should be done.
This means training of soldiers jerks along at the pace of the slowest and depends on the ability of the commander. It's not the way things are done in the Australian Army.
This clash of cultures led to tensions between the kandak and the OMLT. A workable modus vivendi seemed to have been established between the two forces, but tensions had not evaporated.
The Australians understood they had to be careful when they moved around the base; they carried their weapons at "action", ready to protect themselves at all times.
Previously, only one Digger had been shot by one of the soldiers he'd been sent to train, although the International Security Assistance Force says up to 3 per cent of coalition soldier "incidents" involved so-called "green on blue'' engagements: Afghans shooting at their international allies.
The fact ISAF has a shorthand name for these events demonstrates their frequency.
Until until 8.20am last Sunday, the Catering Corp's Lance Corporal Andrew Jones was the only Australian who had died at the hands of the people he'd come to help.
That morning, the kandak commander had given one of his usual, "inspirational" speeches to the assembled troops. The OMLT stood to one side with their translators. When the order to "fall out" was given, the Afghan soldiers began to break up into small groups, for a lesson on patrolling.
That was apparently the martyr's signal. One Digger, who was not a witness, says the killer had begun chanting prayers in Arabic. Another is not so sure. Everyone agrees, however, that he then charged forward with a machine gun, spraying bullets at the Australians.
Two fell at once. The hail of shots at less than 20 metres killed them instantly. An Afghan translator standing with them also sank to the ground, never to rise again, while another was badly wounded. Although he'd been fatally wounded, one of the Diggers incredibly managed to flick the safety catch off his weapon. He returned fire at his assassin, as did another of the seven wounded Australians.
The Afghan died, caught in the crossfire. The whole incident was over in seconds.
The OMLT gathered together, dragging the wounded Diggers to cover. The medic had been taught to bandage himself then perform first aid on his mates, and that's what he did. Despite his own wounds, he triaged the others, binding their wounds to staunch the blood and then supervising their attempts at first aid.
An urgent call for help was broadcast. Within 20 minutes helicopters were moving the wounded to medical facilities at Tarin Kowt, but the wounds of the Digger who had returned fire were too serious. He died on the operating table.
Killed were Corporal Ashley Birt, Captain Bryce Duffy and Lance-Corporal Luke Gavin.
Afterwards, the Afghan commander assured the Australians they were safe; that the attack was the action of a ''lone wolf''. The Afghans were apparently as shocked as everyone else. The commander's previously tense relationship with the Diggers was forgotten; he, too, had been horrified by the attack.
The Taliban did not claim responsibility, indicating the attack was genuinely not initiated by the insurgency. It appears unlikely that the military inquiry will ever be able to determine exactly what motivated the sergeant to become a martyr.
There was no doubt, however, about what the attack might mean back in the Australian headquarters at Tarin Kowt. Almost every Digger I've spoken to in the past three weeks believes real progress has been achieved in the battle against the insurgency in Oruzgan. This is the verdict of civilian analysts as well.
Although soldiers won't admit it officially, the reality is the tactics have changed. The old theories of fighting "war among the people" have been tossed away.
There are two legs to the new operational method; but you won't find one of these being talked about by the military. The Australian Special Operations Task Group has been critically effective in removing insurgent leaders from the battle space. In other words; killing them. It's a deliberate, carefully targeted policy. And it's working.
Much effort has been put into intelligence, with many more technical aids for collecting information. These range from the ability to "listen in" to Taliban radio communications through to instantaneous video links, which can show insurgents moving into ambush positions in time for them to be attacked and destroyed. Using accurate intelligence has transformed the war.
The Australians now run an interrogation centre at Tarin Kowt, which has apparently provided a solid amount of "actionable intelligence". The army says this is run according to the Geneva conventions, and the Red Cross has inspected the facility but no journalist has been able to visit.
Proof of the strategy's success is twofold. First, the so-called fighting season ended about six weeks early this year. Taliban commanders based in Quetta can't get enough fighters to build and lay improvised explosive devices (IEDs). High-quality technical intelligence shows it.
The second leg of the strategy has been the deployment of mentors. In the past, this force tended to operate in units dominated by Australian forces - now the mentors break up into the small OMLTs and allow Afghans to lead the fight, even if they are perceived to be less effective.
The problem is that this exposes the Diggers to exactly what occurred last weekend. And this is what the Taliban are hoping will occur again, because the insurgency is being squeezed. Hard.
The bubble of government control in Oruzgan has much more than doubled over the past year. Afghan locals are responding positively to the new environment. For them, it's a significant improvement. And, perhaps most particularly, the new road (built by the Dutch) means they can get their crops to market in less than a quarter of the time it took a year ago. The dynamic is changing.
The insurgency had, for example, regularly destroyed a phone tower that provided mobile reception in the Chora Valley. But, eventually, they realised support for their actions among the locals was vanishing. People appreciated that development had positive benefits. The Taliban were seen as backward and harming the local lifestyle. The tower now sends out a clear signal.
The military still search for the "tipping point" - the mystical, perhaps mythological, moment they believe will herald success. It marks a switch of momentum from the insurgents to the government.
Despite last weekend's attack, the Australians are planning to continue their campaign over winter. This is the time the insurgents normally retire to the twig fires to huddle against the bitter cold and mountain snow. But the OMLTs will be moving, occupying an area that's been off-limit since 2006.
The Khas Uruzgan district is the province's badland. It is territory the Australians want to seize back from the insurgency. Although it's terrible to admit, the success or failure of that mission will probably have much more relevance to the fight against the Taliban than the three tragic deaths one week ago.
Nicholas Stuart travelled to Afghanistan as an embedded journalist with the Australian Defence Force.
www.afghanistannewscenter.com
Reuters By Susan Cornwell November 5, 2011
WASHINGTON - A U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership agreement is being held up by Afghan demands for limits on "night raids" against insurgents and for a timeline for Afghans to assume control over detention centers, sources following the talks told Reuters.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said last week that the two nations had agreed on as much as 90 percent of the substance of the keystone deal. It is intended to provide a framework for the future U.S. role in Afghanistan as control over security is gradually transferred to the Afghans.
While U.S. officials had hoped to unveil the document for an international conference in Germany on December 5, disputes over controversial night raids on Afghan homes and the running of detention centers could delay it well beyond that date, congressional staff who follow the issue say.
"I think a more realistic expectation is now at NATO in Chicago," one congressional aide said, asking not to be named, referring to a NATO summit planned for May 2012.
The sticking points are more evidence of strains in the U.S.-Afghan relationship as Western combat forces start leaving. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has repeatedly criticized Western military tactics and said recently that Afghanistan would back neighboring Pakistan if it went to war with the United States.
Under an international agreement reached last year, local Afghan forces are to be in charge of security by the end of 2014, as Western forces withdraw. Thirty-three thousand of nearly 100,000 U.S. troops will leave by next September.
But the West will likely fund Afghanistan's police and army for years to come. Clinton made clear the United States would continue playing a role in security.
"We anticipate having a transition that does include security components, not only from the United States, but also from NATO," she told lawmakers last week.
U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General John Allen, who commands U.S. and NATO forces there, are working through some of the security cooperation issues with Karzai, Clinton said.
A U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the partnership document would agree to an extended U.S. troop presence in principle, and it might define broadly what types of things troops would do beyond 2014.
But the details such as troop numbers would be worked out in a subsequent "Status of Forces" agreement, he said.
HATED MILITARY TACTIC
Night raids, in which soldiers search Afghan homes for militants under the cover of darkness, have long been one of the most hated foreign military tactics in Afghanistan. Karzai has repeatedly denounced them and pushed for them to be halted altogether.
Many western military commanders see them as an important tool against the Taliban and other insurgents, however.
But some of the raids are led by Afghan forces. Afghan commanders must sign off on all raids, Afghan forces are often present for them and lead at least 25 percent of the raids, according to a recent report by the Open Society Foundations, which is backed by philanthropist George Soros, and The Liaison Office, a Kabul-based nongovernmental organization.
U.S. officials want to make transfer of authority over detention centers in Afghanistan "conditions-based," the congressional staffer said. In particular, they want to make sure detainees now held by foreign forces will be properly treated when they are transferred to Afghan control.
NATO has already stopped sending prisoners to some Afghan jails because of U.N. warnings of torture there.
A U.N. report last month said that Afghanistan's intelligence agency and police force have been "systematically" torturing detainees, including children, at a number of jails. The Afghan government rejected many of the allegations but conceded there may have been abuse.
The Washington Post reported last week that CIA, U.S. military and State Department officials were warned of abuses at one Kabul prison run by the Afghan intelligence service, but continued to transfer prisoners to the service's custody.
The United States is also concerned about the security of Afghan prisons. In April, hundreds of prisoners escaped from a jail in Kandahar in Afghanistan's southern Taliban heartland.
"The detainee issue is pretty difficult to resolve. I don't think we or the Afghans feel a lot of pressure to conclude this (agreement) quickly," said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official who chaired Obama's 2009 review of Afghan war policy.
A State Department official would not comment on the talks' substance, but said there was no hard deadline for the deal.
"We look forward to coming to agreement soon, but we are committed to the right agreement, not fast agreement." (Additional reporting by Missy Ryan; Writing by Susan Cornwell; Editing by Warren Strobel and Eric Walsh)
Known Haqqani leader captured in Afghanistan: NATO
KABUL, Nov. 5 (Xinhua) -- Rashid Ahmad Arshad, known Haqqani facilitator, at a traffic control point in southern Afghan Laghman Province, was captured on Thursday, a press release issued by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force said on Saturday.
Arshad, detained by Afghan National Army and ISAF, "aided Haqqani by moving weapons and contraband throughout eastern Afghanistan", the press release said.
Combined forces set-up the traffic control point after receiving information of insurgent movement in the area, in Laghman Province, some 260 km east of Afghan capital Kabul.
Arshad and two other individuals were taken into ISAF custody of forces "after they were positively identified as insurgents wanted for questioning."
"Arshad remains in Coalition custody," ISAF said, adding "there were no Coalition or Afghan civilian injuries (during the operation)."
The ISAF has intensified its attacks targeting Haqqani Network after the latter was blamed for the Sept. 13 around-20-hour raid against the U.S. embassy and the ISAF headquarters in Afghan capital Kabul.
Making of an Afghan martyr
The Canberra Times BY NICHOLAS STUART 05 Nov, 2011
AFGHANISTAN - He awoke before dawn. The Afghan National Army sergeant knew exactly what he was going to do that day but there was so much to be done first; the purification ritual before becoming a martyr.
Two days earlier, on Friday, the Muslim holy day, he'd attended the mosque. On Saturday he confirmed his resolution, decided to act, and determined exactly how he'd cleanse his body before death.
Carefully, and with neat deliberation, he shaved his body, removing all his hair. Next he washed carefully, until he'd cleansed himself according to scripture. Then he put on unsoiled, spotless, underclothes. Only after that did he put on his uniform, fixing it neatly, before loading the magazines of his PKM automatic machine-gun with live ammunition, ready to kill.
Then he went on parade, mingling as normal with the 300 or so other soldiers of his kandak, or battalion.
A small unit of Australian trainers, an ''omelette'', had been attached to the kandak on and off for the previous couple of months. It had only formed in the middle of the year, because Forward Operating Base Pacemaker was outside the diggers' original zone of operations. However, it had become evident that controlling this area was vital, and the Australians had leapt at the opportunity to mentor the new kandak whey it was formed. The location was the gateway to Orzgan province and the Afghan National Army's decision to raise the unit seemed to indicate just how quickly it was expanding its ability to operate independently.
That's why the Afghan commander had originally decided to base his newly raised kandak in this particular location. It was - it is, vital. Pacemaker is located only 30km south of the main Aussie headquarters at Tarin Kowt. It sits astride the critical Main Supply Route. Nearly all of the material needed to keep the Australian forces functioning has to travel along this road.
The new kandak itself was a mix of old soldiers and recent recruits. Simply assembling it had been one of those miracles of Afghan improvisation. Its first-ever task was to concentrate all its new sub-units together after a road move - a significant feat for an army virtually without transport and proper communications. No detailed movement orders were prepared; there wasn't even a real ''concept of operations'', or way of explaining how all the groups would come together. Yet, a day or so before the move was scheduled to occur, everything somehow happened.
The Afghan soldiers were fed, trucks and buses refuelled, and the unit slipped into its new lines (barracks) in July. The new kandak was formally attached to 4 Brigade and the Australians began their mentoring.
On the October 13, Defence Minister Stephen Smith finally announced to Parliament that a small Australian force - an OMLT, pronounced omelette - would be deployed to assist the Afghans with their training at Pacemaker, even though the new forward operating base was not actually in the province the diggers were responsible for. At the time, this appeared to be a clear indication that the ongoing war against the insurgency was going well, because our troops were taking the fight against the Taliban into new areas, previously off limits to Afghan government forces.
But when the diggers went down to the FOB they quickly sensed a note of tension suspended in the air around them. The training mission is easy, but the cultural sensitivities that accompany it require delicate negotiation if the task is to be achieved. Even though the kandak itself had been newly formed, more than half of its soldiers had been fighting for years. Some had been in uniform for decades. Many had once fought the very people they were now standing alongside.
Others, like the kandak commander himself, saw the introduction of foreign troops as reflecting badly on their own military skills. He seemingly felt his authority was being threatened by having soldiers of another nation training his command. This is a very Afghan perception, because the commander often takes on direct, personal responsibility for almost everything his soldiers do. He felt he was being undermined.
This clash of cultures led to tensions between the Kandak and the OMLT. It appears, however, that a workable ''modus vivendi'' had been established between the two forces, despite their different ways of doing things. Nevertheless, this didn't mean the tensions had evaporated. The Australian's understood that they had to be careful when they moved around the base, although no one fully comprehended how immediate the danger was. They always walked around with their weapons loaded, at ''action'', ready to protect themselves at all times. It wasn't a relaxed situation.
Previously, only one digger had ever been shot by one of the soldiers he'd been sent to train, although the International Stability Assistance Force says as much as 3 per cent of the number of ''incidents'' in which coalition soldiers were involved can be described as so-called ''green on blue'' engagements: Afghans shooting at their international allies. The very fact that ISAF has a shorthand name for these events demonstrates the frequency with which they occur.
Until last week's tragedy, the Catering Corps' Lance Corporal Andrew Jones was the only Australian who'd died as the hands of the people he'd come to help. At the end of May an Afghan had shot Jones in the early hours of the morning. The soldier had gone on duty to make breakfast for a returning patrol. An Afghan in a nearby guard tower had opened fire at virtual point-blank range. His motives were unexplained, although some Afghan soldiers at this base told me last week that the assassin was ''unbalanced'', and ''not very clever''. Jones' death had come as a shock to Australians; headquarters, however, warned the attack might not be a ''one-off''. This was still the case until 8.20 last Sunday.
On that fatal morning the Kandak commander had given one of his usual, ''inspirational'' speeches to the assembled troops. The omelette stood to one side with their translators - the 'terps. When the order to ''fall out'' was given the Afghan soldiers began to break up into small groups, for a lesson on patrolling.
That was apparently the signal the martyr was waiting for. One digger, who wasn't an eyewitness to the event, says the killer had begun chanting prayers in Arabic. Another is not so sure. What everyone agrees on is that he then charged forward with a medium machine-gun, the 7.62 PKM, spraying bullets at the tight-knit group of Aussies.
Two fell at once. The hail of shots at less than 20m killed them instantly. An Afghan translator standing with them also sank to the ground, never to rise again, while another had been badly wounded by the indiscriminate shots of the PKM. Although he'd been fatally wounded, one of the diggers had incredibly managed to flick the safety catch off his weapon. He returned fire at his assassin, as did another of the seven Australian's who'd been wounded.
The Afghan died, caught in the crossfire. The whole incident had taken only seconds before it was over.
The OMLT gathered together, dragging the wounded diggers to the cover of their hardened accommodation and covering their retreat. This could, if necessary, be defended if others decided to launch an attack. The medic had been taught to bandage himself then perform first aid on his mates, and that's exactly what he did. Despite his own wounds he quickly triaged the others, binding their wounds to staunch the pulsing blood and then supervising their attempts at first aid.
Within 20 minutes helicopters were ''dusting off'' the wounded to the Role Two medical facilities at Tarin Kowt, but the wounds of the digger who'd returned fire were too serious. He died on the operating table.
The Afghan commander assured the Australians they were safe; that the attack was the action of a ''lone wolf'', one man acting on his own. The Afghans were apparently as shocked as everyone else had been by the suddenness of the assault. The commander's previously tense relationship with the diggers was forgotten; he too had been horrified by the murderous attack.
Significantly, the Taliban did not claim responsibility, indicating that the attack was genuinely not initiated by the insurgency. It appears unlikely that the military inquiry will ever be able to determine exactly what motivated the sergeant to become a martyr - no testament has yet been found to help understand what could have possibly have inspired his killing spree.
There was no doubt, however, about what the attack might mean back in the Australian headquarters at Tarin Kowt. Surprisingly, perhaps, the concerns were not about the danger of other rogue Afghan soldiers conducting similar attacks, but rather concerns about what the political dynamic might mean for support for their mission.
You see, it's not just the commanders who believe they are accomplishing the mission. Almost every digger I've spoken too over the past three weeks believes real progress has been achieved in the battle against the insurgency in Orzgan - and it's important to note that this is the consistent verdict not just of the soldiers, but of civilian analysts as well.
The reality is the tactics have changed significantly. The old theories of fighting ''war amongst the people'' have been tossed away. And it's this new approach that is being credited with the achievements that are being chalked up to the diggers.
There are two legs to the new operational method; but you won't find one of these being talked about by the military. The Special Operations Task Group has been critically effective in removing insurgent leaders from the battle-space. In other words; killing them. It's a deliberate, extremely carefully targeted policy. And it's working.
A great deal of effort has been put into intelligence. Earlier, the Task Force had tended to believe one particularly corrupt Afghan leader, who spun stories to the Aussies that his enemies were Taliban operatives. Now this has changed. The number of technical aids to collecting information - the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets - has vastly increased. These range from the ability to ''listen in'' to Taliban radio communications through to instantaneous video links from space which can show insurgents moving into ambush positions in time for them to be attacked, and destroyed, by the very patrols they were hoping to surprise.
Using accurate intelligence has transformed the war. This is passed to the SOTG, which determines when the insurgent leaders will be isolated and vulnerable. Then they strike.
There's nothing pleasant about these operations, although it isn't the intention of the commandos to kill their quarry. The Australians now run an interrogation centre at Tarin Kowt, and this has apparently provided a solid amount of so-called ''actionable intelligence''. The army claims this is run according to the Geneva conventions, and apparently the Red Cross has inspected the facility, although no journalist has been able to visit the centre.
The point is that the Taliban are apparently running out of capable leaders who can organise the insurgency in the province. This means the fight depends on local insurgents who are more likely to make mistakes or, more particularly, are simply reluctant to take on the government forces because of the high chance of dying.
The proof of the success of this strategy is twofold. Firstly, the so-called ''fighting season'' has ended about six weeks early this year. The Taliban commanders based over the border in Quetta simply can't get enough fighters to step up to build and lay improvised explosive devices. High quality technical intelligence proves it.
The second leg of the strategy has been the deployment of the mentors. In the past this force tended to operate in units that were dominated by Australian forces - now the mentors break up into the small OMLTs and allow the Afghans to lead the fight.
The problem is that this exposes the diggers to a green on blue engagement. And this is exactly what the Taliban are desperately hoping will occur again, because the insurgency is being squeezed. Hard. The bubble of government control in Orzgan has much more than doubled over the past year. The map talc is now covered with overlay that shows much of the province is now ''blue'', or ''permissive''. These areas remain what any normal person would consider unsafe, and any travel by an European without a military escort is likely to come to a sudden, abrupt end. Nevertheless, Afghan locals are responding positively to the new environment. Perhaps most particularly, the new road (built by the Dutch) means they can get their crops to market in less than a quarter of the time it took a year ago. The dynamic is changing.
The insurgency had, for example, regularly destroyed a telephone tower that provided mobile reception in the Chora valley. But eventually they realised that support for their actions among the locals was vanishing. People appreciated that development had many positive benefits. The telephone tower now sends out a clear signal.
The military still search for the ''tipping point'' which they believe will herald success. Nevertheless, and despite last weekend's attack, the Australians are planning to continue their campaign over the winter period. This is the time the insurgents normally retire to the dry twig fires to huddle against the bitter cold and mountain snow. But the OMLTs will be moving, occupying an area that's been off-limits since 2006.
The Khas Uruzgan district is the province's badland. It's territory the Australians want to seize back from the insurgency. Although it's terrible to admit, the success or failure of that mission will probably have much more relevance to the fight against the Taliban than the three terrible and tragic deaths one week ago.
Taliban steps up attacks ahead of Afghan Loya Jirga
By Abdul Haleem
KABUL, Nov. 4 (Xinhua) -- Amid Afghan government's efforts to convene Loya Jirga or traditional grand assembly to get national endorsement for inking the possible strategic partnership with the United States, the Taliban militants have intensified attacks to spoil the step.
The armed outfit fighting Afghan government and some 130,000 strong-NATO-led troops with nearly 100,000 of them Americans, in the latest attacks, targeted a logistic company providing assistance to the NATO-led forces in Herat province on Thursday killing two people and injuring three others.
Afghan government is going to convene a Loya Jirga within weeks, probably by the end of November to discuss the proposed Afghan-U.S. strategic partnership and the possible establishment of the U.S. military bases in the militancy-plagued Afghanistan.
As a sign of strong opposition to the possible formation of U.S. permanent military bases in Afghanistan, the Taliban outfit, in a statement released to media outlets days ago, termed the upcoming Loya Jirga as a trick to legalize the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and vowed to disrupt it.
"Under the orders of its masters, the Kabul administration wants to abuse a much respected custom of our country (Loya Jirga) and try to give a legal face to the establishment of permanent bases for the American occupying forces on the Islamic soil of Afghanistan," the Taliban statement, sent to media last week said.
"For its long term goal of permanently staying in Afghanistan, the Americans want to once again abuse this tradition through its stooge regime to call a supposed Loya Jirga in which faces of its preference will be gathered, food will be eaten and once again, games will be played with the fate and future of its nation," the English statement of the Taliban outfit read out.
Although the authenticity of the statement has yet to be verified, the inflexible outfit warned of dire consequence to anyone attends the traditional Loya Jirga or grand assembly including tribal elders, chieftains, parliamentarians and functionaries.
To oppose the presence of NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the post-Taliban Afghanistan and lash at government-initiated Loya Jirga, the militants have intensified their attacks recently.
On Oct. 31, the Taliban militants stormed a guesthouse in their former stronghold Kandahar 450 km south of Afghan capital Kabul leaving six people including three UN employees, dead.
Similarly, two days earlier of Kandahar offensive, on Oct. 29, the Taliban fighters, in a brazen attack, carried out a deadly suicide bombing against NATO-led troops in the fortified capital city Kabul killing 16 people including 13 Americans.
The coming four-day Loya Jirga is scheduled to be held under a giant tent inside the Polytechnic compound and as part of security measures, the government has given holidays for the students of Polytechnic during the Jirga, besides stationing police on the hilltops and roads leading to the Jirga avenue.
Taliban militants, who attacked a peace Jirge or peace gathering under the same tent in 2010, have warned sternly to disrupt the coming Loya Jirga.
"The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (name of the ousted Taliban regime) calls on its brave and courageous Mujahideen (holy warriors) to target every security guard, person with intention to participate the so-called Loya Jirga, and such traitors will be pursued by Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate in every corner of the country and will face severe repercussions," the statement warned.
7 Indicted in Bhutto Murder Case
VOA News November 5, 2011
A Pakistani anti-terrorism court has indicted two police officers and five alleged militants for the 2007 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.
Officials say the two police officers — the former Rawalpindi police chief and another senior officer — were indicted for failing to provide adequate security to former Prime Minister Bhutto in the city.
The French news agency says the five militants were charged with “criminal conspiracy” for bringing a suicide bomber from the tribal belt in the northwest and keeping him in a home in Rawalpindi.
Benazir Bhutto was killed December 27, 2007 by a suicide bomber after her election rally in the city.
All the accused have denied the charges.
New ‘Truth and Justice’ Party Looks To Shake Up Afghan Politics
RFE/RL By Frud Bezhan November 04, 2011
Boasting a self-proclaimed reformist agenda and members from across the country’s ethnic and ideological spectrum, the new Haq-wa-Edalat or Truth and Justice party officially launched this week in Afghanistan.
In doing so, it hopes to challenge the Change and Hope party, considered the only effective opposition group in the country, and provide a potential alternative to the government of President Hamid Karzai, which continues to struggle with widespread corruption.
Hamid Farooqi, one of the four temporary spokesmen of the party, summarized those aims at the party’s official launch event on November 3 in Kabul: “We hope to fulfill people’s hopes and needs in the political, economic, and social spheres of life. Those values that have unfortunately been neglected by the current government. We hope our political formation will be a healthy opposition in the political arena.”
Female Afghan politician Azita Rafat said the party aimed to provide the country’s war-weary citizens with hope.
“Our message to the suffering people of Afghanistan is that we will not leave you at a time when our country faces its greatest battle against war and terrorism. Our fate is the same as the fate of our people in their pursuit of freedom, peace, justice, security, and progress. We are standing with the people,” Rafat said.
In the more than year-long lead-up to the official launch, the party’s membership has generated considerable interest.
It boasts several high-profile dissidents from the Karzai government, including former Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and opposition figure Sima Samar, the chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.
The party has also been noted for bringing together representatives of the nation’s diverse ethnic, religious, and ideological groups.
They include Abbas Noyan, an ethnic Hazara intellectual; former Finance Minister Hamid Faruqi, a Pashtun; Assad Walwalji, an Uzbek intellectual and fierce opponent of warlord and Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum; Kabir Ranjbar, a leftist deputy who dissolved his Democratic Party to join; and a former deputy justice minister of the Taliban, Jalauddin Shinwari.
Rocky Road Ahead...Maybe
While some say the party’s promise of fresh thinking and varied demographics could shake up Afghanistan’s political scene, others predict that Truth and Justice will face significant hurdles.
Kabul-based political analyst Nasrullah Stanekzai says the party, like its predecessors, will find it difficult to gain legitimacy in the eyes of Afghan society, where there is widespread mistrust of political parties.
“People in Afghanistan have had very bad experiences with political parties in the past. Between 1978 [when leftists gained power] until the period of the mujahedin, not only have political parties not worked for the people, but they have actively worked against them bringing them war and destruction,” Stanekzai said.
Stanekzai said that a culture of true political participation has yet to surface in Afghanistan, and that trust in political parties needs time to develop after years of political turmoil.
Out of more than a dozen parties, Change and Hope, headed by the former foreign minister and presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah, is Afghanistan’s leading opposition bloc.
The party is dominated by Northern Alliance fighters who battled against the Taliban during the 1990s.
Truth and Justice, unlike Change and Hope, says it is in favor of reconciliation talks with insurgents if they are transparent and “do not sacrifice justice.”
Among its others positions, the party says it supports continued cooperation with international forces, while insisting that Afghanistan’s sovereignty be respected and that its regional relationships do not suffer as a result.
Soldier: Afghan killings were in legitimate combat
The Associated Press By GENE JOHNSON Saturday, November 5, 2011
JOINT BASE LEWIS-McCHORD, Wash. - An Army staff sergeant accused of masterminding the murders of three Afghan civilians for sport gave his first public comments about the case at his court martial Friday, denying involvement in any plot but acknowledging he took fingers off their corpses "like keeping the antlers off a deer you'd shoot."
Wearing his green uniform decorated with service ribbons, Staff Sgt. Calvin Gibbs of Billings, Mont., contradicted the accounts of co-defendants and fellow soldiers who portrayed him as an imposing, bloodthirsty sociopath. He said that as far as he knew, each of the killings was legitimate.
The 6-foot-4, 26-year-old Gibbs answered questions from his lawyer, Phil Stackhouse, before five military jurors, a judge and spectators — including his wife — at Joint Base Lewis-McChord south of Seattle. When Stackhouse asked why he took the fingers, Gibbs said he wasn't proud that he had done so.
"I think I was trying to be hard, a hard individual, and not let it affect me," he testified. "In my mind, it was like keeping the antlers off a deer you'd shoot. ... You have to come to terms with the things you're doing."
He added that he tried to disassociate the corpses from the people they had been.
"Bodies in general didn't mean anything to me," he said.
Gibbs is the highest-ranking of five soldiers charged in the killings, which took place in January, February and May of last year. Prosecutors said Gibbs and his co-defendants slaughtered the victims with grenades and powerful machine guns during patrols in Kandahar province then dropped weapons near their bodies to make them appear to have been combatants.
Gibbs wasn't present for the first killing but was accused of a providing an "off-the-books" grenade to then-Cpl. Jeremy Morlock of Wasilla, Alaska, who used it when he and Pvt. 1st Class Andrew Holmes, of Boise, Idaho, killed an Afghan teenager. Morlock and Holmes have pleaded guilty to murder.
Gibbs was accused of direct involvement in the second and third killings. He testified that the second killing was legitimate because he came under fire, and that he had nothing to do with the third killing.
Two co-defendants and other soldiers have testified against Gibbs, but Stackhouse said in his opening statement that the co-defendants conspired to blame Gibbs for what they did.
The shocking case came to light in May 2010, after a soldier who was beaten by Gibbs and others for reporting drug use in the platoon told investigators that his comrades had deliberately killed civilians. The five soldiers were arrested in Afghanistan, along with several others who faced less serious charges, including assault and drug use.
Gibbs also acknowledged Friday that he beat up the whistleblower, Pvt. 1st Class Justin Stoner, whom he described as a coward. After administering the beating, Gibbs and Morlock returned to Stoner's bunk. Gibbs admitted he displayed two of the severed fingers as he and Morlock tried to persuade Stoner not to speak with investigators.
"I didn't think it would scare Stoner because he had already seen the fingers before," Gibbs said. "He didn't really react to it."
One of the defendants, then-Spc. Adam Winfield of Cape Coral, Fla., tried to blow the whistle on the plot after the first killing by sending Facebook messages home to his parents in which he warned that more killings were planned.
"If you talk to anyone on my behalf, I have proof that they are planning another one in the form of an AK-47 they want to drop on a guy," Winfield wrote.
Calls by Winfield's father to Lewis-McChord went unheeded, and before long two more Afghan civilians had been killed — one with the AK-47 found beside his body, prosecutors said. Winfield pleaded guilty in the final killing and said he took part because he feared Gibbs would hurt him if he didn't.
Gibbs' testimony Friday was at odds with that of the other witnesses, who said he began talking about killing civilians soon after he joined the unit in late 2009. In the second killing, Morlock — who is serving 24 years for the murders — said Gibbs killed an unarmed man after firing an illicit AK-47 into the wall of a compound and tossing the weapon at the man's feet to make him appear to have been an enemy.
But Gibbs maintained the engagement was legitimate. The man started firing with the AK-47, but the gun jammed, and he and Spc. Michael Wagnon, who is also charged in that killing, returned fire, Gibbs said.
"I was engaged by an enemy combatant," he said. "Luckily his weapon appeared to malfunction and I didn't die."
Wagnon's court martial is scheduled for January.
In the third killing, Gibbs contradicted testimony from Morlock and Winfield, who said Gibbs told them to shoot as he threw a grenade at an unarmed man.
Gibbs said he had nothing to do with that killing, and didn't even witness it. He ran toward the gunfire and saw Morlock and Winfield on the ground, firing into a cloud of dust, he said. Shortly before the shooting, he said, he had chastised the two of them for going outside the compound on their own.
During cross-examination, Maj. Robert Stelle sought to portray aspects of Gibbs' story as farfetched. According to Gibbs, he noted, the second incident took place when a lone Afghan man — with no other military-age men nearby, armed with an AK-47 with no extra ammunition — attacked an entire squad of heavily armed Americans.
Gibbs faces 16 charges, covering a range of allegations from premeditated murder to assault. In one instance, he's accused of ordering his men to fire on unarmed men in a field. No one was injured, and Gibbs insisted on the stand that one of the men in the field was carrying a rocket-propelled grenade.
However, others who have testified about that shooting, including Staff Sgt. Robert Stevens, of Portland, Ore., who was at the time a close friend of Gibbs, said they knew the men were unarmed.
Gibbs could face up to life in prison if convicted. Four out of five jurors must agree for him to be convicted.
US's post-2014 Afghan agenda falters
Asian Times By M K Bhadrakumar Nov 4, 2011
There couldn't have been a more appropriate venue than the old Byzantine capital on the Bosphorus to hold a regional conference on Afghanistan at the present juncture. The conference at Istanbul on Thursday carried an impressive title - "Security and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia". The "heart" had 14 chambers - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The conference was packed with high drama, which was unsurprising, since its "brain" - the United States - acted almost imperviously to the beatings of the heart.
Intrigue and counter-intrigue dogged the conference from the
outset to such an extent that its eventual failure was a forgone conclusion.
The US and its Western allies began with high hopes that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner Turkey would secure from the conference a declaration - preferably signed by the "14 heartland" states - that would prepare the ground for establishing a regional security and integration mechanism on the pattern of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In turn, this declaration would take wing at the forthcoming Bonn II conference in December (to which Germany has invited 90 countries and 15 international organizations).
In the event, Thursday ended on a somewhat miserable note in Istanbul, the heart of Asia having suffered even a minor rupture. Uzbekistan broke loose and stayed away at the last minute, with the remaining 13 countries finally settling for an anodyne joint statement that will become the latest in a series of platitudes and good intentions since the US invaded Afghanistan.
Bound to crash-land The conference agenda was lop-sided in the first instance. Instead of focusing on the pivotal issue of a viable Afghan national reconciliation, how to set up such a process and how to secure it as "Afghan-led" and genuinely "Afghan-owned", the masterminds of the conference - the United States in particular - loaded it with geopolitics.
The conference was burdened with an ambitious agenda of imposing on the region under Western leadership a mechanism to mediate in a host of intra-regional disputes and differences which are, arguably, tangential issues that could have a bearing on Afghanistan's stabilization but are not the greatest concern today. This was, to put mildly, like putting the cart before the horse. The Western masterminds needlessly introduced a controversial template for a new security architecture for Central and South Asia, complete with an institutional mechanism and a "contact group" for monitoring the implementation of a matrix of "confidence-building measures".
This was an idea that was bound to crash-land, given the deep suspicions about the US's intentions in the "war on terror" in Afghanistan and the unwillingness of the regional states to accept the permanent habitation of the West as the arbiter-cum-moderator-cum-mediator in their region.
During the preparatory stages at official meetings in Oslo, Norway and Kabul through September and October, it became evident that there were no takers in the region for a new regional security organization presided over by the West. Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan and most of the Central Asian countries demurred on the US proposal for a new regional security architecture. India, which resents outside mediation on its disputes, kept quiet so as not to offend the US, while probably remaining confident that Pakistan would do its job anyway.
Moscow came up with its own counterproposal in the shape of a statement of principles of regional cooperation listing political, economic and other measures to build confidence and encourage cooperation among the countries neighboring Afghanistan. The Russian approach found favor with China, Pakistan and Iran, and being unexceptional in any case, it gained traction and ultimately seems to have paved the way for Thursday's joint statement at Istanbul.
However, Washington (and Ankara) continued efforts until the last minute to somehow institutionalize a regional process through "working groups" and a "structured" form of consultations. But Pakistan would appear to have put its foot firmly down on these ideas, pointing out that an OSCE-type security related conference or a full-fledged security apparatus would be completely unacceptable since there was a world of difference between the Cold-War compulsions which initiated the Helsinki process and the prevailing Afghan situation.
Pakistan's contention is that Afghanistan's neighboring countries could at best have a supportive role in ensuring the peace, security and territorial integrity of that country and instead of proposing new mechanisms, the focus should be on implementation of the existing mechanisms for peace, security and development.
The US game plan served four objectives. One, Washington hoped to "shackle" Pakistan within the four walls of a regional security mechanism dominated by the West so that it becomes one protagonist among equals and its claim to an eminent status in any Afghan peace process gets diluted.
Two, the regional mechanism would give the US and its allies a handle to retain the lead role in the search for an Afghan settlement and also beyond during the post 2014 period. Three, Washington estimated that the regional security apparatus would inevitably come to overshadow the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the number one regional security process in Central Asia and South Asia which, in turn, would erode the dominant influence of Russia and China in Central Asia.
Finally, the US envisaged the regional mechanism to provide the security underpinning for its "New Silk Road" project, which is running on a parallel track - quintessentially a modern version of its "Greater Central Asia strategy" dating back to the George W Bush presidency. The New Silk Road proposes Afghanistan as a regional hub to bring Central Asia and South Asia closer together under the garb of regional development and integration.
Its real intent, however, is to roll back the pre-eminent position of Russia and China in Central Asia and to gain direct access to the vast mineral resources of the region through communication links that bypass Russia and Iran. The US's agenda included gaining for NATO some sort of formal, institutional role in regional security in Central Asia. (Safeguarding the energy pipelines is a newfound 21st century "challenge" that NATO proposes to assume.)
Conceivably, Moscow and Beijing spotted a red herring from day one. The most significant outcome of the Istanbul Conference, therefore, might turn out to be that the SCO will hasten its decision-making process and swiftly steer through the applications of Pakistan and India for membership of that organization.
A Russian statement issued on Monday following Foreign Ministry-level political consultations with China in Moscow stated that the two countries discussed the modalities of finalization of the membership of the two South Asian countries in SCO and "spoke of expediting the process" of membership of India and Pakistan (and Afghanistan's status as an SCO "Observer"). The likelihood is that a decision in this regard might even be formalized at the SCO Heads of Governments meeting due in St Petersburg on Monday.
Note of triumphalism Underlying all this high drama has been the realization in Washington (and the regional capitals) that the political-military situation in Afghanistan is decisively shifting in Pakistan's favor, prompting a desperate Western attempt to ensure the US and NATO's permanent military presence in the strategic Hindu Kush.
Without doubt, a dangerous period lies ahead for the US and its NATO allies with the strong possibility of Mullah Omar's forces and the Haqqani network openly collaborating with a view to intensifying the insurgent activities.
The devastating suicide car bomb attack in Kabul killing 13 American and 3 Australian soldiers may well be the harbinger of a new offensive. Its timing - on the eve of the Istanbul conference - carried a barely-disguised message to the US administration that crunch time has come and the US strategy to degrade the Taliban and force them to come to the negotiating has not only failed, but the Taliban seem more than ever convinced that they are inching toward conclusive victory.
Clearly, US secretary of state Hillary Clinton's visit to Islamabad 10 days ago has not helped reduce the huge trust deficit in the US-Pakistan relationship. The Pakistani military seems amused that Clinton made a virtue out of dire necessity by graciously "offering" to Islamabad the "primacy" to "squeeze" the Haqqanis and bring them to the negotiating table.
Whereas, the heart of the matter is that the US's covert attempts in the recent months to gain direct access to the Taliban leadership and to suo moto initiate a peace process from a position of strength lie in shambles today.
On the other hand, Pakistan's estimation is that US President Barack Obama is going to find himself more and more on the defensive as next year's election approaches, lessening even further the US's capacity to pressure Islamabad. A tone of triumphalism is appearing in the Pakistani discourses.
Indeed, the Obama administration, too, would sense that the factors of advantage are incrementally tilting in Pakistan's favor and that the US lacks any real leverage to influence the Pakistani military. The US roped in Turkey to push the agenda of the Istanbul Conference, given its traditionally warm and friendly relations with Pakistan. The Saudi and United Arab Emirates presence in Istanbul was also expected to influence Pakistan. But the Istanbul Conference may have resulted in causing some injury to Turkish-Pakistani ties. A Turkish observer wrote:
Cold winds have started to blow between the two [Turkey and Pakistan] due to the Afghan problem ... Islamabad is quite annoyed at Turkey for its role in the conference ... Basically, Pakistan is angry at Turkey and the US, which want a result oriented conference. For the conference to bear fruit an institutionalization of the process is a must. In other words in the absence of some kind of a mechanism, to monitor the process that might include implementing confidence-building measures, everything said in Istanbul will stay on paper.
Turkish diplomacy has tried to calm down the Pakistanis, telling them that the presence of Turkey in the regional framework should alleviate the concerns of Pakistanis vis-a-vis other players. After all the Turks do not have a secret agenda of strengthening the hands of India at the expense of Pakistan but I am doubtful that they succeeded in reassuring Pakistan.
All in all, from the Russian and Chinese point of view, it becomes desirable - almost imperative - from now onward while looking ahead, that Pakistan is enabled to have strategic autonomy to withstand the US pressure. Most certainly, they would appreciate Pakistan's steadfast role in frustrating the US design to install a regional security mechanism for continued interference in the Central Asian region.
On balance, the petering out of the Istanbul Conference constitutes a grave setback for the upcoming Bonn Conference II in December. With the Istanbul Conference failing to erect an institutionalized framework of regional cooperation, Bonn Conference II lacks a viable agenda except that 2011 happens to provide a great photo-op, being the 10th anniversary of the first conference in December 2001.
The original intent was to ensure that the Taliban representatives attended the Bonn Conference. But short of a miracle, that is not going to happen. That leaves the US and its NATO allies to work out the planned transition in Afghanistan in 2014 in isolation, as they gather for the alliance's summit in May in Chicago.
In sum, the regional powers are unwilling to collaborate with the US and its allies to choreograph the post-2014 regional security scenario. Russia and China insist that the central role of the international community in Afghanistan should be of the United Nations once the US and NATO's transition is completed in 2014.
Evidently, they would hope for the SCO to take a lead role in the stabilization of Afghanistan. Afghanistan's expeditious admission as an SCO observer alongside Pakistan's induction as a full member conveys a loud message that regional security is best handled by the countries of the region, while extra-regional powers can act as facilitators. That is also the final message of the Istanbul conference.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
Diggers exposed in Taliban badlands
The Sydney Morning Herald November 5, 2011
Tensions were building before the shocking deaths of three Australian soldiers in Afghanistan, writes Nicholas Stuart.
The Afghan National Army sergeant awoke before dawn. He knew exactly what he was going to do later that day but there was much to be done first: the purification ritual before becoming a martyr.
Two days earlier, on Friday, the Muslim holy day, he'd attended the mosque. On Saturday he confirmed his resolution, decided to act, and determined how he'd cleanse his body before death.
That morning, he performed a macabre ritual. Carefully, and with neat deliberation, he shaved his entire body. Next, he cleansed himself according to scripture, before putting on spotless underclothes and his uniform, fixing it neatly. Finally, he loaded the magazines of his PKM automatic machine gun with live ammunition.
Then he went on parade, mingling as normal with the 300 or so other soldiers of his kandak, or battalion.
A small unit of Australian trainers had been attached to the kandak, on and off, for the previous couple of months. It had formed only in the middle of the year, because Forward Operating Base Pacemaker was outside the diggers' original zone of operations. But it had become evident that controlling this area was vital, and the Australians had leapt at the opportunity to mentor the new kandak when it was formed.
The location was the gateway to Oruzgan province and the Afghan National Army's decision to raise the unit seemed to indicate just how quickly it was expanding its ability to operate independently.
That's why the Afghan commander had originally decided to base his newly raised kandak here. Pacemaker is just 30 kilometres south of the main Australian headquarters at Tarin Kowt and sits astride the critical main supply route. Almost everything needed to keep the Australian forces functioning has to travel along this road.
The new kandak was a mix of old soldiers and recent recruits. Simply assembling it had been one of those miracles of Afghan improvisation. But, in July, the kandak was formally attached to the 4th Brigade and the Australians began their mentoring.
On October 13, the Defence Minister, Stephen Smith, finally told Parliament a small Operational Mentor and Liaison Team - an OMLT, pronounced omelet - would be deployed to assist the Afghans with their training at Pacemaker, even though the new forward operating base was not in the province for which the Diggers were responsible.
This appeared to be a clear indication the war against the insurgency was going well, because Australian troops were taking the fight against the Taliban into new areas previously off-limits to Afghan government forces.
But, when the Diggers arrived, they quickly sensed tension. Although the kandak was newly formed, more than half of its soldiers had been fighting for years. Some had been in uniform for decades. Many had once fought the very people they were now alongside.
Others, such as the kandak commander, saw the introduction of foreign troops as reflecting badly on their own skills. He seemingly felt his authority was being threatened by having soldiers of another nation training his command.
The Afghan way isn't to delegate. Instead, the commander bursts down through the ranks to (literally) grab an individual soldier and physically demonstrate how particular actions should be done.
This means training of soldiers jerks along at the pace of the slowest and depends on the ability of the commander. It's not the way things are done in the Australian Army.
This clash of cultures led to tensions between the kandak and the OMLT. A workable modus vivendi seemed to have been established between the two forces, but tensions had not evaporated.
The Australians understood they had to be careful when they moved around the base; they carried their weapons at "action", ready to protect themselves at all times.
Previously, only one Digger had been shot by one of the soldiers he'd been sent to train, although the International Security Assistance Force says up to 3 per cent of coalition soldier "incidents" involved so-called "green on blue'' engagements: Afghans shooting at their international allies.
The fact ISAF has a shorthand name for these events demonstrates their frequency.
Until until 8.20am last Sunday, the Catering Corp's Lance Corporal Andrew Jones was the only Australian who had died at the hands of the people he'd come to help.
That morning, the kandak commander had given one of his usual, "inspirational" speeches to the assembled troops. The OMLT stood to one side with their translators. When the order to "fall out" was given, the Afghan soldiers began to break up into small groups, for a lesson on patrolling.
That was apparently the martyr's signal. One Digger, who was not a witness, says the killer had begun chanting prayers in Arabic. Another is not so sure. Everyone agrees, however, that he then charged forward with a machine gun, spraying bullets at the Australians.
Two fell at once. The hail of shots at less than 20 metres killed them instantly. An Afghan translator standing with them also sank to the ground, never to rise again, while another was badly wounded. Although he'd been fatally wounded, one of the Diggers incredibly managed to flick the safety catch off his weapon. He returned fire at his assassin, as did another of the seven wounded Australians.
The Afghan died, caught in the crossfire. The whole incident was over in seconds.
The OMLT gathered together, dragging the wounded Diggers to cover. The medic had been taught to bandage himself then perform first aid on his mates, and that's what he did. Despite his own wounds, he triaged the others, binding their wounds to staunch the blood and then supervising their attempts at first aid.
An urgent call for help was broadcast. Within 20 minutes helicopters were moving the wounded to medical facilities at Tarin Kowt, but the wounds of the Digger who had returned fire were too serious. He died on the operating table.
Killed were Corporal Ashley Birt, Captain Bryce Duffy and Lance-Corporal Luke Gavin.
Afterwards, the Afghan commander assured the Australians they were safe; that the attack was the action of a ''lone wolf''. The Afghans were apparently as shocked as everyone else. The commander's previously tense relationship with the Diggers was forgotten; he, too, had been horrified by the attack.
The Taliban did not claim responsibility, indicating the attack was genuinely not initiated by the insurgency. It appears unlikely that the military inquiry will ever be able to determine exactly what motivated the sergeant to become a martyr.
There was no doubt, however, about what the attack might mean back in the Australian headquarters at Tarin Kowt. Almost every Digger I've spoken to in the past three weeks believes real progress has been achieved in the battle against the insurgency in Oruzgan. This is the verdict of civilian analysts as well.
Although soldiers won't admit it officially, the reality is the tactics have changed. The old theories of fighting "war among the people" have been tossed away.
There are two legs to the new operational method; but you won't find one of these being talked about by the military. The Australian Special Operations Task Group has been critically effective in removing insurgent leaders from the battle space. In other words; killing them. It's a deliberate, carefully targeted policy. And it's working.
Much effort has been put into intelligence, with many more technical aids for collecting information. These range from the ability to "listen in" to Taliban radio communications through to instantaneous video links, which can show insurgents moving into ambush positions in time for them to be attacked and destroyed. Using accurate intelligence has transformed the war.
The Australians now run an interrogation centre at Tarin Kowt, which has apparently provided a solid amount of "actionable intelligence". The army says this is run according to the Geneva conventions, and the Red Cross has inspected the facility but no journalist has been able to visit.
Proof of the strategy's success is twofold. First, the so-called fighting season ended about six weeks early this year. Taliban commanders based in Quetta can't get enough fighters to build and lay improvised explosive devices (IEDs). High-quality technical intelligence shows it.
The second leg of the strategy has been the deployment of mentors. In the past, this force tended to operate in units dominated by Australian forces - now the mentors break up into the small OMLTs and allow Afghans to lead the fight, even if they are perceived to be less effective.
The problem is that this exposes the Diggers to exactly what occurred last weekend. And this is what the Taliban are hoping will occur again, because the insurgency is being squeezed. Hard.
The bubble of government control in Oruzgan has much more than doubled over the past year. Afghan locals are responding positively to the new environment. For them, it's a significant improvement. And, perhaps most particularly, the new road (built by the Dutch) means they can get their crops to market in less than a quarter of the time it took a year ago. The dynamic is changing.
The insurgency had, for example, regularly destroyed a phone tower that provided mobile reception in the Chora Valley. But, eventually, they realised support for their actions among the locals was vanishing. People appreciated that development had positive benefits. The Taliban were seen as backward and harming the local lifestyle. The tower now sends out a clear signal.
The military still search for the "tipping point" - the mystical, perhaps mythological, moment they believe will herald success. It marks a switch of momentum from the insurgents to the government.
Despite last weekend's attack, the Australians are planning to continue their campaign over winter. This is the time the insurgents normally retire to the twig fires to huddle against the bitter cold and mountain snow. But the OMLTs will be moving, occupying an area that's been off-limit since 2006.
The Khas Uruzgan district is the province's badland. It is territory the Australians want to seize back from the insurgency. Although it's terrible to admit, the success or failure of that mission will probably have much more relevance to the fight against the Taliban than the three tragic deaths one week ago.
Nicholas Stuart travelled to Afghanistan as an embedded journalist with the Australian Defence Force.
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