[Afghan News] September 23, 2011

[یاسمینه]

Crowds weep as slain former Afghan president buried
Mirwais Harooni and Hamid Shalizi, Reuters September 23, 2011, 9:03 pm
KABUL (Reuters) - Weeping Afghans gathered under tight security on Friday to bury former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, the government's chief peace negotiator killed this week by a suicide bomber posing as a Taliban envoy with a message about possible talks.
After prayers at the presidential palace, a coffin draped in the black, red and green national flag was taken to a hilltop in the Wazir Akbar Khan district for burial.
Crowds along the procession route pushed, shoved and clambered their way through the throngs of mourners to touch Rabbani's coffin as it made its way toward the burial site.
Others chanted "God is great" as the coffin passed by. Hundreds more were clustered on the hilltop around his grave.
Bursts of automatic gunfire briefly unsettled the capital as police fired shots into the air to disperse large groups who moved toward the burial site without having passed tight security checks.
Streets surrounding the capital's political and diplomatic heart were blocked-off and almost empty.
Special forces guarding the funeral procession route leading to "swimming pool hill," a small outcrop overlooking Kabul's diplomatic enclave where the Taliban once carried out executions in a disused, Soviet-built pool.
Rabbani was killed by a man who claimed to be a Taliban envoy with a message of peace from the insurgent leadership.
His death has reignited long-simmering ethnic tensions, stirring fears of retribution. But his supporters and political allies called for a peaceful burial on Friday.
"We will avenge the death of our leader but today, please be calm," said a man using a loudspeaker.
Others rushed to take control of the microphone and shouted slogans attacking the government and foreign troops operating in the country.
"Death to the American allies," one man roared before a defense ministry official ordered the speakers switched off.
MOST DIFFICULT TIME
Car windscreens and walls along normally congested roads were covered with posters bearing the face of Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik and former mujahideen resistance fighter who became president after the fall of the Soviet-backed regime.
"Professor Rabbani's martyrdom is a big loss for Afghanistan and it is a sad day for all of us," said restaurant owner Mohammad Zia.
One of Zia's customers sat sipping tea beneath a window bearing Rabbani's photo and added: "Rabbani was killed at the most difficult time for Afghans, when security is at it's worst and people feel hopelessness."
Condolences and tributes poured in from prominent Afghans and foreign governments condemning Tuesday's killing and urging Afghans not to give up on Rabbani's fledgling peace process.
President Hamid Karzai, who chose Rabbani to head the High Peace Council last October, cut short his trip to the United Nations General Assembly in New York to return for the burial.
He has come under intense criticism from political opponents who say he instructed Rabbani to meet with the assassin. Karzai's office has said he was not involved.
Rabbani's protege and former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah, one of Karzai's most long-standing critics, wept as the coffin was taken up the hill.
"Today we bury our respected leader but we will not keep silent," he shouted, prompting a huge roar from the crowd.

Dignitaries pay tribute to slain Afghan ex-leader
Associated Press By AMIR SHAH and CHRISTOPHER TORCHIA 23/09/2011
KABUL, Afghanistan - Dignitaries on Friday paid tribute before the coffin of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was killed by a suicide bomber claiming to carry a message of peace from the Taliban.
President Hamid Karzai, Afghan lawmakers and foreign ambassadors gathered at the presidential palace at the beginning of the funeral ceremony for Rabbani, whose casket is draped in a red, black and green national flag.
"It is our responsibility to act against those who are enemies of peace," said Karzai, who hailed Rabbani as a tireless advocate for reconciliation and "the martyr of the path of peace."
The president said Afghans should not despair over Rabbani's death, but instead should escalate efforts to bring an end to years of fighting in Afghanistan.
"Today we are witnessing one of the biggest and saddest events of this important political time in the history of the world," said Salahuddin Rabbani, the former president's son. He urged the Afghan government to aggressively investigate the killing.
Mourners prayed, and a military band played the national anthem. Then the casket was carried by uniformed servicemen with caps and white gloves, marching stiffly.
The ex-president headed Afghanistan's High Peace Council, which was seeking to reconcile the nation's warring factions. He was killed Tuesday evening in Kabul by an assassin who visited his home under the guise of delivering a message from the insurgency.
The 70-year-old Rabbani was the leader of Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, which helped overthrow Taliban rule during the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. The peace council that he headed was set up by Karzai to work toward a political solution to the conflict.
It has made little headway since it was formed a year ago, but it is backed by many in the international community as helping move toward a settlement.
The suicide attacker who killed Rabbani had a a bomb in his turban, and gained entry to the former president's home by convincing officials, including Karzai's advisers, that he represented the Taliban leadership and wanted to discuss reconciliation.
Rabbani's death only deepens rifts between the country's ethnic minorities, especially between those who made up the Northern Alliance — including Tajiks like Rabbani — and the majority Pashtun, who make up the backbone of the Taliban.

Afghanistan's Abdullah Abdullah: The Taliban Does Not Believe In Peace Talks
September 22, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
The death of former Afghan president and leading peace negotiator Burhanuddin Rabbani in a brazen suicide attack has shocked Afghanistan and dealt a blow to hopes of a negotiated settlement with the insurgency.
Rabbani was killed on September 20 in his home during an audience with a man who said he was bearing a "special message" from Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar.
Who will fill Rabbani's shoes? Can anyone?
Former Afghan presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah believes a new High Peace Council leader can be found, but also thinks the Taliban doesn't believe in peace talks. He told RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan that until Pakistan severs all its ties with the Taliban, peace will remain out of reach.
RFE/RL correspondent Zarif Nazar spoke to Abdullah, who leads the Coalition for Change and Hope, Afghanistan's main democratic political opposition group.
RFE/RL: What are your views on the terrorist attack that killed Rabbani?
Abdullah Abdullah: It was a tragic event and a loss to the people of Afghanistan. A person who dedicated 50 years of his life to attaining peace was unfortunately killed by the enemy of Afghanistan and that of the Afghan people. They have committed a crime against the people of Afghanistan and brought death to thousands of innocent Afghans. They showed their real faces, their dark intentions, and because of this, innocent blood was shed [on September 20].
The enemy of Afghanistan wants to destroy everything good and positive in the country [with] the kinds of atrocities they have committed over the years. For all [Rabbani's] work toward achieving peace and his work toward reconciliation, for them to respond in this way, shows the dark motives and character of this group. "
RFE/RL: Who do you think was behind the assassination?
Abdullah: To answer this, we must begin a full and comprehensive investigation. It might be too early to say, but questions should be asked as to how these men entered Rabbani's compound and how they received [an] audience with him. These are the first questions that come to mind.
We all know who was behind these attacks, but it is important to investigate how it was done. Unfortunately, this tragic event wasn't the first, nor will it be the last. For this reason, it is important to find answers so the people of Afghanistan know how it was carried out.
RFE/RL: What plans are there for the future of the Peace Council? Who can fill Rabbani's shoes?
Abdullah: We will begin the process in a few days time, after things have settled down. It's very difficult to replace a man who has dedicated most of his life to the betterment of his country. But if we all join hands and continue to represent -- and work for -- the people, the hole Rabbani has left might be filled.
RFE/RL: What are your thoughts on the Peace Council's efforts to try and find a negotiated settlement?
Abdullah: Thus far, the Taliban have not demonstrated even one sign of interest of seriously coming to the table to discuss a political settlement. The attempt at peace talks has been the only approach [taken so far]. This has encouraged the Taliban to increase the violence and create fear among the people. They think that using this strategy will allow them to regain power in Afghanistan.
Even before this incident, I was confident that the Taliban does not believe in peace talks, that they want to overthrow the current government, that they want to create an Islamic state, and that every crime they commit is done under the pretense of Islam.
There is also continued support for the Taliban from our neighbor [Pakistan]. Day by day, the government is losing people's support and trust. Government bodies like the police and military have not been developed, and there is no rule of law. So this encourages the Taliban to continue terrorist attacks and bring harm to the people of Afghanistan.
If there is to be a serious plan to end this, then more pressure must be placed on Pakistan to sever its ties with the Taliban.

Rabbani's murder disappoints Afghans
By Abdul Haleem, Zhang Jianhua
KABUL, Sept. 23 (Xinhua) -- The endemic uncertainty in Afghanistan has at last claimed the life of Afghan peace broker Burhanudin Rabbani and thus battered the hope of war-weary Afghans for embracing lasting peace in their conflict-ridden country.
Rabbani, 71 who has served as chairman of the government-backed peace body the High Council for Peace since October 2010, was assassinated by a suicide bomber at his residence in Kabul on Tuesday.
A man pretended to be a Taliban messenger entered Rabbani's house on Tuesday evening and blew himself up leaving himself and Rabbani dead on the spot.
Four more people sustained injuries in the incident, according to officials.
Hundreds of thousands of Rabbani's supporters including some government functionaries attended his funeral ceremony in Kabul on Friday amid tight security.
The late Rabbani's elder son Salahudin Rabbani, also serving ambassador of Afghanistan to Turkey, in his speech called on the government to bring those responsible for the murder of his father to justice at its earliest, while urging the mourners to be patient.
Speaking on the occasion, President Hamid Karzai praised the services of late Rabbani for bringing about peace and reconciliation in the war-torn Afghanistan and described him as " Martyr of Peace" in the country.
The late Rabbani, who headed the moderate Islamic party Jamiat- e-Islami (Islamic Society) till his death and had fought against the erstwhile Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-89 and then resisted Taliban regime onslaught until its collapse in 2001, had been regarded as a powerful figure in Afghan society.
Series of demonstrations have been held in several Afghan cities including Kabul, Faizabad, Herat, Badghis and Mazar-e- Sharif since Rabbani's assassination and the demonstrators, while demanding the punishment of those behind his murder, called for the dissolution of the High Council for Peace.
Some of the mourners even at burial ceremony lashed at the peace process, calling on government to annul the High Council for Peace, while chanting slogans "We want honorable peace", "Death to Taliban and terrorists".
Speaking to the mourners after the burial ceremony, President Karzai's main challenger in last presidential election Abdullah Abdullah warned the government to punish those responsible for the attack at its earliest or face peaceful mass demonstrations.
He also warned that, "we would not sit indifferent unless and until the enemies is identified and punished."
Gun shots were also happened during the burial ceremony.
A day earlier on Thursday, the strong man and the governor of northern Balkh province who is a member of Jamiat-e-Islami party in his speech denounced the government-backed peace process and vowed to avenge the murder of Rabbani.
Afghans from all walks of life including former foes have condemned the murder of Rabbani as a terrorist act.
"The assassination of professor Rabbani is a great loss and I hope his murder will not affect the peace process," a former Afghan Defense Minister during the then Moscow-backed regime Shah Nawaz Tanai observed.
Moreover, the serving parliamentarian and former speaker of Wolesi Jirga or Lower House of Afghan parliament Mohammad Yunus Qanooni in his reaction termed Rabbani's murder as the last shot to peace process, saying Rabbani's murder categorically demonstrated that government-initiated peace process is not acceptable to terrorists.

The post-Rabbani Afghanistan
By Omar Samad Thursday, Foreign Policy September 22, 2011
An informed source in Kabul revealed to me that an ominously fateful intelligence tip relayed to several top Afghan political figures last week by an official at the National Directorate of Security (NDS) pointed to a radical Taliban faction planning to target a high-ranking member of the former anti-Taliban coalition in the days to come. Some took the warning seriously and ramped up close-protection measures. Others, like former President and head of Afghanistan's High Peace Council Berhanuddin Rabbani, who had rushed back from an overseas visit for the explicit purpose of meeting a supposed Quetta Shura Taliban emissary, either was not briefed on time, took the warning lightly or was been given strong assurances by facilitators that the emissary was the real deal.
On Tuesday, Ustad (professor) Rabbani, as he was called by most Afghans, paid for his trust, oversight, or overconfidence with his life, as the attacker (named in reports as Esmatullah, a supposed Quetta Shura messenger), detonated his booby-trapped turban when Rabbani greeted him inside his home in the heavily-guarded Wazir Akbar Khan district.
Obviously, the Afghan capital is rife with conspiracy theories. What is clear, however, is that this assassination, the latest in a series of high-profile attacks targeting senior government officials and former anti-Soviet mujahedeen leaders, has shaken Kabul's political scene to the core. The trust factor that is so desperately needed in any bid for peace has now been irreparably damaged.
Farouq Wardak, the influential Minister of Education and active member of the HPC, admitted to Afghan media that the latest attack has "muddied the situation, and made it difficult to distinguish friend from enemy," an indication that even ardent supporters of the reconciliation process are having misgivings about its sustainability. However, from its inception, many Afghans have been torn about the viability of the HPC and how much it could accomplish when very little incentive exists for pursuing political talks. And the limited developments that have taken place since gave little indication that the talks have made much progress even before Rabbani's murder.
Afghan pundits making the rounds of the country's television talk shows have repeatedly accused the government of ineptitude and wishful thinking, adding that the reconciliation process is flawed and needs to be reviewed. In addition, public frustration and growing anger with Pakistan's unwillingness to help crack down on militant safe-havens on its territory are clear impediments facing any peace initiative.
The ripple effects of these assassinations are also being felt across the country and beyond, at a time when there is a growing concern about NATO's limited military ability to deal with the killings and its own casualties, the slower-than-expected rate of progress to build up an effective Afghan security apparatus, the Pakistani hedging-game that aims to force self-serving negotiating terms for reconciliation, and the Afghan government's inability to make visible headway with political outreach to the Taliban and other disaffected groups.
Initial reactions by Afghan and Western leaders do not give any indication of an immediate strategic reassessment or tactical adjustment. On Tuesday, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, President Barack Obama assured the Afghan President, "this will not deter us from continuing on the path that we have, and we'll definitely succeed."
Many in Afghanistan agree that almost a year since the launch of the HPC, there is a need for a serious review of the core political strategy that drives the peace effort, before the threats to social and political stability further erode confidence, and hamper the work that is required in the security and governance sectors.
The Taliban, or at least the powerful segments that consider the momentum to be in their favor, seek to derail the reconciliation process, while waging psychological war that aims to further weaken the negotiating position of the Kabul government, and to continue to dent Western public opinion perceptions.
Sandwiched between suspicious Afghan groups that balk at talks with the Taliban, and splinter groups within the Taliban conglomerate that want to sabotage dialogue by any means, the Karzai administration is left with two choices: 1) to continue along the fledgling path of a complex and incoherent reconciliation process that will increasingly require Pakistani assistance and Taliban accommodation, or 2) call for an intra-Afghan re-assessment of the strategy, but this time with the dual aim of bringing clarity to the strategy, and strengthening the Afghan government's negotiating position if and when the two sides reach that stage to discuss contentious issues such as power-sharing, governance, and democratic and gender rights.
A coherent strategy will need simultaneous work on the following policy tracks:
1. To reassess the strategic objectives at home and with key international partners.
2. To build up Afghan domestic support and consensus through political consultation and dialogue with a broad spectrum of Afghan leaders and communities.
3. To revamp existing mechanisms for reintegration and reconciliation
4. To establish a real-time coordination and verification mechanism embedded within the reconciliation framework to prevent incidents such as imposters and suicide bombers from entering into the system.
5. To push for a range of diplomatic, intelligence and concrete efforts to bring more coherence and active cooperation among regional players, especially Pakistan, in the fight against militant hideouts, transit routes, recruiting, financing and training networks.
Such an initiative also offers an opportunity to end the current political stalemate that has crippled the operations of all three branches of government, and has soured relationships among political forces since the contentious presidential elections were held two years ago. This tension has been exacerbated further by last year's controversial parliamentary election, and the series of controversial interferences by non-mandated governmental organisms in the electoral process, such as Afghan President Hamid Karzai's special election tribunal, that followed.
Although no group has yet claimed responsibility for the latest brazen assassination, it comes on the heels of a series of blistering attacks since the beginning of the year, believed to be the work of the Haqqani group, a brutal ally of the Taliban based in Pakistani-administered North Waziristan.
The U.S. now says it is ready to take unilateral action against the Haqqanis unless Pakistan moves against them. Furthermore, on Tuesday, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused the Pakistani military intelligence agency (ISI) of using the Haqqani group to wage a "proxy war" in Afghanistan.
With the U.S. showing signs of serious frustration with Pakistani denials and reluctance to take action against lethal groups using cross-border sanctuaries to attack Afghan and NATO troops, it will become increasingly more difficult to make headway with sporadic secret talks that have taken place between U.S. officials and Taliban emissaries.
The assassination of Professor Rabbani, whose controversial appointment as head of the HPC last year came as a surprise due to his past antagonism towards the Taliban, is not only a clear rejection by powerful elements of the peace process, but also an indication that Taliban hardliners may be winning a power struggle within their multi-layered organization.
Even though the so-called "moderate Taliban" now have a window of opportunity to break away before the process collapses altogether, that scenario is less likely to occur now as the pendulum swings in favor of the Taliban's more extreme anti-peace factions. The controversial arrest of the Taliban's number two, Mullah Ghani Baradar, by Pakistani authorities in February 2010, in Karachi, was a clear indication that Afghan elements who are seeking channels of dialogue are dependent on the host-country's whims.
Understanding the uphill challenges that the HPC faced in recent months, Rabbani in recent speeches publicly voiced his displeasure with brutal Taliban tactics. At an Islamic scholars' gathering in Tehran last week, he argued against brutality and the use of suicide attacks.
On Tuesday, the soft-spoken scholar-turned-rebel/politician-turned-peace advocate, became the newest victim of such an attack, dimming further the prospects for a future peace.
Omar Samad is the former ambassador of Afghanistan to France (2009-2011) and Canada (2004-2009) and spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001-2004).

Survivor Tells of Taliban Plot in Former Afghan President’s Assassination
New York Times By ALISSA J. RUBIN and JACK HEALY September 22, 2011
KABUL, Afghanistan - In his first public appearance since rushing back to Afghanistan after the assassination of the country’s leading peace broker, a solemn President Hamid Karzai said Thursday that the Taliban had gained access to their target by wooing senior leaders with an audio CD suggesting that peace was within reach.
Mr. Karzai’s statement and an account from a former Taliban member who helped bring the bomber to the peace broker, Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former Afghan president who led the country’s High Peace Council, painted a picture of a dark and complex plot that unfolded over four months to enable the assassin to move in on his target.
The recording was part of what appears to be a meticulously orchestrated ruse planned by the Taliban to place an assassin in a room with Mr. Rabbani. His death on Tuesday struck a body blow to the peace process and saddled Mr. Karzai’s government with yet another crisis.
Mr. Karzai said the suicide bomber who killed Mr. Rabbani had given Afghan officials a CD in which a Taliban official lauded Mr. Rabbani as a “dear” and “respected” teacher.
“We mistook it as a peace message,” Mr. Karzai said. “That was only deception.”
Mr. Karzai spoke in the majestic sun-dappled garden of the presidential palace as Afghanistan’s national intelligence service took Rahmatullah Wahidyar, the member of the High Peace Council who introduced the bomber to Mr. Rabbani, to a news conference in central Kabul.
Mr. Wahidyar’s account largely dovetailed with Mr. Karzai’s, indicating that he, too, had been duped, and it raised many questions about why the High Peace Council members were so ready to trust Taliban members they did not know.
Mr. Wahidyar, a middle-aged former Taliban official with a long black beard, was himself wounded in the attack. Wearing traditional loose-fitting pants and a tunic, he entered the room with help from intelligence officials, hunched over as if in pain. The blast disabled his arm, he said, and left him deaf in one ear. He occasionally cocked his head forward as reporters asked questions.
His account made clear that the senior High Peace Council members for the past four or five months were utterly committed to making contact with senior Taliban members in an effort to find a way to reach a peace agreement.
With that goal, they made contact with a man named Abdul Sattar, whom Mr. Wahidyar described as “an honest man among the Taliban.” Mr. Wahidyar, Mr. Rabbani and Mohammad Massoom Stanekzai, who leads the peace council’s secretariat, invited Mr. Sattar to Kabul and then asked him to contact the Quetta Shura, the Taliban leadership council in Pakistan. Mr. Sattar later returned with Hamidullah Akhund, a man trusted by the Taliban, Mr. Wahidyar said.
Mr. Akhund, whom Mr. Wahidyar also referred to as Akhundzada, came to Kabul twice and met both Mr. Rabbani and Mr. Stanekzai. Mr. Akhund took an audio message from Mr. Rabbani to the Quetta Shura and established a close relationship with Mr. Wahidyar, according to his account.
Referring to Mr. Akhund, Mr. Wahidyar said: “During four months we had continuous contacts with these people through Hamidullah. My number was given through secretariat of peace council, and I also got his number, and we were in contact and he was reporting to us what he did and whom he spoke with.”
Then a week ago, Mr. Akhund called and said the Quetta Shura was ready for talks with the Afghan government. At the time, Mr. Rabbani was traveling in Iran and the Arab gulf states in part to arrange for the establishment of an office for the Taliban in Qatar as a way of furthering the peace talks, Mr. Wahidyar said. Mr. Akhund said that he was not able to bring the message personally to Mr. Rabbani but that a trusted person would do so and bring messages and documents.
“When I told Mr. Stanekzai this, he got very happy,” said Mr. Wahidyar, and he instructed his staff to pick up the guest when he arrived and treat him “honorably and respectfully and bring the guest to Kabul.”
A few days later, Mr. Wahidyar received a telephone call from a man in Kandahar who said he had been sent by Mr. Akhund. Mr. Wahidyar sped there, using vehicles lent by Mr. Stanekzai, who was on his way back from a quick trip to Pakistan.
The man sent by the Quetta Shura was housed in a guesthouse kept by the peace council in Kabul, and the guesthouse staff was admonished not to let him leave the grounds. The guest, whose name was Mullah Esmatullah, brought with him two audio clips: the first was for Mr. Stanekzai, and the second was for Mr. Rabbani. The first recording included a warning that only Mr. Rabbani should hear the message addressed to him.
Mr. Karzai, who also heard the audio clip for Mr. Stanekzai, said it was an “amazing” message. He listened to it shortly before leaving on his trip to the United Nations — the trip he cut short after Mr. Rabbani was killed.
“There were lots of good messages in that CD,” Mr. Karzai said, adding that a deputy of Mr. Rabbani listened excitedly to the recordings.
Mr. Wahidyar said there were some “motivating things” in the message. The Taliban repeated that they would return to Afghanistan after the foreign troops left. They also expressed concern that “there is lots of adultery in Afghanistan and asked what will the government do about this, and there was some other stuff that I don’t remember,” he said.
On Monday, the day before the assassination, Mr. Wahidyar went to check on the Taliban messenger, Mr. Esmatullah. He was not in the guesthouse. Mr. Wahidyar said that he called him, and that Mr. Esmatullah said he had “gotten bored and gone out to offer prayers at a nearby mosque.”
The next day, near dusk, Mr. Wahidyar picked up Mr. Esmatullah in his car and drove him to Mr. Rabbani’s house. They entered the house, and the secretary for Mr. Rabbani greeted Mr. Wahidyar warmly and asked permission to have guards search the two men.
“I said, ‘Sure,’ ” said Mr. Wahidyar, but it seemed that the guards did not search them well because moments later the bomb exploded just after the two greeted Mr. Rabbani, who was standing next to Mr. Stanekzai in a small room.
Mr. Esmatullah approached Mr. Rabbani and “embraced him, and at this time I heard an explosion,” Mr. Wahidyar said. “After that I went unconscious. I did not know what happened.” When he came to, “I saw the guy lying at my feet, and I saw his body without his head.”
Mr. Esmatullah had hidden the explosives in his turban.
At the end of the his statement, Mr. Wahidyar pledged to continue to try to bring peace, and Mr. Karzai ended his news conference by saying that “peace is something that all the people in Afghanistan want.”
The American ambassador here, Ryan C. Crocker, made a statement on Thursday supporting the peace council, but he acknowledged the damage done by Mr. Rabbani’s murder.
He said the attack “raises very serious questions as to whether the Taliban and those who support them have any real interest in reconciliation.”

If Not The Taliban, Then Who Killed Rabbani?
RFE/RL By Bashir Ahmad Gwakh September 22, 2011
It has been nearly 48 hours since former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani was assassinated in a brazen suicide attack in Kabul, but in an uncharacteristic twist in a country where Taliban claims of responsibility are standard procedure, the militant organization has officially provided only a "no comment."
The group's muted response, its refutation of early claims of responsibility attributed to a Taliban spokesman, and various accusations being tossed about, add to what is developing as a genuine whodunit.
What is known is that the attack was up close and personal. The 70-year-old Rabbani, who headed the High Peace Council established by the president's office to facilitate negotiations with the Taliban, was killed in his home upon receiving a man bearing a "special message" from Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar.
In a news conference held on September 22 by the country's intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), an eyewitness to the assassination described the scene.
Ramatullah Wahidyar, a member of the High Peace Council and former deputy minister in the former Taliban regime, was the one who brought the bomber to meet with Rabbani and with top presidential adviser Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, who was seriously injured in the attack.
"When we entered into the main building of [Rabbani's house, his secretary] Haji Nazir opened the door. The [suicide bomber] entered the room before me," Wahidyar said. "Ustad [Rabbani] was sitting right in front and [Masum] Stankezai was sitting next to him. Ustad then got up from his seat and opened his arms to embrace him, saying, 'Welcome welcome.' The guest then moved forward and bowed his head to give him a hug. Then there was a loud bang and I blacked out. When I regained consciousness, I saw that Ustad and Stanekzai had been taken away."
'It Was A Trick'
According to President Hamid Karzai, it was Stanekzai who first alerted him that a messenger had arrived in Kabul bearing an audio CD with a message of peace from a Taliban representative.
After listening to the audio message, the president said, he spoke with Rabbani, who then rushed back from a trip to Iran to listen to the recording himself.
"Before I went to the UN General Assembly, I knew that a meeting between Rabbani and Taliban members was going to take place," Karzai said.
But "it was not a peace message," Karzai said on September 22. "It was a trick."
Several questions remain unanswered.
What was on the CD and why would Rabbani drop his guard to meet with a supposed representative of the Taliban, which had threatened him on numerous occasions?
And why was the Taliban reaction so confused? If the assassination was intended to signal the Taliban's strong lack of interest in negotiations, then that is not the message that was sent with its uncharacteristic "no comment" issued on September 21.
Initially, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid claimed responsibility for the attack in an interview with Reuters. But the same spokesman later wrote in a statement to RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan on September 21 that the group "did not know about the incident."
Later the same day, the Taliban issued a broad statement to the media stating that it had no comment on Rabbani's assassination, rejecting the Reuters report as baseless, and demanding a correction. (Read a Twitter timeline of the back and forth at the end of this story.)
Indication Of Division?
On September 21, Reuters and other news agencies published follow-up reports highlighting the confusion and exploring the question of whether it is an indication of division within the highest ranks of the Taliban. On September 22, RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan reported that Mujahid had sent a new message providing new contact details.
The circumstances and details, then, continue to be murky. But even without the clarity that the expected admission from the Taliban would provide, it is clear that the group is considered the main suspect.
"The perpetrators are known. It was the Taliban. But the Taliban doesn't have the ability to carry out such a well-organized operation alone," Balkh Province Governor Ata Muhammad Noor told Radio Free Afghanistan on September 21. "Pakistan's ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) was supporting them."
Officially, however, investigators are allowing for other possibilities.
Speaking to journalists in Kabul on September 22, NDS spokesman Shafiqullah Taheri said that it is possible that apart from the Quetta Shura, the leadership council of the Afghan Taliban that is believed to be based in Pakistan, other elements were involved in planning and pulling off the attack.
"Our investigations are continuing. What we know so far is that a person named Hamidullah Akhund came to talk to the peace council," he said. "He claimed to be representing the Quetta Shura. This means that the Quetta Shura was involved in the attack. But as the investigations progress, we will know who else was involved."
Warlord Past
There are a number of entities who could be seen as benefitting from the new landscape. While Rabbani's assassination is seen as a blow to the peace process, there have also been whispers that his warlord past was a hurdle to negotiations.
Whether it carried out the attack or not, observers predict that the Taliban's recruiting efforts and image as a hard-hitting insurgent group will be strengthened following the assassination.
Depending on how the chips fall, politicians opposed to both Karzai and the Taliban stand to gain. An opposition grouping headed by opposition leader Abdullah Abdullah has strongly opposed the idea of negotiating with the Taliban and has characterized the group as unworthy of participating in the government. This position could prove attractive in future elections.
And Rabbani did not lack for enemies. This was a man, after all, who is remembered by many Kabulis as the man responsible for the shelling of their city during the Afghan civil war.
So it is plausible that someone other than the Taliban might have wanted him dead. The question is, if not the Taliban, then who?
RFE/RL correspondent Frud Bezhan and Radio Free Afghanistan correspondent Zarghona Mangal contributed to this report

Letter Found in Pocket of Rabbani's Assassin
TOLOnews.com Thursday, 22 September 2011
A blood-stained letter has been found in the pocket of the suicide bomber who assassinated High Peace Council chief Burhanuddin Rabbani. It was addressed to Mr Rabbani and sent by the Taliban's Quetta Shura.
In the letter, obtained by TOLOnews, the Quetta Shura poses a number of questions and sets out a series of demands relating to the peace process.
The letter was sent by Mawlawi Enayatullah Makhtoum. He is the brother of Mawlawi Hayatullah who was the deputy minister of agriculture and livestock during the Taliban regime. The letter was sent through Mullah Esmatullah, who lives in Kandahar province, the birth place of the Taliban.
The Islamic Emirate sees presence of foreign troops, airstrikes, night raids, oppression, torture and bullying as the main factors of war, the letter said.
It added that contacts to exchange prisoners could never bring the end of war.
Part of the letter said that vows made by Pakistan to co-operate in bringing the Taliban were misplaced because Pakistan was not the Quetta Shura's representative.
The letter went on to suggest that the withdrawal of "foreign mercenaries" in small numbers would not resolve anything and that Jihad would continue intensively.
Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, an ex-president of Afghanistan and the head of the peace council, was assassinated on Tuesday evening at his home.

Pakistan Warns US It Risks Losing an Ally Over Afghan Accusations
VOA News September 23, 2011
Pakistani officials are warning the United States risks losing an ally if it continues to publicly accuse Islamabad of being involved in attacks on U.S. targets in Afghanistan.
On Thursday, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, told U.S. lawmakers that the al-Qaida-linked Haqqani network, acting with support from Pakistan's military spy agency, planned and conducted the last week's assault on the U.S. Embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar hit back at the criticism, telling a private Pakistani news channel late Thursday that the United States cannot afford to alienate the Pakistani government or its people. Khar said that if the United States chooses to push Pakistan away, it will do so at its own cost.
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani told reporters in Karachi Friday that the U.S.-Pakistani relationship is fraught with difficulty, saying “they can't live with us [and] they can't live without us.”
Mullen said that among other attacks, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence also supported the September 10 car bombing of a a NATO base in the central Afghanistan Wardak that wounded 77 U.S. soldiers.
Mullen said the ISI uses the Haqqani network as a “veritable arm” to act in Afghanistan against Afghan and coalition forces and expressed concern about the impunity with which extremist groups are allowed to operate from Pakistan.
Washington maintains that Haqqani militants take shelter in sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal region in between attacks in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has repeatedly rejected such accusations by the United States.

Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy
New York Times By ELISABETH BUMILLER and JANE PERLEZ September 22, 2011
WASHINGTON - The nation’s top military official said Thursday that Pakistan’s spy agency played a direct role in supporting the insurgents who carried out the deadly attack on the American Embassy in Kabul last week. It was the most serious charge that the United States has leveled against Pakistan in the decade that America has been at war in Afghanistan.
In comments that were the first to directly link the spy agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, with an assault on the United States, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went further than any other American official in blaming the ISI for undermining the American effort in Afghanistan. His remarks were certain to further fray America’s shaky relationship with Pakistan, a nominal ally.
The United States has long said that Pakistan’s intelligence agency supports the Haqqani network, based in Pakistan’s tribal areas, as a way to extend Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. But Admiral Mullen made clear that he believed that the support extended to increasingly high-profile attacks in Afghanistan aimed directly at the United States.
These included a truck bombing at a NATO outpost south of Kabul on Sept. 10, which killed at least five people and wounded 77 coalition soldiers — one of the worst tolls for foreign troops in a single attack in the war — as well as the embassy assault that killed 16 Afghan police officers and civilians.
“With ISI support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on our embassy,” Admiral Mullen said in a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “We also have credible evidence that they were behind the June 28th attack against the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective operations.” In short, he said, “the Haqqani network acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.” His remarks were part of a deliberate effort by American officials to ratchet up pressure on Pakistan and perhaps pave the way for more American drone strikes or even cross-border raids into Pakistan to root out insurgents from their havens. American military officials refused to discuss what steps they were prepared to take, although Admiral Mullen’s statement made clear that taking on the Haqqanis had become an urgent priority.
On Thursday, Rehman Malik, Pakistan’s interior minister, rejected accusations by the United States of ISI involvement in the attacks in Afghanistan. “If you say that it is ISI involved in that attack, I categorically deny it,” he said in an interview with Reuters. “We have no such policy to attack or aid attack through Pakistani forces or through any Pakistani assistance.” He also said his government would “not allow” an American operation aimed at the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, a remote part of Pakistan’s lawless tribal region.
Mr. Malik seemed to indicate that American officials had threatened on Tuesday in meetings in Washington with the head of the ISI, Maj. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, that American troops were prepared to cross the border from Afghanistan to attack Haqqani militants. An American official would say only that David H. Petraeus, the new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, told General Pasha that the C.I.A. would continue its campaign of drone strikes against the Haqqanis in Pakistan and pursue them in Afghanistan.
“The Pakistan nation will not allow the boots on our ground, never,” Mr. Malik said in an interview with Reuters. “Our government is already cooperating with the U.S. — but they also must respect our sovereignty.”
A senior American official said Thursday that no decisions had been made on actions that the Obama administration might take against the Haqqanis.
American covert raids into Pakistan are rare — only two, including the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in May, have become public — but some American intelligence officials argue that more aggressive ground raids in Pakistan are necessary.
The United States gives Pakistan more than $2 billion in security assistance annually, although this summer the Obama administration decided to suspend or in some cases cancel about a third of that aid this year. Altogether, about $800 million in military aid and equipment could be affected.
The suspension was intended to chasten Pakistan for expelling American military trainers this year and to press its army to fight militants more effectively. The decision was made after the Bin Laden raid in Pakistan, where the leader of Al Qaeda had been living comfortably near a top military academy.
Admiral Mullen is to retire at the end of this month, and coming from him the statements carried exceptional weight. For years he has been the American military official leading the effort to improve cooperation with the Pakistanis. But relations have reached a nadir since the Bin Laden raid. Pakistani officials were angered that they had not been told of the raid in advance, and questions remain about whether Pakistani intelligence was sheltering Bin Laden.
Although American military officials believe that the ISI is in many cases directing the Haqqani network to attack United States forces in Afghanistan, they did not go so far as to say on Thursday that the ISI specifically directed the assault on the American Embassy. American military officials did not describe the kind of support they believe the ISI gave the Haqqani network for the embassy attack, and also offered no evidence for their claim. In July 2008, the United States was able to determine that the ISI was behind the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul based on intercepted communications of ISI officers.
Admiral Mullen testified alongside Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, who told the committee that the attack on the embassy and the assassination this week of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the leader of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council and a former Afghan president, were “a sign of weakness in the insurgency.” He cast the attacks as signs that the Taliban had shifted to high-profile targets in an effort to disrupt the progress that the American military had made.
No one has claimed responsibility for the attack on Mr. Rabbani, which has dealt a potentially devastating blow to efforts to negotiate a peace with the Taliban.
In his remarks to the committee, Admiral Mullen voiced a stern warning to Pakistani officials, who he said were undermining their own interests as well as American interests in the region.
“They may believe that by using these proxies, they are hedging their bets or redressing what they feel is an imbalance in regional power,” he said. “But in reality, they have already lost that bet. By exporting violence, they’ve eroded their internal security and their position in the region. They have undermined their international credibility and threatened their economic well-being.”
He also said he did not think he had wasted his time by putting so much effort into improving ties with Pakistan’s government.
“I’ve done this because I believe that a flawed and difficult relationship is better than no relationship at all,” he said. “Some may argue I’ve wasted my time, that Pakistan is no closer to us than before, and may now have drifted even further away. I disagree. Military cooperation again is warming.”
Elisabeth Bumiller reported from Washington, and Jane Perlez from Islamabad, Pakistan. Mark Mazzetti contributed reporting from Washington.

5 NATO Soldiers Killed in Afghanistan
VOA News September 23, 2011
Five NATO soldiers have been killed in separate incidents in Afghanistan.
The coalition says a roadside bomb killed two of its service members in eastern Afghanistan on Friday. NATO did not release the soldiers' nationalities.
Also Friday, three Italian soldiers were killed in a road accident in Afghanistan's western Herat province. Italian defense officials say two other soldiers were wounded in the accident.
At least 439 international troops have been killed in Afghanistan so far this year.

Time to get real about the future in Afghanistan
Washington Post By Anthony H. Cordesman Friday, September 23, 2011
The U.S. focus on Afghanistan largely centers on withdrawing most forces by 2014 and reducing the cost of the war. These are important issues: By the end of fiscal year 2013, the United States will have spent $560 billion on the war, and current annual costs are more than $110 billion. It is, however, far easier to talk about troop levels and budget cuts than to plan and conduct a real-world transition to Afghan responsibility for security and funding of Afghan operations and to deal with the strategic realities involved. The United States needs to come to grips with a range of extremely difficult issues, none of which involves good options.
First, Washington needs to reassess its strategic interests in Central and South Asia and whether these call for continuing a major commitment of aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan after a U.S. withdrawal. The answer may well be yes, but some argue that the best way to play the new great game in the region is to leave things to Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, India and the Central Asian countries. This thinking holds that the United States has other strategic priorities and limited resources and that regional power will be forced to deal with situations. Strong arguments can be made for staying or for leaving; what’s important is that the United States decide on its grand strategy for the region and act on it, not simply focus on transition in Afghanistan.
Second, we need plans that recognize the key focus of the war is not Afghanistan but Pakistan. Afghan instability is a problem, but the strategic center of gravity is Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation that acts as a sanctuary for al-Qaeda, the Taliban and a range of local extremist movements. Reassuring rhetoric aside, U.S.-Pakistani relations continue to deteriorate, as does Pakistan’s internal stability at virtually every level. Some argue that staying in Afghanistan and providing aid to Pakistan will guard our interests and help provide stability. Others think that our role in Afghanistan simply breeds tension with Pakistan or that there is little we can really do and we should therefore leave. Once again, Washington needs to make clear decisions flowing from a grand strategy.
Third, we need to be far more honest about the difficulties in conducting a successful transition in Afghanistan and the role we will have to play after 2014, if we decide to stay. We are scoring significant victories against the Taliban in the south and in attacks on key Talibanand al-Qaeda leaders and cadres. It is not clear, however, whether we are making sufficient gains that these threats cannot wait us out until after 2014 or whether the Afghan government can hold such areas and build up civil governance, the rule of law and a functioning economy.
As events this week underscore, insurgents are conducting bombings, assassinations and other operations that intimidate the Afghan people and help drive down U.S. and allied public support for the war. Furthermore, the Karzai government is far from effective and is politically unstable, and Afghanistan faces an election the year we leave. We may be winning tactically, but insurgents may be winning a battle of political attrition that will ultimately be strategically decisive.
The United States needs a far more honest debate over all these issues and over whether there is a credible chance of forcing the Taliban into any viable form of political settlement. Constant spin and good news from the U.S. government and criticism from the media are no substitutes for the kind of transparency that would give an assessment of real-world prospects for winning credibility.
Finally, if we do decide to stay, it must be with the understanding that the Afghan government will need a decade of aid to deal with an economy that will suffer a massive depression if U.S. and other outside funding is suddenly reduced. Outside aid is some 14 times higher than the Kabul government’s revenue-generating capability, and U.S. and outside military expenditures are as much as 30 times higher.
If we are to stay in Afghanistan and have any hope of real victory, we need a transition plan, civil and military advisers, and aid programs to deal with these issues. Afghan forces may be ready to take up much of the security burden in 2014, but the nation cannot survive without very substantial U.S. aid beyond 2020.
The Afghan civil economy might become self-sustaining in a decade or more. No talk about mining and a “new Silk Road,” however, can have anything like the needed impact until 2025 to 2030.
Moreover, Afghanistan still needs help in developing adequate government capacity, creating a functioning legislature and dealing with serious political problems if there is to be a credible election in 2014 to replace Hamid Karzai. The requirements are likely to be a major U.S. military and civil advisory presence indefinitely into the future and annual aid of $8 billion to $10 billion.
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and was part of the civilian advisory team to Gen. Stanley McChrystal in 2009. His analyses on the Afghan war are online at csis.org/program/burke-chair-strategy.

For new commanders in Afghanistan, a fine balance
Washington Post By Kevin Sieff September 22 , 2011
FORWARD OPERATING BASE SHARANA, Afghanistan - Col. Edward Bohnemann leaned over the rocky bluff at the edge of his brigade’s most remote outpost, staring into a valley near the Pakistan border that is peppered with mud-baked huts and is home to a sea of insurgents.
Bohnemann’s subordinate officers pointed to mountain ridges in the distance, outlining a strategy to vanquish the insurgents by expanding the U.S. presence in the area. But as an incoming commander during the last years of America’s 10-year-old war, Bohnemann wasn’t convinced.
“The question is not, can we build these outposts?” Bohnemann said. “The question is, can they be sustained by Afghan forces?”
When President Obama told Americans in July that the “tide of war is receding” in Afghanistan, 3,100 soldiers from the 172nd brigade were just beginning to arrive in this rugged swath of the country — their first Afghan deployment coinciding almost exactly with the war’s ebb.
The timing leaves Bohnemann to balance two separate directives that are often at odds with each other: to do all he can to defeat insurgents, while also preparing for an American departure by the end of 2014. Last month, during his first visit to the outpost, called Twins, the tension between those priorities played out on the battlefield.
Soldiers in this strategic foothold want to expand upon the work of their predecessors. But many top U.S. officers worry that doing so while the foreign role in the war effort is carefully dismantled might be counterproductive. Americans are already preparing to hand over bases, outposts and checkpoints to Afghans.
Like the rest of Bohnemann’s domain in Afghanistan’s eastern Paktika province, Twins is in a rugged, sparsely populated part of the country, where insurgents come from seven militant networks, crisscrossing the Pakistani border and settling into local villages for weeks or months at a time. The Taliban is a concern, but it’s not public enemy number one.
Bohnemann walked from tent to tent at 10,400 feet, where exhausted U.S. soldiers, who have taken indirect fire every day since they arrived, greeted him.
“I saw these mountains for the first time,” one said, “and my mouth dropped.”
Bohnemann’s men suggested building a series of outposts along nearby ridges, which would provide support to police checkpoints within local villages. Past efforts to establish such checkpoints without mountain outposts have backfired, with insurgents swiftly toppling them.
The larger strategy is to keep insurgents in the east away from what’s often referred to as the “Kabul security zone” — an effort to protect the country’s capital and encourage the central government’s growth. The difficulty of that mission has been underscored over the past two weeks, with an attack last week on the U.S. Embassy and the assassination on Tuesday of former president Burhanuddin Rabbani in his Kabul home.
“Owning the high ground allows us to dominate the terrain and to establish a government presence in the area,” Lt. Col. John V. Meyer told Bohnemann. “We’re going to clean out this entire bowl,” he said, referring to the valley below Twins.
Bohnemann, an affable leader with an easy smile, knew that Meyer’s suggestion would work in the short term, but at this stage of the war, that wasn’t enough to win him over. Although Afghan forces are growing in number and capacity, officials here worry that the United States runs the risk of overbuilding on the eve of its withdrawal, leaving Afghans with bases they cannot man.
“Whatever we do must be Afghan-sustainable,” said Gen. Daniel Allyn, the top U.S. military official in eastern Afghanistan. “If we place an outpost on top of a mountain that’s only accessible by air, we have to make sure they can continue to operate there, given the limitations of their air force.”
Top Afghan commanders are usually candid about their own troops’ limitations in fulfilling a U.S.-designed mission.
“We are a capable force, but without artillery, heavy weaponry and air support, there are many things we cannot do,” said Lt. Col. Mohammad Kazimi, an Afghan battalion commander in Paktika.
The Afghan army’s capacity has increased over the past year, “making my job a lot easier,” Bohnemann said. But other members of the brigade, also known as Task Force Blackhawk, have expressed more skepticism about the ability and loyalty of Afghan soldiers.
Of course, those perceptions could change; they have only recently arrived. Although the U.S. role in Afghanistan is approaching its 11th year, from the perspective of many troops on the ground, the war has just begun. Soldiers inherit this conflict for about 12 months at a time before handing over bases, outposts and intelligence to another crop of servicemen.
Evidence of that recent transition was still visible in Paktika as of last month — signs that still read Task Force Currahee instead of Task Force Blackhawk, soldiers who still got lost on the expansive forward operating base, young infantrymen jumping at the chance to go on their first patrol.
Then there’s the larger question of how a brigade crafts its own mission, makes its own imprint.
Seemingly prosaic dilemmas related to that goal — to build an outpost or not; to expand or cede ground — speak volumes about the state of the war.
“It’s a fine line,” Bohnemann said. “We don’t want to build something today that can’t be used tomorrow.”

Key senator says Haqqani should be on terror list
(AFP) – September 22, 2011
WASHINGTON — A top US senator pressed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Thursday to add the militant Haqqani network to a formal terrorism blacklist, citing recent attacks in Afghanistan.
"I request that the State Department take the additional step of listing the network as a Foreign Terrorism Organization and look forward to receiving your response," said Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein.
Feinstein, a Democrat, said "there is no question that the Haqqani network meets the standards" for joining the list.
"It conducts attacks against US targets and personnel in Afghanistan, and poses a continuing threat to American, Afghan, and allied personnel and interests," she said in a statement.
Her comments came after the top US military officer, Admiral Mike Mullen, charged that the Haqqani network "acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan?s Inter-Services Intelligence agency."
Washington blames Haqqani militants for an assault on the US embassy in Kabul last week, a June attack on the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul, and a bloody September 10 truck bombing in Afghanistan's Wardak province.
The Haqqani network is probably the most dangerous faction in the Afghan Taliban. A CIA asset turned Al-Qaeda ally, the United States in the 1980s funneled arms and cash to the Haqqani faction to counter Soviet forces.

Afghan Neighbors Discuss Reviving 'Silk Road'
September 23, 2011 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Afghanistan and its neighbors and allies, including the United States, have met to discuss reviving the ancient "silk road" across Central Asia.
About 25 countries, including Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia, met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to discuss how Central Asian countries could become more interlinked through trade.
The Silk Road once linked merchants traveling from China to Turkey, carrying goods ranging from gems to textiles and spices.
Its modern-day version would include economic projects like the Trans-Afghanistan project, a planned natural-gas pipeline that would snake its way from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and into India.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who also attended, said stronger regional economic links could help prepare Afghanistan for after 2014 when coalition forces are due to pull out of the country.
"As coalition combat forces leave Afghanistan, the support structure that has grown up will shrink and it will mean fewer jobs for Afghans and a loss for the Afghan economy," said Clinton.
Clinton said she hoped a new Silk Road would convince Afghanistan's neighbors that their stability and prosperity were linked to that of Afghanistan.
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said the project to revive the Silk Road would be taken up at an international peace conference on Afghanistan to be held in Germany in December.
compiled from agency reports

The Death of Reconciliation in Afghanistan
September 22, 2011 Marvin Weinbaum The National Interest
The assassination of former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani should put to rest any vision of the Afghan conflict ending in reconciliation with the Taliban leadership. Rather than Rabbani’s death occasioning questions of its impact on the future of negotiations, it should instead serve as the final piece of evidence that, in fact, there is no peace process to salvage. What has passed for discussions with the Taliban were meetings with individuals almost entirely initiated by outright frauds or those unauthorized to speak for anyone other than themselves. Even then none of the supposed peace feelers ever amounted to anything more than talking about talks.
For some time now, the Taliban, by their words and deeds, have shown that they lack interest in compromising with the Karzai government or its international allies. The idea that Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura or the Haqqani leadership would bid for cabinet positions or provincial appointments was an essentially Western notion. It assumed that the Taliban could be induced to accept a democratically inclined, coalition government that could also constitutionally incorporate their Islamic doctrinal aims—this with a movement whose leadership has never shown much tolerance for those who did not share their particular worldview. The elemental Taliban precondition for beginning any negotiations has always been clearly stated: that foreign troops must first leave. In other words, that the Kabul government should effectively leave its fate to a Taliban force that had no intention of disarming. While most of the Taliban’s enemies have concluded that only a political solution can end the fighting, it seems that the Taliban alone have continued to believe in a military outcome.
Why then have so many opposing the Taliban been reluctant to give up on a peace process? Why have they appeared to grasp at straws that to the insurgents suggest a lack of determination and desperation? And why have they imagined that even were talks to begin they would take anything less than years to succeed? For answers we need to appreciate that the Kabul government has had a strong investment in keeping alive the prospect of serious negotiations.
Professor Rabbani as head of a High Peace Council represented the most visible manifestation of the Karzai regime’s commitment to push for reconciliation. The decision to name Rabbani, the former mujahideen party chief, as lead negotiator had little to do with choosing a person for his reputation for finding compromises. Indeed, Rabbani’s past suggested a man more capable of creating dissension than harmony, more likely to show intransigence than flexibility. Rabbani’s anarchic rule between 1992 and 1996 bears most of the responsibility for the Taliban’s march to power starting in 1994. The selection of Rabbani, the prominent leader of the country’s large Tajik ethnic minority, was designed so that the northern minorities would find it more difficult to reject out of hand the idea of direct talks with their long-time enemy the ethnically Pashtun Taliban. Surprisingly, Rabbani took his role seriously and made an earnest effort to find common ground with the Taliban. For his part, President Karzai sought to use the quest for negotiations to burnish his shaky claims to legitimacy by taking on the mantel of a peacemaker among a people fatigued by decades of war. By rallying his government and the international community behind a peace process, Karzai also hoped to deflect the heavy pressures from his critics at home and abroad that he address domestic political reforms.
The United States and Britain among others have also had an agenda in touting a political solution. Despite doubts, especially within the U.S. military, over whether the time was ripe for negotiations, Washington diplomats worked hard to facilitate political negotiations, even to opening our own lines of contact with the Taliban. Like many of its NATO partners facing rising domestic doubts about involvement in Afghanistan, the U.S. has been anxious to explore any shortcuts to an early termination of the conflict. Politically, Washington has also been concerned that any observed reluctance to endorse peace overtures could leave Americans accused of being responsible should, as most likely, they go nowhere.
But it is Pakistan that has been the principal instigator of a negotiated settlement. By promising to bring the major Taliban figures to the table, Pakistan’s military has hoped to relieve some of the pressure to act aggressively against those Afghan insurgent groups that it has been sheltering. Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership has consistently sought to convince the U.S. that the Taliban are moderates who will act pragmatically if given the opportunity to govern free of threats. For Pakistan, a power-sharing arrangement in Kabul presents probably the only way out of a serious dilemma—how can it place a friendly Pashtun force inside Afghanistan that would be expected to diminish Indian influence in the country and also avoid provoking a civil war by fearful non-Pashtuns. The solution for Pakistan has been to promote a coalition government in Kabul that in having to share power could be checked should they later be inclined to turn around and align themselves with Islamic militants challenging the Pakistani state.
The truth is that there is little at present that drives the Afghan Taliban leadership toward accepting a political settlement and a great deal that motivates them to sustain their fight. Despite real setbacks during the military surge in 2010 and 2011, the Taliban are not, as some contend, a dispirited fighting force, willing to take best deal they can get. Eventually, if Afghan security forces show themselves up to the task, reintegration through many political deals with defecting Taliban commanders and foot soldiers is conceivable. But the insurgents are for the time being convinced that they are holding their own militarily, indeed winning. Why even consider compromise when you have only to wait a few years while international troops are drawn down and finally leave? From the moment that they first emerged in Afghanistan, the Taliban have always been convinced that they have time and God on their side. The carefully planned killing of Rabbani is a rude reminder.

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