View Full Version : Afghanistan Research: Demographics


Darweshkhel
06-21-2010, 06:07 PM
Uruzgan province


Capital Tirin Kot
Population 312,000
Area 22,696 km²

http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/images/locator/25.gif
The mountainous region of Uruzgan, well-known as the birthplace of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, is situated in southern Afghanistan. In March 2004, Daykundi Province was carved out of an area in the north, leaving Uruzgan with a majority Pashtun population. Although Uruzgan has some mineral resources, including coal and fluoride, agriculture is the primary source of livelihood. Uruzgan’s farmers have traditionally cultivated grains, apricots, and almonds, but many have switched to poppy production, and opium is now the province’s main source of revenue. Uruzgan’s farming community has experienced significant difficulties due to the drought over the past several years, and dam construction programs are under consideration to address this problem.

Uruzgan province is located in the Southern region of the country having borders with Zabul and Kandahar in the South, Helmand in the East, Daikundy in the North and Ghazni in the West. The province covers an area of 12640 km2. Around three quarters of the province (72%) is mountainous or semi mountainous terrain while a little more than one-fifth (21%) of the area is made up of flat land, as the following table shows:

Topography type
Flat 21,1%
Mountainous 47.2%
Semi Mountainous 24.5%
Semi Flat 5.9%
Not Reported
1.2%

Uruzgan has a total population of 320,589. There are approximately 44,896 households in the province, and households on average have 6 members. The following table shows the population by district.
Almost all (97%) of the population of Uruzgan lives in rural districts while 3% lives in urban areas. Around 52% of the population is male and 48% is female. Pashtu is spoken by 90% of the population and 90% of the villages. The second most frequent language is Dari, spoken by the majorities in 46
villages and approximately 19,000 people. Uruzgan province also has a population of Kuchis or nomads whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter 37,115 individuals, or 1.5% of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Uruzgan. Of these 74% are short-range migratory and 26% are long-range migratory. Almost all of these Kuchi are in fact partially migratory, with on average 25% of the households staying behind in the winter areas when the
others migrate. The summer areas for the short range migratory Kuchis are Chora and Khas Uruzgan districts of Uruzgan province. In the spring, some 1400 Kuchi households migrate into Uruzgan province (Khas Uruzgan and Tirin Kot districts) from Kandahar. The Kuchi population in the summer is 39,480 individuals.

Population by Districts
District

Tirinkot Uruzgan Centre
Number of males 57409
Number of females 52303
Total population 109712

Chora
Number of males 37666
Number of females 36093
Total population 73759

Khas Uruzgan
Number of males 19650
Number of females 18238
Total population 37888

Shahidh assas
Number of males 24383
Number of females 24129
Total population 48512

Dehraoud
Number of males 26473
Number of females 24245
Total population 50718

Total
Number of males 165581
Number of females 155008
Total population 320589

Background
Uruzgan province is strategically positioned in the centre of the so-called Pashtun tribal belt, linking the west (Herat and Ghor), the south (Helmand and Kandahar) and the southeast (Zabul and Ghazni), as well the central highlands of Day Kundi. The province is mostly mountainous and rural. The main water source is a two-river system (Helmand and Tirin Kot) that joins in Deh Rawud and flows to Kajaki in Helmand. Present-day Uruzgan is the result of population policies carried out as part of the statebuilding strategy of Durrani Pashtun rulers that began in the late 18th century and continues today. Historically Uruzgan was inhabited predominately by the Hazara ethnic group. They were expelled northwards by Ahmad Shah Durrani (late 18th century) and Amir Abdur Rahman (late 19th century) in two waves:

1st wave: Deh Rawud, Tirin Kot and parts of Shahidi Hassas
2nd wave: Chora, Khas Uruzgan, Gizab and remaining parts of Shahidi Hassas

In the first wave, mainly Ghilzai Pashtun tribes settled in Hazara territory; however many of these Ghilzai were later given land north of the Hindu Kush so that outmigration would weaken their power in the South and increase
Pashtun influence in the North. In the second wave of population shifts, the state facilitated new settlement of Zirak Durrani tribes in Uruzgan that displaced much of the remaining Hazara population in the peripheral areas of the present-day province.

A more recent reshaping of ethnic territory was the creation of Day Kundi province a few months prior to the 2004 presidential elections. Here the Hazara majority districts in Northern Uruzgan were carved out from the Pashtun-dominated ones in the South in order to create a Hazara-majority
province. Today, only two Uruzgan districts (Gizab and Khas Uruzgan) have sizeable Hazara-minorities. Though Gizab was made part of Day Kundi in 2004, it has since been returned to Uruzgan. After forced out-migration in previous centuries, the Hazara now constitute an estimated 8 percent of the provincial population. Though they have worked out a mutually beneficial modus vivendi with the Pashtun majority based on trade and a common interest in stability, there are lingering disputes between the two groups over land/resource allocation dating to Pashtun settlement of Hazara territory in the mid-18th and late-19th centuries.

While local politics in Uruzgan are partially shaped by these tribal and ethnic alignments, it has become increasingly clear since the 2006 survey that ethnic (Pashtun/Hazara) and tribal (Durrani/Ghilzai) rivalries are just one element in a complex environment.

Tribal and Ethnic Relations
Today, politics, conflict and violence in the Province are driven by a growing polarization between a tight network of mostly Popalzai (Zirak Durrani) power holders—linked to one former governor of Uruzgan—and most of the rest of the population. From 2002 until 2006, the provincial government was largely responsible for creating and deepening tribal rifts to weaken potential challengers, consolidate the government’s influence, and establish Popalzai rule, though the tribe constitutes only a small minority
(about 10%) in the Province. For instance, the provincial government was instrumental in carving out the new Popalzai-majority (75%) district of Chenartu from southern Chora, essentially as a ‘tribal enclave’ that would allow a greater share of resources to flow directly to the area, instead of through Chora as before. These ‘divide-and-rule’ policies generated conflict by revitalizing the latent Durrani/Ghilzai conflict and dividing individual tribes internally. During this period, a greater share of foreign aid and other external resources were channelled to the Popalzai community, but also to selected individuals from other tribes (e.g., Nurzai), which exacerbated intra-tribal
tensions and weakened tribal cohesion. Most importantly, the provincial government used resources, threats and other political manoeuvres to divide the two largest tribes of Uruzgan (Achekzai and Nurzai) along sub-tribal lines, as these were the only tribes that threatened its power.
Moreover, there was no reconciliation in the post-2001 government in Uruzgan, even though this found some practice in other provinces and the principle was later endorsed by the Karzai government. Instead, the office of the governor initiated a ‘witch hunt’ against everybody who had been even marginally associated with the Taliban government (e.g., the Ghilzai in Tirin Kot, and Durrani tribes in other districts).

Zirak Durrani (Pashtun) 57.5%
Achekzai 35.0%
Popalzai 10.5%
Barakzai 9.0%
Mohammadzai 1.5%
Alkozai 1.5%
Panjpai Durrani (Pashtun) 18.5%
Khogiani 1.0%
Nurzai 17.5%
Ghilzai (Pashtun) 9%
Hotak 4%
Tokhi 2.5%
Suliman Khail 1.0%
Andar 1.0%
Taraki 0.5%
Hazara 8.0%
Other Pashtun 6%
Babozai 5.0%
Kakar 0.5%
Sayed/Quraish/Tajik 1.0%

372
Uruzgan map


373
Ethnic groups

374
Uruzgan tribes

Darweshkhel
06-21-2010, 06:12 PM
Afghans in the Uruzgan province have asked the Dutch not to leave their province by presenting them with a petition. In a document given to Radio Netherlands Worldwide, the Afghans praise the Dutch for building and restoring "bridges, schools and medical centers". As far as RNW knows, this is the first time Afghans have used this way of asking foreign troops to stay.

According to tribal leaders and commanders who signed the letter, "the Dutch have a strong relationship of trust with the population of Uruzgan, which has resulted in ‘sustained security". The leaders ended their petition with an appeal for Dutch parliamentarians to reconsider their decision to leave Uruzgan. In February, the Dutch cabinet fell over the Uruzgan issue. The political parties were divided on whether to continue the NATO mission in Uruzgan. In August Dutch troops will start leaving the province, which lies between Helmand and Kandahar.

Shura
The petition was handed over to a delegation from the military base Camp Holland on Monday, during a traditional shura (meeting) with 100 to 150 Afghans. The people who wrote this ‘protest letter’ were local Afghans, who asked district leader Daoud Khan to take the lead. It was signed by several leaders from Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawod, Chora and Gizab.

An independent employee of an NGO in Uruzgan was asked by Radio Netherlands Worldwide to review the petition and give his view on the importance of this document. According to him, it is "good news" amd "important leaders from Uruzgan have decided to sign this". The document was signed by prominent Barakzai-leaders, but also other tribes are also represented.

Jan Mohammed
But members of the prominent Popolzai-tribe have not joined the initative. They weren’t at the shura. Popolzai tribesmen are strongly linked to President Hamid Karzai and to the former governor of Uruzgan Jan Mohammed who was sacked by the Dutch because of corruption and for excluding other tribes. This Popolzai-leader’s network never supported the Dutch presence in Uruzgan.

The Dutch didn’t sent the head of their mission, but lower diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the meeting. According to the Ministry of Defence, the Dutch weren’t told this would happen in Tarin Kowt.

“Otherwise, we would have sent a higher delegation of course,” they said.

The text of the petition:

Appeal to the elected Representatives of the Dutch People

We Elders, Maleks and Commanders of tribes from the districts Tarin Kowt, Chora, Dehra Wood and Gizab in Uruzgan with firm faith in God Almighty and believing in the sacred religion of Islam appeal on behalf of the people of Uruzgan to the representatives of the Dutch people.

Cause of our appeal is the discussion of the Netherlands for extending the military contribution to ISAF Mission in Afghanistan.

We fear that a withdrawal of Dutch soldiers from Uruzgan lasting significant negative consequences for until now the very successful process of social and economic development of the Province of Uruzgan.

Roads, bridges, schools, health centre and administration building have been built and restored. Programs for drinking water supply, irrigation, water reservoirs and electricity supply were realized. Many development programs for farmers and for improving family income have been implemented. 70% of families in Uruzgan have directly benefited from the Dutch economic aid to developing Uruzgan. Visible consequence of agricultural support is for example the significant decline in poppy cultivation in Uruzgan.

The economic and social progress would not have been achieved without military protection of the environment by the Dutch PRT. Afghan security forces are not yet capable for ensuring security and stability in Uruzgan alone by themselves. Therefore the civilian targets in Uruzgan cannot be accomplished in the next years without military security provided by the coalition of Netherlands, USA, Australians, ANA and ANP. However, without attaining civilian targets, there will be no security in Uruzgan. In the security network of Uruzgan the Netherlands are essential for Uruzgan because the Dutch ISAF Contingent have developed a strong relation of trust to the population of Uruzgan and without such a relation creating sustain security is not possible in Afghanistan.

We will make our contribution to a secure environment by for example fighting poppy cultivation, corruption and violence of human rights. However, alone we cannot do much in the current situation against violent criminal groups of insurgents.

The Shura knows that the mission for the Dutch troops in Uruzgan was dangerous and it will remain. With sadness and respect, we will always keep the memory of fallen soldiers.

With sorrow we think of the death of Afghan people and the fallen great tribe leader Rozi Khan.

Their death should not be for nothing.

We appeal to the elected representatives of the Dutch population, do not leave Uruzgan in the middle of the process of Province Building and please vote for a temporary extension of the ISAF Mission in Uruzgan in the interest of peace in Uruzgan, Afghanistan and throughout the region.

This appeal has been formulated and signed by the participants of the Shura which was held in Sarshakhli Tarin Kowt.

Published on : 26 March 2010 - 5:49pm
Afghans petition the Dutch to stay | Radio Netherlands Worldwide (http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/afghans-petition-dutch-stay)

German translation can be found here
http://www.marieluisebeck.de/fileadmin/files/Afghan_Uruzgan_Provinz_Petition__deutsch__01.pdf

Darweshkhel
06-23-2010, 08:10 AM
Kabul, October 2009 – Nearly every second Afghan citizen is under 15 years of age – in numbers: 12 million or 49 percent of the population. Also, more than one out of three Afghans – some 9 million people or 36 percent of the population – lives in absolute poverty and cannot meet his or her basic needs. On the positive side, the proportion of primary-school age children that is attending school has increased from only 37 to 52 percent in just over two years time. These are only a few of the numerous figures of the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/8 conducted by the Central Statistics Organization (CSO) and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The assessment is based on statistical data collected during a one-year period from August 2007 through August 2008 – making it the most extensive statistical venture of its kind in Afghanistan. 156 enumerators were involved, male and female interviewers travelled to 395 districts in 34 provinces, collected data from more than 20.000 households with over 152,000 Afghan citizens.

Population structure and change

The population size of Afghanistan estimated on the basis of the NRVA sampling procedure is close to 25 million people. The most striking feature of the Afghan population is its very young age structure. Some 49 percent (12 million) is under 15 years of age, whereas elderly of 65 and over represent less than three percent of the total population. The proportion under 15 is among the very highest in the world and significantly higher than that of neighbouring countries, ranging from 26 percent in Iran to around 39 percent in Pakistan and Tajikistan.

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Some of the most urgent issues documented by the NRVA 2007/8 are resulting from Afghanistan’s rapid population growth, continuous very high fertility and significant immigration in recent years. With a population numerically dominated by children and a Total Fertility Rate of 6.3 children per woman the country is confronted with significant economic and social challenges. High fertility not only has adverse effects to the health of mothers and children, it also reduces female access to education, gainful employment and other personal development opportunities. The determinants and compounding factors of high fertility are many, but generally include poor health services (especially related to provision of and information about family planning), limited knowledge of contraceptive methods, low contraceptive prevalence, high child mortality, low education and limited empowerment of women. The NRVA findings show a worryingly high infant mortality rate of 111 and under-five mortality rate of 161 per thousand live births. However, there are signs of improvement in recent years: the NRVA 2007/8 suggests that fertility rates have declined in the last three years across all age categories. With respect to infant mortality, it suggests a 33 percent decline since 2001.

Overall Afghanistan faces a high and increasing demand for education, health services, basic infrastructure and jobs. Sectoral development planning will have to take these perspectives into account. This prognosis also emphasizes the need of a comprehensive population policy addressing the high levels of fertility and child mortality. For a well-founded population policy and for development planning, a Demographic and Health Survey and a full population census are badly needed.

The total number of households in Afghanistan is estimated at around 3.4 million. This implies an average household size of 7.3 persons. The large majority of households (73 percent) have 4 to 9 members. Around 19 percent (some 650 thousand households) accommodate 10 or more people, and only eight percent have three or less persons. In the Afghan context, the absence of a male head of household can signify a highly vulnerable position of the household members in terms of income security and social protection. In total there are 70 thousand female-headed households in Afghanistan.

In addition to natural increase, Afghanistan’s population has substantially grown due to returning refugees, predominantly from Pakistan and Iran. It is likely that additional immigration is also a factor of population growth, with Iran being the leading country of origin and destination of migrants. By far the most important reason for international migration today is employment. This indicates the relatively weak labour market situation in Afghanistan, as well as the economic importance of labour migration for the country’s economy.

As a consequence of many years of war and civil unrest, a considerable number of people have fled once or repeatedly. In recent years, large numbers of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have started to return or have resettled elsewhere in Afghanistan. When asked, 60 percent of all households report that this large influx of refugees has affected them negatively during the past year, whether directly or indirectly. There is no doubt that large-scale international migration – including consecutive massive waves of refugees and, more recently, returnees – made a significant impact on the overall size and structure of the population. In terms of numbers, internal migration is even larger than international migration. Marital status is a key principle in the social relations in Afghan society.

Marriage is a universal phenomenon in Afghanistan and is characterized by early marriage for women, with a mean age at first marriage of 17.9. On average husbands are nearly 7 years older than their wives. While divorce and separation are practically invisible in the marital status distribution, the incidence of widowhood increases with age, especially for women. Afghanistan has around 135 thousand widowers, but considerably more than half a million widows. The two major causes of this large number of widows are high male mortality in the last three decades of conflict in Afghanistan and large age differences between spouses. Irrespective of the cause, widowed women can be classified as being in a vulnerable position.

The NRVA findings include a noticeable decline of early marriages and a steady drop in the spousal age difference in recent years. These developments can be expected to have positive effects on women’s health and empowerment.

The Afghan population is overwhelmingly rural: 74 percent (around 18.5 million people) live in rural areas and only 20 percent (5.0 million) in urban areas, whereas six percent (1.5 million) belong to nomadic Kuchi. A full picture, and
the possibility to produce population growth rates and population projections, is not possible as of yet, because of the absence of adult mortality indicators, life expectancy estimates and more adequate migration information.

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Population structure at a glance
• Population size around 25 million
• Rapid population growth
• Half the population under the age of 15
• Very high Total Fertility Rate of 6.3 children per woman
• Very high infant mortality (111 per thousand live births) and under-five mortality (161)
• Significant immigration (including refugees)
• Total number of households around 3.4 million
• Average household size of 7.3 persons
• Marriage is an almost universal phenomenon
• Women’s mean age at first marriage: 17.9 years
• More than half a million widows
• Population is overwhelmingly rural (74 percent)

Labour force characteristics
Afghanistan’s labour market has the typical characteristics of a less developed economy: it is dominated by the agricultural sector and performs poorly in providing decent work, reflected in productive employment, secure income, gender equality and social protection. More than 90 percent of jobs can be classified as vulnerable employment that does not secure stable and sufficient income.

Due to the very large share of children, less than half of the Afghan population is in the official working age of 16 years and over. Within this working-age population of over 12 million people, one-third (four million) is inactive and two-thirds (8 million) are currently actively engaged in the labour market, either by working or looking for work. The corresponding labour force participation rate – being an important indicator of available human resources;
calculated as the proportion of a country’s working-age population that engages actively in the labour market – is a relatively high 67 percent. In the
context of Afghanistan this might indicate that many people are compelled to find work for bare household survival. High labour force participation is found in rural areas and among Kuchis (see Figure 3). This is typical for less developed economies, in which educational opportunities are few, where most people are engaged in labour-intensive agricultural activities, and where wage earning opportunities are scarce, so that many household members need to work to provide sufficient income. The NRVA figures also indicate a clear gender disparity in the labour market, with 5.3 million male and 2.8 million female labour force.


Women
The overall labour force participation rate of 67 percent in Afghanistan conceals large differences by sex and age. Although generally labour force participation is lower for females than for males, in the Afghan economy this gender gap is large. Less than half (47 percent) of the working-age females is currently active on the labour market, against 86 percent of males, a gap of 39 percent points. The gap is relatively small in the rural and Kuchi populations (respectively 34 and 28 percent points), due to female engagement in agricultural and pastoral activities.

However, in urban areas the gap is as large as 60 percent points because of a very low female labour force participation of 21 percent. Generally, women do not only work less often than men, but those who do also work for less hours and in less secure jobs. The low female participation rates indicate that women are still a significant untapped potential in the country. Underlying causes are a variety of competing demands and barriers for women, such as their care-taking responsibility for children, elderly and the disabled, frequent pregnancies, household chores, low educational attainment and restricted mobility. These conditions determine the large gender gaps at all age levels. The largest gender gap of 45 percent points is found in the age group 40-64.

Children
Widespread poverty and inadequate educational opportunities drive many households to send their children looking for work. In total 1.9 million Afghan children aged 6-17 (21 percent) are employed. According to the formal definition of child labour, of these children at least 1.2 million (13 percent) are performing child labour. This high prevalence demands strong government policy and interventions to protect the health and development of Afghan children. Providing adequate education is a prominent strategy in this respect.

Labour migration
Widespread poverty and a lack of income-generating opportunities drive many Afghans to go and look for work elsewhere. The importance of this strategy is indicated by the fact that 7 percent of all households have a labour in-migrant, 6 ercent saw a member leave for work elsewhere and 14 percent had seasonal labour migrants. Labour migration is an almost exclusively male phenomenon: 94 percent of labour in-migrants and 98 percent of labour out-migrants are men. A (returning) labour in-migrant as defined here is someone who has moved to the current place of residence some time during the past five years and whose original reason for moving away was work-related. A labour out-migrant has moved away from the present household during the past year in order to go and (look for) work elsewhere.

Labour force characteristics at a glance
• Working-age population (age of 16 and older): 12 million
• Labour force (employed or looking for work): 8 million
• Unemployment rate: 7 percent
• Total number of unemployed: 363 thousand males, 205 thousand females
• 47 percent of the working-age females are active on the labour market
• 86 percent of working-age men are active on the labour market
• 1.9 million Afghan children aged 6-17 (21 percent) are employed
• 1.2 million (13 percent) children are performing child labour
• 443 thousands in-migrants and 254 thousands out-migrants looked for work elsewhere
• Iran is by far the most important origin and destination of Afghan labour migrants

The agricultural sector at a glance
• 55 percent of households are engaged in farming
• The proportion of households with access to irrigated land, rain-fed land and garden plots
is, respectively 40, 17 and 11 percent
• 68 percent of households have any type of livestock
• Wheat is the main staple food produced in the agricultural sector
• Opium is the most important crop for 12 percent of households that use irrigated land
• The provinces Urozgan and Helmand are leading in opium production
• Agricultural production services and veterinary information services are used by 10 and 15
percent of the respective target groups
• Lack of water is the main reason for leaving fallow rain-fed land (37 percent) and irrigated
land (65 percent)

Poverty incidence and poverty profiling
The overall headcount rate for Afghanistan is estimated at 36 percent of the total population and indicates that some 9 million Afghans are not able to meet their basic needs. Moreover, a large share of the population has a consumption level that is only little above the poverty threshold, implying that they are vulnerable to falling into poverty with small adverse shifts in their livelihoods. Average per-capita monthly consumption expenditure of poor Afghans is only 950 Afs, but the corresponding figure for the non-poor is still only less than 2,100 Afs. The cost of eliminating poverty by bringing
the consumption expenditure of all poor people up to the poverty threshold is estimated at around 28.4 billion Afs., approximately 570 million USD in 2007 prices.

Poverty in the rural population is close to the national average, the incidence in the urban population is relatively low (29 percent) and in the Kuchi population very high (54 percent). The corresponding figures for major regions range from 23 percent in Southwest to 45 percent in East and West-Central. The apparent pattern is that poverty incidence is high in any
part of the country.

Poverty incidence and poverty profiling at a glance
• 9 million Afghans are not able to meet their basic needs (36 percent of population)
• The highest poverty is among the Kuchi population (54 percent), followed by rural and
urban population (36 and 29 percent)
• Average size of poor households is 8.0 persons, compared to 6.9 for non-poor
households
• Poverty is more widespread in female-headed households
• Households of illiterate heads are 8 percent points more likely to be poor than those of
literate heads
• The proportion of poor households among those that own land is 26 percent; for households
that rent, sharecrop or mortgage land the poverty incidence is 42 percent.

Education
The overall indicators of education and literacy in Afghanistan reflect an education system that has performed very poorly. In addition, they invariably show very large gender gaps. Overall, only 17 percent of the population aged 25 years and over has attended any type of formal education, and the corresponding figure for women is as low as 6 percent. This manifests the lack of human capital in the country, which is required for good public administration and strong private sectors in the economy. The low literacy rate of 26 percent of the total adult population (12 for females and 39 percent
for males) – the fourth lowest in the world – also implies that the large majority of people are denied access to much information relevant to them and to further personal development. Of the altogether 9.5 million illiterate adult people in Afghanistan, 5.5 million are women and 4.0 million are men.
Despite these extremely poor overall indicators, there are signs of strong improvement in recent years.

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The NRVA 2007/8 shows that 48 percent of all children between 7 and 12 (a total of 2.3 million) are not attending primary school, and the reverse conclusion is that only 52 percent years of age have enrolled in primary school. Still, compared with the previous assessment this reflects a significant increase from the 37 percent in 2005. Analysis of literacy by age also supports this sign of improvement of the education system. It suggests that after decades of stagnation, male literacy increases from around 30 for those in their mid-twenties to 62 percent for children in their early teens. Corresponding female literacy rises from below 10 to 37 percent. This effect is, however, particularly observed in urban areas; in rural areas the absolute gap between male and female literacy rates is largely maintained. There, literacy rates and gender gap indicators of the youngest age groups are now at the level of the urban population at the start of the recent surge in literacy levels. In the Kuchi population, improvements are small, resulting in extremely low literacy rates for teen-age girls and boys at, respectively, around 10 and 20 percent.

Education at a glance:
• Only 17 percent aged 25 years and over have attended any type of formal education
• Low literacy rate of 26 percent: 12 percent for women, 39 percent for men
• 9.5 million illiterate adult people in Afghanistan: 5.5 million are women and 4.0 million are men
• 48 percent of children between age 7 and 12 (a total of 2.3 million) are not attending primary school
• In the youngest age groups beyond primary school age literacy rates rise sharply
• Literacy gender gap has started to narrow, especially in urban areas

Health characteristics at a glance
• 37 percent of children aged 12-23 months received the recommended full immunization against tuberculosis, polio,
diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus and measles
• The corresponding rates for urban, rural and Kuchi populations are 63, 33 and 13 percent
• Only 36 percent of pregnant women use skilled antenatal care services
• Only 24 percent of delivering women use skilled birth attendants
• More than 400 thousand Afghans were reported as disabled
• 85 percent of the population is within one hour travel distance to any health facility, but for those on foot the
proportion is only 68 percent

Position of women
Afghan women are experiencing high fertility (around 6.3 children per woman), closely spaced births, early pregnancies and poor maternal health care in terms of antenatal and delivery care. In addition, the health system provides genderspecific barriers to women because of their restricted mobility and unresponsiveness by providing insufficient female health personnel. Despite the very low levels of maternal health care provision, the NRVA surveys suggest significant improvements in the last few years.

Also in terms of age at first marriage noticeable changes can be observed. Increasingly smaller proportions of women marry at young (before 18) and very young (before 15) ages, and the average age difference between wives and husbands has significantly declined. These changes are important with respect to pregnancy-related health risks and more gender balance in household decision making. An issue that is partly related to large spousal age gaps is the large number of widows in the country – over half a million. In the context of Afghanistan, these women, along with 70 thousand female heads of households, can be classified as especially vulnerable.

Women’s position on the labour market is also particularly weak, among other things indicated by their continuous very low participation in economic activities. Many factors bear down upon women’s quest for economic productivity, including restrictions to mobility, reproductive responsibilities, limited economic opportunities, and covert preference for males on
the labour market. Only 47 percent of the working-age females are currently active on the labour market, compared to the very high 86 percent labour force participation rate of males. Women’s participation is larger in the rural and Kuchi populations (respectively, 61 and 70 percent), due to female engagement in agricultural and pastoral activities. In urban areas, female labour force participation is a very low 21 percent. Overall, it can be stated that women participate less in economic activities, for fewer hours and predominantly in vulnerable employment.

Women are much less predisposed to migration, as men represent the large majority of migrants. This especially applies to international migration. Women tend to migrate relatively more from rural to rural areas, probably due to marriage rather than to employment. Overall, female migrants are more likely to be economically inactive. The data indicate persistent cultural restrictions to women’s mobility and highlight the dearth of economic opportunities for women in the country.

Darweshkhel
06-26-2010, 11:58 PM
Badghis
483

Dai Kundi
484

Farah
485

Ghor
486

Helmand
487

Herat
488

Kandahar
489

Khost
490

Kunduz
491

Kunar
492

Logar
493

Ningarhar
494

Nimroz
495

Nuristan
496

Paktika
497

Uruzgan
498

Wardak
499

Admin Khan
06-27-2010, 12:18 AM
This is what I call a contribution to our website here.

amna.
06-27-2010, 03:42 PM
manana for sharing.

Darweshkhel
06-28-2010, 12:50 AM
Darweshkhel do you have any research papers on the Taliban ?


Already posted last week, just check 'Research on Afghanistan and Pashtun matters'.

Darweshkhel
06-28-2010, 11:22 AM
You'll get TONS of information on Durrani Empire by checking 'Books about Afghanistan written by ANGREEZ' in the literature section.

Darweshkhel
06-28-2010, 12:08 PM
be patient hindupashtuna, im gonna post more links when I got more time but check out literature section - you'll find a lot. those books are huge man.

Darweshkhel
06-29-2010, 02:51 AM
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Afghan refugees fight for food being doled out by a private bankowner at the Kili Faizo temporary camp at the Chaman border. Thousands of Afghans have crossed into neighboring Pakistan, bringing few belongings and living in squalid conditions with little food. (Lynsey Addario/Corbis)

Afghanistan and Refugees

During the 1980s and early 1990s, Afghanistan produced more refugees than any other country. Large numbers of Afghans first fled their homeland following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Afghan refugee population peaked in 1991, when more than 6 million Afghans (nearly one-quarter of Afghanistan’s entire population) were refugees in other countries, primarily Pakistan and Iran.

Some 1.4 million Afghans repatriated in the early 1990s, but refugee flows continued throughout the decade, not only into neighboring countries, but also further afield, including to Europe, where nearly 200,000 Afghans applied for asylum between 1992 and 2001. Hundreds of thousands of other Afghans became displaced within Afghanistan during this period. Although more than 1.8 million Afghan refugees returned home in 2002 after the United States ousted the Taliban regime, Afghans remain the world’s second-largest refugee population.

Among the main causes of the flight of Afghan refugees have been Soviet efforts to impose social and economic reforms, ongoing fighting between Soviet and Afghan opposition forces, infighting among various Afghan factions following their defeat of the Soviets, and widespread human rights abuses at the hands of successive regimes and different factions, including the Taliban.

Besides giving rise to massive refugee flows, twenty-five years of endless conflict and violence have devastated Afghanistan and its people. Most of the population lives in poverty. Afghanistan has the world’s highest infant mortality rate and its lowest life expectancy. Much of the country’s infrastructure lies in ruins.

Soviet Occupation and Mujahideen Resistance

Afghan refugees first fled in notable numbers in 1978 after a pro-Communist group overthrew Afghanistan’s king and took power. The new government quickly alienated Afghanistan’s mostly rural, conservative population by trying to impose an unpopular agricultural reform program. Government forces killed an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 civilians who resisted the changes.

In late 1979, Soviet forces occupied Afghanistan. Fearing that the Soviets would enforce even more radical measures, as many as 600,000 Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran within weeks of the invasion. In an effort to control the population, the Soviets embarked on a wave of terror. By the end of 1981, more than 1.5 million Afghan refugees had fled the country. Afghan opposition forces known as mujahideen (“struggler”) quickly surfaced, largely from among the refugees.

In Pakistan, most of the refugees settled in camps in the two provinces nearest the Afghan border—Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan. It was the height of the Cold War, and the West, particularly the United States, showered the refugees in Pakistan, who had fled communism, with aid. Eventually, most of the refugees were able to find subsistence work or to rent land that they could farm, and their camps achieved an air of normalcy.

The international community was not as generous, however, to Afghan refugees who fled to Iran. Islamic fundamentalists had seized power in Iran in 1979, and just one month before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iranian students had taken a group of U.S. embassy officials hostage. The United States and its allies were not inclined to offer the Iranian authorities any assistance, even for Afghan refugees.

With financial support and political encouragement from outside sources as diverse as the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan (all seeking to advance their own geopolitical interests), the various mujahideen groups gathered strength. Throughout the 1980s, the mujahideen, which largely operated out of Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, repeatedly attacked Soviet troops and weakened Moscow’s resolve. Fighting between the Soviets and the mujahideen, and Soviet retaliatory measures against the civilian population, prompted even more Afghans to flee. By the late 1980s, the number of Afghan refugees outside the country had grown to more than 5 million.


The Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan proved costly both politically and financially. In 1989, the combination of international pressure, domestic dissent, and the mujahideen’s persistence led Moscow to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Soviets left in power a Communist regime headed by Mohammed Najibullah that held on to power for three more years. The mujahideen intensified their efforts, and the number of Afghans fleeing the country increased yet again. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by 1990 some 6.3 million Afghans were refugees.

In April 1992, the mujahideen captured Kabul. Between April 1992 and late 1993, more than 1.4 million Afghans repatriated. But within months of their victory, the various mujahideen groups, unable to work out a power-sharing agreement, turned against each other. In Kabul alone, more than 50,000 people were killed as rival mujahideen factions battled for control of the city. The southern city of Kandahar descended into chaos, with warlords looting, raping, and killing at will. The new round of violence, together with decreased international funding for repatriation, brought the repatriation to a standstill.

The repatriation’s funding problems reflected the West’s diminished interest in Afghanistan and Afghan refugees following the end of the Cold War. In Pakistan, lack of international funding led the UNHCR and the World Food Program (WFP) to cut off food aid to most refugees in 1995. That prompted a large-scale migration of refugees from the camps into Pakistani cities, particularly Peshawar in western Pakistan, a move that the Pakistani authorities said led to increased crime and economic problems in the cities. The welcome that Afghan refugees had enjoyed in Pakistan for a decade and a half came to an end.

The Taliban

The lawlessness that existed in southern Afghanistan during the mid-1990s led to the emergence of a new group, the Taliban, that initially sought to bring order to the area. The group was guided by ultraconservative religious leaders from rural areas of Kandahar but was made up primarily of young returned refugees from Pakistan who had studied at religious schools in Pakistan that taught a strict, insular brand of Islam.

The Taliban (reportedly funded and largely manipulated by the Pakistani armed forces, which sought to expand their influence in Afghanistan) gained control of Kandahar and took a series of measures to establish order, including executing drug traffickers, burning opium fields, and disarming the warlords. But they also imposed their own brand of Islam. They commanded women to cover themselves from head to toe with burqas and banned them from working outside the home. They also ended education for girls.

The relative order that the Taliban managed to bring to Kandahar increased the group’s popularity and attracted thousands of new recruits to its ranks. In 1995, the Taliban captured Herat, the largest city in western Afghanistan. The population of Herat did not welcome the Taliban, however. Most Taliban fighters were of a different ethnic group (Pashtun) than the locals, and their strict brand of Islam was not popular with many local people. Nevertheless, the Taliban continued to gather strength and in 1996 captured Jalalabad, the most important city in the east (and the gateway to Pakistan) and then the capital, Kabul. Its victories were costly, however. Thousands of civilians died as a result of the fighting. The Taliban’s seizure of Kabul also led to yet another exodus of some 40,000 Afghans, mostly members of ethnic minorities and Kabul residents who opposed the Taliban’s conservative social policies.

According to international human rights groups, the Taliban administered areas under its control like a police state. Observers reported killings of civilians, the destruction of homes and entire villages, the detention of civilians, and forced recruitment. The Taliban’s restrictive policies toward women, including the ban on their working outside the home, the requirement that women be escorted by a male relative any time they left the house, and the ban on male doctors or nurses attending female patients, resulted in a health care crisis for women and left thousands of widows and their families destitute.

During the late 1990s, the Taliban continued its efforts to gain control of the north, the only region of the country still controlled by the opposition. In July 1998, the Taliban captured Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan’s largest city and the opposition’s de facto capital. Following their victory, Taliban fighters were said to have killed thousands of ethnic Hazara residents of Mazar-e Sharif and nearby areas. The fighting and subsequent massacres drove thousands more Afghan refugees, mostly Hazaras and members of other ethnic minorities, to Pakistan and Iran.

The Taliban launched another successful offensive in the north in mid-1999, this time in the Shomali Plains, an area just north of Kabul. More than 250,000 people fled the plains. Most went into the opposition-controlled Panjshir Valley, in northeastern Afghanistan, or to Pakistan. But the Taliban reportedly forced some 40,000 to move to Kabul. Continued fighting in northern areas during 2000, compounded by the effects of a drought of historic proportions, led to an exodus of another 172,000 refugees to Pakistan and to the displacement within Afghanistan of some 350,000 other people.

Afghan Refugees No Longer Welcomed

Some 10,000 Afghans who fled the fighting in the north in 2000 tried to seek refuge in Tajikistan but were refused entry by the Tajik authorities and Russian troops guarding the Tajik/Afghan border. Members of the group remained stuck at the border, enduring frequent attacks by the Taliban and receiving little international assistance.

Afghan refugees arriving in Pakistan in the late 1990s and early 2000s found a situation much changed from that experienced by those who had fled to Pakistan before them. The Pakistani authorities, frustrated by the continuing flow of Afghan refugees, had embarked on a campaign of harassment of Afghan refugees living in urban centers. Police stopped Afghanis in the streets and demanded bribes to set them free. They forcibly returned to Afghanistan thousands of Afghan men who could not afford to pay the bribes.

In November 2000, Pakistan officially closed its border to prevent more refugees from entering (a move that had little effect, since most refugees found other ways to enter the country). The authorities also blocked assistance to tens of thousands of Afghan refugees who had managed to enter Pakistan and had gathered at Jalozai camp, near Peshawar. By doing so, the Pakistani authorities sought to send a message to others inside Afghanistan that they would not be welcomed or assisted in Pakistan. The result was that by late 2000 conditions at Jalozai were described as among the worst of any refugee camp in the world.

Afghan refugees in Iran experienced similar problems. Since the mid-1990s, the refugees had lost many of the benefits they had previously enjoyed—for example, the ability to work in Iran. In late 1998 and early 1999, mobs demanding the deportation of the refugees attacked and in some cases killed Afghan refugees. In 2000, Iranian Revolutionary Guards swept through Afghan-populated areas, arrested Afghans on the street, confined them to camps, and deported as many as 50,000 of them. The Iranian authorities also blocked an unknown number of Afghans from entering Iran during 2000.

At the beginning of 2001, Afghanistan stood on the brink of catastrophe. Some 3.6 million Afghan refugees were outside the country; 375,000 other Afghans were internally displaced. The drought that had begun in 2000 had turned into the most severe drought to hit the country in more than thirty years. More than 4 million people were at risk. The Taliban did little to assist the displaced.

Tens of thousands more Afghans fled to Pakistan or became displaced within Afghanistan in early 2001. In Herat, more than 80,000 newly displaced persons gathered in a makeshift camp on a barren field outside the city. In late January 2001, a sudden cold snap hit Herat and killed more than 480 of the displaced, mainly children and elderly people. By August, an estimated 900,000 Afghans were internally displaced. Nearly half were located in areas of northern and central Afghanistan that were battered both by conflict and drought. The World Food Program reported that famine conditions existed in some areas. The international community’s response, however, was limited.

The situation in Afghanistan changed dramatically after September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks on the United States set into motion a series of events that once again thrust Afghanistan into the international spotlight and brought about momentous political change.

Post–September 11, 2001

Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States, the U.S. government accused the Al Qaeda organization, and its leader, Osama bin Laden, based in Afghanistan, of masterminding and executing them. The U.S. government demanded that the Taliban turn bin Laden over to the United States, but the Taliban refused. On October 6, the U.S. Armed Forces launched a military campaign in Afghanistan aimed at rooting out Al Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power.

During the four-week period between September 11 and October 6, 2001, thousands of Afghan civilians fled Kabul and other cities likely to be targeted by U.S. and allied forces. Most remained within Afghanistan, largely because all of Afghanistan’s neighbors kept their borders closed and refused to permit fleeing Afghans to enter. UN and nongovernment organization (NGO) personnel working in Afghanistan, including relief personnel, also left the country.

After U.S. air strikes began on October 6, hundreds of thousands of Afghans fled their homes, including an estimated 40 to 70 percent of the residents of the country’s largest cities. Despite Pakistan’s border closure, an estimated 160,000 Afghans made their way into Pakistan between September 11 and the end of the year, mostly by avoiding official border crossings and entering via remote mountain passes.

The Pakistani authorities, apparently fearing that millions of Afghans would try to enter if they did not take steps to deter them, kept their border sealed and blocked aid to the refugees who did manage to get into the country. The UNHCR and other refugee advocacy and relief groups criticized Pakistan’s actions, but the Pakistani authorities remained unyielding.

The Iranian authorities, who also kept their border sealed, established two camps just inside the Afghan border for fleeing Afghans. They provided the displaced Afghans with little assistance, however, and conditions were said to be grossly inadequate.

The U.S. military action succeeded in ousting the Taliban from most of northern and western Afghanistan by mid-November. Taliban forces abandoned Kabul on November 13 and headed south toward Kandahar, the only region still largely under Taliban control. Anticipating that the Kandahar region would become the new focus of U.S. military action, tens of thousands of Afghans fled the area.

By the end of 2001, a new, interim Afghan government was in place in Kabul. International peacekeeping troops began to arrive, and relief agencies were able to get much-needed assistance to most of the estimated 1 million Afghans who were displaced throughout the country.

Unprecedented Repatriation

Tens of thousands of refugees made their own way back to Afghanistan during the last weeks of 2001 and first two months of 2002. Many were spurred by the fall of the Taliban. Others were encouraged by the international community’s promise of massive aid to a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Donors meeting in Tokyo in late January pledged $1.8 billion for 2002 to assist in the reconstruction of the country. Several thousand Afghans were also forcibly returned to Afghanistan during this period, primarily from Iran.

It was only on March 1, 2002, however, that UNHCR began its program of assisted repatriation to Afghanistan. The speed and scale of the repatriation exceeded all expectations. During the first month of the organized return, some 150,000 refugees repatriated, mostly from Pakistan. By mid-June, the number of returned refugees from Pakistan and Iran surpassed the 1 million mark. Although the rate of repatriation slowed later in the year as winter approached, by late December 2002 more than 1.8 million Afghan refugees had repatriated, including 1.5 million from Pakistan and more than 250,000 from Iran. It was the largest repatriation taking place anywhere in the world in more than thirty years.

Besides the refugees who repatriated, another 400,000 internally displaced Afghans returned to their homes between December 2001 and December 2002. A majority, some 230,000, did so with assistance from the International Organization for Migration, UNHCR, and other organizations, but many returned by their own means.

Most observers welcomed the repatriation. They argued that it denoted a positive response to political developments since September 11, 2001, and reflected refugees’ confidence in the future of their country. Others, however, expressed concern about Afghanistan’s ability to absorb so many additional people. With the cities largely in ruins, the countryside still in the grips of drought, millions of people dependent on international assistance, sporadic fighting continuing around the country (both between U.S. forces and remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters and among rival Afghan factions), and the new administration struggling to establish order, some relief groups argued that UNHCR should not encourage repatriation until conditions inside Afghanistan improved. Also during the course of 2002, a number of industrialized countries stopped accepting new asylum applications from Afghan nationals and began taking steps to return Afghan asylum seekers to their homeland, a move that concerned refugee advocates and that some viewed as premature.


Indeed, many of the refugees who returned found it impossible to return to their areas of origin because of drought, insecurity, or lack of assistance. At the end of 2002, nearly one-third of all the returnees were living in Kabul. Some were crowded into the homes of relatives or friends, but many were living in abandoned or partially destroyed buildings, and some only had tents for shelter. Although the international community provided Afghanistan substantial international assistance during 2002, donors did not provide the full $1.8 billion they had promised, an amount that would, in any case, only have scratched the surface of Afghanistan’s many reconstruction needs.

A Hopeful but Uncertain Outlook

At the end of 2002, more than 2.7 million Afghan refugees remained outside the country and 700,000 Afghans were still internally displaced. Anticipating continued repatriation in the coming year, UNHCR launched an appeal for $195 million to assist the repatriation of another 1.5 million refugees in 2003.

There remained many obstacles to repatriation, however. The new Afghan administration that was put in place by Afghan leaders in June 2002 was weak. Despite substantial financial, political, and military support from the international community, the Afghan government remained woefully underfunded, had limited capacity to meet the country’s many needs, and exerted little authority outside of Kabul. Powerful warlords who once terrorized vast regions of the country were once again in control in many areas, and widespread insecurity and human rights abuses continued.

Nevertheless, many observers both inside Afghanistan and internationally, as well as many ordinary Afghans, remained positive about the country’s future and hopeful for an end to what has been one of the largest refugee crises in modern history.

Hiram A. Ruiz

See also:

Border Controls; Civil Wars and Migration; Cold War; Internally Displaced Persons; Non-Refoulement; Refugee Camps; Repatriation; Return Migration; UN High Commissioner for Refugees
References and further reading:

Center for Economic and Social Rights. 2002. Human Rights and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. New York: Center for Economic and Social Rights.

Hassan, Yusuf. 2000. “The Crisis the World Forgot.” AINA UN Afghanistan Magazine.

Human Rights Watch. 2001. Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in Fueling the Civil War. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Kaplan, Robert D. 2000. “The Taliban.” The Atlantic Monthly (September).

Marsden, Peter. 1998. The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.

Rashid, Ahmed. 2000. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Rubin, Barnett. 2002. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, State Formation and Collapse in the International System. 2d ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Rubin, Barnett, Ashraf Ghani, William Maley, Ahmed Rashid, and Olivier Roy. 2001. “Afghanistan: Reconstruction and Peacemaking in a Regional Framework.” KOFF Peacebuilding Reports. Bern: Swiss Peacebuilding Foundation.

Ruiz, Hiram. 2001. Pakistan: Afghan Refugees Shunned and Scorned. Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR - *Der Hohe Flüchtlingskommissar der Vereinten Nationen (http://www.unhcr.ch/).

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Relief Web,” http://www.reliefweb.org.

United Nations Security Council. 2002. The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General (A/57/487-S/2002/1173). New York: United Nations.

U.S. Committee for Refugees. 2002. World Refugee Survey 2002. Washington, DC: USCR.

pukhtana
06-29-2010, 06:26 PM
Is that true, Germans?

Roshina
07-08-2010, 12:38 AM
Darwesh wrora,

Thank you TOO much for your contribution to this thread! This is very generous of you to provide!

I'm wonder if you'd happen to know whether the influential Akbar S. Ahmad who is the father of Amineh Hoti / Amineh Ahmed of Harvard University and has authored several books on Pukhtuns (including one called Pukhto Mataluna!) is the same Akbar S. Ahmed who has filmed documentaries on Islam and Muslims? One of those films is a series of several films and has been shown by BBC; it's called "Living Islam."

I really wanna know because if he is the same, then I'm surprised he's never discussed! The guy has contributed SO much to Islamic literature, Pukhtun history, Pukhto language, Pukhtun ethnography, Pukhto anthropology!

Roshina
07-08-2010, 02:54 AM
Never mind! I just discovered that he IS Amineh Ahmed Hoti's father! DR. AMINEH AHMED HOTI | PukhtunWomen (http://pukhtunwomen.org/node/130) And that he IS the same Akbar S. Ahmed who filmed "Living Islam" and wrote the books on Pukhtun economy and society and all.

In that case, we need to talk about his immense contribution to Pukhtuns, Islam, and Muslim life! The guy is incredibly amazing and influential. I met with someone today who told me about him, and I was like, "Wait, is he the same person who ...?" And she said she didn't know, so I was really curious to find out. He's a big deal all over the world, and I've yet to hear any discussions about him in Pukhtun circles! C'mon, folks!

I'll start something on him in the next couple of days, ka khairee.

Darweshkhel
07-10-2010, 04:25 PM
Darweshkhel I wanted to thank for al your hardwork and efforts in OF.

I had a few questions.

I remember my dad telling we gave Germans refuge and how we had no Visa with Germany. Also how Germans and foreigners lived in Afghanistan.

any source or article on this?

Sorry for being late!
Excuse me what do you mean by 'how we had no Visa with Germany'??

Well I cant provide you with a source at the moment but I can tell that your dad is right.
The Germans were one of the first european nations to establish diplomatic relations to AFG. They have send an expedtition to Afghanistan in 1915 first which is called Niedermayer-Hentig Expedition. This was lead by German Army officers Oskar Niedermayer and Werner Otto von Hentig. For a quick read try this link:
Mavi Boncuk: 1915 | The Niedermayer-Hentig Expedition (http://maviboncuk.blogspot.com/2010/03/1915-niedermayer-hentig-expedition.html)
Their ambition was to convince Afghanistan to declare war to the British Empire and to attack them at the NWFP!
Later when Shah Amanullah came became king many germans were sent to AFG as instructors, engineer, teachers, university professors etc all kinda specialists to provide AFG technical skills and knowhow. Some of them lived in AFG for many years. In return Afghan students were allowed to study in Germany (very famous painter, composer, musician, poet Ustad Abdul Ghafoor Breshna was one of the first students in Munich) link here: Afghanland.com Afghanistan Ustad Abdul Ghafoor Breshna (http://afghanland.com/entertainment/music/breshna.html)

Afghan historians and researchers were finally touched by German Aryan ideology and became 'brothers' since then. Germany was of course glad to gain a new 'brother' in Central Asia and was quick to conclude agreements, long-term policies and treaties. In fact there was no other country that closed more deals in Afghanistan. Until the wars came...

There is a great book in german language by Matin Baraki 'Die Beziehungen zwischen Afghanistan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945 - 1978: dargestellt anhand der wichtigsten entwicklungspolitischen Projekte der Bundesrepublik in Afghanistan', Marburg 1995 ISBN 3631481799.

I hope I could answer your question you can live with until I find a source on this.

Regards
Darweshkhel

opredia
10-11-2010, 12:03 PM
darwashkhel brother thanks for information . but i would love to ask you something which has no data on net and i am searching for so long but could not get answer to it.

I wanted to know state of pashto in province herat, farah, and other province in north where pashtuns migrated in early ninteees.

I want to know exactly weather these people have become persainzed or still majority pashtuns speak pashto in northern afghanistan.

What happening in herat and farah province overall. i know in cities many pashtuns have become persianized and do not speak pashtu but in other districts of herat and farah what exact is the state of pashto.

hoping for positive and quick response

Feroza_Banu
10-14-2010, 05:07 PM
I can never thank you enough

this is awesome work!... i will be reading it little by little inshaAllah

Admin Khan
10-14-2010, 07:11 PM
Feroza,
Darweskhel, one of the head figures of PF, has contributed hundreds of similar threads.

Darweshkhel
10-15-2010, 05:43 AM
darwashkhel brother thanks for information . but i would love to ask you something which has no data on net and i am searching for so long but could not get answer to it.

I wanted to know state of pashto in province herat, farah, and other province in north where pashtuns migrated in early ninteees.

I want to know exactly weather these people have become persainzed or still majority pashtuns speak pashto in northern afghanistan.

What happening in herat and farah province overall. i know in cities many pashtuns have become persianized and do not speak pashtu but in other districts of herat and farah what exact is the state of pashto.

hoping for positive and quick response

Ill check my stuff as soon as I can please be patient

Fish
10-15-2010, 01:35 PM
DarweshKhel,

Where did you get the information regarding Urozgan province? Do you have the information for Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Parwan, Balkh and other Afghan provinces?

Also thanks for the information already provided.